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ABSTRACT 
Western governments have focused increasing attention over the past 
decade on combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and associated means of delivery. However, there has been relatively little 
scholarly examination of their individual anti-proliferation strategies, and 
virtually no meaningful attempt at comparison. The extant literature on 
proliferation therefore fails to illuminate the national preferences among 
influential supplier states that presumably have shaped international efforts to 
curb proliferation. This gap in knowledge fosters assumptions about the 'like-
mindedness' of Western responses to proliferation that essentially remain 
untested. 
This dissertation promotes and contributes to a nascent research agenda 
focusing on responses to proliferation at the national level by comprehensively 
examining the policies of two pivotal members of the Western anti-proliferation 
coalition. It addresses the central questions of how and why two close strategic 
allies and dedicated anti-proliferation partners might disagree on the means by 
which to achieve common anti-proliferation goals. 
The study constructs an original analytic framework by which to categorise 
and examine national responses to proliferation. It then utilises this framework 
as the basis for discrete empirical investigations of the anti-proliferation policies 
of the United States and Australia since the mid-1980s in the areas of chemical 
weapons (CW), biological weapons (BW), and missiles. Using a structured, 
comparative case studies methodology, it yields comprehensive comparative 
findings and analysis. 
The study's major comparative finding is that the United States and 
Australia have favoured markedly different, and not entirely complementary, 
anti-proliferation approaches. This divergence has been consistent over time 
and across the various proliferation areas. Its comparative analysis then infers 
that, because the likely explanations for this finding include causal variables 
that also distinguish other key supplier states - e.g. differences in the perceived 
geopolitical threats posed by proliferation - similar national divergence almost 
certainly extends to other Western governments. This in turn suggests that the 
superficial appearance of Western unanimity in responding to proliferation is 
misleading. 
The study concludes by suggesting that significant fissures among the 
national policy preferences of Western supplier states has negative implications 
for their ability to advance common anti-proliferation goals effectively. 
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PREFACE 
In a hasty bid to retaliate for the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986, 
Libya launched a missile attack against a tiny US Coast Guard station on the 
remote Italian island of Lampadusa. This episode remains the first and only 
case outside aggression against the military forces a NATO country on 
NATO territory. Fortunately, because Libya had only obsolete, early-generation 
SCUD missiles - limited in range, inaccurate, and armed solely with 
conventional munitions - they fell harmlessly into the sea, leaving the incident 
as a largely forgotten footnote the last chapter of the Cold War epoch. 
However, this incident also stands as a portent of what would soon emerge as 
one the most significant challenges facing Western states in the post-Cold 
War security environment: horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. 
If a similar scenario were played out today, the potential consequences 
could be far more dire, due to the improving capabilities that a number of 
proliferant countries have attained since the mid-1980s. Moreover, the 
prognosis could become increasingly worse over the coming decade. An 
alarming number of countries that are hostile to the United States and its 
friends and allies now have, or are actively working to attain, WMD and 
associated ballistic or cruise missile delivery systems. 
Libya's hapless missile attack occurred at about the start of the time 
period covered by the following study. At that juncture, preoccupied by East-
West tensions, scholars and public officials alike accorded relatively little 
attention to the issue of horizontal proliferation of WMD. The marginal energies 
that the problem did receive tended to focus narrowly on nuclear weapons, with 
scant thought directed toward chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and 
missiles. 
In stark contrast, as Krauthammer foresaw just a few years later as the 
Cold War was ebbing: 'The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security 
for the rest of our lives' (1990: 31 ). Indeed, nearly a decade into the post-Cold 
War era, 'it is now widely agreed that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) weapons, and their means of delivery is the major threat to 
global peace and stability in the 21st Century' (Lewis Dunn 1998: 59). Western 
governments in particular have come to see proliferation in all its dimensions 
as, in the recent words of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 'The 
overriding security interest of our time' (Washington Post, 02/22/98). 
In light of the growing emphasis that Western governments are placing on 
the need to respond to the proliferation threat, there also should be a 
corresponding exigency for rigorous academic examination of their individual 
and collective efforts in this regard. This task stands as an emergent and 
largely incomplete element in the current research agenda for the academic 
study of international security (Mutimer 1994 ). The study that follows seeks to 
take a modest but nonetheless important incremental step in advancing this 
agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The present study seeks to examine how and why so-called 'like-minded' 
Western supplier countries, although belonging a common security 
community and sharing the same broad anti-proliferation goals, nonetheless 
frequently disagree on the specific means by which to achieve them. 1 It seeks 
to demonstrate that, in the cases the United States and Australia, differences 
in specific policy preferences amount to systematically divergent national 
approaches to proliferation response. 2 It then analyses these findings in order 
to explain the apparent puzzle of why two close strategic allies and dedicated 
anti-proliferation partners would so differ in their response to proliferation. 
The thesis concludes that some intuitively obvious agent-specific 
explanations such as differences in national attributes (e.g. size, power), 
governmental systems, and domestic political pressures, while important 
factors in shaping the relevant national policies of each actor, do not appear to 
explain convincingly the specific divergence discerned in their respective anti-
proliferation preferences. Rather, it finds that this overall divergence is better 
explained by differences in structural variables (e.g. perceived proliferation 
threats), with other factors contributing secondarily. Because such differences 
are likely to apply to other actors, the analysis is also intended to make a 
contribution to a broader understanding of the efficacy and cohesiveness of 
overall efforts by Western supplier countries to respond individually and 
collectively to the proliferation challenge. 3 
The study uses a unitary conceptual framework to assemble separate 
empirical accounts of the specific instruments that each of the two subject 
actors has used in each of the three subject issue areas - chemical weapons 
(CW), biological weapons (BW) and missiles - in pursuit of their common anti-
proliferation goals as Western supplier states operating in the context of the 
international nonproliferation system. It utilises this data 'to identify the 
similarities, and differences uncovered by the separate, but juxtaposed, 
analyses' (Rosenau 1975: 6) in order to identify patterns which can be 
characterised as divergent approaches to proliferation response, defined as a 
1 The term 'like-minded' is a self-description used by the United States and other Western 
governments to describe their shared commitment to the goal of preventing proliferation. 
2 The terms "anti-proliferation' and 'proliferation response' are used throughout to denote the full 
spectrum of policy instruments explicitly designed to stem, reverse, or deal with the consequences of 
horizontal proliferation of chemical weapons, biological weapons, and/or missiles. The term 
'nonproliferation' is used to denote expressly the subset of (mostly diplomatic) instruments specifically 
designed to stem or reverse the quantitative or qualitative spread of these systems. The term 
'counterproliferation' is used to denote expressly the subset of (mostly military) instruments specifically 
designed to cope with the realised possession of these systems by potentially hostile countries. See 
Chapter 2 for a full discussion of these and other definitional distinctions. 
3 The designation 'supplier' country is used herein as a term of art from the proliferation 
literature. It is used to denote countries that have the capability to contribute to the acquisition of 
proscribed weapons. It does not literally imply that every country in this grouping is a major exporter in 
every applicable area of equipment and technology. Rather, it denotes a broad and loosely defined class 
of the countries that participate in anti-proliferation efforts, based on the common premise that 'the 
principal identities ... in these practices are those of 'suppliers' and 'recipients" (Mutimer 1998: 106). 
Western countries comprise a large proportion of this class of countries, but are by no means the only 
members. 
1 
consistent preference for certain types of policy instrument over others. 4 The 
study then applies existing theoretical models to these findings in order to 
explain such differences in approach. 
In general terms, it has been observed that, stripped to its essentials, 
foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved, and 
the means for achieving them (Charles Hermann 1978b). The overall purpose 
of this study is thus to compare two actors operating within the same system 
whose respective sets of relevant national objectives are as alike as possible in 
order to see to what extent they likewise coincide regarding the means for 
achieving these objectives, and then explain any patterns of difference that 
have been discerned, thereby affording a glimpse under the veil of 'like-
mindedness'. 
The focus of interest is not the international nonproliferation system per 
se, but rather the national anti-proliferation policy preferences of actors 
operating in the context of that system.5 Elements of the system necessarily will 
feature prominently.6 However, these multilateral instruments are not the focus 
in and of themselves, but rather in their roles as instruments of national 
proliferation response policy. As Roberts observes regarding multilateral 
structures: 'Non-proliferation instruments are tools of policy, to be used well or 
poorly ... the key issue is ... whether interested states with constructive purposes 
will pay enough sustained attention to them' (1998: 72). It is precisely this 
attention of interested states that this study seeks to explore. 
SCOPE 
Limitations 
The study encompasses all aspects - unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral 
- of the national proliferation responses of the subject countries, targeting non-
nuclear WMD (i.e. CBW) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-class 
missile delivery systems.7 This can be generalised in the negative as not 
nuclear or conventional weapons issues. 
The topic of nuclear proliferation has been excluded for several reasons. 
4 Note that this formulation carefully avoids overstating the fundamental nature of the divergence 
being postulated. Each state officially embraces the gamut of anti-proliferation instruments, and neither 
side, nor even any faction on either side, would seriously suggest that any of these instruments are utterly 
worthless and should be discarded completely. Rather, divergence is defined as showing a consistent 
preference for one set of instruments, or put another way, as treating some set(s) of instruments as 
subsidia~ to other(s). 
The concept of national policy is used throughout the present study to denote an amalgamation 
of what might be termed doctrine, policy, and practice. These could also be thought of as distinct 
concepts: doctrine referring to a broad goal (e.g. strengthening nonproliferation suppliers regimes); policy 
referring to a specific plan to pursue such a goal (e.g. national criteria for supporting new MTCR 
members); and, practice referring to actual behaviour in implementing these plans (e.g. how the US voted 
on Ukraine's application to join the MTCR). However, such parsing is not needed for the analytic 
objectives of the present study. 
6 Readers are assumed to have a basic working knowledge of the international nonproliferation 
system. For general background see: Center for Nonproliferation Studies (1997). This excellent overview 
of virtually every international nonproliferation instrument is revised periodically. The most recent edition is 
available on the internet at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ reports/pdfs/invntorv.pdf. 
7 The MTCR Annex defines 'Category 1' as any system (eg. rocket, ballistic missile, cruise 
missile) inherently capable of delivering a 500 kilogram warhead at least 300 kilometres (commonly 
expressed with the shorthand notation '300km/500kg range/payload'). 
2 
The primary consideration is that, in contrast to the other proliferation areas, 
there is already a mature literature on nuclear proliferation (Ogilvie-White 
1996), making the need for additional scholarship in the nuclear area 
comparatively less compelling. This alone would seem to justify focusing on the 
other, relatively neglected areas. A secondary consideration is that a strong 
argument can be made that some nuclear nonproliferation instruments are 
conceptually anomalous to other elements of the contemporary nonproliferation 
system.8 The nuclear nonproliferation regime, based on the NPT, was created 
at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, and reflects the priorities, 
alignments and dynamics of that era. With its indefinite extension of a norm that 
legally divides states between 'haves' and 'have nots', it remains very much a 
progeny of its day, and thus is hard to compare to the other proliferation areas 
where systematic nonproliferation efforts have evolved only in the last fifteen 
·years or so. The structural 'have/have not' anomaly would pose particular 
difficulties for the present comparison of the United States and Australia -
grounded as it is on their status as 'like minded' anti-proliferation partners -
given that these countries remain on opposite sides of the nuclear divide. In 
fact, in an opinion survey conducted in conjuncture with the present research 
(see Appendix 3), a number of US and Australian officials who agreed that the 
United States and Australia share common anti-proliferation goals, were careful 
to qualify that this opinion only applied to the non-nuclear areas, and that the 
two countries have had much more divergent objectives in the nuclear area.9 
A tertiary (and admittedly controversial) consideration mitigating against 
inclusion of the nuclear issue is that, notwithstanding popular conceptions to 
the contrary, a plausible case can be made that the processes of nuclear 
weapons technology development and horizontal proliferation have actually 
remained static relative to the other proliferation areas, making it in some ways 
a less urgent problem.1° Finally, bearing in mind the breadth and complexity of 
the topic, it is expedient to omit the nuclear dimension in order to keep the 
current study to a manageable size. 
The exclusion of conventional weapons issues conforms to the traditional 
parameters of the national proliferation response policies that are being 
8 A case could also be made that the nuclear issue is also anomalous in terms of 
counterproliferation. As in bilateral 'nuclear' disarmament, counterproliferation for nuclear weapons largely 
deals with their missile delivery systems, rather than the nuclear weapons themselves. (See the 
discussion of missile counterproliferation in Chapter 4.) 
9 Leaver (1997a; 1997b) observes that Australia, in addition to having been frequently and 
publicly at cross-purposes with the US throughout most of the 1980s on the related issue of vertical 
nuclear disarmament (i.e. echoing the calls of many non-aligned states for faster and deeper cuts in the 
nuclear arsenals of both superpowers), initially opposed the US-sponsored NPT, objecting to its 
discriminatory structure and, up until the past few years, took a reformist stance against the treaty's status 
quo. For a fascinating account of one aspect of the early Australian context for this issue see Walsh 
(1997). 
10 This is not to detract from the gravity of the unprecedented nuclear arms race in South Asia, 
heralded by the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, which essentially has created a new class of 
non-NPT nuclear weapons states. That said, the significance of these lamentable developments is more 
political than material. The tests represent merely the overt acknowledgment and demonstration of long-
standing capabilities by these hitherto so-called 'threshold' states, and therefore can not be seen as new 
instances of proliferation in a literal or technical sense. Indeed, the most significant proliferation 
development in the region arguably is the recent progress that both countries have made in developing 
nuclear-capable missiles that may now enable them to use their nuclear weapons effectively against one 
another's major population centres. To a lesser extent this also applies to China, the third country in the 
South Asia equation, which is a declared and long-standing nuclear power, but which is still working to 
attain missile capabilities on par with the other declared nuclear weapons states. 
3 
studied. The United States and its Western nonproliferation partners typically 
define the targets of their proliferation response policies using some variation of 
the formula 'WMD and missile means of delivery'. Conventional systems and 
technologies are therefore excluded from this official term of art literally by 
definition.11 The United States particular has been careful to differentiate 
between its conventional arms transfer policies and its nonproliferation policies. 
The logic behind this strict demarcation is that whereas the proliferation of 
WMD and MTCR-class missiles in any other country for any reason is seen as 
inherently undesirable (at least officially), a comparable judgement regarding 
the possession of any given conventional weapon system by (or transfer to) any 
given country, is entirely contingent on the specifics of each case. 
The usefulness of such rigid distinctions between proliferation and 
conventional arms transfers is a subject of contention within the proliferation 
literature. 12 But whatever the merits of this academic debate, the parameters of 
the present study are set by the scope of the policy issues as defined by the 
governments being studied, which for the present excludes conventional 
weapons issues. 
In addition to nuclear and conventional weapons issues, the study also 
omits the full range of proliferation policies directed against Iraq that were put in 
place during and after the 1990-91 Gulf War (e.g. UNSCOM). The rationale for 
not covering these policies is that together they represent an utterly unique 
case. The post-Gulf War responses to Iraqi proliferation have been largely the 
result of Iraq's defeat in a war fought over unrelated issues. As such, they are 
not representative of proliferation response generally, and more importantly 
could not be replicated elsewhere. That said, these issues will be examined to 
the extent that they have influenced broader proliferation response policy. 
A final excluded topic is WMD-related terrorism. This issue has received a 
great deal of attention in the aftermath of the 1995 gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. There is undeniably a grey area between 
WMD terrorism and anti-proliferation. Certain aspects of counterproliferation 
undoubtedly would be helpful in dealing with a terrorist incident. It has even 
been argued that nonproliferation instruments may indirectly impede WMD 
terrorism, although this is not easily demonstrated other than for state-
sponsored terrorism. Here again though, since terrorism tends to be treated by 
11 Confusingly, there have been occasional official references by the US and others to 
'conventional proliferation', but these have usually been stated in a context that carefully distinguishes the 
issue as a separate policy area from 'nonproliferation'. Note that this formulation explicitly excludes 
aircraft, despite the fact that some aircraft can be used to deliver WMD. 
12 Most scholars tend to concur with the official view that proliferation should remain narrowly 
defined. This prevailing school of thought argues that efforts to extend the conceptual definition of 
proliferation, although based on good intentions, run the risk of watering down the concept by 
overreaching. Moreover, analysts note that the issue is conceptually distinct, since conventional arms 
transfers are almost universally viewed as a legitimate aspect of international trade and politics 
(Fergusson 1993). Parker (1999) reinforces this conceptual logic with the argument that conventional 
proliferation poses negligible risks for Western countries. On the other hand, at least a few prominent 
analysts question the wisdom of retaining this traditional distinction. For example, putting forward a 
national security rationale, Sokolski (1995) suggests extending nonproliferation policies to cover certain 
critical advanced war-fighting technologies that are not widely available throughout the world and which 
would pose significant threats if used against US forces. Keller and Nolan (1997/8) make similar 
recommendations, albeit for different reasons, arguing that certain conventional systems can be as 
destructive and/or destabilising as WMD and missiles. Mutimer (1994) takes this argument further, 
suggesting that proliferation should be defined as any weapons-related diffusion that has an adverse 
impact on regional or global security and stability. 
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the countries being studied as a law enforcement matter rather than as a 
proliferation issue (Oehler testimony [tst.] 1996),13 the topic by definition is 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
Timeframe 
The approximate chronological starting point for the study is the mid-
1980s. This juncture corresponds to the rise of serious Western concern about 
horizontal chemical/biological weapons and missile (CB/M) proliferation. The 
second half of the decade witnessed the introduction of virtually every element 
of the present international non-nuclear nonproliferation system, including the 
creation of the Australia Group (AG) and the MTCR, the beginning of efforts to 
strengthen the then largely symbolic BWC, and the first hints of real progress in 
what had for decades been fruitless and interminable negotiations on a global 
ban on chemical weapons. Other elements of proliferation response (e.g. 
nonproliferation sanctions, and counterproliferation) were also first conceived 
during roughly the same timeframe. As a mid-level US official succinctly put it in 
early 1989, 'It has not been until quite recently that it has become more 
common to talk about missile proliferation, chemical weapons proliferation, and 
we hear now a bit about biological weapons proliferation' (Hinds tst.: 13).14 
Previously, to the extent that these types of weapons received any attention, it 
was in the context of East-West competition and bilateral arms control. 
Chronological parameters are applied flexibly among the different issue 
areas of this study, because developments in the different areas did not take 
place in strict parallel. Moreover, in order to provide the historical context for 
contemporary structures and issues, major antecedents are touched upon. 
Overall, the greatest emphasis is given to the post-Cold War period 'when 
international concern about chemical and biological weapons [and missiles] 
switched from US-Soviet competitive programmes of development and 
deployment within the context of East-West confrontation, to proliferation of 
CBW [and missiles] in a nearly multi-polar and more unpredictable international 
system' (Latter 1992: 1 ). 
The research cut-off date is approximately January 1999. In a few cases, 
highly pertinent additions to the literature and real-world developments after this 
date are noted. 
RELEVANCE 
Background 
There are no comprehensive empirical studies that examine the full 
spectrum of non-nuclear anti-proliferation policies of either the United States or 
13 Documentation throughout is provided in a slightly modified version of the standard APA 
author-date style. Because secondary literature, and the different types of primary sources - interviews 
(int.); official documents/publications (off.), and testimony (tst.) - are listed separately in the Bibliography, 
the latter are so identified within parenthetical citations by abbreviations. Dates are omitted for interview 
citations since all interviews occurred during roughly the same period of research. 
14US officials at the levels of desk officer to deputy office director are generally referred to herein 
as working-level, office directors to deputy assistant secretary as mid-level, and assistant secretary or 
above (i.e. Senate confirmed) as senior-level. Agency heads and deputy heads are sometimes referred to 
as top- or high-level. See Appendix 1 for comparison of US and Australian official ranks. 
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Australia in the post-Cold War period.15 Likewise, there is no research 
comparing US and Australian policies, or more broadly the non-nuclear anti-
proliferation policies of any Western supplier states. 16 One very recent study 
does offer an in-depth historical comparison of the nuclear nonproliferation 
policies of the United States and France (Jabko & Weber 1998). Intriguingly, 
although this study is limited to the nuclear area, and therefore is not directly 
comparable to the present research, it clearly is analogous in its objectives, 
findings, and potential relevance. 17 It reveals 'the persistence of national 
trajectories of ideas and institutions that continue to generate different 
underlying interests and state preferences in the area of nonproliferation policy' 
(p. 149). In particular it finds that the ostensible commonality in these countries' 
current approach is in fact quite superficial. These findings suggest that the first 
seeds of interest in the comparative study of national approaches to 
proliferation response may already be taking root as a nascent research 
agenda. 
The bulk of the extant literature on proliferation, instead of looking at 
national approaches to anti-proliferation, tends to concentrate on other issues. 
These include: technical capabilities and characteristics of WMD and/or 
descriptions of specific WMD programs in various countries (organised either by 
country/region or type of program); 18 why and how nations seek to acquire 
WMD and/or why and how other nations assist them in these efforts (i.e. 
focusing on the proliferators, both supplier and receiver, rather than the anti-
proliferators); 19 the systemic dynamics of proliferation (e.g. technology diffusion, 
breakdown of Cold War client-patron constraints);20 the systemic effects of 
proliferation (e.g. destabilising);21 the political/philosophical legitimacy of 
15 One notable exception regarding the US is a comprehensive multi-volume study by Lewis 
Dunn et al. (1992). Unfortunately, in addition to being now somewhat dated, this government-sponsored 
study appears to have been distributed on a limited 'official use only' basis, and so is not freely available 
for scholarly research, being for all intents and purposes unpublished. For an extremely provocative think-
piece by the same lead author on the evolution of US policy responses to proliferation see Lewis Dunn 
(1998). For a summary overview of US proliferation responses see Bowen and David Dunn (1996). For an 
conceptual overview of US proliferation response see Mussington (1994). 
16 For a limited exception see a study by the Center for Counterproliferation Research (n.d.) 
which presents brief case studies on the proliferation responses of five NATO countries. Unfortunately, 
this excellent government-sponsored study is not widely available outside official circles. Additionally, it 
focuses on policy questions pertaining to the NATO Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) and so, not 
surprisingly, does not broadly address all elements of proliferation response. Finally, because it is in 
essence a government report, it does not employ standard academic research methodologies or 
documentation. 
17 Beyond its different subject matter, this study also uses different methodology in that it 
represents a 'least similar case' comparison, since France for decades was the only Western government 
that refused to accede to the NPT. (See the methodology discussion below for an explanation of the 'most 
similar case' structure used in the present study.) 
18For examples that are especially applicable to the CB/M areas see: Burck and Flowerree 
(1991); Burrows and Windrem (1991); Carus (1992b); Clark (1993); Cordesman (1991); Ewin, Ranger and 
Bosdet (1994); Feldman (1995); Oberg (1999); Navias (1993); Nolan (1991b); Ranger (1995); System 
Planning Corporation (1992); and, Truesdel (1996). 
19For recent examples and/or those especially relevant to CB/M, see: Barnaby (1993); Carus 
(1989; 1991); Davis and Frankel; (1993); Eyre (1998); Escude (1998); Flank (1993); Perkovich (1998); 
Reiss (1995); Sagan (1996/7); Solingen (1995); Thayer (1995). For seminal works (solely looking at the 
nuclear area) see Epstein (1977) and Betts (1977). 
2°For the seminal post-Cold War work in this area see Nolan (1992). Recent examples of this 
segment of the literature are literally too numerous to attempt to cite individually. 
21 The sub-literature on the negative impact of proliferation is far too vast for individual citations. 
For a recent, comprehensive, and representative example of this genre see Ranger and Wiencek (1997). 
For examples of the rare challenges to this orthodoxy, arguing that proliferation can be beneficial (or not 
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nonproliferation;22 and technical and structural characteristics of the various 
multilateral proliferation-related regimes (or more commonly, narrow elements 
thereof). Moreover, many of the studies that do focus on national responses to 
proliferation tend to emphasise normative (i.e. prescriptive) rather than 
descriptive analysis (Chafetz 1995). 
Normative analysis aside, there is thus a surprising dearth of broad, in-
depth empirical and conceptual consideration of how and why individual 
supplier states have endeavoured to respond to proliferation.23 These general 
tendencies to focus on the proliferators rather than the anti-proliferators, or else 
on systemic or technical issues, while neglecting rigorous examination (as 
opposed to prescriptive analysis) and comparison of the national anti-
proliferation policies of individual supplier states, represents a conspicuous gap 
in the existing proliferation literature.24 
This overall gap in the extant literature is further exacerbated for the CW, 
BW and missile areas, because the preponderance of what relevant literature 
there is concentrates exclusively on issues of nuclear weapons proliferation, 
with some (but almost never all) of the other areas examined in passing, or 
more often ignored altogether.25 'The domination of both academic research 
and policy formulation by the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
particular must be scrutinised', one analyst exhorts, because 'in the final years 
of the 1990s, the scope of the problem extends well beyond nuclear weapons' 
(Moodie 1995: 72). Another scholar laments that, although the literature on 
chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation is relatively scant, even 
this literature is 'so extensive that it seems to mock the more modest efforts to 
understand missile proliferation' (Karp 1996: 163). A telling illustration that this 
pervasive nuclear-centric bias is still very much alive and well and continuing to 
dominate proliferation-related scholarship is afforded by a recent 
undergraduate-level IR textbook (Baylis & Smith 1997), which devotes an entire 
chapter to nuclear proliferation, whilst scarcely mentioning the other 
proliferation areas. 
Contributions 
The present study seeks to contribute on different levels to the extant 
body of theory relevant to explaining the proliferation response behaviour of 
Western supplier states. These theoretical contributions are threefold: 1) 
as harmful as often portrayed, or not in each and every instance, or not in the case of nuclear weapons) 
see: Feldman (1982); Mearsheimer (1993); Muller (1997); and, Waltz (1981). 
22Not surprisingly, this sub-set of the literature has been promulgated for the most part by 
analysts from developing countries, and in particular countries that have been the target of Western anti-
proliferation efforts. For an succinct summary of, and simultaneous rebuttal to, this element of the 
literature, see Nye (1992). For subsequent examples see Chubin: (1993); Singh (1998); and, 
Subrahmanyam (1993). For an interesting variation, criticising Western proliferation response as a 
manifestation of an illegitimate new 'Pax Americana' approach to global security, see Tickner ( 1995). 
23 Unfortunately, the few recent pieces that have attempted methodically to examine supplier 
responses to proliferation from a broad conceptual perspective have concentrated solely on the nuclear 
area. For examples, see Cioffi-Revilla (1998) and Schneider (1994 ). 
24For an excellent review of the theoretical literature on nonproliferation (though limited to nuclear 
nonproliferation) which aptly underscores this point, see Ogilvie-White (1996). 
25Again, there is a substantial, robust literature covering the individual multilateral non-nuclear 
nonproliferation instruments (eg. CWC, BWC, Australia Group, MTCR). However, this literature tends to 
focus narrowly on the technical characteristics and diplomatic structures of these individual regimes, 
rather than on the broader issue areas, or on how individual supplier countries use these and other 
national instruments as tools in their overall anti-proliferation strategies. 
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challenging a specific untested theoretical assumption in a subset of the 
proliferation literature regarding the similitude of Western proliferation 
responses; 2) enabling more effective application of existing theoretical tools; 
and 3) assisting in the construction of an intermediate-level theory of Western 
proliferation response behaviour by supplying both an overarching conceptual 
framework incremental empirical building-blocks. It also aspires to make a 
useful public-policy contribution. 
Challenging Untested Assumption 
Because it suggests that there has been meaningful divergence between 
the anti-proliferation approaches of two Western supplier states, the present 
study challenges an untested assumption, prevalent in a minor segment of the 
academic literature, that Western supplier states act in virtual lock-step in their 
response to shared proliferation threats. That the study has been designed as a 
'similar case' comparison makes this refutation more direct. By empirically 
demonstrating significant differences in a 'similar case' comparison, it sounds a 
cautionary note for any perspective that presupposes profound cohesiveness in 
Western responses to proliferation. 
In a representative example of this assumption, one analyst describes 
Western supplier states as acting de facto as a 'supranational entity' in their 
response to proliferation - a monolithic us against the rest of the world's them 
(Chafetz 1995). Those who subscribe to this characterisation - often 
promulgated in critical analyses by scholars from developing countries -
sometimes allow that there may be occasional policy squabbles among 
Western supplier states in these areas, but nevertheless tend to dismiss these 
as insignificant and rare. Such assertions plainly are not supported by the 
findings of this study. Western supplier states may share the same broad anti-
proliferation objectives, and these aims may differ from those of some other 
groupings of states, but that is very different from agreeing on the specific 
policy prescriptions by which individually and collectively to pursue these 
objectives. 26 
The same underlying premise is often discernible in the mainstream 
proliferation literature, albeit as a vague, sometimes unarticulated cognition that 
for all intents and purposes it is the United States alone that sets the Western 
anti-proliferation agenda. This perspective is doubtless reinforced by the 
broader hegemony/leadership literature that, as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 
note, tends to assume that 'secondary or "supporting" states ... can safely be 
ruled out as "contenders" or "challengers" to the leading state' (1991: 394). 
Such assumptions are probably also sustained by the habit of Western supplier 
states to themselves stress their 'like mindedness' on anti-proliferation aims, 
which easily becomes interpreted as 'like mindedness' as to the means to 
realising these objectives. This fallacy is all the more understandable since 
Western governments do not like to advertise disputes amongst themselves in 
these areas. 
26 The supposition that Western supplier countries embrace common anti-proliferation objectives, 
while intuitively plausible, and hence reasonable as an operative assumption, nonetheless has not been 
tested through rigorous academic examination. For example, on a contrary anecdotal note, a number of 
US and Australian officials interviewed expressed doubts regarding the nature and sincerity of the anti-
proliferation objectives of certain other Western countries, notably France and Germany A definitive 
judgement on this point would require the cumulation of data from additional research along the lines of 
the present study. 
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Enabling Extant Theory 
The study facilitates the use of existing theoretical tools to help explain the 
differing proliferation response behaviour of the two countries being studied. 
Existing theoretical perspectives are not readily helpful in explaining discreet 
instances of divergence, for example why Washington and Canberra have 
disagreed on among numerous other things: 
•the need to negotiate a global treaty against missile proliferation 
•plans by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to destroy the last 
known remaining samples of the smallpox virus 
•technical details of challenge inspection provisions of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) 
•membership criteria for the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) 
• the need for punitive economic sanctions against countries that transfer 
certain technologies to others 
•the future viability of the AG 
•the appropriate way to define what is prohibited by the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) 
•the need to threaten nuclear retaliation to deter CBW attacks 
• the need for routine inspections to verify the BWC 
And so on. 
By fitting such individual differences into broad conceptual patterns, the 
present research provides a framework that renders specific proliferation 
response behaviour more amenable to causal inference. Given the key roles 
that the subject states play in the anti-proliferation sphere, this represents a 
significant advance in the practical application of existing theory to explain an 
important set of real-world foreign policy behaviour. Moreover, while some of 
the explanations so adduced are wholly sui generis, one of the crucial causal 
variables identified is systemic - differences in the geopolitical balance of 
proliferation threats - and therefore could plausibly explain other similar cases 
of national divergence. This raises the prospect that the study's analytical 
conclusions may provide the foundation for a broader theory-building 
endeavour. 
Assisting Theory Building 
At the broadest theoretical level, the study makes potentially important 
contributions to the task of developing an intermediate-level theory to explain 
the proliferation response behaviour of Western supplier countries. The issue of 
Western proliferation response behaviour represents a classic example of what 
Alexander George (1997) and Rosenau (1975) both refer to as the intermediate 
problems of foreign policy that await theoretical explication. They suggest that 
theory-building for such intermediate problems is likely to prove far less elusive 
than a general theory of foreign policy. 
The conceptual aspect of this latent theory-building contribution is 
provided by the framework for analysis and synthesis of existing normative 
perspectives that the study uses to frame and organise its empirical 
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country/issue case studies (see Chapters 2-3). Constructing a comprehensive 
framework for analysis - as a conceptual tool that can be applied to future 
studies in order to facilitate systematic cumulation of structured cross-research 
comparative analysis - is a crucial prerequisite to theory-building that 
represents a consequential theoretical exercise in itself (Alexander George 
1979; Reynolds 1975; Verba 1967).27 Because the present study incorporates 
an internal comparative element, its conceptual framework has been designed 
to facilitate comparative analysis, and therefore should serve as a satisfactory 
basis for accreting analysis from complementary studies of other Western 
supplier countries. Moreover, the present study contributes empirical 
knowledge covering both the most important actor and a key secondary actor in 
this sphere, and considering the relatively small number of Western supplier 
countries (and the even smaller number of key players), the task of conducting 
sufficient future research to lay the necessary groundwork for a meaningful 
theory-building project appears viable. 28 Indeed, it may even prove feasible to 
expand such an intermediate theory-building agenda to include non-Western 
supplier countries (e.g. China, Russia). 
The stress placed on the study's relevance for theory building rather than 
theory testing should not be misconstrued as indicative of a lack of theoretical 
rigour or ambition. This is an unavoidable consequence of the overall 
theoretical weakness of the extant literature on proliferation vis-a-vis the anti-
proliferation behaviour of states. There is wide recognition among theoreticians, 
including proponents of the social science imperative to test generalisable 
theories, that such testing needs to be preceded by theory conceptualisation 
and theory building, and that in turn these must rely on in-depth studies that 
examine how and why relevant events transpired (Bull 1972; Eckstein 1975; 
Alexander George 1979; George & Bennett 1997; Hermann & East 1978; 
Kegley 1980; King, Keohane & Verba 1994; Hudson 1993; Lijphart 1971, 1975; 
McGowan 1975; Papadakis & Starr 1987; Neil Richardson 1987; Rosenau 
1975, 1976, 1980; Russet 1974; Sartori 1991; Yin 1984).29 Lijphart makes this 
27Reynolds defines a conceptual framework as, 'The development of a taxonomy, a 
classification, a set of categories, into which data may be arranged' (60). He notes that this theoretical 
exercise has two purposes: to ensure that all or most relevant information is taken into account; and, to 
provide a basis for structured comparison. 
28 I do not wish to minimise the challenges inherent for any such theory-building endeavour. In 
the first place, it puts a heavy onus on future scholars to undertake complementary research, who may or 
may not choose to rise to the occasion. More fundamentally, even the most ardent proponents of the FPA 
theory-building agenda as a whole acknowledge that it is not precisely clear how assembling this type of 
data, and even analysing patterns, generates new theory. But this reflects an intrinsic problem facing any 
and all attempts at foreign policy analysis, especially of the comparative variety. As Smith notes, 'There 
has always been a serious problem in knowing how to move from the collection of evidence, from the 
manipulation of data, towards a theory. What is a theory of foreign policy and what would one look like? 
... I think that this problem has bedevilled the history of foreign policy analysis; it has certainly bedevilled 
the comparative foreign policy approach' (1987: 47). Moreover, he makes clear that this problem is not 
confined to the ambitious quantitative incarnations of comparative foreign policy espoused especially 
during the 1970s (eg. events data), approaches that are widely seen to have lost their lustre, but rather to 
all of the various ongoing approaches to studying foreign policy. 
29 Some recent trends in IR scholarship (eg. post-modernism, constructivism) have challenged 
the very notion of even attempting to build generalisable theories. While such paradigm debates are well 
beyond the scope of the present study, it may nonetheless be observed that, even setting aside any 
potential contributions to theory building, or for that matter comparative analysis, the present study 
remains valuable as a stand-alone empirical analysis of the practices of each of two key actors in an 
important policy area. Such empirical data is intrinsically relevant for conceptualisation in any form, 
regardless of one's intra-disciplinary proclivities. To take a case in point, there has been at least one 
recent attempt to examine states' anti-proliferation practices through the prism of constructivist analysis 
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point as follows: 
The intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be 
more promising than a superficial statistical analysis of 
many cases. In such a situation, the most fruitful approach 
would be to regard the comparative analysis as the first 
stage of [a] research [agenda] in which hypotheses are 
carefully formulated (1971: 685). 
Alexander George echoes this thought: 
A simultaneous comparison of two or more cases, if each 
comprises an instance of the same class of events, can 
be an excellent research strategy for cumulative 
development of theory. In this way the investigator can 
move beyond preoccupation with the single case study to 
comparative case studies (1979: 52). 
Hudson, noting approvingly that this long-standing consensus has been 
increasingly reinforced in recent years, states, 'The case study - in more 
systematic form (e.g. process tracing) - has made a big comeback .... You have 
to get your hands dirty to understand the real world' (10-11 ). Ergo, theory-
building contributions are a necessary prerequisite to any theory-testing 
endeavour for topics where there is a deficit of empirical research addressing 
questions of how and why. 
King, Keohane and Verba suggest the following criteria by which to 
assess the theoretical relevance and sufficiency of any proposed research topic 
in terms of contributing to theory building: 
A research project should pose a question that is 
'important' in the real world ... [and] should make a specific 
contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by 
increasing our collective ability to construct verified 
scientific explanations of some aspect of the world .... This 
latter criterion does not imply that all research that 
contributes to our stock of social science explanations in 
fact aims directly at making causal inferences. Sometimes 
the state of knowledge in a field is such that much fact-
finding and description is needed before we can take on 
the challenge of explanation. Often the contribution of a 
single project will be descriptive inference. Sometimes the 
goal may not even be descriptive inference but rather will 
involve the close observation of particular events or the 
summary of historical detail. These, however, meet our 
second criterion because they are prerequisites to 
explanation (1994: 15). 
The present study indisputably meets the first of these requirements (i.e. it 
is important in the real world). It also readily satisfies the second criterion, since 
there is a recognised scholarly literature on proliferation. But as discussed 
already, although this literature is extensive in many respects, it is limited in its 
treatment of the anti-proliferation policies of supplier states generally, and 
virtually non-existent in comparing their national approaches. The comparative 
analysis provided in the concluding chapter to explain the differences discerned 
in the preceding case studies between US and Australian proliferation response 
preferences, therefore offers a solid, currently unavailable basis for developing 
(Mutimer 1998), which surely might have benefited from additional empirical data on the subject. 
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a generalisable theory of proliferation response behaviour. 
Enriching Public-policy 
Beyond its theoretical relevance, the study should assist policy-makers in 
the United States and Australia to understand better each others' (and perhaps 
even their own) anti-proliferation perspectives. Providing such clarity has 
intrinsic public-policy relevance. This function is loosely akin for policy-makers 
to the purposes served by popular psychology books that try to explain men 
and women to themselves and each other ... You Just Don't Understand: Anti-
proliferators in Conversation ... Superpowers Are From Mars, Anti-proliferation 
Partners Are From Venus. It should equally assist anyone else trying to 
understand these countries' anti-proliferation policies. 
On a more general level, the study should directly enhance 
comprehension of the choices and pressures that any supplier country faces in 
seeking to respond to proliferation. By examining specific differences in the 
perspectives and policies of two countries with conjoint anti-proliferation 
objectives and commitments, it addresses issues that are highly germane to our 
understanding of the wider international anti-proliferation system, and the ways 
in which individual supplier countries operate within and around it. Finally, by 
noting a significant divergence in the preferences of two key members of the 
Western anti-proliferation coalition, it raises questions about the efficacy of the 
anti-proliferation project as a whole which, at a minimum, depends on broad 
cooperation among this core group of like-minded states. 
METHODOLOGY 
Analytic Framework: Orientation and Structure 
Orientation 
Because the study focuses on anti-proliferation actors rather than on the 
international nonproliferation system in which they operate, its analytical 
orientation is firmly grounded within the general analytic framework of foreign 
policy analysis (FPA) and its associated sub-literatures, in this case with an 
explicit comparative dimension. This sets it apart from the predominant 
theoretical and methodological schools in the international relations (IR) 
discipline.30 
The study loosely employs an 'environmental model of foreign policy 
analysis' as Papadakis and Starr (1987) suggest as its general analytical frame 
of reference. 31 This multi-causal model posits interconnected influences on 
30 Such an actor-centric focus reflects the fundamental assumption of the FPA research agenda 
that, as Ripley states, 'The global system is the arena of politics rather than the major force in 
international politics' (1993: 410). This in turn severely limits the applicability of wider IR theory. For 
example, Ripley goes on to observe that, because this underlying FPA orientation is inherently 
incompatible with the system-centric tenets of neo-realism, the goals and contributions of individual FPA 
studies can not be judged by the standards of the neo-realist paradigm. Which is not to suggest that the 
current study has nothing to gain from, nor contribute to, other strands of IR theory since, as discussed 
already, it seeks to do both, but from the characteristic confines of an actor-centric perspective. 
31 For an excellent graphic depiction of this model see Papadakis and Starr (1987), Figure 20.1, 
p. 417. Unfortunately, the original publisher, Allen & Unwin (Boston), indicates that it no longer holds the 
rights to this material. The subsequent rights holder, HarperCollins (UK), likewise specifies that it no 
longer owns the copyright on this material and has no further information. Correspondence with one of the 
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foreign policy behaviour. These include in the first instance national foreign 
policy processes and actors (e.g. policy-making structures, individuals) that 
lead to foreign policy decisions, and underlying these immediate decision-
making factors, indirect opportunities and constraints on these 
processes/actors that are attributable to the various levels of environment (e.g. 
international system, societal) in they operate. model offers the 
advantage of synthesising the strands FPA, as well as allowing wider IR 
theory integrated into the FPA framework by taking into account the 
structural influences of international relations and the international system. 
Structure 
The analytical structure of a foreign policy study can adhere to either of two 
standard configurations: 1) horizontal studies seeking to test general theories 
by studying a limited number of variables across a wide spectrum of actors; or, 
2) vertical studies seeking to develop in-depth understanding by investigating a 
wide spectrum of variables for one or a few actors (Handel 1981; Rosenau 
1980; Yin 1984). Utilising the latter approach, the present study has been 
designed as a two-country comparison in order to permit an appropriate 
balance between in-depth examination and structured comparative analysis. 
Such a vertical design seems intrinsically more able to meet the objectives laid 
out above than for example a horizontal comparison of the policies of all of the 
Western supplier states in one, or at most a few, very narrowly circumscribed 
issue areas (e.g. ewe implementation). 
The specific structure employed has been intentionally designed to push 
the workable bounds of a vertical study - encompassing three separate major 
issue areas, each examined over a span of up to two decades, for each of two 
actors. This is done to maximise the comparative dimension.32 Such a broad 
vertical structure inevitably imposes limitations on the depth of treatment 
possible for each discreet element - each of the six constituent case studies 
could easily justify an entire book onto itself - as well as a certain 
cumbersomeness in tying these heterogeneous topics together in a coherent 
narrative. However, these drawbacks represent inescapable trade-offs, the 
proper balance of which can only be dictated by the particular analytical 
objectives to be served. 
The purpose of the dual-actor structure is not to explore the relationship 
between the actors per se, but rather to explore and compare the individual 
national policies of each. Having said this, it has to be recognised that these 
states work together as anti-proliferation partners, and that all such dyadic 
relationships affect the national policies of the actors involved to a greater or 
lesser extent (Neil Richardson 1987; Snyder, Bruck & Burton 1969). In the 
context of the present study, whereas its larger relationship with Australia 
authors also failed to identify who, if anyone, now holds the applicable rights. Therefore the necessary 
permission to reproduce this material could not be obtained. 
32 Serious consideration was given to an alternative vertical design: up to 4-6 actors for a single 
broad issue area. This option would have offered comparable scope for in-depth empirical case-studies 
and cross-case analysis, and at least in principle for accumulation of data from complementary future 
studies. However, it would have had far less worth as a stand-alone study. It would not have provided a 
complete picture of any aspect of the subject - either each actor's overall anti-proliferation approach 
across areas, or the full spectrum of all Western responses in each issue area - whereas the current 
design provides a complete account of the totality of anti-proliferation responses for each actor across the 
non-nuclear areas. 
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exerts relatively little direct influence on US anti-proliferation policies, the same 
relationship is inevitably a more important consideration for Australia (e.g. in 
terms of larger issues of alliance management).33 
Empirical Case Studies: ""'°'''°'"'.,,•II".•" 
Selection 
Design, Sources 
It is imperative base the selection of case study subjects on a set of 
objective, articulated criteria, particularly in small-n comparisons (Collier 
& Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990). The United States Australia have been 
selected as 'similar case' subjects the present study based on the following 
interconnected criteria: 1) leadership roles and active participation in all facets 
of the international nonproliferation system; 2) commonality in commitment to 
shared anti-proliferation goals; and, 3) commonality in other pertinent respects. 
Bertsch and Cuppit (1993: 59) suggest that states' roles in the 
international nonproliferation system can be divided into five general categories: 
1) coordinating states that play roles in all components; 2) collaborating states 
that play roles in some components ; 3) sensitive states that may have relevant 
industries or technological capacities, but which do not play a significant role, 
and which also are not hostile (i.e. which do not import, export, or produce 
targeted weapons systems); 4) threatening states that oppose the system (i.e. 
which attempt to acquire, produce or export applicable weapons or associated 
technology); and, 5) peripheral states that do not play a role and which are 
irrelevant to the proliferation issue. The first of these categories includes about 
twenty states, fewer than half of which play activist roles across the spectrum of 
applicable fora. It is this latter group of less than ten key actors that demarcates 
the pool of potentially useful subjects based on the first of the above criteria. 
The United States has been selected as a case study due to its singular 
role as a coordinating state and the dominant leader of international anti-
proliferation efforts, commensurate with its role as lone superpower within the 
post-Cold War international order. In this sense it can be properly seen as the 
principal subject of the study. 
Australia has been winnowed from the pool of potential comparative 
subjects based on having achieved a high cumulative ranking for all of the 
above criteria. For comparative purposes it can properly be seen as what has 
been termed a first-follower to US leadership in this sphere (Cooper, Higgott & 
Nossal 1993). Australia scores high in the categories of international leadership 
and participation. It is fair to say that Australia is universally recognised as 
among the most active players in the anti-proliferation realm. Through a series 
of high-profile initiatives over many years - like creating the Australia Group in 
the early 1980s, hosting an unprecedented conference of governments and 
representatives of national chemical industries in the late 1980s, brokering the 
final resolution of the ewe negotiations in the early 1990s, and most recently 
in 1998 assembling most of the world's foreign ministers to bolster efforts to 
33 This dynamic is typical of the relationship between a middle-power and a major-power ally 
(Fox 1977; Handel 1981 ). It is readily discernible in the empirical case studies (see Chapters 4-5), which 
reveal that Australia considers US policies in forming its own national positions much more than vice 
versa. The case studies also show that this factor leads to a one-sided phenomenon of Australian 'self 
censorship', whereby Canberra opts to adopt a position that is not its preferred position, but rather the 
closest to that preferred position that it perceives as having a chance of gaining US approval. 
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strengthen the BWC - Australia has become one of the most influential actors 
in this sphere (Darling interview [int.]; Evans 1997). Indeed, one long-serving 
senior US official characterises Australia as the most important player 
internationally on proliferation issues after the United States (McNamara int.). 
Australia has a strong sense of common purpose with, and in the eyes of, 
the United States. Former US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas McNamara 
makes this clear: 'They're probably our strongest partner in nonproliferation 
overall. We cooperate better with the Aussies on average than we do with 
almost anyone else I would say' (int). Such perceptions are reciprocal and 
widespread. In an opinion survey of relevant present and past officials from 
both countries, over ninety per cent affirm that the two countries share the 
same anti-proliferation objectives (see Appendix 3, question 1 ). 
There are obviously other Western states that to a greater or lesser extent 
are also leaders in the international nonproliferation system and have similar 
anti-proliferation objectives to the United States. However, Australia has 
significant additional advantages as a comparative subject. For instance, citing 
their socio-cultural commonalties, Lijphart (1971) asserts that the Anglo-
American countries generally represent one of the more advantageous 
categories of non-regionally contiguous states for purposes of 'like case' 
comparative foreign policy case studies. This generalisation is particularly apt in 
the case of a security-related issue such as proliferation response. Although the 
United States and Australia are extremely dissimilar structurally - in terms of 
national attributes (i.e. regional middle-power versus lone global superpower), 
geopolitics, etc. - they share an unusual degree of commonality in the politico-
military arena. One key manifestation of this is uncommonly close intelligence 
sharing and cooperation, including on proliferation and related strategic 
issues.34 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the Anglo-American 
intelligence nexus for our purposes. Many scholars of foreign policy decision-
making see the availability and processing of information as central to 
understanding foreign policy behaviour (Ripley 1993). Officials often stress the 
critical role that access to reliable intelligence plays in making policy decisions 
on nonproliferation (Freedenberg tst. 1989; Oehler tst. 1995; Woolsey 1993a). 
Indeed, during interviews a number of senior Australian officials cited the 
intelligence relationship as a key factor in explaining the high degree of 
commonality between Australian and US anti-proliferation objectives relative to 
other Western countries, in that most other Western countries simply do not 
share the same detailed awareness of the seriousness of the proliferation 
threat. In addition to intelligence cooperation, the two countries have an 
unusually close strategic alliance relationship underpinned by regular bilateral 
consultation and cooperation in the politico-military sphere generally, including 
specifically on proliferation issues. 
Although there are other countries that roughly match Australia in meeting 
all of these various criteria, most notably Britain and Canada, there are a 
number of appurtenant factors that make Australia a more interesting and 
feasible subject for comparison. As regards Britain, the increasingly significant 
role played by the European Union (EU) in this and other foreign and security 
policy areas makes British policy as such increasingly hard to isolate and 
34See Ball (1985) for a description of the unrivalled intelligence cooperation among Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. (New Zealand has more recently been 
largely excluded from this privileged club.) 
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define, a factor that would hopelessly complicate any comparative analysis. 
Canada is therefore left as the most promising alternative to Australia on the 
merits of the criteria. On less easily quantifiable subjective and aesthetic 
grounds, however, the contiguous geographic proximity and extreme cultural 
resemblance between the United States and Canada would lend an incestuous 
quality to such a two-country comparison that seems undesirable. More 
importantly, Canada's foreign and security policies are likely shaped to an 
unusual degree by the desire to demonstrate independence from its powerful 
neighbour, leading it to espouse opposing positions 'as a matter of principle 
rather than interest' (Handel 1981: 145). For purposes of a 'similar cases' 
comparison, being different for difference sake represents an unhelpful 
dynamic.35 And so we are left with Australia. 
Using the United States and Australia as comparative subjects 
immediately presents a serious challenge due to the structural dissimilarities 
between them within the international system (i.e. lone superpower versus 
middle/regional power). In other words, this type of analysis runs the inherent 
risk of comparing proverbial apples and oranges. That said, by the same line of 
reasoning a compelling argument could be made that the same perils are 
attendant in comparing any other actor to the United States, given the latter's 
singular role in the prevailing post-Cold War international system. This logic 
would then wholly exclude the most important actor in the international system 
from any type of comparative foreign policy research, effectively nullifying the 
value of comparative FPA studies as a class. It is precisely to avoid being 
backed into this type of artificial methodological corner that we must recall the 
admonition against applying the standards of irrelevant IR paradigms to specific 
FPA research designs (Ripley 1993). Sartori offers helpful advice on how to 
navigate around just such comparative pitfalls, observing that any comparison 
between two distinct entities necessarily involves similarities and differences, 
and that in order to have merit a comparison must focus squarely on the former. 
He elaborates: 
Thus, pears and apples are comparable as fruits, as 
things that can be eaten, as entities that grow on trees; 
but incomparable, e.g., in their respective shapes. Making 
this point in general, the question always is: comparable 
with respect to which properties or characteristics, and 
incomparable (i.e. too dissimilar) with respect to which 
other properties or characteristics? (1991: 246) 
Applying this counsel to the present research, it can be seen that not only are 
the United States and Australia undoubtedly comparable as Western 
coordinating states in the international supplier nonproliferation system sharing 
strong common commitments to anti-proliferation objectives in the context of an 
alliance relationship, they are as discussed above uncommonly cognate 
members of this grouping. 
35 Of course it is likely that all US allies are motivated to a greater or lesser extent by the desire 
to demonstrate their independence from the United States as the dominant leader of the Western alliance 
network. However, it seems likely that Canada represents a particularly strong, almost idiosyncratic, 
manifestation of this dynamic. Handel (1981) for example specifically concludes that Canada falls into this 
pattern to a far greater extent than Australia. 
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Yin differentiates the 'embedded multiple case studies' version from the 
standard 'multiple case studies designs' as follows: 
What distinguishes this type of analysis ... is that the unit of 
analysis is clearly embedded within a larger case, and the 
larger case is the major interest of the study .... ln such 
instances, the appropriate analysis of the embedded unit 
of analysis should first be conducted within each case. 
The results should be interpreted at the single-case level 
and may be treated as but one of several factors in 
pattern-matching ... at the single-case level. The 
patterns .. .for each single case may then be compared 
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across cases, following the replication mode for multiple 
cases. Finally, the conclusions drawn for multiple cases 
can become the conclusions for the overall study (1984: 
115). 
Applying this embedded design to the present study, each of the two 
countries represent a unit of analysis, and each of the three issue areas 
represent a differentiated case. Thus, the study will employ a two-by-three (2x3) 
structure, with three cases each two units of analysis, equalling six 
differentiated cases. This structure will permit three levels of comparative 
analysis: 1) each actor comparing policies within each issue area over time 
(i.e., tracing the evolution of policies); 2) for each actor comparing policies 
among the three issue areas; and 3) comparing patterns between actors. 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) note that a single case study often contains 
many distinct observations. This is especially germane for case studies as 
broad as those in the present study. The implication is that further structuring 
can be useful at the sub-case level. Therefore, in order to facilitate comparisons 
among cases, and to maximise the cumulative value of the embedded case 
studies collectively, each constituent case uses the same generic template, 
representing a unitary typology of observations (see Figure 2). Notwithstanding 
this uniform structure, no attempt has been made to restrict the content of 
either the individual case studies, or the two sets of embedded case studies, to 
uniform lengths. Any attempt to impose this type of artificial balance among the 
differentiated cases would not only be impractical, but potentially prejudicial.36 
Figure 2: Constituent Case Study Template 
1. Relative priority 
2. Capability-denial* 
a) national export control 
b} limited-membership (global) supplier regimes 
c) wider supplier norms 
d} national enforcement (i.e. interdiction, sanctions, incentives, linkages) 
e) other capability-denial (i.e. sabotage/destruction, targeted regimes, indirect 
measures)** 
3. Non-possession Norm-building* 
a) global treaty norms 
b) other non-possession (i.e. regional/targeted mechanisms, indirect 
measures)** 
4. Consequence-mitigation* 
a) counterproliferation 
b) deterrence 
* See Chapter 2 for a complete explanation of these categories 
**Amalgamated due to infrequent use 
36 In the first place, the respective units of analysis (i.e. US and Australia) vary materially in their 
complexity - the US has a far more complex internal policy-making process and employs a far wider array 
of proliferation response instruments. Secondly, although CW and BW are in many respects very different 
in terms of both their technical characteristics and the proliferation responses that they have engendered, 
and therefore appropriately are considered as separate issues, they nevertheless have often been 
lumped together. This has is mirrored in a degree of overlap in proliferation responses. Since this in turn 
creates redundancy in examining them separately, every effort has been made to minimise detailed 
repetition in each of the two BW case studies of areas already covered in the preceding CW case study. 
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Sources 
Empirical data is derived from a mix of official documents, interviews with 
past and present officials, legislative testimony and statements, newspapers 
and other specialised news services, as well as some relevant secondary 
sources. Due to the extreme sensitivity of these issues on national security and 
other grounds, and the contemporary timeframe of the study, access to official 
documents has been somewhat limited, particularly in the case of classified US 
Executive Branch material. Requests submitted under the US Freedom of 
Information Act were only minimally successful for material dating from the 
Bush Administration, and were unsuccessful regarding material from the 
Reagan and Clinton periods.37 However, requests submitted under the 
Australian Freedom of Information statute were far more successful, yielding 
declassification and release of a substantial number of documents. 
In order to offset this uneven access to classified documents, extensive 
use is made of non-documentary sources of information, including interview 
data and testimony. Every effort has been made to achieve an appropriate 
balance among these types of source, recognising their respective strengths 
and weaknesses.38 That said, there is a strong emphasis on interview data. 
This is consistent with Yi n's ( 1984) observation that the case study method -
because it is best suited to the examination of contemporary issues for which 
archival sources are not readily available - may appropriately rely heavily on 
interview data. 
Interview data are drawn from nearly sixty Interviews with present and 
past officials, ranging in position from desk officers to cabinet ministers.39 The 
interview strategy (i.e. interviews sought) for US officials gave the highest 
priority to cognisant assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and 
office directors (or equivalents) at the State Department, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and 
National Security Council (NSC), as well as senior US negotiators in relevant 
multilateral fora. Secondary priority was given to more senior and junior officials 
from these agencies, and officials from other agencies (e.g. Energy, 
Commerce, intelligence). For Australian officials the highest priority was given 
to first assistant secretaries, assistant secretaries, and section directors at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and senior Australian 
negotiators, with secondary priority assigned to more junior and senior DFAT 
37 A FOIA request for material from the Bush administration yielded the release of approximately 
6000 pages of original documents. However, because the bulk of this material was unclassified, it proved 
to have only limited research value. A FOIA request for material dating from the Reagan administration is 
still pending, nearly two years after the initial application. No formal request was made for material from 
the Clinton period after being advised off the record that such a request would not be successful, and 
moreover would damage access to current officials as interview subjects. 
38 For example, in the US system, Executive Branch testimony before Congress is vetted 
beforehand by the White House and other agencies. Therefore, officials testifying at committee hearings 
do not necessarily provide a full and accurate account of their agency's views, but rather a sanitised 
version of these views that is consistent with agreed Administration policy. (At the same time, 
spontaneous answers by official witnesses to questions posed by committee members can often be quite 
revealing, especially when reading between the lines.) Likewise, in the Australian system parliamentary 
statements are even more formalised (and comparatively rare), representing binding statements of 
Government policy. These sources are therefore very useful as a gauge of formal policy positions. 
However, interviews - especially 'background' interviews where current and former officials feel at ease 
speaking freely - and in the US case also testimony by former officials, are useful tools for gaining candid 
insight into the internal decision-making process that led to those positions. 
39 See Appendix 1 for position/rank equivalents between US and Australian officials. 
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officials, and officials from other agencies (e.g. Defence, intelligence). 
THESIS PROCEDURE 
Chapter 2 sets out a typology of national responses proliferation that 
serves as a conceptual framework for the subsequent empirical and analytical 
elements the study. This chapter begins by differentiating anti-proliferation 
from the concepts of strategic trade controls and traditional arms 
control & disarmament. It then suggests distinguishing three broad anti-
proliferation categories: 1) capability-denial; 2) non-possession norm-
buildinglmaintenance; and, 3) consequence-mitigation. 
Chapter 3 then synthesises extant normative perspectives on the 
proliferation response categories identified in the preceding chapter in order to 
distinguish their conceptual strengths and weaknesses as well as to explore 
how they correspond with one another (i.e. whether they are complementary). 
For the purposes of the present study it is essential clearly to delineate such 
normative perspectives, because they represent the implicit conceptual 
underpinning of national perspectives, and thus by extension any differences 
discerned between the national perspectives of the United States and Australia. 
Chapters 4 and 5 represent the empirical portions of the study. Chapter 
4 begins by examining US anti-proliferation efforts generally, and then moves 
on to examine the individual proliferation areas in separate case studies (see 
Figure 2 above), concluding with a brief unifying summary of the patterns 
discerned across these case studies.4° Chapter 5 follows the same procedure 
for Australia. These empirical chapters, especially Chapter 4, are uncommonly 
long, comprising several nearly chapter-length sections. This asymmetric length 
for the empirical chapters is dictated by the case study design employed, which 
necessitates embedding the national case studies in two unitary chapters. 
Chapter 6 begins with a summary comparison of the findings of the 
preceding empirical chapters. It then analyses possible explanations for the 
divergence that has been discerned between the proliferation response 
patterns of the two subject countries. It concludes by suggesting areas for 
complementary research and briefly considering the implications of the study's 
findings for the effectiveness of Western anti-proliferation efforts as a whole. 
Appendices 1-2 provide useful background information, on US and 
Australian official rank equivalents, and on their national possession and 
employment of CB/M. Appendix 3 provides analysis of an opinion survey of US 
and Australian officials, as well as complete response data tables. 
4° Chapter 4 has been reviewed by the United States Government for security classification 
purposes. No changes of any substance were made as a result. No other part of this thesis has been 
submitted for security review. As with the study as a whole, the views expressed in Chapter 4 are those of 
the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US 
Government. 
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CHAPTER2 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: A TYPOLOGY 
OF NATIONAL PROLIFERATION RESPONSE 
A requirement for any investigation and analysis of national responses to 
proliferation is a precise understanding of the instruments covered by this class 
of activity, as well as how these instruments correlate to one another. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive anti-proliferation 
typology, tailored to the requirements of comparative national case studies 
spanning different proliferation areas. In order to facilitate examination, analysis 
and comparison of the individual case studies, a unifying typology is needed 
that distinguishes broad conceptual approaches to proliferation response, and 
then identifies the specific policy instruments that fall within each of these 
approaches. 
The chapter begins by establishing the outer boundaries of proliferation 
response as a class of activity, by distinguishing it from the cognate concepts of 
strategic trade control and traditional arms control & disarmament. It then 
suggests that national proliferation response can be divided into three broad 
conceptual approaches - capability-denial, non-possession norm-building, and 
consequence-mitigation. Finally, it identifies and describes the various specific 
policy instruments that can be used to support each of these approaches. 
(Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches is taken up 
in the next chapter.) 
BACKGROUND 
In constructing an anti-proliferation typology, it is not necessary to start 
entirely from scratch. At the same time, there is no extant typology available 
that provides a satisfactory basis for a structured comparison of national 
policies. Indeed, one of the more glaring weaknesses in the proliferation 
literature is the absence of an authoritative, comprehensive framework to 
delineate the extensive array of instruments that countries use to respond to 
proliferation. 1 
Nonproliferation, cou nterprol iteration, anti-proliferation, proliferation 
response, proliferation control, arms control; disarmament ... These terms are 
used disparately and often interchangeably within the proliferation literature to 
signify a hodgepodge of interrelated and overlapping concepts. This confusion 
largely stems from terms inherited from Cold War concepts being carried over 
and inexactly applied to newer proliferation concepts (Mutimer 1994 ). The 
problem is not so much that individual analysts have not been careful to delimit 
their usage of such terms - although regrettably many have not - but rather 
that, lacking the overall parameters of a standardised umbrella typology, these 
ad hoc formulations frequently do not coincide, and occasionally are even used 
1 This is not surprising when one considers how relatively little scholarship has focused on national 
proliferation response (see Chapter 1 ). Even the wider study of anti-proliferation has only very recently 
become a major focus of sustained scholarly inquiry. Until less than a decade ago, to the extent that 
proliferation response was dealt with systematically as a discrete academic topic, it was treated either as 
a very minor autonomous category, or more customarily as a subordinate sub-category of the arms 
control & disarmament category. The anti-proliferation domain therefore is relatively immature as a field of 
scholarly inquiry, leaving inadequate time for consensus to coalesce on standardised concepts, 
categories, and definitions. 
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to convey diametrically different meaning. (Hence the reader is forewarned that 
the same terms will often be used with different specific meanings when they 
appear in quoted passages.) 
A number of recent studies offer anti-proliferation typologies of one sort or 
another. However, these are not wholly consistent, suggesting that 
standardisation may remain elusive for some time yet. Furthermore, none are 
entirely satisfactory in themselves for the purposes of the present study. The 
main defects of these typologies (beyond their collective inconsistency) are 
their tendency to: 1) focus on only a portion of the comprehensive spectrum of 
anti-proliferation instruments across the proliferation areas; 2) treat these as a 
subset of the larger arms control and disarmament category (thereby 
conceptualising anti-proliferation within ill-fitting arms control paradigms); and 3) 
focus on international regimes rather national policies. 2 By way of illustration of 
these tendencies, one relatively comprehensive typology classifies the NPT as 
a proliferation prevention instrument, the CWC and the BWC as arms control 
instruments, the MTCR as a conventional arms control instrument, and omits 
the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) entirely, along with 
all unilateral and bilateral instruments (Dando 1992). Such idiosyncratic 
categorisation is especially problematic if, as is the case in the present study, 
the objective is to provide a framework for nuanced cross-case investigation 
and analysis of a broad spectrum of national proliferation response policies. A 
framework tailored for these purposes is therefore required. 
WHAT PROLIFERATION RESPONSE ISN'T: SETTING PARAMETERS 
It is important to set the conceptual parameters of proliferation response 
by demarcating cognate concepts that lie beyond them. In this regard, the 
export control-based elements of nonproliferation admittedly bear a close 
kinship with strategic trade controls. Likewise, the treaty-based elements of 
nonproliferation bear a correspondingly close relationship to traditional arms 
control & disarmament. However, notwithstanding these similarities, and even a 
degree of outright structural overlap, proliferation response as it has evolved 
over the past 10-15 years can be conceptually distinguished in significant ways 
from these Cold War concepts. 
Strategic Trade Controls 
There has been direct structural overlap between nonproliferation and 
strategic trade controls, in that Western countries have often superimposed 
nonproliferation export controls on existing strategic trade control 
implementation structures (e.g. legislative authorities, export licensing 
procedures). The two categories of activities also occur in tandem and very 
much spill over and influence each other. Indeed, this aspect of nonproliferation 
is often superficially thought of merely as strategic trade policy reoriented from 
West-East to North-South. However, it is important to understand that there 
are fundamental conceptual and structural distinctions between them. 
2 In fairness, few of these are stand-alone pieces that aspire to be comprehensive but, rather like 
the current chapter, address the scope and needs of a specific study at hand. Davis (1999) stands as a 
notable exception, although his brief typology is only offered in the context of a critical opinion piece. For 
examples of relatively comprehensive anti-proliferation typologies, see Croft (1996), Dando (1992), MUiier 
(1994 ), Mussington (1994 ), Schneider (1994) and Simpson (1998). 
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The most fundamental difference lies in what is controlled, and in relation 
to which countries. Nonproliferation export controls focus only on exports that 
are relevant to a narrow class of weaponry (i.e. WMD and missiles) that is 
deemed to be so abhorrent that exports to any country that could contribute to 
the development of such weapons must always be prevented. Such controls, 
therefore, involve close scrutiny of such exports to any destination. By contrast, 
strategic trade controls focus on the entire range of militarily relevant trade, but 
only involving recipients that are deemed so abhorrent that contributing to any 
aspect of their military capability must always be prevented. 
Confusingly, there is some overlap in functional coverage between the two 
categories. Strategic trade controls do apply to WMD, and even more so to 
missiles, by virtue of these being weaponry (i.e. because strategic trade 
controls apply to any and all militarily significant capabilities). However, 
because strategic trade controls apply equally to all manner of armaments and 
military technology, they focus overwhelmingly on conventional armaments 
rather than WMD, since conventional weapons and technology represent the 
bulk of militarily significant trade (Wendt int.). The relative abhorrence vis-a-vis 
these different types of items does not really enter into the equation. The goal 
of strategic trade controls, rather than preventing the spread of specified 
weapons - a core goal applying universally to all aspects of nonproliferation - is 
instead to stymie the organic military capabilities of hostile states (Bryen tst. 
1989). This category of activities is therefore narrowly targeted at states that 
are perceived to pose direct military threats (sometimes unfashionably known 
as enemies). Put another way, whereas nonproliferation export controls target 
only specific classes of armaments, strategic trade controls target only specific 
classes of recipient countries. 
The conceptual distinctions between strategic trade controls and 
nonproliferation export controls are reflected in pronounced structural 
differences. International cooperation on the former, as embodied by the now 
defunct Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), 
requires a strong consensus on who, precisely, the enemies are. 3 Such a 
consensus allows for an extremely draconian approach. Because COCOM 
targeted hostile countries that posed direct military threats to all of its members, 
it represented a method of economic warfare, functioning as a 'sharp stick' with 
which to try to punch holes in the militarily relevant industrial bases of those 
countries ([State] int.).4 COCOM accordingly was able to exercise a virtual veto 
over all East-West transfers of militarily relevant equipment and technology. By 
contrast, nonproliferation does not assume any political consensus about the 
3 In the case of COCOM, the West had just such a consensus throughout the Cold War regarding 
the Soviet Union and other communist countries, but when the Soviet Union collapsed, so too soon after 
did COCOM. Despite strenuous efforts by some senior US officials in the aftermath of the Cold War to 
redirect COCOM from its original East-West orientation to a North-South orientation, this initiative faced 
implacable opposition from other Western countries (Wendt int.). In the end, COCOM was replaced by the 
so-called Wassanaar Arrangement, which is less a coordinating body for strategic trade controls than a 
relatively ineffectual information sharing arrangement for conventional arms transfers to certain 
destinations. Virtually all Western countries still have strategic trade control systems, and these still 
overlap with national implementation of nonproliferation export controls. However, they are now 
implemented strictly on a national basis, based on each country's perceptions of its own strategic 
interests. 
4 Some interview subjects have asked not to be cited directly by name. In such cases a 
parenthetical citation is used to indicate that the source is an interview. The affiliation of the interview 
subject is also provided when this information would not compromise the anonymity of the source. 
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nature of the countries targeted. This allows nonproliferation export controls to 
be practised by, and theoretically coordinated among, a much more diverse 
group of countries. But it also means that these countries will have to apply 
such controls to recipients that they do not necessarily regard as hostile. 
Indeed, Western countries routinely apply nonproliferation export controls to 
suspected proliferators who also happen to be friendly countries or even close 
allies (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan). Moreover, 
they also routinely apply nonproliferation controls to countries that are not 
suspected proliferators, including even each other. It goes without saying that 
no country wants to use too sharp a stick against its friends and allies, not to 
mention get poked with such a stick itself. 
Contemporary multilateral nonproliferation export controls therefore as a 
rule bear only the most superficial resemblance to the Cold War COCOM 
system. They do not target the industrial base of any country. Rather, 
nonproliferation employs gentler, flexible, and inevitably weaker methods. It is 
left to individual countries to make decisions that take into account their own 
assessments of the proliferation risk posed by both the specific commodity and 
the specific end-user on a case-by-case basis. A dramatic illustration of this is 
the effective loosening seen in Western dual-use exports to China once the 
basis for controls on such items shifted in the mid-1990s from strategic trade to 
nonproliferation (Clarke & Johnston 1999). 
The bottom line is that unilateral strategic trade controls may an effective 
way for an individual state to augment nonproliferation efforts against 
unambiguous national adversaries. Other than in highly unusual cases (e.g. 
Iraq), however, it is difficult in practice to multilaterise such efforts with strict, 
COCOM-style arrangements under the generic banner of nonproliferation. 
Traditional Arms Control & Disarmament 
Treaty-based nonproliferation bears a close relationship with traditional 
arms control & disarmament. The two categories of activities often occur in 
tandem and tend to spill over and influence each other. There is also an area of 
functional overlap in that disarmament does play a specific, though to date 
disproportionately minor, nonproliferation role (i.e. the 'reversing' element). 5 
This aspect of nonproliferation is often thought of merely as traditional arms 
control reoriented from West-East to North-South. However, here too 
conceptual and structural distinctions are frequently drawn between these 
categories. Given the overlap between these areas, it is arguable that trying to 
delineate neat conceptual distinctions represents an unnecessary and artificial 
exercise. Certainly any such lines unavoidably must be both imprecise and 
confusing. That said, a counter argument can be made that such distinctions 
are becoming increasingly important, because hybrid policies have emerged in 
recent years that intermingle arms control and nonproliferation goals and 
methods (Davis 1999).6 In any case, the fact remains that these concepts are 
5 No horizontal BW proliferation is known to have been rolled back under the aegis of the BWe. A 
few countries unexpectedly declared covert programs under the ewe, although this apparently came as a 
surprise to most participants and, in any case, represents a small fraction of suspected covert 
proliferators. Overall, most historic cases of 'rollback' have not occurred as a direct result of 
nonproliferation arms control, but rather due to other factors, for example changes in regime or 
geopolitical environment. 
6 Davis is highly critical of this recent trend of muddying of distinction between arms control and 
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often differentiated in the literature and among policy-makers. It is therefore 
essential to clarify how they are to be understood in the present study. 
As noted above, the concepts of arms control, disarmament, and 
nonproliferation are often used interchangeably within the proliferation 
literature. But it is also common to see them being differentiated. As if this were 
not confusing enough, in the cases where they are distinguished, the way in 
which they are distinguished often varies. And just to muddy further the 
definitional waters, one of the most prevalent ways in which the terms are 
distinguished does not correspond to the differentiation criteria used here. 
One of the most widespread forms of differentiation, both within the 
academic literature and in some official usage, equates the term disarmament 
with any and all legal treaty instruments and the term nonproliferation narrowly 
with export control instruments. 7 There is a strong undertone of political 
expediency to parsing the definitions in this way, since many Third World 
countries have visceral objections to the very idea of nonproliferation, and 
therefore prefer not to have the term associated with global treaty instruments 
to which they are parties (Herby 1991 ). In some ways, this politically motivated 
distinction may be as or more important than the conceptual distinctions that 
follow in explaining the persistent differentiation among these terms. 
For the present study, the most relevant differentiation is not between 
disarmament and nonproliferation, but rather between two separate classes of 
nonproliferation. In other words, proliferation denial instruments (e.g. export 
controls), and treaty instruments designed to address proliferation (e.g. NPT, 
CWC) are both treated as sub-categories falling under the umbrella concept of 
nonproliferation (see next section). Thus, the main distinction that is most 
interesting for our purposes is between traditional arms control & disarmament 
(e.g. START, INF, CFE) on the one hand, and all classes of nonproliferation 
(including treaty-based nonproliferation) on the other. 8 It is precisely this type of 
larger distinction that Fergusson is referring to when he states: 'The political 
agenda ... has come to be dominated in recent years by the universal non or 
counter-proliferation approach .... ln contrast, the arms control approach, which 
has dominated in the past, has largely disappeared' (1995: 69). 
The conceptual distinction being observed here (i.e. between traditional 
arms control & disarmament and treaty-based nonproliferation) is in many ways 
analogous to the distinction made in earlier theorising between the concepts of 
arms control and disarmament themselves. Seminal works in this area during 
the early part of the Cold War, for example Schelling and Halperin (1961) and 
Bull (1965), carefully distinguish between the concepts of arms control and 
nonproliferation as separate classes of activity. The most germane example of a hybrid instrument that he 
cites is the BW Trilateral Process with Russia. However, based on the current typology, I regard this 
unambiguously as an arms control instrument, notwithstanding any attendant nonproliferation rhetoric 
(see Chapter 4). More apropos examples might include the US-ROK NHK-11 arrangement or the US-
DPRK missile talks. 
7 This specific distinction has become less prevalent in American official usage. However, it still 
tends to be adhered to in Australian circles. For a well developed conceptual typology based on this 
distinction, see Zanders (1997). 
8 There is a longstanding debate in the literature on traditional arms control & disarmament about 
whether confidence building agreements such as the successive Vienna Documents or the US-Russian 
Incidents at Sea agreement should even be included in this category. Typically, such instruments, which 
constrain but do not eliminate military forces, are distinguished as 'soft' arms control. For the purposes of 
the present study, traditional arms control & disarmament is widely defined to encompass all such 
instruments. 
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disarmament. In doing so these theorists implicitly seek to distance the arms 
control efforts of their day from the discredited disarmament experiments of the 
preceding inter-war period. J. L. Richardson explains how the differences 
between the arms control and disarmament schools were manifested in the 
conceptual debates of the 1960s: 
The goals of arms control were generally taken ... to be to 
reduce the risk of war, especially nuclear war; to reduce 
its destructiveness, if it should occur; and to reduce the 
cost of preparedness (the burden of the arms race), in that 
order of priority. An important implication of this ranking of 
the goals was that disarmament, the reduction of arms, 
was not necessarily desirable unless it could be shown as 
likely to promote the primary goal, reducing the risk of war. 
The arms control school did not assume, as the disarmers 
had tended to, that agreed measures of disarmament 
would ipso facto achieve this. In the same way, arms 
control agreements were not desirable for their own sake, 
but for their consequences (1987: 5). 
Today these concepts have come to be used almost interchangeably. At 
most they are distinguished in current parlance by a useful but nonetheless 
rather narrow technical distinction along the following lines: 
Arms control refers to agreements designed to regulate 
arms levels either by limiting their growth or by restricting 
how they may be used. This is a far less ambitious 
endeavor than disarmament, which seeks to reduce or 
eliminate weapons (Kegley & Wittkopf 1991: 461 ). 
The reason that the fundamental conceptual rift between them is no longer 
operative is quite simply that the tenets of the arms control school that 
Richardson describes eventually became the dominant paradigm for Cold War 
arms control & disarmament as a whole. 9 This, then, is the conceptual basis for 
all aspects of what we now refer to as traditional arms control & disarmament, 
wherein the value of constraints or reductions is not seen as inherent, but 
instead as contingent on whether the consequences enhance security or other 
beneficial objectives (Dougherty & Pfaltgraff 1990: 413; Fergusson 1991 ). 
It is this core premise of traditional arms control & disarmament that brings 
us to the basal conceptual distinction between this category and treaty-based 
nonproliferation. In other words, there is a difference involving goals along 
roughly the same lines to those posited in the 1960s between arms control and 
disarmament. Whereas the objectives of traditional arms control & disarmament 
are conditional, those of nonproliferation are fixed and absolute. The 
nonproliferation sphere does not encompass all types of armaments, but only 
those weapons deemed to be so intrinsically dangerous and abhorrent (i.e. 
WMD and associated missiles) that an absolute goal can be set to prevent or 
reverse their spread in any and all circumstances. 10 Thus, our attitude regarding 
9 It should be noted that Fergusson posits that the arms control paradigm did not necessarily win 
this debate, suggesting instead that the distinction merely became muddled in the popular imagination. He 
states: 'Arms control became conflated with the notion of disarmament, in that the former came to be seen 
as a realistic means of achieving the latter' (1991: 192). In any case, the essential point for us is that the 
arms control paradigm became the paradigm after the mid-1960s for arms control & disarmament. 
10 As noted above {Chapter 1: 3, especially footnote 11 ), there is an active debate within the 
proliferation literature about the potential merit of broadening the scope of nonproliferation by extending 
the stigma of illegitimacy beyond merely WMD and associated missiles. However, the prevalent 
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the possession by country X of a thousand tanks could be positive or negative, 
depending on our political relationship with country X, our opinion of its 
intentions, our opinions of the corresponding capabilities and intentions of its 
neighbours, etc. By contrast, our attitude regarding the possession by country X 
of even a single biological weapon is conclusively negative without any 
additional information. 11 This difference in goals - based on the difference 
between the contingent versus inherent judgement of the legitimacy of the 
targeted weapons - separates all aspects of nonproliferation from all aspects of 
traditional arms control & disarmament. The bottom line is that, unlike traditional 
arms control & disarmament, nonproliferation conceptually judges the 
proliferation of certain types of weapons to be inherently intolerable, and the 
freezing or reversing of such proliferation to be inherently beneficial. 12 
A codicil to this fundamental conceptual distinction is that it is grounded in 
a pre-existing status quo demarcating 'haves' and 'have nots'. On one side of 
this line, activities involving specified armaments are treated as traditional arms 
control & disarmament, and on the other side as nonproliferation. This line is 
particularly significant in terms of the negotiation of treaty-based 
nonproliferation instruments. The distinction derives from the truism that, in 
order to engage in traditional arms control & disarmament, one must already 
have, and be acknowledged to have, armaments to control and disarm. 
Consequently, whereas traditional arms control & disarmament is something 
that acknowledged 'haves' do amongst themselves for their own contingent 
reasons, treaty-based nonproliferation is something that 'haves' and 'have nots' 
alike do specifically in order to make sure that no new 'haves' are created. 13 In 
other words, nonproliferation is embedded with a conception of a fixed status 
quo of 'haves' and 'have nots'. Accordingly, 'By definition, any legal instrument 
giving expression to the goal of non-proliferation implicitly defines the freezing 
of the ... status quo as the minimum floor of success' (Leaver 1997b: 167). This 
minimum floor can then be extended to include reversing instances where 
prevention has failed in order to restore the status quo. However, going beyond 
this floor by affecting the status quo 'haves' is, at least from their perspective, 
crossing the conceptual line that separates nonproliferation from traditional 
perspective is that the term 'nonproliferation' should be used exclusively in connection with WMD. That 
said, a grey area is clearly emerging as real-world momentum builds to renounce certain exceptionally 
odious non-WMD weapons ( landmines, blinding lasers). 
11 Although just how negative depends on contingent factors. For example, while the United States 
in principle regards nuclear proliferation on the part of both friend Israel and foe North Korea negatively, 
indubitably it is more negative about North Korea. 
12 The 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of CBW represents something of a hybrid in this and 
other respects. It is clearly an arms control rather than nonproliferation instrument, because it does not 
affect possession, but merely use (and for many countries for most of its existence merely first-use). 
However, it treats the use (or at least first-use) of CW as inherently vile. Moreover, like a nonproliferation 
instrument, it seeks universal adherence by 'haves' and 'have nots' alike (see below). Finally, it has an 
indirect nonproliferation benefit, in that to the extent it deters use, it creates an indirect disincentive for 
possession. 
13 Arrangements among 'haves' to constrain or reduce their weapons therefore constitute 
traditional arms control & disarmament rather than any version of nonproliferation. The significance of this 
conceptual distinction for the present study can be fully appreciated by noting that, whereas virtually every 
element of US force structure has been subject to the constraining effects of arms control & disarmament, 
Australia did not engage any type of traditional arms control & disarmament (i.e. constraining or reducing 
something it has) between the Washington naval agreements in the 1930s and the recently-concluded 
Ottawa Convention on landmines. All of Canberra's so-called arms control & disarmament efforts in the 
intervening years were focused on either: 1) encouraging others to engage in traditional arms control & 
disarmament; or 2) nonproliferation. 
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arms control & disarmament. 14 
This conceptual distinction becomes crucial when examining the policies 
of a status quo 'have' such as the United States, and even more so when 
comparing these to the policies of a 'have not' .15 The status quo orientation of 
nonproliferation is organically embedded in the US Government's operative 
definition of proliferation: 'Proliferation is the spread [emphasis added] of 
nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and the missiles to deliver them' 
(Poneman official [off.] 1994, 18 February). The core purpose of Washington's 
nonproliferation policies therefore by definition is to prevent the spread of 
certain weapons or to reverse such spread in the event that it occurs. In other 
words, nonproliferation is defined as preventing a change in the notional status 
quo. 
The definitional emphasis on a proliferation status quo begs the question: 
where and by whom is this benchmark set? This question does not pose a 
particular problem for the nuclear milieu in which the concept of nonproliferation 
was invented. In the context of the NPT, the benchmark of 'haves' and 'have 
nots' was formally established at a fixed point in time, and has been carried 
forward. The division of labour between nuclear arms control & disarmament 
and nuclear nonproliferation thus is clearly drawn. So India and Pakistan may 
now be overt nuclear powers, but the rest of the world still declines to treat 
them as status quo 'haves'. But determining comparable benchmarks is more 
difficult for the other proliferation areas, since the status of 'haves' and 'have 
nots' is ad hoc and variegated by contrast. 16 At least one analyst defines the 
status quo simply as any proliferation beyond the United Nations Security 
Council's (UNSC) five permanent (P-5) members (Muller 1997).17 Others seem 
to make an unstated assumption that the status quo is set by the situation that 
existed in the late 1960s or early 1970s. At an absolute minimum, the status 
quo might be defined as the declared possessors at the advent of negotiations 
for a global non-possession norm, although this, too, presents problems. 18 At 
any rate, the point is that there is no broad consensus either in the literature or 
among countries on where to draw the line. 
The concept of a proliferation status quo is most germane when there are 
14 This is not to say that disarmament cannot occur in conjunction with nonproliferation. Indeed, 
many 'have nots' insist that this is a necessary parallel activity, or even a prerequisite, for their 
participation in nonproliferation. Therefore, encouraging wider participation in treaty-based 
nonproliferation may be seen as among the various reasons for 'haves' to engage in disarmament (i.e. 
leading by example). For example, under the aegis of the CWC negotiations the United States and the 
Soviet Union (as the two acknowledged CW-possessor states) engaged in traditional bilateral 
disarmament between themselves - with encouraging CW nonproliferation as one {albeit minor) of their 
many contingent goals and considerations - while they and all of the other participants in parallel were 
negotiating nonproliferation for everyone else. 
15 Note that the status quo status of the US varies across the different areas. The US possessed 
BW until the early 1970s, continues to possess CW, but is in the process of eliminating it, and continues 
to possess nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. 
16 Taking 1990 as a snapshot year when CBW/M proliferation first achieved conspicuous 
international attention: BW proliferation was widespread, with no acknowledged possessors; CW 
proliferation was widespread, with the United States and Soviet Union as acknowledged possessors; 
missile proliferation was widespread, with numerous acknowledged possessors, and the United States 
and the Soviet Union as the only formal non-possessors (for intermediate-range systems). 
17 However, since China does not have existing capabilities in some of these areas (e.g. long 
range cruise missiles), it is unclear whether it should be considered a 'have' in all instances. 
18 One obvious problem is that no such treaty norm, nor even negotiations for such norm, exists or 
has ever existed for missiles. Perhaps since the BWC specifically bans means of delivery, this could be 
used as an expedient means to define the missile status quo, but this would clearly be taking licence. 
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acknowledged 'haves'. Once the number of acknowledged 'haves' reaches zero 
- for example in the BW area after the United States and Soviet Union signed 
on to the BWC in the early 1970s - the conceptual line of demarcation is 
eliminated and the endeavour becomes the same as the inherent 
nonproliferation goal - to prevent the emergence or re-emergence of specified 
armaments everywhere. The concept of a status quo therefore is very important 
in cases where there are no global bans, or while such bans are being 
negotiated, but are nearly irrelevant thereafter. 19 
The distinguishing conceptual features of nonproliferation - inherent 
objectives based on a fixed status quo - create a number of corresponding 
structural differences between the scope and content of nonproliferation versus 
traditional arms control & disarmament treaties. Not every treaty or agreement 
dealing with proscribed armaments constitutes nonproliferation. By definition 
nonproliferation instruments do not deal with the issues of deployment or use; 
and when disarmament is used to achieve the nonproliferation goal of reversing 
proliferation, it must involve the complete and permanent elimination of the 
target class of weapons and all associated production infrastructure. An 
agreement involving caps or partial reductions, because it accepts the 
existence of some weapons, can only be considered as nonproliferation to the 
extent that it explicitly treats such elements as interim measures on the path to 
complete and permanent elimination. 
Zanders in effect describes this functional manifestation of the difference 
between the contingent goals of traditional arms control & disarmament versus 
the inherent goals of nonproliferation (although he expresses this in terms of 
arms control versus disarmament): 
Arms control [meaning traditional arms control and 
disarmament] consists of a set of security policies aimed 
at managing quantitative and qualitative levels of 
particular arms categories. The respective ceilings on 
weaponry can be placed higher or lower than the levels 
existing at the time of negotiations. Disarmament 
[meaning treaty-based nonproliferation] comprises a 
subset of arms control policies that seek to reduce the 
level of a particular arms category to zero among the 
parties concerned (1997: 19).20 
Fergusson (1991) takes this differentiation an intriguing step further, by 
19 That said, Fergusson asserts that the distinction between 'haves' and 'have nots' continues to 
distinguish treaty-based nonproliferation from traditional arms control & disarmament even after all 'haves' 
become 'have nots'. He notes: 'Although both may agree not to possess certain types of weapons, the 
developed advanced states have the ability to produce prohibited weapons quite rapidly,' concluding, 
'Effectively, the problem relates to the purpose of nonproliferation relative to arms control' (1995: 82). As a 
concrete example of such residual relevance, the US formally indicated as a condition of its ratification of 
CWC that, if it perceived a strategic threat due to non-compliance or non-participation, it would withdraw 
from the treaty in order to reassert its status quo anti as a 'have'. 
20 It is clear from the context of this quote - an article that tries to apply traditional arms control and 
disarmament concepts to the new nonproliferation agenda - that he is in fact trying to distinguish between 
traditional arms control and disarmament and nonproliferation disarmament. It should be noted that this is 
not a particularly good definition of traditional arms control in that it focuses solely on types and levels of 
armament. As noted already, in addition to types and quantities of weapon, traditional arms control can 
apply to constraints on the deployment or use of both armaments and personnel. For example, the 
Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty restricts the geographic location of treaty-limited equipment, 
and the Vienna Document(s) on Confidence and Security Building Measures restricts the size, timing and 
secrecy of military exercises. 
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asserting that even completely eliminating a class of weapons does not 
necessarily equal disarmament if this is done for the contingent reasons of 
arms control. He gives the example of INF, arguing that, because this class of 
weapons was eliminated to promote stability in the specific context of the Cold 
War confrontation in Europe, rather than because its elimination was seen as 
inherently beneficial - or we might add because they violated an established 
status quo - it should be seen as arms control rather than disarmament. 
The line between traditional arms control & disarmament and 
nonproliferation roll-back is obviously fuzzy. However, while it is debatable 
where this line should be drawn, the conceptual distinction remains useful. Let 
us use topical case of India and Pakistan to consider various examples of this 
distinction. Neither of these states are status quo 'haves'. But having each 
acquired nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missile delivery systems (i.e. 
the preventative element of nonproliferation having failed in both cases), they 
and other states might see value in measures to manage the risks posed by 
this situation (e.g. capping weapons numbers, restricting missile deployments, 
establishing 'hot-line' capabilities and procedures) (Kamal 1999; Talbott 1999; 
Yasmeen 1999).21 Such contingent measures, however, constitute traditional 
arms control rather than nonproliferation.22 Indeed, to the extent that others 
were to welcome such arms control arrangements targeting proliferated 
weapons, nonproliferation goals could actually be undermined in that 
possession would be in some measure legitimised. Turning to actual reductions 
in proscribed armaments, imagine that the two countries were to negotiate 
reductions in their respective inventories of WMD-capable missiles to a 
symmetrical level far below the current inventory for each. This would very likely 
be a positive achievement from a traditional arms control & disarmament 
perspective. But it is not nonproliferation because the agreement retains 
proliferated missiles, and again, to the extent that such an agreement is 
blessed by others, it can be said to damage nonproliferation by legitimising 
these residual inventories. Now let us imagine that the missiles in question are 
relatively primitive, and that to facilitate this bilateral agreement, outside 
countries agreed not to oppose the countries' upgrading the quality of the 
residual inventory. This still may or may not be a positive outcome from a 
contingent arms control & disarmament perspective, but assuredly it would be a 
nonproliferation catastrophe, since not only would the existence of the residual 
proliferated missiles be legitimised, but the qualitative proliferation would have 
actually been facilitated. So while qualitative and quantitative enhancements of 
the capabilities of non-status quo 'haves' always constitutes proliferation, the 
opposite (i.e. reductions of their capabilities) counterintuitively does not 
automatically constitute nonproliferation. 
The conceptual differences between nonproliferation and traditional arms 
21 A modest first step along these lines was taken in February 1999 when the Prime Ministers of 
the two countries signed a missile launch notification agreement. 
22 Australia, Britain, the United States and others did at one point make a half-hearted attempt to 
encourage India and Pakistan to negotiate a non-deployment agreement for their nuclear-capable 
missiles, as well as associated confidence building measures (CBMs). In doing so, however, they appear 
to have been careful to make clear that this initiative was intended to promote regional stability rather than 
nonproliferation, and that enacting such measures would not alter the status of these countries as 
proliferants (DFAT off. 1993, 5 July). It will be interesting to see whether recent nuclear and missile tests 
sparks renewed interest in promoting arms control, even at the expense of tacitly bolstering their status as 
de facto 'haves'. 
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control & disarmament affect the composition and scope of treaties in the 
different categories in other ways. Because the latter category is designed to 
achieve goals such as minimising the risk or cost of conflict, it is only worthwhile 
to the extent that it occurs among potential enemies, since such goals are 
irrelevant among countries that would not fight a war in any case (Gray 1993). 
This is not the case with nonproliferation, which seeks to prevent any spread of 
specified weapons types beyond a fixed status quo, encompassing friend and 
foe alike. Consequently, traditional arms control & disarmament in practice tend 
to occur in bilateral instruments between potential enemies (e.g. START, INF) 
or between groupings of potential enemies (e.g. whereas treaty-based 
nonproliferation occurs in broad multilateral instruments among heterogeneous 
groups of states. 
Finally, whereas traditional arms control and disarmament concentrates 
on existing weapons, nonproliferation tends to focus on preventing the future 
acquisition of weapons capabilities (Fergusson 1995). For this reason treaty-
based nonproliferation has sometimes been described as disarmament before 
the fact. Consequently, whereas traditional arms control & disarmament deals 
primarily with armaments and secondarily with associated production 
capabilities, treaty-based nonproliferation deals primarily with production and 
even pre-production capabilities. This means that functionally the scope of 
nonproliferation treaties tends to cover a much wider range of dual-use facilities 
and activities. 
THAT WHICH IS TO BE TYPIFIED: DISTINGUISHING CONCEPTUAL 
APPROACHES TO PROLIFERATION RESPONSE 
Having considered what proliferation response isn't, we can now turn to a 
discussion of what it is. There are several conceivable ways to parse this 
category conceptually. Multilateral nonproliferation regimes can be grouped by 
issue - e.g. nuclear regimes (NPT, NSG) versus CW regimes (CWC, AG). 
Alternatively, they can also be categorised by function - e.g. legal bans (BWC, 
CWC, NPT) versus export control arrangements (MTCR, AG, NSG). Both of 
these common methods for grouping multilateral instruments within the 
international nonproliferation system offer advantages for studies that focus on 
the system as such. 23 But neither is optimal for comparing the national policies 
of actors operating within that system. International regimes represent the basic 
unit of analysis for studies of the international system. However, it is national 
policies, rather than multilateral regimes, that represent the basic unit of 
analysis for studies of an actor's responses to proliferation. There are two 
reasons for this. First, some national proliferation response instruments do not 
involve multilateral regimes (e.g. unilateral sanctions). Second, individual 
multilateral regimes may serve multiple purposes as national policy instruments. 
To illustrate the latter point, recall the above discussion on the conceptual 
differences between traditional disarmament and nonproliferation, including the 
example of the parallel disarmament and nonproliferation objectives that the 
United States pursued under the aegis of the CWC negotiations. During the 
ratification process, the Clinton Administration stressed that as a tool of national 
policy, the ewe served at least two purposes, serving as both a mechanism for 
23 The former approach is especially useful for studies of a single issue-element of the international 
nonproliferation system (e.g. the nuclear nonproliferation system). The latter approach is useful for studies 
spanning the overall international nonproliferation system. 
31 
US-Russian disarmament and a global nonproliferation vehicle (Christopher tst. 
1996; Deutch tst. 1994; Perry tst. 1996). The US had explicitly recognised this 
during the negotiations themselves: 
The CWC will ban the use, development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. 
It is therefore designed as both an arms control 
agreement requiring the declaration and destruction of 
existing stocks, and as a nonproliferation tool designed to 
prevent the further spread of CW (ACDA & State 
Department tst. 1990: 281 ). 
In fact the CWC serves an even wider range of purposes, including as a 
disarmament instrument, as a non-possession norm, as an export control 
regime, and even as a vehicle to promote technology sharing, cooperation, and 
economic development. Ergo, the fact that country X and country Y each 
support the ewe - a statement that at one level would be equally valid for the 
United States and Iran - does not tell us what extent they do so and for which 
of its purposes. 24 This observation is true of many instruments that 
simultaneously support different nonproliferation purposes. 
Another possible categorisation method that does focus on national 
responses is by the type of instrument employed (e.g. diplomatic, economic, 
military). A more subtle variation would group instruments according to 
contrasting attributes - e.g. coercive versus cooperative, discriminatory versus 
universal, like-minded versus pluralistic, voluntary versus imposed, optimistic 
versus pessimistic, intrusive versus sovereign, unilateral versus multilateral 
(Schneider 1994; Wright 1993). Again, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with 
these or any other method of categorisation, and indeed such categories 
embody important conceptual distinctions. But the key distinction for the 
present study is not the characteristics of a given instrument, but rather the 
policy purpose that the government employing it is trying to promote. Put 
another way, our typological goal is to group instruments according to the 
objectives that they serve, rather than to group objectives according to the 
instruments that serve them. 
The first step in constructing a tailored typology for a comparative study of 
national proliferation response is to conceptualise the underlying purposes that 
anti-proliferation instruments promote. This will then allow us to group the 
sundry instruments according to the approach each supports. In order to meet 
the specific needs of the current study, these descriptive categories must be 
sufficiently expansive to encompass at a minimum the full spectrum of national 
proliferation response instruments used by the two subject countries, and 
preferably by all Western supplier countries. 
It is reasonable to assume that the United States, by virtue of its status as 
the lone superpower among Western states, utilises the broadest possible 
range of instruments. As an expedient, therefore, the scope of these descriptive 
categories may be calibrated on a requirement to take in all elements of US 
proliferation response. US anti-proliferation efforts encompass the following 
objectives: 
the use of the full range of political, economic and military 
24 One of the few comparative politics studies looking specifically at Australia and the United 
States makes this precise point regarding their attitudes towards the CWC (Siracusa and Cheong)! 
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tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or 
protect our interests against an opponent armed with 
weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should that 
prove necessary (Poneman off. 1994, 18 February). 
These goals can be divided into three broad approaches: 1) capability-denial; 
2) non-possession norm-building; and, 3) consequence-mitigation. 25 
Capability-denial: Supply-side Nonproliferation 
One of the two basic approaches to nonproliferation is for supplier 
countries to seek to deny the capability of 'have not' countries to acquire 
proscribed weapons. This is accomplished not only by impeding access to the 
weapons themselves, but also to equipment, technology, services, and 
knowledge that could contribute to indigenous development of such weapons. 
Because this approach focuses primarily on inherent capability, with a country's 
intentions only a secondary factor, it can be thought of as strict nonproliferation. 
Virtually every 'have not' country is a potential target for supply-side 
nonproliferation. 
The primary characteristic of this approach is that it is the exclusive 
domain of supplier countries. It is most effective when there is cooperation 
among all or most suppliers so that they do not undercut one another with 
inconsistent rules or implementation. However, although this type of supplier 
cooperation may or may not exist, by definition it does not extend to 
recipients. 26 In other words, The target country is not a participant in the 
establishment and execution of the rules' (Zanders 1997: 19). This means that 
the approach does not require the consent of, or participation by, these 
countries in order to work effectively. That said, its effectiveness varies 
depending on the extent to which a given proliferator is dependent on outside 
sources to acquire a given capability. 
The overall goal of this category of activity at any point in time is to 
impede further proliferation from occurring. It is therefore self-consciously 
prophylactic in character. Roll-back of proliferation may be achieved indirectly 
by thwarting programs of proliferation concern for long enough, or to such an 
extent, that the proliferators themselves give up the game. However, the main 
focus is to prevent rather than to reverse. Moreover, in reality the goal of 
preventing proliferation often translates to the more modest objective of merely 
slowing it down. This overall purpose may entail any number of subsidiary 
goals: 
Supply-based ... [instruments] may serve overlapping 
purposes. First, they might directly create or reinforce 
barriers to entry into production by denying or hindering 
25 Two out of three of these roughly track with the three categories that Simpson (1998) suggests 
for classifying approaches to nonproliferation: 1) denial strategies; 2) norm building; and, 3) mechanisms 
to deal with non-compliance. However, I would argue that compliance mechanisms are not a discrete 
approach, but rather a means of strengthening implementation and enforcement of one or the other 
nonproliferation approaches (i.e. denial strategies and norm building). Moreover, because the present 
study is examining national responses to proliferation broadly defined, we need a conceptual framework 
that includes instruments that go beyond nonproliferation. 
26 Or at least not in their role as recipients. Recall that supplier countries are defined as those that 
have the capability to contribute to the acquisition of proscribed weapons. Most of these countries in fact 
are themselves 'have nots' in terms of possession of actual weapons. Some countries with intermediate 
capabilities often are both administrators and targets of this approach. 
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the acquisition of significant material, equipment or 
technology from foreign sources. This may be sufficient to 
block a program, or it may force the proliferator to push its 
foreign acquisition efforts farther from the direct 
production stream and produce more of its inputs and 
stages domestically. In either case, this could increase 
costs and difficulty and affect the quality of the resulting 
weapon ... Second, they may be vehicles to extend 
safeguards and other controls over the entire range of a 
state's civilian production stream, thus forcing the state to 
begin clandestine operations farther upstream. Third, they 
may be used to shape a state's production capacity in 
certain directions and to discourage its evolution in others. 
Fourth, they may be used to obtain more information 
about a state's production capability, intentions and 
activities (Keeley 1995: 24-25). 
Notwithstanding variations in the rules and their implementation among supplier 
countries and across proliferation areas, the basic formula for the supply-side 
approach is well established. 
Because capability-denial focuses on preventing the spread of inherent 
capability, it seeks to do so at the earliest feasible stage. The approach 
therefore is innately concerned as much, or more, with production capabilities 
as it is with weapons per se. However, the production capabilities to be denied 
are strictly limited to those that directly contribute to proscribed weapons. 
Judgements about whether to seek to deny a particular country's access to a 
particular item are based on: 1) the inherent proliferation risk posed by a given 
item, defined as precisely how directly it could contribute to a proscribed 
capability; and 2) the proliferation threat posed by a given country, defined as 
whether and to what extent it is suspected of trying to become a 'have' in 
defiance of the nonproliferation status quo. Thus the approach is grounded in 
an ongoing series of case-by-case judgements by suppliers regarding both 
inherent capability and intentions. In cases where an item is judged to have an 
extremely high inherent capability to contribute to proscribed weapons, this 
consideration generally takes precedence over considerations of possible 
intent. In cases where the item poses a moderate inherent proliferation risk, and 
particularly if it has other non-proscribed uses (i.e. dual-use), then intention is 
taken heavily into account. In cases where the item poses a low inherent risk, 
then intention is left as the only consideration. 
Non-possession Norm-building: Cooperative Nonproliferation 
The second basic approach to nonproliferation is to get governments to 
consent to abide by legally-constructed norms against possession of proscribed 
weapons. In other words, this approach seeks to secure and enforce voluntary 
pledges that, whether or not a state has the latent capability to proliferate, it 
does not intend to do so. 
Under this approach, countries agree to forswear acquiring a specified 
class of weapons, and to eliminate any that have been acquired already in 
contravention to the nonproliferation status quo. This approach is accomplished 
by working to build, broaden, strengthen, and maintain agreements proscribing 
possession. Because this approach requires the consent of its targets, it can be 
thought of as cooperative or consensual nonproliferation. The ultimate objective 
of the approach is universally to eliminate demand for proscribed weapons by 
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codifying and demonstrating participant countries' intentions not to possess 
them, whether or not they have the inherent capability to do so. 'Such 
agreements direct their efforts towards eliminating demand', one analyst 
observes, by creating 'confidence in and commitment to the disarmament 
regime' (Wright 1993: 163). 
Although the main characteristic of the norm-building approach is that it is 
consensual, a variety of means may be used to secure a government's 
consent, including coercion. To take an extreme example of the latter, 
UNSeOM can be considered to be a consensual arrangement in a strict sense, 
although the means used to obtain (and maintain) Iraq's consent were highly 
coercive. 27 Turning to a more typical example, the ewe has built-in penalties 
for non-members, which are explicitly designed to encourage wide participation. 
Noting the often coercive means that Western countries use to pursue non-
possession norm-building, Fergusson goes so far as to characterise this 
approach as a 'tool of political control, in which the strong dictate to the weak, 
masquerading as the collective good' (1991: 194 ). 
It is important to note that the conception of norm-building used here 
reflects a specialised understanding of the term norm that is peculiar to the 
proliferation literature. The term 'norm' is generally used to describe a common 
consensus that has evolved around a particular issue area (e.g. it is bad to kill 
another country's diplomats). In this sense, a norm exists to the extent that it 
has already come to be widely recognised and adhered to internationally. 
However, in the current context, the term refers to a formal agreement of one 
sort or another that bans possession of specified weaponry. 28 According to this 
specialised understanding, norms can be legislated through diplomatic 
processes designed for this purpose. 29 Unlike traditional customary norms, 
which are binding upon all states, this type of legislated (i.e. constructed) norm 
is only binding on the contracting parties, and then only to the extent that they 
opt to follow the rules (Thomas & Thomas 1970).30 The effectiveness of the 
norm-building approach therefore is a factor of the proportion of states agreeing 
to participate, as well as the quality of their compliance. 
There is considerable variation among issue areas in both the nature of 
these normative rules and the means by which they are implemented. But here, 
too, the basic formula is well established. The operative prohibition almost by 
27 However, as discussed in Chapter 1, UNSCOM resulted from Iraq's defeat in a war fought over 
unrelated issues. It is virtually inconceivable that the level of coercion involved would have been used if 
proliferation had been the only issue. 
28 That said, these two understandings of the concept are implicitly joined. Thomas and Thomas 
observe that there is a link between the traditional concept of customary norms and this type of legislated 
norm, in that the latter 'may provide seeds from which international customary law springs' (1970: 44). 
From the opposite perspective, Price (1995) argues that there has been a longstanding taboo (i.e. 
traditional norm) against CW. This implies that the CWC, although a forced norm in one sense, 
nonetheless could also be seen as merely the culmination (or perhaps codification) of an full-blown norm 
that had already developed naturally over time. McElroy (1989) reinforces this latter point in his case 
study of the influence of norms on US renunciation of CBW use. 
29 Interestingly though, Bell (1999) suggests in a forthcoming study that such 'forced evolution of 
norms' may increasingly become the sense in which the concept of norms is understood generally during 
the present unipolar period in international relations. However, she bases this judgement on the 
increasing pressure governments face from international civil society, in the form of non-governmental 
organisations, which have not in fact played a driving role historically in the development of CB/M-related 
non-possession treaty-norms. 
30 As noted in Chapter 3, some argue that this type of legislated norm should be seen as a first 
step in the creation of a customary norm, and so eventually may become binding on all states. 
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definition focuses on the weapon per se. As a rule, a non-possession norm 
cannot prohibit capabilities that merely could facilitate the production of 
proscribed weapons, but only those that are demonstrably intended to do so 
(Robinson 1987). Mutimer elaborates: 
The focus of [nonproliferation] disarmament practices is 
not on the technology which 'inevitably' gives rise to 
military capability, but on that capability itself. 
Disarmament practices seek to reduce or eliminate the 
weapons which pose military threats, not to constrain the 
movement of technologies underlying those capabilities 
(1998: 115). 
In practice, this means that restrictions on inherent capabilities tend to be 
narrowly limited to those very few that have no other conceivable purpose but 
to produce prohibited weapons. Dual-use research, development and 
production capabilities, as well as defensive military programs, may or may not 
be monitored, but they typically are not disallowed, and in fact usually are 
explicitly authorised in order to provide an incentive for participation. 
Consequence-mitigation: Beyond Nonproliferation 
A third approach to proliferation response seeks to ameliorate the 
consequences of realised proliferation by using primarily military 
countermeasures to deny the proliferator effective use, or the capacity to 
coerce by the threat of use, of proliferated weapons. This is accomplished by 
deterring, preventing or effectively defending against or coping with such use. 
The operative characteristic of this approach is that it does not target 
development or possession of weapons. Because of this post-proliferation 
focus, the approach is sometimes referred to as proliferation management. 
Another apt description would be use-denial (i.e. denying a proliferator the 
benefits of possession by denial the capacity effectively to use or threaten to 
use proliferated capabilities). 
Consequence-mitigation is premised on the basic assumption that 'a 
country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their means of delivery ... can in 
all likelihood succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts' (Miller tst. 1997). 
Only actualised proliferators (i.e. countries that have successfully circumvented 
capability-denial, and/or cheated, withdrawn from or opted out of non-
possession norms) are targets. Because it seeks to deny a proliferator's 
capability to use proscribed armaments, in a sense, just as cooperative 
nonproliferation has been labelled disarmament before the fact, consequence-
mitigation might be aptly characterised as capability-denial after the fact. 
It should be noted that while capability-denial nonproliferation is generally 
associated with diplomatic and economic tools, whereas use-denial is generally 
associated with military tools, this is not always the case. As noted already, the 
approaches identified herein are grouped by the objectives being sought, rather 
than by the types of tool used to pursue these aims. Thus, a military strike to 
prevent the completion of a suspected CW factory would be an unusually 
coercive example of capability-denial, while the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
prohibiting the use of CBW would be an unusually cooperative example of 
consequence-mitigation. The former aims to prevent proliferation, while the 
latter seeks ameliorate the consequences of living with it. 
Use-denial differs conceptually from supply-side nonproliferation in that, 
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whereas nonproliferation seeks to prevent any acquisition of proscribed 
weapons, concern about possible use of such weapons is obviously reserved 
primarily for politically hostile proliferators. 31 For example, the United States has 
missile proliferation concerns about friendly countries such as Israel and South 
Korea. These proliferators are therefore targets (at least in theory) of its 
nonproliferation efforts. But far from extending this to targeting them as part of a 
consequence-mitigation strategy, Washington in fact works with them 
cooperatively in this regard, assisting them with missile defence programs to 
ameliorate the impact of missile proliferation by their hostile neighbours (Clark 
1993; OSD off. 1997a). Consequently, cooperation among countries in 
pursuing this approach requires a shared perception that at least some 
proliferators are potentially hostile, representing a common danger. 
Because the main focus of this approach is on latent military 
preparedness, it generally does not entail the consent of its targets. 32 
INSTRUMENTS SUPPORTING THESE APPROACHES 
Capability-denial Instruments 
National Export Controls 
National export controls are often seen as just the implementing 
mechanism by which Western countries carry out commitments under 
multilateral supplier regimes, and so tend to be disregarded as an independent 
policy tool. However, national export control regulations, procedures, and 
individual licensing decisions can represent important independent tools of 
national policy. In a sense, the consensus rules of the supplier regimes are 
least common denominators (albeit among a relatively homogeneous group of 
countries), and therefore represent minimum acceptable standards of restraint 
for their members. Thus, individual countries may choose to cleave to the letter 
of these multilateral rules, or even abuse their national discretion to try to shave 
a bit off. But they are equally free to go beyond these multilateral standards by 
applying stricter approval standards, insisting on stringent precautions (e.g. 
government-to-government assurances, technical safeguards), or even 
controlling additional items. Such augmented measures can be applied across 
the board, or particular countries or regions may be singled out for exceptional 
vigilance, again based entirely upon national discretion. 
31 There is some overlap in this regard between nonproliferation and consequence-mitigation. To 
some extent the universal nonproliferation imperative also extends to denying effective use, in that any 
such use could indirectly create a wider incentive for proliferation. As Lewis Dunn puts it, 'proliferation 
begets proliferation' (1998: 61 ). For example, Iraq's effective use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
devastating use of missiles by both countries in the so-called War of the Cities, are is widely seen as 
having given ideas to others. However, setting aside such indirect nonproliferation considerations, the 
primary focus of consequence-mitigation is to prevent effective use by hostile states against friends, allies 
and oneself. 
32 Even the notable exception cited above - that to the extent that a country has acceded to a 
treaty instrument prohibiting use (e.g. 1925 Geneva Protocol, CWC), this creates an explicit justification 
for others to deter any such use or threat of use by promising to respond with diplomatic, economic, 
and/or military reprisals - should not be exaggerated. Because the 1925 Geneva Protocol is widely 
regarded as customary international law, all countries are already subject to this restriction vis-a-vis 
chemical, biological and toxin weapons and so, strictly speaking, consent is not required to provide such a 
justification. Moreover, even in the absence of such explicit justification, a country could cite the right of 
self-defence provided in the UN Charter as justification for responding to any attack. 
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Limited-membership Global Export Control Regimes 
The most visible instruments that support the capability-denial approach 
are multilateral export control arrangements like the AG and MTCR. Indeed, 
many observers view these supplier regimes as synonymous with, and 
representing the full extent of, this approach to nonproliferation. The key 
purpose of such regimes is to develop common export controls and coordinate 
their effective implementation among supplier countries. This is achieved by 
national implementation of a common set of rules for a specific list of items. The 
strength of these regimes in preventing WMD-relevant transfers is affected by a 
combination of factors, including: the extent to which all major suppliers are 
represented; the extent to which the rules and lists unambiguously apply to all 
relevant transfers; and the extent to which members conscientiously follow the 
rules in their national implementation. Beyond this core mission, supplier 
regimes also serve to: focus the attention of members on the proliferation 
problem; facilitate the sharing of intelligence and technical information among 
members; and identify and respond quickly to emerging proliferation threats 
(Van Ham 1993). 
Although the scope of such regimes is global, their membership is 
restricted, and they are not considered to be part of the UN system (Lyons 
1995). Because they operate as consensus organisations, there is a strong 
imperative to limit membership, in order to facilitate cohesion and avoid 
cumbersome decision-making. Determining who is allowed to join the club is 
therefore a key (and potentially thorny) issue. Specific considerations boil down 
to a candidate's degree of commitment to nonproliferation and role or potential 
role as a supplier of relevant equipment and technology. 
Such instruments seek to manage activities - e.g. commercial 
transactions - that are intrinsically extremely difficult to monitor for compliance 
(Boutin 1994; Wright 1993). Of necessity, supplier regimes therefore must rely 
on members to implement their commitments in good faith, with few or no 
formal enforcement mechanisms. In practice, this means the effectiveness of 
supplier regimes depends on the 'like mindedness' if their members, both in 
their desire not to contribute to proliferation in any and all cases and in not 
having proliferation ambitions themselves. 33 
Wider Export Control Norms 
The inherent membership limitations of the export control regimes exclude 
a number of countries that in principle might nonetheless contribute to the 
overall capability-denial enterprise. Such countries could include those with an 
imperfect commitment to nonproliferation (e.g. non-members of non-possession 
norms), proliferants and other countries that could act as second-tier suppliers, 
and non-supplier transhipment countries. Supply-side nonproliferation can be 
enhanced by convincing such countries to adhere to responsible export control 
standards. This can be achieved in a number of ways. The most common is to 
promote unilateral adherence to the rules of a limited-membership supplier 
regime by countries outside the regime. For example, both the AG and the 
MTCR have invited non-member countries to apply the rules of the regime 
33 As we shall see in the case studies, this balance can get tricky in the case of countries that can 
be viewed as both potential suppliers and potential proliferants (e.g. India, Israel). If countries that are 
seeking technology join, then the regime faces the problem of internal proliferation. 
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unilaterally, in effect suggesting that these rules become a quasi-universal 
export control norm. 
Supplier regime rules also can be extended on a more formal basis 
through bilateral agreements, essentially bilateralising unilateral adherence. For 
example, the United States has obtained binding political commitments to apply 
the MTCR Guidelines and Annex from a number of missile technology suppliers 
that, for one reason or another, are unwilling, or have not been permitted, to 
join the MTCR. 
Alternatively, export control obligations can be incorporated into global 
treaty instruments (e.g. CWC Article l(d), BWC Article 111).34 Because such 
instruments are negotiated among an extremely diverse set of countries, 
representing lowest common denominator outcomes, such obligations generally 
consist of vague prohibitions against assisting proscribed activities, with no 
concrete rules of the road or coordinated implementation (MOiier 1994: 255-
256). However, the object is to extend to the widest possible number of 
countries the norm that proliferation-relevant exports need to be controlled. 
Targeted (Reinforced) Export Control Regimes 
In cases where a significant number of supplier countries shares a 
common perception that a certain country, group of countries or region poses a 
clear and present proliferation danger - or even if the proliferation danger is 
only moderate proliferation, that it is hostile to collective strategic interests - it 
may be possible to apply the tenets of strategic trade control to the 
nonproliferation mission. This tool is based on the premise that 'the proliferation 
problem is not global and generic, but regional and specific' (MOiier 1997: 65). 
For example, since the defeat of Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, and the 
ongoing failure of UNSCOM to disarm Iraq's WMD and missile programs, the 
United States with UN authorisation has maintained and aggressively enforced 
severe restrictions on dual-use transfers to Iraq. Likewise, after the Gulf War 
the P-5 countries explored imposing enhanced constraints on their own 
transfers of a wide range of military and dual-use items to the Middle East 
region, under the auspices of the Arms Control Middle East (ACME) initiative. 
Along less formal lines, the United States has for years tried to rally its Western 
allies to join it in taking a similar approach to the group of countries that it terms 
'rogue states'. However, the abject failure of the ACME initiative, and the 
extreme difficulty which the US continues to face in selling its rogue state 
perspectives to even its closest allies (Bertsch, Cupitt & Yamamoto 1997), 
illustrate the difficulty in achieving the high level of political consensus on 
shared threats that is needed in order to apply stringent targeted controls. 
Compliance Mechanisms 
Compliance and enforcement mechanisms are among the most 
conspicuous arrows in the quiver of both approaches to nonproliferation. These 
run the gamut of interdiction actions, diplomatic pressure, punitive sanctions, 
direct incentives (i.e. positive), linkages (i.e. conditional outcomes on unrelated 
issues) and verification mechanisms. 35 The threat (or promise) or actual use of 
34 So these treaties are in reality triple-hatted, serving as traditional arms control & disarmament 
instruments, as nonproliferation non-possession norms, and as capability-denial tools. 
35 It should be noted that proponents of the capability-denial approach do not equally support all of 
these enforcement mechanisms. For example, incentives are often criticised as rewarding bad behaviour. 
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such instruments is intended primarily to encourage suppliers to exercise 
appropriate restraint in transferring capabilities. A secondary purpose is to 
encourage recipients accurately to account for how they use the capabilities 
that they do receive. These tools are often directly or indirectly associated with 
multilateral export control norms. 
Interdicting specific transfers represents a key enforcement activity. The 
term interdiction inevitably conjures up colourful images of naval dragnets 
culminating in confrontations on the high seas. However, it mostly involves far 
more mundane activities. In the nonproliferation context, interdiction refers 
broadly to any national action undertaken to block a specific transfer of 
proliferation concern from one foreign country to another. The workhorse of 
interdiction is the bilateral demarche; a diplomatic request for a foreign 
government to take some specified action. When a government becomes 
aware of a pending transfer of concern, it may send a demarche to the 
government of the sending country asking it to intervene to block the transfer. 
Alternatively, if the government of the originating country is hostile or 
uncooperative, or if the item has already left its jurisdiction, a demarche may be 
sent to request intervention by an intermediate transhipment country. 36 Failing 
these steps, the government trying to stop the transfer might even publicise the 
transaction, attempting to shame the companies or governments involved into 
taking action. Finally, as a last resort, in rare circumstances, a state may take 
direct military action to seize or turn back a shipment. 
Although achieving compliance is frequently associated with coercive 
enforcement measures (e.g. interdiction, sanctions), incentives can play an 
equally crucial role by rewarding appropriate behaviour (Bertsch, Cuppit & 
Yamamoto 1997; Lewis Dunn 1998). Even cooperative verification, which is 
almost always seen as an adjunct of the non-possession approach to 
nonproliferation, can to a limited degree be used to support capability-denial. 
For example, a supplier country can institute a program to verify the end-use 
assurances that it obtains as a condition for approving export licences 
(Mussington 1995). 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the various mechanisms 
used to gain compliance. Indeed, the extent of a state's commitment to one or 
another nonproliferation approach may, in large measure, be judged by the 
extent to which it takes actions to enforce it. For example, one analyst, noting 
that, 'The use of sanctions - and the threat to use them - has been a valuable 
tool in enhancing international adherence to international export-control norms', 
concludes that countries that have failed to use this tool are 'not 
acting ... aggressively ... to police international export control norms' (Spector 
1996: 173). In other words, the failure to use a significant enforcement tool to 
promote compliance with a capability-denial instrument is seen as an indication 
of lack of commitment to the capability-denial approach. 
Sabotage/Destruction 
The most controversial means of capability-denial is to sabotage or 
destroy research or production facilities in order to prevent the culmination of 
36 One of the main advantages to having transhipment countries enact nonproliferation export 
control regulations is so that they have the legal authority to act on such requests. However, even in the 
absence of such export controls, justification can often be found based on violations of generic customs 
regulations (e.g. false declarations). 
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these capabilities. One of the best known examples of this muscular form of 
capability-denial was the Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear facility in the early 
1980s. A more recent example was the US attack on an alleged CW-related 
production facility in Sudan. Because such actions require compelling evidence 
about the details of a program of proliferation concern, as well as a profound 
conviction that the country in question poses a clear and present danger, they 
represent a rarely used nonproliferation tool. 
Indirect Capability-denial 
Anything that detracts from the resources that a would-be proliferator can 
use to assist its proliferation programs indirectly bolsters supply-side 
nonproliferation. For example, a former US intelligence chief has noted that 
economic sanctions that were imposed on Libya for involvement in terrorism 
have had a spin-off impact on Tripoli's proliferation programs (Woolsey tst. 
1993). By extension, global economic downturn might also deny proliferators 
resources and force them to slow or halt their WMD programs in order to divert 
resources to more urgent national priorities. Global recession surely should not 
be counted as an instrument of national nonproliferation policy, however, 
because it is not a result of government action intended to reduce proliferation 
risks. In other words, only policies directly intended to address proliferation -
versus those that merely have spin-off benefits - can properly be included as 
instruments of national proliferation response. 
Non-possession Instruments 
Global Non-possession Treaty-norms 
The most visible instruments supporting the non-possession approach to 
nonproliferation are universal normative affirmation pacts outlawing possession 
(i.e. BWC, CWC, NPT). It has already been noted that these legal instruments 
serve multiple nonproliferation purposes. However, Goodby (1993) makes a 
compelling case that, notwithstanding their evolving and multifaceted purposes, 
the principle nonproliferation function of these treaties to date has been to 
create formal norms against future possession. In other words, as is the case 
with capability-denial tools, the value of this type of instrument is measured in 
terms of 'the dogs that didn't bark'. It would be difficult to dispute the contention 
that such codified norms have been important, not least because in practice the 
vast majority of countries are parties to nonproliferation treaties, and the most 
parties are not suspected of being proliferants. 
Without contravening Goodby's assessment concerning the primacy of the 
preventative role of the nonproliferation treaties, it should be noted that the 
ewe at least is also fulfilling a modest nonproliferation roll-back function, with a 
handful of past or present hitherto covert CW possessors unexpectedly 
declaring themselves following entry into force in mid-1997. 37 This development 
caught most observers by surprise (Kelle 1997a). In fact, the Organisation for 
the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Preparatory Commission had 
not anticipated that any covert possessors would step forward, and in its 
37 India submitted an initial declaration on 26 June 1997 which refuted years of official denials that 
it had an offensive CW program, reputedly followed by South Korea on 17 August 1997 (CBW Bulletin 37, 
1997). Britain, China, and France subsequently admitted to past or present programs (Washington Post, 
28/10/97). All told, as many as eight countries may have declared past or present programs. 
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planning assumptions allowed for at most one such case. This suggests that 
the roll-back function of the non-possession pacts may previously have been 
underestimated, and may (or may not) become more significant in the future. 
However, this remains to be seen. From the present perspective of cooperative 
nonproliferation, the main function of these instruments therefore must still be 
seen as prophylactic codification of the intent of 'have nots' to remain so. 
Although this type of instrument is described as universal or global, in 
practice they are neither. They are universal only in that all countries that so 
wish may accede to them, and that they aspire to universality. 
The web of nonproliferation treaty-norms is considered to be part of the 
UN system. Each of the these instruments explicitly invests the UNSC with 
ultimate enforcement authority (Lyons 1995; United Nations Association 1995). 
The effectiveness of a universal non-possession instrument depends on a 
combination of factors, including: the breadth of its adherence (i.e. degree of 
universality), particularly among countries with relevant capabilities (and 
especially those suspected of having covert programs); the effectiveness of its 
compliance provisions and the perceived track record of compliance over time; 
and its contribution to customary norms associated with it (e.g. the 'chemical 
taboo'). 
Regional/Targeted Non-possession Mechanisms 
Non-possession mechanisms can also be developed and/or implemented 
on a region-specific basis. One reason to do this is the absence of a global 
norm. For example, the Mendoza Agreement created a CW-free zone in 
southern South America prior to the completion of the CWC (ACDA off. 1992). 
This rationale is especially applicable in the missile area, where there is no 
global norm against possession, and indeed there have been occasional 
proposals for missile-free zones. Another reason is simply to encourage 
regional participation in a pending or existing global norm by providing each 
country with confidence that none of the neighbours will try to 'free-ride'. This is 
potentially an especially important consideration since proliferation tends to be 
concentrated in regions where instability and mistrust are prevalent (Forsberg, 
Driscoll, Webb, & Dean 1995). Regional groupings or existing regional 
organisations (e.g. ARF, OAS, OSCE) could be recruited to assist in 
enforcement of compliance with global norms through complementary 
measures (Vachon 1994 ). Finally, Fergusson (1995) suggests that regional 
mechanisms could be used to augment global norms on a regional basis, for 
example by providing stricter verification measures among regional countries. 38 
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for example has more demanding 
abrogation criteria than the NPT. However, there have been very few examples 
of regional mechanisms of any kind in the real world outside the nuclear area, 
and virtually none along these lines.39 
In addition to regional arrangements, non-possession norms may be 
38 Logically, a regional norm with provisions that are less stringent than a global norm might prove 
useful in a regional such as the Middle East that boasts low rates of participation in stringent global 
treaties. Such a lesser instrument would at least provide some normative constraint. For obvious reasons, 
however, this has not been suggested in the proliferation literature, nor pursued by Western countries, for 
fear of undermining global instruments. 
39 Fergusson himself goes on to acknowledge that regional states have little incentive to go along 
with the calls of Western countries to regionalise nonproliferation. 
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pursued on an ad hoc basis by targeting possessors for imposed/coercive 
disarmament outside the structure of a global norm. This approach can be used 
either in the absence of a global norm, or for possessors that refuse to accede 
to a global norm. The most well known example of such an approach is the 
armistice conditions that the US-led Gulf War coalition imposed on Iraq. 
Compliance Mechanisms 
As noted in the above discussion of supply-side compliance mechanisms, 
a state's efforts to enforce compliance is a cogent indicator of the vigour of its 
support for a given nonproliferation tool. All the categories of enforcement 
mechanisms that are available for supply-side nonproliferation apply to the non-
possession approach (verification, incentives, linkages, sanctions, and 
diplomatic pressure). The purpose of these mechanisms is to encourage 
participation in, and compliance with, non-possession norms. Unlike for supply-
side tools, however, such enforcement mechanisms are often embedded in 
multilateral instruments. National enforcement actions are therefore 
comparatively less important. 
Verification plays the central role in non-possession compliance, inspiring 
confidence that the agreement in question is being observed, deterring 
cheating, and resolving accusations of non-compliance. As one veteran 
negotiator observes, 'The verification provisions being formulated in any 
agreement are often seen as a barometer for assessing the seriousness of 
negotiators' (Vachon 1997: 56). Likewise, existing non-possession instruments 
tend to be evaluated largely based on perceptions of the extent and 
effectiveness of their verification provisions. 40 So support for, and confidence in, 
verification can be seen as a significant indicator of a state's commitment to the 
non-possession approach. 
Indirect Demand-reduction 
Anything that reduces the demand for proscribed weapons indirectly 
bolsters the non-possession approach to nonproliferation. Some analysts cite 
democratisation and/or economic liberalisation as among the most potent 
means to dampen demand for abhorrent weapons (Bertsch, Cupitt & 
Yamamoto 1997; Sokolski 1996; Solingen 1995).41 Others point to alliance 
relationships with a major nuclear power a significant demand-reduction factor 
(Freedman 1993; Gebhard 1995; Rowen off. 1991 ). Still others see the creation 
of regional stability through regional arms control and security architecture as 
having a constitutive relationship with proliferation demand (Fergusson 1995; 
Redick 1995). A case can even be made that military counterproliferation 
programs indirectly contribute to cooperative nonproliferation by providing a 
disincentive for potential adversaries to acquire WMD, since they will be less 
4° For example, both the BWC and CWC have virtually the same normative provisions, but the two 
treaties are viewed very differently. Opponents of the CWC base their criticism on the judgement that, 
despite a complex verification mechanism, it nonetheless cannot be verified effectively. By the same 
token, supporters of the BWC insist that its normative value can be strengthened through the addition of a 
meaningful verification mechanism. These two camps do not often see eye to eye, but they agree that 
verification is the acid test for non-possession instruments (see Chapter 3). 
41 Certainly there have been a number of recent cases that bear this out, for example South Africa 
and Argentina. However, democratic proliferants such as India and Israel stand as a cautionary examples 
that democratisation is not a panacea for proliferation. Indeed, Perkovich (1998) explicitly rejects the 
notion that democracy helps to curb or roll back proliferation. 
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able to use these weapons effectively against a state prepared to defend itself 
(Miller tst. 1997; Wallerstein 1998). 
Promoting democratisation, effectively managing and extending alliance 
relationships, facilitating regional security cooperation, and even denying 
effective use of proliferated weapons, all may indirectly contribute to non-
possession norms by reducing demand for proscribed weapons. But just as in 
the case of indirect capability-denial, only policies that have been pursued with 
proliferation in mind can properly be included as national proliferation response 
instruments for our purposes.42 As another study notes, 'Any effort to reduce 
regional tensions or solve long-standing disputes between nations can, of 
course, have a beneficial effect. ... However, we are concerned with political 
actions aimed directly at stopping proliferation' (Flowerree 1991: 69). 
Consequence-mitigation Instruments 
Counterproliferation 
Counterproliferation refers to a spectrum of military capabilities specifically 
designed to reduce or nullify any military advantage that an enemy might 
otherwise gain through using WMD by enabling conventional forces to continue 
to operate effectively in a WMD environment. This can involve passive or active 
defences e.g. missile defences, CBW protection, CBW agent 
detection/avoidance, decontamination, vaccinations, medical treatment - or 
offensive counterforce capabilities - such as 'bunker busting' munitions to 
destroy weapons stockpiles - that serve to reduce the detrimental impact of 
WMD in a wartime situation (OSD off. 1997a}.43 Although counterproliferation is 
usually associated with protecting military forces against the tactical use of 
WMD, it can also be used to protect civilian populations against strategic 
attacks, as illustrated for example by the US National Missile Defense (NMD) 
program (Joseph & Lehman 1998). 
Deterrence 
Instruments of deterrence are used to prevent the use of proliferated 
weapons in the first place by convincing a possessor that the costs of using 
proscribed weapons would far outweigh any conceivable gains. Deterrence is 
very much the other side of the counterproliferation coin. The premise is that, 
'Defense alone, with anti-missile and counterforce weapons, cannot 
make ... forces and citizens entirely safe .... So deterrence is crucial' (Gompert 
1998: 3). On the other hand, Goldfischer argues: 'Threats of devastating 
nuclear punishment seem increasingly less sensible than a deterrent strategy 
that also stresses defense against the spectrum of possible attacks with mass 
destruction weapons' (1998: 169). The bottom line is that deterrence and 
counterproliferation are mutually reinforcing parts of the consequence-
42 For example, to the extent that official claims are true that one of the main considerations that 
led the US to extend titular security guarantees to Ukraine (i.e. NATO's Partnership for Peace) was the 
desire to convince Kiev to give up the nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the Soviet Union (Davis 
tst 1993~, this could be considered a proliferation response. 
4 Note that this definition differs from slightly from some academic and official usages, which 
themselves are at variance. In academic terminology counterproliferation is used to denote any military 
response to proliferation (i.e. regardless of whether the intent is capability-denial or consequence-
mitigation). In official US terminology, the term refers to any proliferation-related activity involving the 
Department of Defense, including multilateral diplomacy (Poneman off. 1994, 18 February). 
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mitigation equation. 
Deterrence is usually achieved by promising, and having the 
demonstrated capability to deliver, a vastly disproportionate military response. 
In the case of the strategic use of WMD, this in effect translates to inflicting 
massive retaliation in the form of retaliation in-kind, retaliation with another form 
of WMD, or possibly equivalent retaliation with overwhelmingly superior 
conventional forces (Utgoff 1997).44 Such threats may also be used to deter the 
tactical use of WMD. However, this poses an obvious credibility problem, 
especially in response to small-scale CW use. In such cases a combination of 
counterproliferation defences and lesser disproportionate responses may be 
threatened instead. Conventional responses are therefore far more likely to be 
used to deter tactical use of WMD. In this sense, counterproliferation serves a 
deterrence purpose by demonstrating to an enemy that conventional forces will 
be able to inflict disproportionate responses even while operating in a WMD 
environment (Gebhard 1995; Wallerstein 1998). 
Military instruments are the dominant, but not the only, basis for 
deterrence. Threats of punitive political, economic, or legal sanctions against 
any use of proscribed weapons are also instruments of deterrence. These 
instruments allow deterrence to be credibly extended beyond WMD use by 
adversaries, in order to deter use in a conflict between third countries (e.g. 
India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq). Normative prohibitions on use (e.g. 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, CWC Article I) can be seen as deterrent instruments to the extent that 
they strengthen such threats. 
44 There is considerable debate within the literature regarding whether the threat of conventional 
retaliation can provide sufficient deterrence against the strategic use of WMD. For example, Joseph and 
Lehman (1998) assert that nuclear weapons are indispensable to deter against the use of NBC weapons 
against US forces and allies by regional states. At a minimum, conventional deterrence would have to 
employ overwhelming conventional superiority, and be sustainable in the face of WMD attacks. However, 
Treverton and Bennet (1997) note that overwhelming conventional superiority could actually provoke use 
of WMD as an asymmetric force equaliser. For an excellent conceptual overview of this issue, see 
Harknett (1994). 
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CHAPTER3 
SYNTHESISING A CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNING: 
EXISTING NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is conceptually to examine extant 
perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the three anti-proliferation 
approaches identified in the preceding chapter. It does not aim to draw 
conclusions as to which of these normative outlooks are correct. Rather, it 
seeks to provide a conceptual foundation for the empirical case studies that 
follow, by offering a balanced elucidation of the arguments on all sides of the 
normative debate. Such different normative perspectives on these approaches 
represent the implicit conceptual underpinning for any real-world differences 
that may exist in the perspectives of Western governments. 
It has already been noted that the body of academic theorising on national 
responses to proliferation is relatively meagre. Yet in fact there is a 'great 
debate' on proliferation response raging in the more policy-oriented proliferation 
literature, especially regarding the relative merits of the two approaches to 
nonproliferation (i.e. capability-denial versus non-possession norm-building). 1 
However, rather than being framed in terms of overarching concepts, this 
debate largely comprises a series of lively dialogues on the relative merit of 
specific nonproliferation instruments (e.g. MTCR), or less frequently classes of 
instruments (e.g. supplier regimes). By considering these discussions within the 
context of approaches specified in the preceding typology, it is possible to draw 
out latent assumptions, and to synthesise a set of broad normative 
perspectives on each approach. 
CAPABILITY-DENIAL 
Negative Perspectives 
Technology Diffusion 
The main argument against the capability-denial approach is that it is 
ineffective to the point of futility and, what is more, becoming increasingly so 
with each passing year. The chief culprit identified in this regard is the 
inexorable diffusion of pertinent technologies within cognate civilian and 
permissible military sectors of the economies of developing countries (Bailey 
1993a, 1993c; Berkowitz 1995; Forsberg et al. 1995; Keeley 1995; Moodie 
1995; Nolan 1992; Bill Richardson 1993; Roberts 1993, 1995; Sopko 1996-97). 
Given that, unlike strategic trade controls, supply-side nonproliferation generally 
does not target broad industrial bases, this process is seen as literally 
unstoppable by denial strategies. As Robinson (1992) asserts, it is impossible 
to erect truly effective barriers against the spread of low technology dual-use 
capabilities without intruding on legitimate commercial interests. 
This perspective is based on the supposition that CB/M capabilities are 
grounded in mature technologies, and that therefore their spread is a natural 
and inevitable consequence of economic development. The work of James 
Keeley has been influential in validating this already prevalent assumption. 
1 There is relatively little discussion of the relative merits of consequence-mitigation, presumably 
because this is widely seen as an adjunct to either variety of nonproliferation. 
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Applying the well established model of industrial maturation to proliferation-
related technology and production processes, Keeley finds that these constitute 
mature 'industries', particularly in the eBW areas and that as a result, scientific-
technical and production-engineering barriers to entry into these industries are 
rapidly diminishing. He concludes that this represents a generic factor affecting 
the dynamics of proliferation across the spectrum of WMD and missile areas. 
'The spread of basic technological capabilities with a weapons potential cannot 
be stopped', he asserts, because, 'The maturation of such technology, and of 
specific weapons technologies, are merely part of a broader process (1994: 
179).' For Keeley the policy implications are obvious: 
From a non-proliferation standpoint, technological 
maturation implies that more states may be better able to 
produce weaponry ... and that the ability of 'supplier states' 
- the possessors of a technological edge in such weapons 
- to control their proliferation may consequently be 
eroding substantially (1995: 13). 
Many observers use such empirical findings regarding the systemic 
consequences of technology diffusion as a basis to draw damning conclusions 
about the long-term viability of supply-side strategies and, accordingly, to 
recommend that the non-possession approach get higher priority. Bailey offers 
an early example of such analysis: 
Export control regimes have not been very successful in 
stemming the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons 
and delivery systems. Due to the ease and availability of 
technology, making such controls more stringent...will 
make little difference .... More resources should be spent 
on ... policies such as arms control (1993a 55).2 
Roberts takes an even more critical line in a contemporaneous essay promoting 
the value of the ewe: 
Rapid industrialization and innovation and globalizing 
trade in high technology goods, virtually all of which has 
[sic] potential military applications, have rendered 
impossible measures that effectively curtail access to the 
military capabilities based on these goods and 
technologies. Efforts to control weaponization and use 
must focus not just on the capability but also increasingly 
on the will to pursue these activities (1993: 13). 
Moodie echoes Roberts' conclusion almost verbatim, contending that, 
'Increasingly, the question will not be the capability to produce such systems, 
but the will and political choice to do so' (1995: 79). Roberts takes his 
conclusions further in a subsequent article that reads like an obituary for the 
capability-denial approach. He states categorically that denial strategies should 
have only a minor subordinate role in the non-nuclear areas: 
Born of the belief that barriers to the flow of technology 
can effectively be constructed between the industrial and 
2 Interestingly enough, Bailey has also been among the most outspoken opponents of the ewe, 
which represents the most ambitious non-possession instrument to date (1993b, 1994 12/8, 1995 12/12). 
But she has supported the idea of a universal non-possession norm for intermediate range missiles (1990 
6/4, 1991). Her normative perspective is thus somewhat hard to pin down. Her article on missile defence 
(1993c) would seem to place her in the camp of the nonproliferation pessimists, who are sceptical about 
the utility of either approach to nonproliferation, and so favour counterproliferation. 
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developing or underdeveloped countries, initiatives to 
expand and strengthen export controls and associate 
coordinating mechanisms ... were combined with proposals 
broaden the global non-proliferation regime beyond the 
nuclear domain into the chemical, biological and missile 
areas. But the broad diffusion of technology combined 
changing nature of high-leverage systems and 
of the defense industrial base conspire to diminish 
leverage of the industrial powers .... Thus, after years of 
strengthen these regimes, there is today a 
understanding that strategies of denial have only 
... role to play in the nonproliferation project (1995: 
Virtually all proponents of the technology diffusion argument readily 
concede that its pertinence varies considerably across the different proliferation 
areas. Keeley (1995) himself takes pains to emphasise this point. Technology 
diffusion is generally seen as least pertinent in the nuclear area, where a 
meaningful threshold continues to exist between civilian technology and 
equipment and weapons programs. In the non-nuclear areas, it is seen as least 
applicable for missiles, more applicable for CW, and most applicable for BW. (It 
is no coincidence that many of the strongest supporters of the technology 
diffusion argument are primarily CBW specialists, while observers who grant it 
less credence often have missile proliferation expertise.) 
Even for missiles, a few observers also argue that, 'The question is no 
longer whether developing countries will acquire the means to produce 
missiles ... but when and what kind' (Nolan 1991: 64 ). Along these lines, 
Berkowitz is one of the few to argue that the technology diffusion effect is highly 
relevant for missile proliferation: 
The basic problem with controlling ballistic-missile 
proliferation is that such attempts are simply overwhelmed 
by the abundant availability of missile technology. The 
more difficult parts of the missile, such as guidance 
systems, are becoming more readily available .... Even if a 
country does not start a missile program, most of the 
technologies can be developed under another guise, or 
will be the unintended result of other industries, such as 
aircraft manufacturing (1995: 285). 
Most missile proliferation experts, by contrast, do not consider the 
technology diffusion effect to be highly relevant for missile proliferation, and 
certainly far less so than for CBW proliferation. A few even group missiles with 
nuclear weapons in this regard (Lewis Dunn 1998; Forsberg et al. 1995). Most 
see missile technology as perhaps more prone to diffusion than nuclear 
weapon technology, but not to the point where denial strategies are of marginal 
utility. For example, Jones and McDonough present a detailed case that 
producing missiles remains a significant challenge for most countries: 
Missiles, especially ballistic missiles, are complex 
machines. For example, the medium-range US Pershing II 
ballistic missile contained 250,000 parts - each of which 
needed to work right the first time under high levels of 
acceleration, vibration, heat, and cold. So the 
development of missiles is an expensive and time-
consuming process, often resulting in an unreliable 
weapon system. Moreover, the development of ballistic 
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missiles becomes particularly difficult at a range of about 
1 OOOkm. Above that range, the missile must use two or 
more advanced technologies: staging (firing rockets in 
series, with the expended rockets reliably jettisoned from 
the missiles) and more sophisticated re-entry vehicles (to 
keep the warhead in working order during its fiery descent 
through the atmosphere). Longer ranges also put a 
premium on more efficient rocket engines, lighter and 
stronger materials, more advanced guidance systems, 
and lighter more advanced warheads (a considerable 
challenge when nuclear warheads are at issue) (1998: 
254). 
Elleman and Harvey offer a comparable assessment: 
Ballistic missiles are fairly complex systems; a high 
degree of technological competence is required to 
reverse-engineer and manufacture clones of simple 
systems, such as a Scud. Significant technical resources 
and arms manufacturing experience, as well as a 
relatively sophisticated industrial infrastructure, are 
needed for indigenous development and production of a 
first-generation missile. For this reason, many developing 
nations will, for the foreseeable future, be unable to 
produce event the most primitive missile system (1993: 
27). 
Karp (1996) observes that very few non-status quo states have the capability to 
produce any ballistic missile indigenously without outside assistance (e.g. India, 
Israel, North Korea). He goes on to argue that, 'The importance of outside 
technical assistance creates tremendous opportunities for export controls to 
slow or even halt the proliferation process' (1993: 256), concluding elsewhere 
that, 'Ballistic missile proliferation is probably more amenable to control than 
any other proliferation problem' (1996: 9). 
The situation is seen as very different in the chemical and biological 
spheres. These capabilities are based on mature technologies which can be 
created in relatively unsophisticated industrialised economies. For example, 
widespread production of CW dates to before the First World War. In the 
Second World War Japan's infamous Unit 731 developed weaponised agents 
and delivery systems, the former including anthrax, plague, cholera and typhus 
rickettsia, and was working to develop numerous other agents including, 
smallpox, yellow fever, tularemia, hepatitis, undulant fever, haemorrhagic fever 
and cerospinal meningitis (Larsen 1995). Britain, Canada and the United States 
jointly also had an extremely sophisticated BW program during the same period 
(Endicott & Hagerman 1999).3 Moreover, these technologies are largely dual-
use (Erlick tst. 1989; King & Strauss 1990). 
The technology diffusion argument therefore is generally seen as highly 
relevant for CBW. This is especially the case for proliferant states that do not 
place a high premium on the safety of their citizens, because some of the most 
technologically challenging elements of a CBW program relate to environmental 
and worker safety (Forsberg et al. 1995). Bill Richardson presents a very 
balanced and representative articulation of the prevailing view on the 
implications of technology diffusion in the CBW areas: 
3 As a matter of historical interest, this study asserts that the United States covertly used its 
offensive BW capabilities during the Korean War. 
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The range of technologies by which a nation might 
develop a chemical or biological warfare capability is very 
broad. A nation determined to have such a capability may 
be deterred by other means, may have its progress 
slowed, or may have to settle for agents other than those 
of choice, but it is unlikely to be stymied by a lack of 
technology (1993: 16). 
Even analysts such as Lewis Dunn (1998), who are sympathetic to the 
capability-denial approach, do not disagree in principle with this assessment. 
It should be noted that the potential for technology diffusion is seen as a 
further order of magnitude greater for BW than for CW. The equipment and 
processes needed to produce BW are far less sophisticated than for CW, 
making the most common biological agents far easier to produce than their 
chemical counterparts (Erlick tst. 1989; Goldberg tst. 1989). In addition, 
'Biological agents reproduce themselves, and the same is true for the 
organisms that produce toxins. So, in contrast with chemical weapons, no large 
quantities of precursors are needed' (ter Haar 1991: 51 ). 
The dual-use nature of production is also far more pronounced for BW: 'It 
is extremely difficult to deny help in terms of technology and material because it 
mimics almost exactly a pharmaceutical industry or some medically 
related ... commercial facility' (Erlick tst. 1989: 37). 
Rogue Suppliers 
Some analysts argue that the problem with supply-side nonproliferation is 
not that the approach itself is flawed, but rather that it is difficult to implement 
effectively because too many significant suppliers continue to operate outside 
the rules (Muller 1997). Critics of denial strategies see this problem as simply 
making an ineffective approach even more so (Bailey 1993a, 1993c). In any 
case, all agree that Western countries cannot deny capabilities effectively if 
their efforts are undercut, either overtly or covertly, by alternative suppliers. 
(Supporters of the capability-denial approach therefore put a high premium on 
securing the cooperation of all major suppliers.) Whether this factor completely 
eviscerates, or merely complicates, supply-side endeavours depends on the 
quantity and quality of the undercutting.4 The most serious challenges therefore 
are posed by non-cooperating first-tier suppliers (e.g. China, Russia). Second-
tier suppliers (e.g. Argentina, Israel, North Korea) represent a lesser problem.5 
Whether this problem has been improving or worsening in recent years is 
an open question. A number of hitherto overtly non-cooperating suppliers have 
been welcomed into the nonproliferation fold in recent years, including Russia, 
China, Israel, South Africa, and Argentina. However, there is widespread belief 
that in some cases covert non-cooperation has continued, and may even have 
increased. This problem is seen as especially acute with respect to China and 
Russia. Moreover, many observers argue that such activities undertaken by 
private concerns may be beyond the control of these countries' governments. 
4 For example, Russia or China may be willing to provide advanced missile technology, but only on 
a small, covert scale, or North Korea may be willing to provide large-scale assistance, but of a vastly 
inferior quality, and neither instance would necessarily negate Western supply-side efforts. However, 
when Russia provides large-scale, advanced assistance to Iran, as recently appeared to be the case, 
Western denial strategies are profoundly undermined. 
5 The examples cited represent countries that have been non-cooperating suppliers at some point 
during the timeframe of this study, and is not intended necessarily to reflect their current status. 
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Karp spells out the negative implications of this for denial strategies (in this 
case regarding missile proliferation) as follows: 
If the Chinese and Russian central governments no longer 
run non-proliferation policy, as increasingly appears to be 
the case, traditional non-proliferation mechanisms like the 
MTCR, sanctions and embassy demarches probably have 
passed their point of marginal returns. The same can be 
said of more imaginative bilateral arrangements. Since 
1993, the United States has invested more than $470 
million in the Russian space program ... but it has been 
irrelevant to missile-related exports. Efforts to end missile-
related exports by offering compensation in the form of 
space launch contracts, while lucrative for Russian and 
Chinese space launch agencies, are also unlikely to be 
effective, since hey do not directly compensate missile 
makers and exporters (1998: 24).6 
The bottom line is that at a minimum, eliminating instances of gross 
undercutting (i.e. large-scale, high-quality transfers) by Russia and China 
stands as critical prerequisite for the future effectiveness of supply-side 
nonproliferation. 
Provoking Proliferation 
A very few observers such as Subrahmanyam (1993) suggest that the 
coercive nature of the capability-denial approach may itself provoke states to 
seek proscribed weapons precisely in order to defy the will of outsiders. Taken 
in conjuncture with the above arguments, this perspective views denial 
strategies as not merely ineffective, but actively counterproductive. Many 
analysts concede that coercive supply-side nonproliferation may aggravate 
North-South tensions generally, as well as erode support for cooperative 
nonproliferation strategies specifically. However, the notion of an explicit causal 
relationship between the heavy-handedness of the approach and a given 
state's decision to seek proscribed weapons do not appear to be given much 
credence in the sub-literature on the causes of proliferation, which focuses on 
other factors (e.g. regional tensions, prestige). 7 In fact, many analysts seem to 
regard this as little more than a convenient rhetorical assertion. As Karp 
observes, it seems doubtful that a country would assume the high economic 
and political costs of pursuing proscribed weapons 'just to show its contempt for 
others, childishly insisting on doing what outside powers say is forbidden' 
(1996: 28). 
Positive Perspectives 
Continuing Foreign Dependence 
A number of analysts argue that proponents of the technology diffusion 
6 It should be noted that Karp does not give up on supply-side strategies as a consequence, but 
rather recommends that instruments be refined to target individual firms rather than governments. 
7 The basic reasoning of this argument is analogous to the argument in the nuclear area that 
asserts that the inequity of the 'have/have not' structure of the NPT is a root cause of nuclear proliferation. 
Notwithstanding that this argument has been taken more seriously, empirically the fact remains that 
nuclear proliferators such as India and Pakistan, and North Korea have demonstrated no apparent 
inclination to reconsider their positions in light of massive and continuing nuclear disarmament by the two 
largest nuclear weapons states. 
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argument are too pessimistic, underestimating the extent to which many 
proliferants continue to depend on outside assistance. This school of thought 
does not dispute that technology diffusion exists and that it will continue to 
increase over time. However, it regards the extreme pessimism about the 
negative consequences as rather exaggerated. The fact that the overwhelming 
majority of proliferants in all of the proliferation areas continue to go to great 
lengths to obtain foreign assistance in pursuing their programs is seen ipso 
facto as proof that such outside assistance remains an important for 
proliferation. As one recent US government advisory panel concludes, 'Foreign 
assistance is pervasive, enabling and often the preferred path to ballistic missile 
and WMD capability' (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat off. 
1998). 
It has already been noted that the technology diffusion argument is widely 
acknowledged to be less relevant in the case of missiles than for CBW. 
According to multiple open source assessments, foreign assistance has played 
a critical role in the missile and/or SLV programs of countries as diverse as 
Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Syria. 
Even the few self-sufficient countries such as Israel and North Korea could not 
have achieved that status without initial foreign assistance. A recent case study 
of the Condor II IRBM program - pursued jointly by Argentina, Egypt, Iraq and 
Libya in the late 1980s before the advent of significant supply-side missile 
nonproliferation efforts and then shut down, apparently in large part due to the 
capability-denial efforts of the MTCR countries - reveals just how critical access 
to foreign assistance can be in enabling missile proliferation: 
The technology was basically contraband from Germany, 
France and the United States, in some cases with the 
complicity of important and prestigious Western firms. A 
very advanced technical plant was built in ... Argentina, 
almost entirely with smuggled technology (Escude 1998: 
57). 
Beyond missiles, some observers argue that the relevance of technology 
diffusion is also often overstated in the chemical realm. For example, one 
comprehensive technical study states: 
Conventional thinking is that chemical weapons (CW) are 
relatively easy to produce. Technically that may be true if 
produced in laboratory quantities, since the chemistry is 
well known and the chemical formulas are readily 
available in open literature. However, production beyond 
laboratory quantities requires materials, chemicals, 
process equipment, expertise, and some advanced 
technology. Additionally, the ability to produce chemical 
munitions alone does not assure a militarily viable option 
without other components (L. Dunn et al. 1992: 111-19). 
Significantly, similar arguments are not heard in the case of biological items. 
Thus, proponents of the continuing foreign dependence argument tend to see 
overall missile dependence as very high, CW dependence as lower but 
nonetheless not insubstantial, and BW dependence as low. 
The prescriptive implications of continuing foreign dependence are 
obvious to adherents of this view. As Bertsh, Cupitt and Yamamoto aver, 
'Export controls on dual-use items (goods and technologies with commercial 
and military applications) can be critical tools for stemming proliferation well into 
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the next century' (1997: 408). Spector offers a balanced articulation of this 
perspective: 
Although the diffusion of advanced scientific and industrial 
capabilities has brought the development of weapons of 
mass destruction and advanced delivery systems within 
the grasp of an increasing number of regional powers, it is 
self-evident that controlling transfers of hardware needed 
for the manufacture of such arms remains an important 
element in international efforts to retard the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery 
systems. Imported hardware and technology remain a 
significant factor in the efforts of states such as Iran, 
Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan to develop nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons, as well as missile delivery 
systems (1996: 173). 
This argument is seen to be reinforced to the extent that suppliers target 
specific programs: 'When we pick a target and stay focused, it does work' 
(Sokolski tst. 1991 : 134 ). 8 
Choke Points 
A variation on the continuing foreign dependence argument is that supply-
side nonproliferation can be fine-tuned to overcome the negative repercussions 
of technology diffusion by concentrating on key choke points for technology, 
equipment, and material. This argument is articulated frequently by US officials 
among others. It is based on two premises. Firstly, that, 'Export controls can be 
effective when dealing with certain types of technology - such as advance 
guidance systems crucial to missile development - that are in the hands of only 
a few suppliers' (Keller & Nolan 1997-98). Secondly, that it is not necessary to 
block all, or for that matter even most, equipment and technology; only a few 
essential areas need to be impeded in order for capability-denial to be effective 
(Sokolski tst. 1991 ). Thus, focusing on technology choke points can make 
denial strategies effective in stopping the spread of proscribed weapons, even 
CBW programs using mature dual-use technologies (Eckert tst. 1994; 
Freedenberg tst. 1989; Tarbell tst. 1995; Wallerstein tst. 1997). 
To a greater or lesser extent, choke point technologies appear to exist in 
all of the proliferation areas. For example, although CW production equipment 
and technology is largely dual-use, it still requires at least some specialised 
equipment, particularly for the production of nerve agents (Goldberg tst. 1989). 
Moreover, a number of precursor chemicals have few civilian applications. 
Keeley (1995) notes that, even for mature technologies, there are always points 
in the dual-use production stream that involve exclusively military applications, 
and that the final stages of weaponisation (i.e. systems integration and testing) 
are by definition exclusively military. This leads him to conclude in the end that, 
notwithstanding technology diffusion, supply-side efforts are not inherently 
8 That said, it has already been noted that achieving wide political support for targeted denial is 
very difficult. Indeed, even export control optimists such as Bertsch, Cupitt and Yamamoto (1997) express 
scepticism about US efforts to rally support for targeting more stringent denial measures against so-called 
rogue states, warning that others are likely to perceive this as 'cover for US commercial and security 
interests, not Western or global interests ... that the definition of rogue state depends on the vagaries of US 
national interests' (415). So while a targeted approach may in theory augment the impact of continuing 
foreign dependence, in practice it is likely to prove difficult to muster and sustain necessary political 
consensus. 
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ineffectual, but that they need to be honed to target military production streams 
and those civilian production streams with the most military utility. 
Qualitative Deepening 
Whether or not they adhere to the notion that technology diffusion makes 
it increasingly futile to try to prevent the spread of proscribed capabilities, many 
observers believe that this argument does not apply (or at least applies less) to 
efforts to impede the qualitative deepening of proliferation. They note that 
advanced programs remain beyond the reach of most developing countries, 
and that this is more or less true across the proliferation areas. This is viewed 
as important because there are significant differences between the threats 
posed by basic versus advanced capabilities in each of these areas (see Figure 
3). For example, one study asserts, 'Across proliferation, acquisition of more 
advanced capabilities should be distinguished from possession of basic, entry-
level capability' (L. Dunn et al. 1992: 1-8). 
Figure 3: Basic Versus Advanced Capabilities 
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•single force delivery munitions control, (e.g. micro-
warheads accuracy systems stockpiles predictability encapsulation) 
•small-scale •penetration •small-scale •tailored •small-scale •munitions 
production aids production munitions production stockpiles 
•slow •multiple •small •large-scale •no •large-scale 
retargeting warheads stockpiles production stockpiles production 
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solid fuel) logistics •wide-area 
•large delivery 
inventory 
Source: Multiple sources (including L. Dunn eta/. 1992, Tables 1-4). 
Many analysts argue that, even in cases where capability-denial tactics 
are unable to prevent the spread of proliferation, they 'still can help to contain 
the eventual scope and sophistication of existing programs, even in cases in 
which countries have crossed the NBC or missile threshold' (Lewis Dunn 1998: 
66). This argument is especially prevalent for missiles, where the general level 
of technology diffusion to begin with is relatively low. For instance, Elleman and 
Harvey note: 
The diffusion of technologies and equipment...will enable 
some of the more advanced regional states to establish 
over the next decade a capacity domestically to produce 
short range (less than 500km) and inaccurate ballistic 
missiles, irrespective of export controls. Indeed, the MTCR 
alone will not halt missile proliferation. The regime, 
however, may be capable of limiting future threats by 
inhibiting countries from making qualitative improvements 
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in range and accuracy (1993: 27). 
An example that is often cited to illustrate the value of this is that during the 
Gulf War, Iraq had only limited-range and inaccurate SCUD derivatives, rather 
than intermediate-range and highly accurate Condor II missiles. It may be 
recalled that Iraq tried to use radiological warfare of sorts by firing concrete-
tipped missiles at an Israeli nuclear reactor, but was unable to score a hit. 
Significantly though, the same line of reasoning is also applied at the 
higher end of the technology diffusion spectrum, including the overwhelmingly 
dual-use biological realm. For example: 'A crude BW capability is within many 
countries' reach, but more sophisticated, militarily useable options - with less 
perishable agents, more sophisticated delivery means, and protection at home 
- are likely to be more difficult to obtain' (L. Dunn et al. 1992: 1-6-7). 
Specifically, 'Nearly all proliferant states lack the sophisticated scientific and 
technical infrastructure needed to develop novel agents' (Forsberg et al. 1995, 
p. 57). Moreover, Western countries retain a virtual lock on the weapons 
potentiality afforded by genetic engineering, which is beyond the grasp of all but 
a few industrialised countries (L. Dunn et al. 1992). Even Keeley (1995) 
concludes that supply-side measures are effective, and probably will remain so, 
against the proliferation of high-end systems across the proliferation areas. 
Proponents of supply-side strategies assert that preventing qualitative 
proliferation represents a profoundly important part of the anti-proliferation 
enterprise. Sokolski (tst. 1991) notes that improvements in missile guidance 
accuracy can augment lethality by hundreds, thousands, or even many tens of 
thousands of casualties. As for CBW, he observes, 'Although we can hope to 
cope defensively against current CBW threats, we may not have as much 
reason to be hopeful against advanced agents' (p. 127). Along the same lines, 
one study concludes: 'The qualitative dimension of BW proliferation is now at 
least as threatening as the possible spread of BW programs to new states' (L. 
Dunn et al. 1992: IV-2). This last statement might well apply to the other 
proliferation areas, because virtually all the advanced capabilities identified in 
the chart above are seen to greatly enhance the threat posed by these 
weapons. 
Driving Up Costs, Slowing Down Progress 
The vast majority of analysts believe that, regardless of whether denial 
tactics are able to prevent the spread of proscribed programs, these tools are 
almost always able to increase their costs and to slow down their rate of 
progress (Lunbo 1997; Simpson 1998. Even the strongest promoters of non-
possession norms do not as a rule dispute this modest claim. For example, 
Evans and Grant offer the following assessment of the Australia Group: 
The effectiveness of the system cannot be established in 
an absolute manner, but it has raised the cost of acquiring 
an offensive CW capability by drying up sources and 
diverting the delivery routes of CW proliferators. It may 
therefore have delayed the programs of countries seeking 
to acquire CW by forcing them into alternative and less 
efficient routes (1991: 88). 
Although non-possession enthusiasts do not usually extol such modest 
outcomes, defenders of the supply-side approach see them as extremely 
valuable. For example Carus, while expressing scepticism that export controls 
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can prevent the spread of missile capabilities, nevertheless suggests that 
merely raising costs of individual programs in some cases can still serve to 
prevent proliferation. He explains: 
It is likely that increasing diplomatic and economic costs 
will lead to the cancellation of some missile programs. If 
missile acquisition is made more expensive, other military 
requirements will compete for limited resources available 
for weapons procurement. Under such circumstances, 
missile programs are apt to be eliminated or given 
reduced priority. Higher costs also will affect the 
international trade in missiles by making purchases more 
expensive and less reliable (1990: 58). 
Similar benefits are seen to be derived from delaying the progress of programs 
of concern. Bertsch, Cuppitt and Yamamoto note: 
Many analysts view export controls as a 'second-best' 
form of policy. Effective export controls, however, can buy 
time for a host of alternative diplomatic, economic, and 
military policies, or a variety of events, particularly the 
advent of democracy, to further delay or even prevent 
proliferation, as well as raising the issue on the policy 
agenda and providing an important symbol of no 'business 
as usual' with targets of the policy (1997: 408). 
Lewis Dunn makes a similar point: 
The importance of slowing programs and buying time 
should not be underestimated. Buying time is important to 
allow outsiders to try to influence countries' incentives to 
acquire NBC weaponry, sometimes beginning dialogues 
on nonproliferation that may bear fruit only years later. By 
slowing programs, export controls have on several 
occasions also made it possible for 'other things to 
happen', not least new thinking by old leaders or new 
leaders rejecting old thinking (1998: 66). 
As one veteran US State Department official interviewed observes, 'The classic 
examples of nonproliferation successes, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, are 
really successes of keeping the lid on until more fundamental things change'. 
Some observers point out that, even in cases where delay does not 
ultimately kill a program, it still gives Western countries breathing room to 
ensure that their defensive capabilities stay ahead of a proliferator's efforts to 
exceed them (Hirsh 1998; Sokolski tst. 1991). Testimony by a US Defense 
official makes underscores that these are critical parallel benefits of delay: 
We think of our task as slowing the dangerous spread ... to 
prevent the threat from exceeding our defensive 
capabilities .... We, therefore, talk about slowing the 
proliferation of threatening technologies, of threatening 
weapons systems, in order to give ourselves more time to 
perfect other measures, active and passive defensive 
measures; of course, that includes also more time for 
diplomacy, for regional understanding and so forth to work 
(Hinds tst. 1989a: 14 ). 
The bottom line is that even the most modest claims for the capability-
denial approach are seen by some to make a critical contribution to responding 
effectively to the threat of proliferation. 
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NON-POSSESSION NORM-BUILDING 
Negative Perspectives 
Breakout 
As one senior ACDA official observes, the technology diffusion argument 
cuts both ways (Mahley int.). He notes, 'A [non-possession] norm has exactly 
the same problem in terms of the explosion of technology because there are 
then ways to work around the strictures of the norm.'9 This observation lies at 
the heart of the breakout argument, one of the main criticisms levelled at the 
non-possession approach. Because relevant capabilities with dual-use and 
defensive applications typically are permitted under the non-possession 
formula, to the extent that the line between these capabilities and proscribed 
weapons programs is narrow or blurred, a country can legally acquire 
capabilities just short of a prohibited program within the framework of treaty 
safeguards. In other words, the nonproliferation buffer is reduced to precisely 
the width and clarity of the line separating allowable civilian and defensive 
programs from proscribed weapons programs. 
Proponents of the breakout argument note that participation in a non-
possession treaty-norm does not merely allow this to happen, but indeed 
facilitates the process by explicitly legitimising and even encouraging outside 
support for permissible cognate activities in exchange for such activities being 
subject to treaty safeguards against diversion to prohibited uses (e.g. BWC 
Article X, CWC Article XI). This is essentially the 'atoms for peace' formula 
pioneered in the NPT, which has subsequently been used as the normative 
model in the non-nuclear areas. In much the same way that critics of supply-
side nonproliferation argue that transposing the antecedent nuclear export 
control model to the other proliferation areas is inappropriate - because the 
technology is too diffuse to be controlled effectively - critics of non-possession 
treaty-norms argue that transposing the antecedent nuclear safeguards model 
to the other areas is inappropriate because meaningful thresholds do not exist 
between permissible and prohibited activities. 
The technical overlap between civilian and/or defensive programs and 
proscribed military programs in the CB/M areas is acknowledged almost 
universally. In the realm of ballistic missiles, Chow (1993) concludes definitively 
that there is no way to safeguard against converting a civilian SL V to an 
offensive ballistic missile. There is also extensive overlap between certain 
aspects of advanced civilian and military aircraft and unmanned air vehicle 
(UAV) technology and offensive cruise missiles (Defense Science Board off. 
1995). Sokolski acerbically observes, 'As for safeguarding "peaceful" space 
launchers and drones, one might as well attempt to safeguard "peaceful" 
nuclear explosives' (1996: 93). Likewise, missile defence capabilities involve 
many of the most sophisticated aspects of missile technology. 
We have already seen that the applicable technologies are heavily dual-
use in the CBW areas. In terms of just how thin the breakout line separating 
civilian and military capabilities can be, Webster (tst. 1989) notes that certain 
9 Note that this assertion is based on the notion of an artificially built and enforced norm rather than 
the more traditional notion of a norm being a reflection of a deep existing consensus. In the latter case, 
problems such as cheating are obviously not highly germane. 
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civilian chemical production facilities can be converted to CW production in less 
than a day. Erlick notes the line is even thinner for BW, asserting, 'Most 
production facilities using microorganisms, including pharmaceutical plants or 
even breweries, can be converted to produce biological or toxin agents in a 
matter of hours, with modest prior provision,' and thereafter can produce 
militarily significant quantities of agent in as little as 96 hours (tst. 1989: 33). 
However, in addition to this civilian overlap, the line between prescribed 
defensive and proscribed offensive military capabilities is also thin and fuzzy. 
Robinson notes, 'In terms of what can actually be observed, a program of 
research into CW weapons may not be intrinsically different from a program of 
research into protection against CW weapons' (1992: 62). Erlick makes the 
same point regarding BW: 'The ultimate objective, be it vaccine or weapon, 
depends on the intent of the use' (tst. 1989: 33). King and Strauss assert that 
when it comes to bio-defence, 'It is not that the programs "appear" similar; it is 
that they have many of he same components' (1990: 122). Moreover, unlike 
CW-related defensive research, in the case of agents used for bio-defence 
research, 'To go from legitimate "laboratory quantities" to "weapons quantities" 
is a matter of days or weeks, not years' (Larsen 1995: 10). Additionally, 'The 
blurring of [BW] defensive and offensive programs is not limited to research, but 
extends to development, testing, production and training' (King & Strauss 1990: 
125). Even passive CBW defences (mock suits, detection equipment) represent 
a key requirement of a useable offensive capability (L. Dunn et. al 1992; 
Findlay 1993 ). 10 
Acquiring breakout capabilities does not involve cheating. In fact, the 
actual act of breaking out is itself quite legal, since virtually all treaty-norms 
include an abrogation clause allowing a party to withdraw after a brief specified 
period (e.g. BWC Article Xlll). 11 Critics of treaty-based nonproliferation see this 
as a fatal flaw. Gray, for example, argues that, 'States decline to be locked into 
regimes of arms control, or regime-compliance behavior, when it no longer 
serves their needs' (1993: 342). 12 
Cheating 
The notion that technology diffusion can cut both ways also applies to the 
problem of cheating. The breakout problem exists even when a state fully 
complies with its obligations. However, many critics of the normative approach 
point out that cheating can serve to aggravate the breakout problem. In a 
sense, cheating can be thought of as covert breakout-in-place. Needless to 
say, one's perspective on the seriousness of this problem depends on the 
perceptions that one has about the effectiveness of a given treaty-norm's 
compliance enforcement mechanisms. Put another way, if verification is seen to 
be effective, then covert non-compliance need not be a matter of concern. 
Ergo, differing assumptions about the importance of the problem of cheating 
tend to correspond to differing assessments of the effectiveness of verification. 
Concern about cheating tends to be associated with the prevalence of 
applicable dual-use technology, which can provide effective camouflage for 
10 It should be acknowledged that at least a few observers argue that some clear distinctions can 
be drawn between offensive and defensive capabilities. 
11 North Korea's threat in 1993 to invoke just such a withdrawal prerogative regarding the NPT led 
to the crisis that resulted in the special arrangements of the Agreed Framework. 
12 That said, historically states have rarely abrogated their adherence to arms control treaties. 
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prohibited activities. Wallerstein explains this dynamic as follows: 
Whereas traditional arms control techniques have utility in 
counting, monitoring and verifying munitions or munitions-
related equipment, such as missile silos, artillery pieces or 
tanks, the arms control approach is less effective when 
the armament in question is produced substantially on the 
basis of dual-use technology .... This leads to the postulate 
that the more limited the probability of detection - or 
stated differently, the easier it is to mask or hide an NBC 
weapons capability - the less 'deterrence' is gained from 
traditional measures such as mandatory declarations, and 
intrusive challenge inspections (1998: 2). 
It therefore follows that verification problems will be least applicable for 
missiles, greater for CW, and greatest for BW. For example, it may well be 
impossible to safeguard a sounding rocket or SLV against breakout as a 
ballistic missile, but it is feasible to verify whether such systems are being 
tested as ballistic missiles (i.e. whether they come back down). 13 By contrast, 
the dual-use nature of CBW provides ample scope for cheating. Kay elucidates: 
The industrial base of many middle-size, developing 
countries is such that a modest chemical or biological 
weapons program could be easily accommodated within 
their open civilian infrastructure, without the construction 
of significant dedicated facilities and with only trivial and 
short fused adjustments associated with final 
weaponization (1995: 101 ). 
There is considerable debate about the efficacy of CW verification - as it 
were falling in the middle - with various analysts reaching profoundly diverging 
conclusions. In a representative example of the sceptic school of analysis, 
Bailey asserts: 'Nonproliferation treaties are either unverifiable (as in the case 
of the biological treaty) or they have verification measures that provide little or 
no confidence against cheating (e.g. nuclear and chemical treaties)' (Bailey 
1993c: 15). On the other hand many experts argue or imply that, even if not 
absolutely water-tight, rigorous CW-related verification mechanisms can provide 
a high level of deterrence against cheating. 14 However, a number of real-world 
events in the past several years are often cited to bolster the case for 
scepticism. For example, Russia has reputedly admitted that the Soviet Union 
developed a novel nerve agent called Novichok, specifically tailored to 
circumvent CWC verification provisions by using components not listed on any 
of the ewe precursor schedules, and which is 5-8 times more toxic than the 
most toxic common nerve agents (CBW Bulletin 02/93). Sceptics' perspectives 
were greatly reinforced by revelations which followed high-level Iraqi defections 
in August 1995 that revealed that, despite several years of the most intensive, 
intrusive verification efforts imaginable by UNSCOM, significant elements of the 
Iraqi CBW program had remained undetected. As a senior US intelligence 
official notes, in terms of CW-related items UNSCOM failed to detect precursors 
amounting to 500 tons of VX agent (Oehler tst. 1996). 
13 For example, without the benefits of any cooperative verification mechanisms whatsoever, the 
US and other Western countries were able to detect a recent North Korean missile test flight over Japan, 
as well as to discount belated North Korean claims that the test involved a peaceful SLV. 
14 See, for example: Adams 1989; Black 1993; Brin 1993, April; Burck, Gordon & Flowerree 1991; 
Findlay 1991a; Freeman & Mathews 1988; Krause 1992; Krepon 1992; Krutzsch & Trapp 1994; Latter 
1992; Pearson 1993b; Roberts 1998; Robinson 1991; Stock, Geissler & Trevan 1995; Vachon 1994. 
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Even many verification optimists concede that it is impossible to achieve 
high confidence of detection when it comes to BW possession (Smithson 1998; 
Wheelis 1992).15 The cautionary lessons of UNSCOM are, if anything, seen as 
even starker in the biological field. As Wallerstein (1998) observes, Iraq was not 
only able to hide a large-scale offensive BW program, but in fact made 
significant technical advances (e.g. testing new aerosolisation methods) despite 
UNSCOM's presence. Furthermore, the program that UNSCOM failed to 
uncover in Iraq was larger and more sophisticated than most, and thus, in 
principle, more detectable (Kay 1995). In addition to large stockpiles of 
standard agents such as anthrax and botulinus toxin, Iraqi military scientists 
were experimenting with novel agents, for example aflatoxin, mycotoxin, ricin, 
and camelpox, all of which had been weaponised in munitions and/or missile 
warheads (Thraenert 1997). Yet some scholars (Wright 1993) prior to the 1995 
defections - a political happenstance having nothing to do with UNSCOM's 
verification efforts - used the negative results of UNSCOM inspections to cast 
doubt on longstanding contentions that Iraq had violated the BWC. Indeed, 
according to the head of UNSCOM, at the time of the defections UNSCOM 
itself was within weeks of making a 'serious mistake' by issuing a final report 
giving Iraq a clean bill of health (Butler 1998, 19 June). Putting it mildly, Oehler 
notes, 'These revelations demonstrated the ability of countries to hide 
capabilities in the face of intrusive international inspection regimes' (Oehler tst. 
1996: 5). 16 
Whatever the initial effectiveness of a verification system, its long-term 
utility as a deterrent against cheating is thought to decrease as participating 
target states become familiar with its weaknesses by receiving inspections 
and/or providing inspectors (Bailey 1993b; Kay 1995). Furthermore, the ability 
of individual countries to assist international verification efforts by providing vital 
intelligence likewise diminishes over time, because the very act of sharing 
intelligence multilaterally inevitably exposes sources and methods which in turn 
enables the would-be proliferant to undertake countermeasures (Kay 1995). 
Finally, verification and compliance are closely related, but not 
synonymous. Whereas the former is a technical, institutionalised process to 
detect non-compliance, the latter is an overtly political, situational process to 
respond to evidence of it. Thus, even if verification points to cheating, any 
ambiguity short of a proverbial 'smoking gun' may be insufficient to ensure the 
broad political that is required to take firm action against a suspected 
transgressor. In other words, imperfect verification can exacerbate, and be 
compounded by, political reluctance to enforce compliance. 
Non-participation 
A final criticism of the non-possession approach is that it only works for 
15 That said, these and many other analysts argue or imply that even imperfect verification 
provides more deterrence against cheating than nothing, and that SW-related verification mechanisms 
should therefore be made as rigorous as possible. See for example: Chevrier 1996, 1998; Dando 1993, 
1994, 1995, 1997; Kearney 1992; MacEachin 1998; Pearson 1993a, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Pearson 
& Titball 1993; Pounds 1993; Roberts 1998; Smithson 1998b; Tucker 1998a, 1998b; Vachon 1997; 
Wheelis 1992; Zilinskas 1988. 
16 Barton (1993), Chauvistre (1993), Duncan and Johnson (1997). and Tucker (1996) all make the 
important observation that, although the UNSCOM experience has demonstrated the difficulty of verifying 
BW non-possession, it has also provided valuable lessons on how to make verification as effective as 
possible against a determined cheater. 
60 
states that opt to participate, with the assumption being that many states 
pursuing proliferation programs will choose not to join. States that have no 
intention of proliferating bear the sovereignty and other costs of membership, 
while hard-core proliferants remain unaffected. As one observer states: 
The BWe and ewe may have some useful provisions 
that will reduce worldwide stocks of biological and 
chemical weapons, but they cannot protect against 
regimes that do not join or governments that violate their 
provisions. The BWe and ewe will eliminate chemical 
and biological weapons in the US and other law-abiding 
countries, while leaving such weapons in place in the 
countries that represent the greatest threat (Hackett 1996: 
2). 
Positive Perspectives 
Changing the Milieu 
Advocates of the normative approach argue that its value should not be judged 
narrowly in terms of the instantaneous impact of a specific treaty. Rather, they 
suggest that the greatest benefit to accrue from an interlocking web of non-
possession treaty-norms is the long-term impact that such a network of 
instruments can have on the fundamental attitudes of states as well as the 
environment in which they operate. This notion is based on the tenet that 
normative treaties do not merely reflect and lock in place an existing consensus 
among states, but that in fact the identities, interests, and policies of states are 
changed over time by the new international norms that these instruments help 
to build (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein). In other words, norms shape 
change as well as vice versa. Therefore, even if a treaty-norm is not universal 
today, it can gain momentum as more states join over time, until the critical 
mass is attained whereby the web of interlocking norms has altered the 
proliferation environment to such an extent that non-possession will have 
become the genuine consensus. 
Fergusson explains that this process begins on the national level as states 
engage with external global norms over time: 
This engagement and exposure will gradually result in 
learning through which states will begin to alter their 
thinking .... They will slowly integrate these global beliefs 
and norms, altering their national behaviour and creating 
the conditions for shifting the process itself to regional 
local, and dyadic levels (1994: 183). 
Roberts notes that this is a long-term strategy, and that accordingly there is no 
expectation for immediate results: 
This is not to argue that norms can prevent ambitious and 
aggressive leaders from acquiring or using weapons of 
mass destruction; rather they work over the long term to 
shape the milieu in which leaders garner support 
domestically and internationally (1993: 13). 
Thus, success eventually will 'rest on the voluntary renunciation of WMD by the 
overwhelming majority of the world community' (Muller 1997: 69). 
A corollary to this argument is that, unlike the capability-denial approach, 
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the non-possession approach sees no inherent danger in the spread of dual-
use capabilities (Mutimer 1998). For example, Muller asserts, 'There is no 
linear, causal relationship between holding technology and abusing it for 
weapons purposes' (1997: 66). This general argument is constitutively related 
to the proposition that technology diffusion makes capability-denial futile in the 
long term, and that therefore ultimately the only hope of preventing and rolling 
back proliferation is to change prospective proliferators' intentions to possess 
proscribed weapons. That is, if technology diffusion is inevitable, then it is more 
sensible to regulate it (i.e. ensuring it is not used for proscribed purposes) than 
to try to fight it. 
Because this argument concentrates on the goal of building a consensus 
by changing perceptions over time, rather than blocking concrete instances of 
proliferation in the short term, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of 
specific instruments with primary reference to the long-term goal. For example, 
Butler (1998, 19 June) argues that the purpose of verification for a non-
possession treaty-norm should not be to detect actual instances of cheating, 
but instead to create a general climate of confidence. Likewise, most non-
possession advocates are not particularly concerned about the criticism that 
only 'good guys' are affected by the rules, since their focus is on the future 
when this description will apply universally. 
Inherent Deterrent 
A number of analysts argue that the inherent deterrent value of treaty-
norms, even in the short term, should not be underestimated. For example, 
Carus (1992a) concludes prior to the completion of the CWC that, 
notwithstanding its limitations, the problem of CW proliferation would probably 
be worse without the CWC's codification and enforcement of a normative 
prohibition. In a landmark study, Chevrier (1995) examines the original BWC, 
as an example of an extremely weak treaty-norm (i.e. one with no compliance 
mechanisms). She finds that the mere existence of a legal prohibition provides 
a meaningful disincentive for covert possession by participants, despite a very 
low probability of detection. This deterrent is based on the fact that even being 
suspected of violating any treaty brings into question a country's overall 
trustworthiness. Chevrier even finds that there is a deterrent for non-parties 
who act overtly or covertly in contravention of a widely subscribed non-
possession norm. 17 She extrapolates that, this being the case, any 
strengthening of a norm's enforcement process can only serve to strengthen its 
basic deterrent value. Nor does it matter if this extra deterrence is only 
marginal, because: 
From the point of view of a country concerned with the 
compliance of others, undetected possession ... is not a 
more serious security threat if the weapons are outlawed, 
provided that the country maintains its ... defenses and has 
no interest in having its own arsenal (80). 
Although Chevrier's is one of the only detailed studies of the explicit 
deterrent effect of a legal prohibition, it reflects widely held assumptions among 
cooperative nonproliferation supporters. The bottom line is that treaty-norms 
17 This assertion seems to be borne out by the negative consequences suffered by India and 
Pakistan as a result of their recent nuclear tests, despite the fact that neither country was party to either 
the NPT or CTBT, and therefore did not violate any legal obligations. 
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are seen as valuable even in the short term by providing an inherent negative 
incentive against possession, and that any strengthening of the baseline norm 
for example through rigorous verification serves to incrementally augment this 
deterrent value. Thus, arguments that verification is less than perfect do not 
negate the need to make verification as strong as possible, and in any case do 
not detract from the inherent deterrent value of having a legal prohibition. 
Limiting the Problem 
Even sceptics of the ability of norms to influence the behaviour of 
proliferators concede that they are a valuable means to narrow the problem to 
that of the 'hard cases'. That is to say, there is wide agreement that treaty-
norms are reasonably effective at their core prophylactic mission, and that this 
is extremely beneficial in preventing proliferation from begetting more 
proliferation. The figurative targets in this sense are not Libya and North Korea, 
but Japan and Sweden. One key US official states this case as follows: 
What a norm does, it helps you by limiting the problem. Its 
a way of keeping the vast majority of countries in the 
world that don't do this stuff from doing it in the future. By 
signing up, it makes it less likely they're going to go for it. 
By knowing that their neighbors have signed up, it makes 
them less worried that their neighbors are going to go for 
it. So that's the biggest thing that the norm does for you 
([State] int.). 
This is the reverse of the criticism that norms only affect the good guys, saying 
that even if this is true, it is important as a means to ensure that today's good 
guys stay that way. 
CONSEQUENCE-MITIGATION 
There has been comparatively little analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of use-denial strategies as a discreet approach for responding to 
proliferation. Moreover, there are few observers who take starkly positive or 
negative positions on this category of proliferation response. It is unclear 
whether this is because the concept itself has only relatively recently received 
public prominence, and moreover is widely seen as merely an adjunct or 
subordinate approach to nonproliferation of one type or another, or because its 
heavy emphasis on military means is so different from traditional 
nonproliferation tools. 18 
Negative Perspectives 
The most significant criticism regarding the deterrence element of 
consequence-mitigation in the CBW areas centres on refuting the assumption 
that this is best achieved through the threat of in-kind retaliation. Subsequent to 
all Western states renouncing in-kind deterrence in the early-1990s, however, 
this argument has largely been rendered moot by its own success. Recent 
18 Of course the concepts of deterrence and CB/M defence are nothing new. But during the Cold 
War they were associated almost exclusively with the strategic Soviet threat rather than the regional 
proliferation context. While this perception was not entirely accurate in terms of US proliferation response 
(see Chapter 4), the fact remains that most observers did not take heed of military countermeasures to 
proliferation until the public profile of this approach was suddenly, dramatically, and somewhat 
misleadingly elevated by the US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993. 
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criticism of anti-proliferation deterrence considers whether nuclear deterrence is 
credible against limited use of CBW, or whether even overwhelming 
conventional superiority can provide an adequate deterrent against WMD. 
Another argument is that robust military deterrence capabilities may have the 
unintended consequence of provoking a sense of powerlessness and insecurity 
that could provoke weaker states to embark on proliferation as the only 
available asymmetric counterweight to Western military dominance. 
Note that in reality all but the last of these 'negative' perspectives do not 
actually challenge the fundamental utility of anti-proliferation deterrence, but 
instead merely question the particular methods by which best to achieve it. 
Indeed, Payne (1995) offers one of the few examples of a truly negative 
perspective on anti-proliferation deterrence. He questions the efficacy of any 
kind of deterrence against rogue states, noting that such regimes are highly 
prone to misperception and miscalculation, and that deterrence concepts 
developed in the bipolar Cold War context do not readily apply to the multi-polar 
anti-proliferation mission. 
Arguments against the counterproliferation element of consequence-
mitigation are largely technical rather than conceptual. A number of military 
analysts question whether the more ambitious aspects of counterproliferation 
(e.g. NMD) are technically achievable or worth the enormous costs involved. 
This debate is aimed at others who assess that the emerging revolution in 
advanced military technologies is making effective defence a feasible prospect 
across the board (McColl 1997; Pilat & Kirchner 1995). 
Beyond these technical questions, even counterproliferation sceptics such 
as Turpen and Kadner (1997) do not challenge the principle that, in addition to 
prevention, it behoves Western countries to take at least some prudent steps to 
cope with mass destruction weapons that manage to slip through the 
nonproliferation net. 19 Concerns have been expressed that counterproliferation 
might be destabilising. However, these seem to be based largely on 
understandable early confusion about what the US had in mind when it 
launched its Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993 - for the most part due to 
muddled, contradictory and evolving US explanations - with critics assuming 
(inaccurately) that Washington was proposing routinely to go to war with any 
country that had acquired proscribed capabilities (i.e. a systematic program of 
peacetime strikes designed to roll back proliferated stockpiles and production 
facilities). Therefore, although the notion of peacetime military responses to 
proliferation continue to be seen as highly controversial, regardless of whether 
they constitute preventative capability-denial or pre-emptive use-denial, these 
concerns have dampened as counterproliferation has come to be understood 
as a predominantly defensive/reactive concept. 20 
Since few observers reject the notion of consequence-mitigation 
altogether, particularly in terms of deterrence and latent military preparedness, 
19 Young (1997, January) is a notable exception, characterising counterproliferation as a worthless 
concept writ large - hatched by warmongers in the service of the US military-industrial complex, and 
driven by technological determinism and the latent imperialist instincts of American leaders -.and 
assertin~ that it only serves to make war more likely. 
2 Putting aside US intentions for its counterproliferation initiative, the few real-world examples of 
WMD-related military attacks (e.g. Israel's attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in the 1980s) have been 
intended to prevent the acquisition of initial capability rather than to roll back proliferated programs. Even 
Allied attacks on German missile and nuclear facilities during World War II fall into this category. The only 
obvious exception is coalition bombing during the Gulf War. 
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the harshest critique ends up being not about the merits of the approach per se, 
but rather on whether it effectively compliments the broader, pre-existing 
nonproliferation project. This in turn is just one aspect of the complex question 
of complementarity among all three of the anti-proliferation approaches (see 
next section below). 
Positive Perspectives 
As just noted, most observers in principle accept the utility of having some 
means effectively to deter and defend against WMD attacks, if possible. All 
sides in the mainstream debate therefore in principle embrace a positive 
perspective on consequence-mitigation. The only debate is regarding whether 
this is technically possible, and if so, at what cost. 
The most categorically positive perspectives on consequence-mitigation 
come from observers who are pessimistic about the utility of either approach to 
nonproliferation. These nonproliferation pessimists go further than advocating 
prudent deterrence and defence, suggesting that these tools should 
increasingly be seen as the most important element of proliferation response. 
For example, Bailey states: 'Given that there are no effective policies to prevent 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defenses are needed' (Bailey 
1993c). Desutter (1997) and Utgoff (1997) make much the same point 
regarding the need for deterrence. However, even most ardent proponents of 
consequence-mitigation do not suggest that it should replace prevention (i.e. 
nonproliferation) altogether, but rather support it as a complementary adjunct 
response. Fisher (1995) represents an example of the rare exceptions, 
suggesting that a cooperative network of missile defence arrangements with 
key allies should be seen as a viable alternative to preventative 
nonproliferation. 
ARE THESE APPROACHES COMPLEMENTARY? 
General Perspectives 
The capability-denial and non-possession approaches to nonproliferation 
are customarily portrayed as mutually reinforcing, forming an integral two-tier 
structure (Fergusson 1995; Mutimer 1998). Advocates of consequence-
mitigation likewise depict it as complimenting the other nonproliferation 
approaches (Desutter 1997; Gebhard 1995; Wallerstein 1998). The 
implications of such assertions of complementarity are considerable. If the 
different anti-proliferation approaches are mutually reinforcing it makes sense to 
pursue them all at once. Pearson explicitly argues this case, calling for 'a 
sustained effort by states to integrate various policy approaches with the goal of 
a strong and seamless web of deterrence against the production, possession, 
and use of these weapons' (1993b: 161 ). He argues that nonproliferation 
treaties, export controls, and applicable military capabilities are all equally 
important in responding to proliferation A recent academic conference reached 
similar conclusions, agreeing that a model nonproliferation system would 
effectively integrate robust non-possession and denial tools (Stanley 
Foundation 1996a). Likewise, supply-side supporters such as Karp (1996) and 
Ozga (1994) cite the absence of a complementary non-possession treaty-norm 
as a major deficiency in the missile nonproliferation system. 
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If one accepts that the different approaches are complementary, it follows 
that there is no harm in pursuing all approaches with equal vigour. If this is the 
case, then the protracted debate in the policy literature about their respective 
strengths and weaknesses would be largely irrelevant. As one top Australian 
official has suggested: 
The argument about the relative effectiveness of global 
norms and export control regimes in containing the risk of 
proliferation is, I believe, essentially an academic and 
sterile exchange at the most which does no great credit to 
the protagonists of either viewpoint. It has all the flavour of 
fiddling while Rome burns. The plain, inescapable reality 
is that treaties and supplier group regimes must be 
complementary, and must both be effective if proliferation 
is to be stemmed (Evans off. 1993: 3). 
However, in the real world, things are not always as cut and dried as the 
above discussion might suggest. Simultaneously pursuing complementary 
approaches with equal vigour is doubtless an appealing prescription. 
Unfortunately, policy makers face inescapable tensions in choosing among the 
different anti-proliferation approaches. 
In the first place, each anti-proliferation approach entails significant 
costs. 21 The political capital, bureaucratic energy, and funding that countries 
have available nationally and multilaterally to address any policy problem are 
finite, and therefore priorities must be set on how best to allocate limited 
resources among available means. Even assuming that the approaches are 
mutually reinforcing, if one or another is seen to deliver only small benefits at 
considerable costs, it may simply be regarded as not worth pursuing, or only 
worth pursuing if these costs are strictly minimised. So even if the approaches 
do not impair one another directly, implicit trade-offs between them may exist. 
Beyond such resource allocation considerations, to the extent that these 
approaches are not mutually reinforcing, then significant trade-offs are 
inevitable. So are they complementary, even on a conceptual level? Probably 
not, or at least not entirely. Zanders (1997) argues that while some elements of 
nonproliferation may be mutually reinforcing, others directly undermine one 
another. A study prepared for the US Congress by the Office of Technology 
Assessment sets forth similar conclusions: 
Balances must ... be struck between conflicting approaches 
to nonproliferation policy .... These approaches ... do not 
represent diametrically opposed positions, but rather 
indicate opposing tensions that must be balanced against 
each other (US Cong. OTA off. 1993: 29). 
Even for analysts who claim that the different approaches are complementary, 
a close reading usually reveals that they accord a marked priority to one 
approach, with the others relegated to supporting roles. In two contrasting, 
overt examples, Roberts (1998) argues that export controls complement norms, 
but gives clear priority to the latter, while Utgoff (1997) admits that non-
possession norms can be useful, but makes clear that they are worthwhile only 
if they are not too costly and do not interfere with supply-side nonproliferation 
21 To cite just a few obvious examples, export controls restrict profits from trade, intrusive 
verification jeopardises sensitive proprietary and/or national security information, and CBW/M defence 
requires massive military investments. 
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and consequence-mitigation efforts. Indeed, the only categorical assertions of 
absolute complementarity found in the recent literature apply specifically to 
capability-denial and consequence-mitigation strategies (Speier 1999; Utgoff 
1997; Wallerstein 1998). 
Specific Incongruities Between Approaches 
Capability-denial Undermines Non-possession Norms 
There is wide recognition in the literature that the aggressive use of the 
capability-denial approach creates tensions between participating supplier 
countries and both developing countries and non-cooperating suppliers (Bailey 
1993a; Fergusson 1995; Moodie 1995; Roberts 1998; Subrahmanyam 1993). 
While we may be sceptical of claims that the discriminatory and coercive nature 
of supply-side nonproliferation has a direct causal effect on proliferation, it 
seems highly credible that denial strategies would foster resentment in their 
targets that would make these countries less inclined to work cooperatively with 
Western countries as partners in non-possession arrangements. Moodie states: 
From the South's perspective, the emphasis and 
approach of the US-led industrialized states are 
hypocritical, selective, and discriminatory. Regimes such 
as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and 
the Australia Group ... are the objects of particularly intense 
Southern hostility. In the Southern view, these efforts to 
deny technology - especially because they deal with dual-
use technology - have discriminatory implications well 
beyond the military realm .... Regimes such as the MTCR 
are seen as efforts to deny the developing world the 
advanced technologies needed not only for legitimate 
commercial purposes but as the foundation for sustained 
development (1995: 83). 
He goes on to conclude, 'Continued reliance on denial strategies will undermine 
any progress ... because the political support of developing countries is crucial' 
(p. 84 ). MOiier warns that by continuing to pursue denial strategies, Western 
countries risk 'dividing faithful [non-possession] regime members between 
North and South and driving the well-minded non-aligned countries into a 
completely false and deleterious solidarity with a handful of wrongdoers' (1997: 
70). Moreover, as Karp notes regarding the MTCR, there is no way to alter 
these basic characteristics of supply-side mechanisms: 
Despite its strengths, the MTCR will never be able to 
create an image of fairness. Although it is a regime in the 
legal sense, its basis in adversarial delineations makes it 
politically more like an alliance. From the perspective of 
key regional states, of which India is the most vocal, the 
whole approach discriminates against the sovereign right 
of regional governments to arm themselves as they see 
fit. This critique is important because it casts doubt on the 
legitimacy of North-South export controls. 
The same dynamic obviously applies to the more coercive denial tools 
such as sanctions. Therefore, the only way for denial tools to not undermine 
cooperative nonproliferation is to apply them only to countries that do not 
participate in, or who have been unambiguously caught violating, the non-
possession regime. 
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Consequence-mitigation Undermines Non-possession Norms 
Some observers affiliated with the US Defense Department's 
Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) (Gebhard 1995; Wallerstein 1998) have 
made the case that the consequence-mitigation approach might indirectly 
reinforce cooperative nonproliferation by providing a negative incentive for 
acquisition. However, this line of reasoning is widely rejected in the academic 
literature, with analysts of various stripes agreeing that to some extent 
proliferation management strategies tend to undermine nonproliferation (Keeny 
1994; Knoth 1995; Kortunov 1994; McColl 1997; Pengelley 1994; Turpen & 
Kadner 1997). Indeed, even senior officials at the State Department and ACDA 
involved with the CPI, although maintaining that counterproliferation programs 
are justified as a means to protect US interests, nonetheless express doubt that 
such activities provide a disincentive to proliferators (Gallucci int.; Mahley int.). 
Certainly the disincentive logic only makes sense to the extent that states are 
motivated to acquire WMD for the express purpose of using it against the 
United States and its counterproliferation partners. 
How specifically does consequence-mitigation undermine the cooperative 
non-possession approach? Virtually all consequence-mitigation tools carry the 
latent threat of military coercion, and so a case could be made that this 
approach also might erode developing countries' willingness to cooperate with 
Western countries on non-possession norm-building. However, since in theory 
only those few states that actually acquire and use proscribed weapons are 
targets of mitigation strategies, it is at least debatable whether such strategies 
should engender hostility among good-faith parties to nonproliferation treaties. 
Nonetheless, even potential targets of a military capability are likely to perceive 
it as coercive, or at least latently coercive, and therefore might be less inclined 
to work cooperatively with governments pursuing use-denial strategies. 
A more significant and pervasive concern is that robust Western 
preparations to cope with proliferation are defeatist about the overall 
effectiveness of any type nonproliferation. This undermines the norm-building 
approach by signalling an unmistakable vote of no confidence in the efficacy of 
normative instruments. As a US press report noted at the time that 
counterproliferation was launched: 'Some analysts in the arms control 
community oppose the program because they believe it represents capitulation 
to arms proliferators - a collective throwing in the towel on efforts to prevent the 
spread' (Washington Post 5/15/94: A 11 ). According to one account, even the 
nonproliferation bureaucracy in the Pentagon itself shared these concerns 
(Milhollin 1994 ). 
This latter effect does not undermine supply-side nonproliferation in 
particular, because denial strategies do not need to enjoy the confidence of 
their targets, and in any case do not claim eliminate the problem completely. 
Indeed, as Fergusson (1996) notes, counterproliferation can assist supply-side 
nonproliferation by raising the bar of effectiveness and so forcing aspiring 
proliferants to seek more sophisticated programs, which are more costly, 
technically challenging and vulnerable to supply-side disruption. Moreover, US 
Defense officials have long argued that one of the primary benefits gained from 
denial strategies is to buy time to develop effective proliferation 
countermeasures (Fitzgibbon int.). 
In marked contrast, the norm-building approach is premised on gaining the 
confidence of its targets in the effectiveness of the overall system, the aim of 
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which is not merely to attenuate the problem, but to solve it. Non-possession 
norms are constructed on a foundation of collective reassurance. Indeed, 
Robinson asserts that the main normative purpose of a non-possession treaty 
is to inspire enough confidence in member states 'for them to relax, or forgo 
adopting, measures of national self-reliance against that menace' (1987: 21 ). 
By devoting vast resources and energies to proliferation management, Western 
countries are in effect visibly hedging their bets on whether treaty norms 
warrant such confidence. Such an overt signal of doubt cannot help but make 
other countries question whether it is wise to rely too heavily on non-possession 
arrangements as the basis for their security (Keeny 1994 ). And for the majority 
of countries, which do not have the wherewithal to acquire counterproliferation 
capabilities and allowable deterrents, and which do not enjoy an alliance 
relationship with a country that does, the alternative might be a countervailing 
deterrence-in-kind (i.e. possession). Nor are security assurances - those 
frequently vague multilateral undertakings to assist participants who are 
attacked - likely to be sufficiently reassuring to offset these seeds of doubt. 
On an even more direct level, given the overlap between defensive and 
offensive capabilities in the eB/M areas, defensive programs severely 
undermine the effectiveness of non-possession norms by exacerbating the 
problems of breakout and cheating. A number of observers therefore argue that 
nonproliferation treaties could be greatly strengthened if some or all exemptions 
for defensive programs were eliminated (King & Strauss 1990; Wright 1993). 
This remains impossible, however, as long as key participants insist on the right 
to pursue counterproliferation strategies. Again, this problem does not 
especially affect supply-side strategies, since these tend to disregard intentions 
(e.g. defensive versus offensive) in the first place. 
Non-possession Undermines Capability-denial 
Non-possession treaty-norms reinforce supply-side efforts by legitimising 
denial strategies that target non-member proliferant states, but only at the price 
of undermining the legitimacy of similar efforts aimed at member states. Non-
possession treaty-norms explicitly authorise the provision and acquisition 
among their members of dual-use and defensive capabilities short of 
weaponisation. In other words, such treaties essentially define the proliferation 
problem as external (limited to non-member states), notwithstanding intra-
regime problems such as breakout and undetected or unproven cheating. 22 
Burck and Flowerree (1991) epitomise this tendency when they state: 'If all 
countries capable of making chemical weapons subscribed to the [eWC] 
convention, the proliferation problem would disappear' (568). 
Denial efforts targeted against members of non-possession treaty-norms 
are therefore deemed unnecessary, or even inappropriate, because of the 
inherent assumption that the proliferation problem resides primarily outside the 
non-possession regime. Ergo, global denial strategies are only justified as in 
the absence of a global treaty-norm. Stock and De Geer (1997) illustrate this 
thinking by not even considering the possibility that the Australia Group should 
continue to operate once the ewe is fully up and running, despite the fact that 
the treaty's only explicit restriction on intra-member transfers is a relatively 
22 Internal proliferation problems are explicitly limited to cases where parties have unambiguously 
been determined to be in non-compliance. Such internal problems are then dealt with according to the 
internal enforcement provisions of the treaty in question. 
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weak one (on actual weapons agents). 23 
Eisenstein notes the consequences from a capability-denial perspective of 
this legitimising effect on all internal dual-use capabilities: 
Of concern is the prospect that some developing nations 
will sign the ewe with the intention ing controls on 
export of chemicals their countries while preparing 
themselves to break out rapidly from under ewe in times 
national emergency (1993: ix). 
much same in arguing against the of 
global missile ban: 
The problem is the illusion that such a safeguard regime 
would create. The MTCR members would then have to 
provide technical assistance to countries that are willing to 
join the regime. Some countries will join simply because 
they know the regime cannot stop them from transferring 
missile technology from space launchers to ballistic 
missiles. The creation of the regime would greatly reduce 
the likelihood of MTCR members joining forces in 
refraining from providing space launch assistance to 
others (1993: 65). 
Indeed, a number of real-world cases have demonstrated that proliferators such 
as Iraq have been able to use membership in non-possession treaties to 
provide a veneer of legitimacy to their efforts to secure ostensibly civilian 
equipment and technology for military programs (Burrows & Wind rem 1994) 
while at the same time lulling the international community into a false sense of 
confidence. The difficulty this poses from a capability-denial perspective is 
manifest when one considers that suspected proliferators such as Iran and 
North Korea are parties in good standing to non-possession treaty-norms. 
This effect may be magnified in the case of norms that feature verification 
provisions, since in such cases the legitimacy of denial efforts may be 
diminished even in cases where suppliers suspect that a country has an illegal 
weapons program. Supply-side nonproliferation 'has a positive verification 
bias ... the parties are driven to deny technology transfer unless positive 
evidence of compliance exists', whereas the non-possession approach 'is 
driven towards a negative verification bias ... the parties are driven to accept 
technology transfer in the absence of evidence of non-compliance' (Fergusson 
1995: 83). Consequently, unless a non-possession verification system is 
foolproof, it runs the risk of undermining denial by producing 'false negative' 
results. (Recall the scholar [Wright] who in 1993, prior to defectors proving 
otherwise, cited the failure of UNSCOM inspections to find evidence of an 
offensive BW program as the basis for challenging claims that Bagdad had 
violated the BWC.) Poor verification of a non-possession instrument can 
therefore be worse than no verification at all from a capability-denial 
perspective, because politically it becomes nearly impossible to target a facility 
that has received a clean bill of health. For example, in the absence of 
23 Because the treaty has a general prohibition on assisting any state to acquire prohibited 
weapons, the case is often made that this represents a blanket obligation of supply-side restraint, 
including among parties. However, this is not reflected in the kinds of specific rules and implementation 
procedures that are needed for effective national implementation of a multilateral supply-side 
arrangement. 
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inspections uncovering a smoking gun, Iran's status as a CWC member is likely 
to undermine US claims that it has an offensive CW program, making it harder 
for Washington to convince others to target Iran with robust supply-side efforts. 
Non-possession Undermines Consequence-mitigation 
Universal non-possession a 
proliferation by use or threat 
use against its interests through of 
retaliation also defensive 
capabilities and is sometimes 
termed the 'lulling effect'. In other words, imperfect disarmament treaties can 
create false confidence that the specified threat has been eliminated, 
undermining support for ongoing measures to deal with it (Bailey 1993b; Lynn-
Jones 1987). This problem is seen as especially acute for democratic countries, 
where public support is needed for military spending. A frequently cited 
example of the lulling effect in action is the evisceration of Congressional 
support for US bio-defence programs following entry into force of the BWC in 
the 1970s. 
Summary Estimation Complementarity 
Capability-denial and consequence-mitigation appear to be fully and 
mutually reinforcing on a conceptual level. 24 Use-denial can even be seen as a 
logical extension or additional layer of capability-denial (capability denial after 
the fact). 25 In a sense these categories conceptually can appropriately be 
bundled together conceptually as two pieces of a common (i.e. complementary) 
approach. 
In contrast, these approaches have a number of incongruous aspects with 
the non-possession approach. This is not to imply that they are wholly 
irreconcilable. But in order for these approaches to be complementary, one or 
the other (here treating capability-denial and consequence-mitigation together 
as a single extended approach) needs to be pre-eminent. Each has a 
potentially useful reinforcing role to play as a subordinate approach, but an 
implicit decision needs to be made on which will support which. Whether this is 
based on conscious prioritisation, or is decided de facto by the accumulation of 
individual policy decisions, the point is that trade-offs are inevitable. 
The bottom-line is that even if a state embraces all types of proliferation 
response simultaneously, it is inevitable that to some extent it will be forced to 
prioritise between non-possession norm-building on the one hand and 
capability-denial and/or consequence-mitigation on the other. 
24 Of course even complementary approaches compete in terms of scarce budgetary resources 
and bureaucratic/political energies. However, even this generic trade-off seems relatively minimal in this 
instance, since capability-denial utilises primarily political and economic resources, whereas use-denial 
utilises primarily military resources. That said, one clear point of resource competition is in the area of 
intelligence, since capability-denial requires intelligence on WMD development programs and associated 
equipment and technology transfers, whereas consequence-mitigation requires intelligence on operational 
WMD capabilities. 
25 Analysts such as Speier (1999), Utgoff (1997), and Wallerstein (1998) make this point explicitly. 
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CHAPTER4 
US PROLIFERATION RESPONSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a structured, comprehensive 
account of US responses to proliferation. It begins with a historical overview 
laying out the general priority that anti-proliferation has had within Washington's 
overall foreign and national security policies, and its general doctrine and policy 
initiatives (i.e. applicable to all proliferation areas). It then explores responses in 
each proliferation area in separate, parallel, multi-faceted case studies. 1 Finally, 
it summarises common patterns that are discernible across these various sets 
of observations. 
SECTION 1: OVERVIEW 
General Priority 
Prior to the 1980s, the United States for all intents and purposes did not 
conceive of a proliferation problem in the CB/M areas. The threat posed by 
these weapons categories was seen almost exclusively in terms of the Soviet 
Union and its allies. The tiny nonproliferation bureaucracy of the time was 
concerned solely with the spread of nuclear weapons. The level of media and 
Congressional interest in non-nuclear dimensions of proliferation was 
correspondingly negligible. This almost total lack of attention, and even 
awareness, persisted through the first few years of the Reagan administration. 
Awareness of the problem of horizontal CB/M proliferation did not occur 
evenly or all at once. The first glimmer was the realisation among nuclear 
nonproliferation experts at ACDA and NSC that the spread of nuclear-capable 
missiles could envenom the risks associated with nuclear proliferation. This 
became the subject of interagency discussion beginning in early 1982 (Speier 
int.). Awareness of the threat of CW proliferation occurred somewhat later, 
sparked by public allegations in 1983-84 that Iraq had used poison gas in its 
war against Iran. This was reinforced by the first glimmer of media interest in 
the wider issue of CW proliferation, based on a series of provocative 
intelligence leaks (Robinson 1991 ). Awareness of BW proliferation was the last 
to emerge, sparked by the 1990 Gulf crisis (Mahley int.). 
Despite a growing awareness of the problem by the working-level 
bureaucracy, and the first tentative steps to formulate a cohesive set of policy 
responses, CB/M proliferation remained an extremely low priority in the mid-
1980s. No formal interagency process focused on CB/M proliferation as such. 
Instead, applicable issues regarding treaty negotiation or implementation were 
dealt with within the interagency arms control structure, while coordination on 
supply-side issues was either ad hoc or handled within strategic trade control 
channels. Such diffusion and inattention was also the rule at the agency level. 
The deputy assistant secretary of state partly responsible at the time recalls 
that CB/M proliferation issues were not regarded as important. Policy decisions 
on these issues were rarely if ever elevated above his level within the State 
1 As noted in Chapter 1, these individual case studies have been included in a single chapter, 
pursuant to the embedded multiple case studies research design being employed. This necessitates an 
extremely long chapter comprising chapter-length case studies. Consequently, both the current and 
subsequent chapter have been divided into numbered sections. 
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Department (McNamara int.). 2 Likewise, the relevant policy issues were 
dispersed among the portfolios of various working-level staff in the defence and 
arms control cell at NSC (Mahley int.). 3 Even at the specialised Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) - the only agency to boast offices with years 
of involvement in all aspects of CB/M nonproliferation and disarmament - top 
leadership was focused almost entirely on traditional East-West arms control 
issues (Alessi int; Mahley int.).4 Senior officials at the Pentagon took a 
somewhat greater interest, particularly in the missile area, but still saw 
proliferation as secondary in importance to a plethora of arms control and 
various other security policy issues pertaining to the Soviet threat (Feith int.; 
Perle int.; Speier int.). 5 
This laissez-faire attitude prevailed more or less throughout the second 
Reagan administration. Notwithstanding a modest increase in Congressional 
and media interest - particularly after Iraq's use of CW against its own citizens 
in 1988 - and sustained efforts by a small but now firmly established cadre of 
working-level bureaucrats in State, OSD, ACDA, NSC and Commerce, the 
issue stayed low priority. President Reagan's National Security Strategy of the 
United States (off. 1988), promulgated during his final year in office, only 
mentions nuclear nonproliferation in passing near the bottom of the priority list. 
There is no mention whatsoever of the threat of, or response to, CB/M 
proliferation. lnteragency coordination on pertinent issues remained ad hoc, 
and rarely rose to senior political levels. According to the deputy assistant 
secretary of defense responsible for all aspects of proliferation response during 
both the late Reagan and the early Bush periods, CB/M proliferation issues 
remained almost completely marginalised through the first year of the Bush 
administration (Hinds int.). 
Although in one sense President Bush was a carry-over from the Reagan 
period, his administration made clear its intention to give much higher priority to 
proliferation issues. While nuclear proliferation continued to dominate this 
agenda, top officials began to point to the other areas as new sources of 
concern. For example, testifying soon after becoming CIA Director, William 
Webster noted: 
Chemical weapons are thought to offer a cheap and 
readily obtainable means of redressing the military 
balance against more powerful foes. Some see them as 
the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons .... Along with 
the proliferation of chemical weapons, two equally 
disturbing developments are the proliferation of both 
2 See Appendix 1 for US-Australian rank equivalence. 
3 The working-level NSC staff rank several notches above their agency counterparts, having 
roughly the same protocol status as a deputy assistant secretary. As noted in a prior footnote, other than 
in this case, US expert officials (e.g. desk officers, branch chiefs) are referred to herein as working-level, 
office directors through deputy assistant secretaries as mid-level, and assistant secretaries or above as 
senior-level. Agency heads and their deputies are sometimes referred to as top- or high-level. The Vice 
President and President are referred to as highest-level. See Appendix 1 for comparison of US and 
Australian official ranks. 
4 As discussed in the following CW case study, to the extent that ACDA's top echelons paid any 
attention to these areas, it was in the context of the traditional arms control & disarmament roles that the 
BWC and CWC played vis-a-vis the capabilities of the USSR. 
5 Interestingly enough, the Reagan administration's first deputy assistant secretary of defense 
responsible for these issues, Ronald Lehman, would later demonstrate the personal interest and expertise 
that he had acquired as a strong advocate of nonproliferation when almost a decade later he became 
ACDA Director in the Bush administration. 
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biological weapons and ballistic missiles (1989b: 10). 
Indeed, almost all of the most worrying proliferation incidents in the preceding 
few years had been in the non-nuclear areas (Bowen & Dunn 1996).6 The new 
stress on these threats was codified in a revised National Security Strategy. Put 
out just two years after the Reagan document, the new version states: 
The spread of ever more sophisticated weaponry -
including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons - and 
of missiles capable of carrying them represents a growing 
danger to international security. This proliferation 
exacerbates and fuels regional tensions and complicates 
US defense planning. It poses ever greater dangers to US 
forces and facilities abroad, and possibly even to the 
United States itself (Bush off. 1990: 65). 
Although preventing proliferation was still not near the top of the list of strategic 
objectives, CB/M proliferation was now seen as an integral part of the national 
anti-proliferation agenda. 
The Bush administration acted quickly to raise the priority of proliferation 
response at the level of bureaucratic organisation. From the beginning, it 
moved across the board to improve and elevate interagency coordination on 
supply-side nonproliferation issues. 7 The White House created the Proliferation 
Policy Coordinating Committee two months after coming to office. This very 
senior level interagency group provided for the first time regularised policy 
coordination of all elements of supply-side nonproliferation across the 
proliferation spectrum. Chaired at the under-secretary level by the State 
Department, it had sub-groups for each of the nuclear, CBW, and missile areas 
that were chaired at the assistant secretary level. Each of these sub-groups in 
turn had working level committees that met bi-weekly to coordinate interdiction 
efforts based on the latest intelligence (Clarke tst. 1989, 1991; Hinds int.). All in 
all this represented an astoundingly rapid and significant increase in the 
bureaucratic attention given to nonproliferation issues. 
The individual agencies also moved quickly to enhance their internal 
nonproliferation structures. The State Department for the first time merged all 
aspects of CB/M nonproliferation - including all non-possession and all supply-
side instruments - into a single directorate (Clarke tst. 1989). OSD quadrupled 
the number of personnel assigned full-time to work on supply-side 
nonproliferation (Hinds tst. 1989). It strengthened these resources further in 
early 1990, by adding additional personnel and creating a new Defense 
Department nonproliferation tsar with the equivalent rank of deputy assistant 
secretary (Fitzgibbon int.; Sokolski int.). NSC for the first time consolidated all 
supply-side nonproliferation issues into a single portfolio, and likewise merged 
the disarmament aspects (e.g. CWC, BWC) into another single portfolio 
(Mahley int.; Poneman int.). 
The near simultaneous occurrence of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, the 
6 For example: Iraqi and Iranian use of CW and missiles in the Iran-Iraq war; confirmation in March 
1988 that Saudi Arabia had acquired the 1,600-mile DF-3A intermediate-range missile from China; rapid 
progress (and associated export expectations) of Argentina's Condor IRBM; and, revelations that Libya 
was constructing a large-scale CW facility. 
7 BWC and CWC issues were already coordinated within the established interagency group for 
arms control and disarmament. At this juncture still very little consideration was given to the 
nonproliferation roles of these instruments. 
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sudden elimination of the Soviet threat, and the anticipation of greater regional 
instability in the post-Cold War environment, led to a sea change in the level of 
US concern about proliferation. Although in its first two years the Bush 
administration had already increased the overall priority given to responding 
the all aspects of proliferation, the Gulf conflict highlighted the asymmetric 
nerability of forces against a enemy CB/M capabilities, 
thus elevating the issue to the forefront of national security concerns. As 
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Richard Clarke 
emotionally testified just weeks after the cessation hostilities: 
None of us who lived minute by minute the 
Persian Gulf war and the attacks on three nations with 
ballistic missiles, none of us who spent weeks trying to get 
chemical protective and biological protective gear to our 
personnel in the theater, can have any doubts about the 
risks and dangers that proliferation poses for our country 
and our allies (1991 tst.: 76). 
UNSCOM soon began to reveal the comprehensive scope of the failure of 
nonproliferation in Iraq, as well as how close Baghdad may have come to using 
CBW. In interviews, virtually all officials involved at the time or subsequently, at 
all levels and across the interagency, recall concluding that the United States 
had only narrowly dodged the bullet of WMD use. The catalytic impact of this 
realisation at the highest levels was profound. 
President Bush formally elevated the priority of the proliferation issue 
during the military build-up preceding the Gulf conflict In November 1990, 
finding that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and 
their means of delivery constituted an extraordinary threat to the United States, 
he formally declared a national emergency under the provisions of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (OSD off. 1997b ). (This formal 
state of national emergency has been renewed every two years since then.) As 
one top administration official told Congress: 'The world has changed ... and 
increasingly we have seen a transition in priorities away from some of the 
traditional concerns and more toward areas such as ensuring that weapons of 
mass destruction do not proliferate' (Lehman tst 1992: 8). 8 President Bush 
signalled this shift in priorities to the world in a speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) on 21 September 1992, in which he identified 
nonproliferation as one of the key elements of the new global security agenda. 
He announced that consequently he had directed ACDA to redirect its efforts to 
support this new agenda (ACDA off. 1992; Bush off. 1992).9 At about the same 
time, CIA Director Robert Gates established the Nonproliferation Center (NPC), 
with a director reporting directly to him, in order to redirect the efforts of the 
entire Intelligence Community (IC) on the new nonproliferation mission 
(Woolsey tst. 1993). 
In addition to increasing the executive branch focus on proliferation, the 
Gulf War also led to increasing public awareness of the issue, and particularly 
its CB/M dimensions. Press coverage on all aspects of the proliferation threat 
surged. Bipartisan Congressional interest also rose dramatically. Indeed, media 
8 He quickly went on to say: 'I should point that that does not mean ... that we have not been worried 
about nonproliferation in the past' (9). 
9 One former ACDA official points out that this was almost entirely a symbolic gesture, since ACDA 
had always been involved in all aspects of nonproliferation (Alessi int.). 
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and Congressional interest has continued unabated ever since. Influential 
newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street 
Journal have carried hundreds of stories, editorials and opinion essays on 
CB/M threats and responses. National security reporter Bill Gertz of the 
Washington Times has made a virtual cottage industry of splashing highly 
classified intelligence leaks about proliferation across the page. the 
Congressional front, more a dozen House and Senate committees 
sub-committees have issued scores of reports and held hundreds of hearings to 
hear testimony from nearly 700 witnesses relating to CB/M proliferation since 
Gulf War. 
The Clinton administration came to office at the bow-wave of this intense 
public and Congressional concern about proliferation. The new President 
arrived in Washington with an election mandate (and personal inclination) to 
focus on domestic rather than foreign policy and national security issues. 
However, even if the President himself was focusing 'like a laser' on the 
economy, his newly assembled national security team took pains to indicate 
that, whereas the previous administration had elevated proliferation to the first-
tier of priorities, the Clinton administration would put it even higher, near the 
very top of this list. 
Top officials from different agencies quickly emphasised their focus on 
proliferation. For example, at his very first appearance on Capitol Hill, President 
Clinton's new CIA Director characterised the proliferation threat as new, 
menacing, and getting worse. He testified: 
Of the many issues that have emerged in recent years, 
few have been more serious - and have more serious and 
far-reaching implications for global and regional security 
and stability - than proliferation .... A growing number of 
countries are seeking advanced weapons, including 
nuclear, chemical and biological ones, as well as missiles 
to deliver them (Woolsey tst. 1993, 24 February: 9). 
A senior State Department official informed Congress: 
Nonproliferation is the central priority of the post-Cold War 
world. The proliferation of dangerous weapons represents 
the most critical security threat we face. As a result, the 
Clinton administration is placing a very high priority on 
nonproliferation (Davis tst. 1993: 2). 
Perhaps most significantly, Defense Secretary Les Aspin's much touted Bottom 
Up Review of US strategic priorities identified the proliferation of WMD and 
missiles and the single most urgent and direct threat to the security and 
interests of the United States (Pilat & Kirchner 1995). 
By the middle of President Clinton's first term, anti-proliferation had 
become firmly established at the centre of a new national security orthodoxy. A 
senior ACDA official put it this way: 'In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery 
systems is receiving the priority attention that was once reserved for the 
superpowers' nuclear competition' (Wulf tst. 1994 ). Moreover, while nuclear 
proliferation was still seen as the highest priority (Davis tst. 1993; Gallucci int.), 
the other areas were now portrayed as extremely important too. Whereas the 
Reagan National Security Strategy fails to even mention CB/M proliferation, and 
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the Bush version mentions it only in passing, the Clinton rendition devotes an 
entire seven-page section to all aspects of the proliferation topic. It states: 
A critical priority for the United States is to stem the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. 
Countries' weapons programs, and their levels of 
cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be 
among our most important criteria in judging the nature 
our bilateral relations (Clinton 1995: 42). 
From the beginning, the administration backed its interest 
in proliferation response with intensified bureaucratic coverage. The White 
House sent a powerful early signal in this regard creating the position 
Special Assistant to the President for Nonproliferation and Export Controls, for 
the first time elevating and merging NSC management of all aspects of 
proliferation response - supply-side, non-possession and, broadly speaking, 
even proliferation management - under a single senior official (Poneman ). 10 
The Pentagon also elevated and revamped coverage of anti-proliferation policy. 
In addition to the symbolism of adding a proliferation reference to the title of the 
incoming assistant secretary responsible for international security policy, a new 
position of deputy assistant secretary of defense for counterproliferation policy 
was created, responsible for all aspects of nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation (Carter int.; Fitzgibbon int.; Wallerstein int.). The State 
Department likewise consolidated all proliferation-related issues for the first 
time under a deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation. All in all, 
the further bureaucratic elevation of the proliferation issue in the first years of 
the Clinton period was dramatic. 
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Robert 
Gallucci recalls: 'There's no question that my highest priority was proliferation 
concerns' (int.). His successor recollects: 'I was up to here in 
proliferation .... Almost all of the major initiatives were in the nonproliferation 
area' (McNamara int.). Their Pentagon counterpart likewise saw proliferation as 
'the national security challenge of our times' (Carter int.). What had just a few 
years before been the concern of a small clique of lowly bureaucrats had 
become a significant day-to-day focus of senior officials at the assistant, under-, 
and even deputy secretary level. 
The Clinton administration's initial expressions of concern about 
proliferation have grown stronger in recent years. Officials at the highest levels 
have reiterated countless times the seriousness with which they view the 
proliferation peril. Whereas at the beginning of the administration, proliferation 
was elevated to a critical priority, its status subsequently has risen to top billing. 
This is aptly reflected in the title of a recent article by one of the President's 
senior national security aides: 'US Non-proliferation Strategy: No Higher 
Priority' (Steinberg off. 1997). In a recent major policy speech the Secretary of 
State characterised the problem as 'the overriding security interest of our time' 
(Washington Post, 02/22/98). In his most recent annual testimony on global 
threat assessments, the Director of Central Intelligence ranked proliferation as 
the number one danger facing the United States, noting that proliferation in 
hostile countries such as Iran had outpaced the intelligence predictions of only 
10 As a transitional arrangement, this presidential aide shared joint jurisdiction on the CWC with his 
arms control counterpart up until treaty ratification, in order to retain continuity with the Congress. 
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a few years ago (Tenet tst. 1998). 
The level of bureaucratic coverage has also risen in recent years. 
According to one source, by 1996 over six hundred personnel in up to sixty 
separate executive branch offices were assigned full time fighting 
proliferation, representing a five-fold increase over the same figures at the end 
of the Reagan administration (Sokolski tst. 1996). Even more recently, the 
Director of Central Intelligence significantly augmented NPC staffing levels, 
enhanced the authority of its director (Washington Post 11/4/97). For its part, 
the Pentagon merged three agencies that hitherto had concentrated on 
War missions to create the proliferation-oriented reat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA). 11 This anti-proliferation super-organisation has consolidated 
implementation responsibilities, including export licensing, managing treaty 
verification, and sponsoring technical research. It has a compliment of 2, 100 
personnel and an annual budget of $1.9 billion (Washington Post, 10/2/98). 
It should be noted that there is a growing chorus of knowledgeable 
observers who assert that, notwithstanding its declared commitment to the 
cause of anti-proliferation, the Clinton administration's deeds have not matched 
its anti-proliferation rhetoric. Specifically, they note that it has been unwilling to 
sacrifice diplomatic, economic and other interests to achieve anti-proliferation 
goals. Because the administration is seen regularly to subordinate anti-
proliferation goals to competing interests, these observers infer that President 
Clinton has been dishonest about the priority that he and his administration 
attach to fighting proliferation. For example, a former mid-level official from the 
Bush administration charges, 'As a policy matter, nonproliferation is being taken 
less and less seriously' (Sokolski 1996). Likewise, a recent Congressional 
report complains, 'By speaking loudly but carrying a small stick the Clinton 
Administration risks its credibility and America's security' (US Cong. Senate. off. 
1998: 1 ). 12 This sentiment is echoed in interviews by several former mid-level 
and senior officials from various agencies, including at least one who served in 
both the Bush and Clinton administrations. 
Interviews with current career bureaucrats seem to reinforce claims that 
there has been a lack of alignment between the declaratory and actual priority 
given to proliferation response. A mid-level official at ACDA notes that this 
problem has been especially pronounced in terms of the administration's 
willingness to take action to stop problematic Russian and Chinese CB/M-
related exports. He states, 'We haven't acted as vigorously as we should 
have .. .for political reasons' (int.). According to a mid-level State Department 
official with long-standing involvement in proliferation issues, despite strong 
rhetoric to the contrary, nonproliferation clearly is not treated as a top priority by 
the Clinton administration. This official contends that many career officials hold 
this view privately and that, as a result, there is widespread discontent within 
the career bureaucracy (int.). Others are less direct, but hint at the same 
general problem ([ACDA] int.; [DOD] ints.). 
Congressional concern about the administration's commitment on 
11 The three antecedent agencies were: Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense 
Nuclear Agency); the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA); and, the On-site Inspection 
Agency (OSIA). 
12 This document was released as a minority report, meaning that the Democratic members of the 
subcommittee declined to associate themselves with it. This is an indication of the extent to which this 
issue recently has become a source of partisan political contention. 
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proliferation issues became so acute that in late 1996, Congress attached 
legislation to the 1997 fiscal year Intelligence Authorization Bill that mandated 
the creation of the high level, bipartisan Commission to Assess the 
of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of 
Mass Destruction, renewing this mandate in November 1998 
[33] 1993; New Times, 11 /1 /98). 13 This blue-ribbon panel 
recently issued a highly critical report, concluding administration's 
nonproliferation efforts were disorganised, and calling on the White House 
create a new government-wide proliferation tsar (New Times 7/9/99). 
Indeed, even recent administration decisions strengthen relevant 
bureaucratic structures at C and DOD occurred the of intense 
Congressional criticism following leaks and public allegations - including the 
very public protest resignation of the NPC's long-time director - that plans were 
in the works to reduce the resources and standing of these organisations 
(Washington Post 4/10/97, 6/26/98). 
The Clinton administration for its part has stoutly rejected suggestions that 
it has downgraded its commitment to proliferation response, insisting that this 
has been and remains second to none. Most recently, it sought to demonstrate 
this commitment by creating a separate Nonproliferation Bureau within the 
State Department (State off. 1999, March). 14 Moreover, a former senior White 
House official who served in both the Bush and Clinton administrations explicitly 
refutes claims to the contrary, insisting, 'There was absolutely no diminution of 
efforts to implement the nonproliferation regimes forcefully and effectively in the 
Clinton administration' (Poneman int.). 
What is to be made of these conflicting accounts? Perhaps the Clinton 
administration has overstated its commitment. On the other hand, the 
administration's critics may be exaggerating its deficiencies. It is even 
conceivable that both perspectives are valid; that proliferation response has 
been the administration's top national security priority, but that at the same time 
it has put even its highest national security interests behind competing political 
and economic interests. Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no question 
that the priority given to proliferation response has dramatically and steadily 
risen since the mid-1980s. The only difference of opinion is: By precisely how 
much in recent years? This question seems impossible to resolve definitively in 
the face of starkly conflicting claims by those in positions to know. At the very 
least, this controversy suggests that recent US declaratory priorities should not 
necessarily be accepted at face value. 
General Doctrine and Policy Initiatives 
The United States did not have any overarching anti-proliferation strategy 
until the final months of the Bush administration (Fitzgibbon int.). Prior to that, 
13 Attaching legislation not supported by the administration to a major appropriations bill is a 
common Congressional tactic in order to avoid a presidential veto. The eight commissioners on this panel 
include such luminaries as former Deputy Defense Secretary and CIA Director John Deutch and two-time 
former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Ambassador Robert Gallucci was removed from the 
panel after re-joining the administration as President Clinton's special envoy for Russian missile 
proliferation. 
14 This move was part of plan to implement the Congressionally mandated elimination of ACDA, 
involving the consolidation of its functions within the State Department effective April 1999. As a result, 
the former Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was divided into three organisations, adding separate 
bureaus for arms control, and nonproliferation. 
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proliferation response policies were ad hoc. However, even in the absence of a 
cohesive doctrine, there were consistent themes in the policy initiatives of the 
day. 
During the early to mid Reagan period, the main focus was on 
strengthening national export controls on relevant items. OSD and State led an 
ongoing effort to push the interagency to adopt systematic nonproliferation 
export controls. This process continued throughout the 1980s. It culminated in 
July 1990 (coincidentally just days before Iraq invaded Kuwait) when a target 
list of 36 countries with projects of proliferation concern was instituted. Even as 
East-West trade controls were being eased, this list ensured that licences 
would be required for relevant dual-use exports to countries posing proliferation 
risks (LeMunyon tst. 1990). In a sense, this represented the juncture at which 
the main goal of US export controls shifted from strategic trade control to 
nonproliferation. 15 
Parallel to getting its own house in order - and not unrelated, since the 
Commerce Department as a rule would only go along with new US export 
controls if other Western countries followed suit ([ACDA] int.) - the Reagan 
administration early on began to bring sustained bilateral pressure to bear on 
allies such as Germany to create or tighten relevant national export controls 
(Perle int.). By the mid-1980s, with these tasks well along, the US focus turned 
to the more ambitious project of creating and then strengthening a system of 
multilateral supplier regimes to formalise and harmonise Western 
nonproliferation export controls ([State] int). This remained the locus of US 
proliferation response efforts throughout the early 1990s. 
Beginning early in the Bush administration, Washington modestly began 
to expand its conception of proliferation response, tentatively looking beyond 
traditional supply-side tools. It began to consider the anti-proliferation utility of 
global non-possession treaties. 16 In addition, the Pentagon quietly took steps to 
counter proliferation militarily. On 18 October 1989, the under-secretaries of 
defense for policy and acquisition established the DOD-wide Proliferation 
Countermeasures Working Group, with a mandate to assess and address 
emerging proliferation threats from a military perspective (Rowen off. 1991, 31 
July; Woitowitz off. 1991, 16 April). The group's chairman described its purpose 
as follows: 
We need to start working on how to deal with proliferation 
we may not be able to control. Because our efforts may 
not be 100 percent successful, DOD has begun a parallel 
effort to assess new military threats and promote 
appropriate military countermeasures to them .... The group 
hopes to learn what specific operational or program 
changes might be desirable (Sokolski tst. 1990b: 172). 
Although this internal DOD initiative did not receive much attention at the time, 
despite being notified to Congress and reported in the specialised defence 
15 However, unlike in the nuclear area, CB/M controls were never embodied as such in identifiable 
lists. Rather, they were grafted onto the existing strategic trade controls, by adding relevant items to the 
State Department's munitions list and the Commerce Department's dual-use commodities list (Bryen tst. 
1989). This remains the case today. 
16 That said, the BWC and pending CWC were still primarily seen as serving traditional arms 
control functions (e.g. addressing Soviet capabilities) rather than playing critical nonproliferation roles (see 
CW and BW case studies below). 
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press, it marked the official addition of consequence-mitigation as an explicit 
element of the US proliferation response. Nonetheless, strengthening supply-
side instruments remained at the heart of the US anti-proliferation strategy. 
The first public reference to an overall proliferation response strategy was 
articulated in the 1990 National Security Strategy: 'Our comprehensive 
approach to this problem includes stringent controls and multilateral 
cooperation designed to stop the spread of these technologies and 
components' (Bush off.: 66). Although rather nebulous, this formulation 
suggests that, even as the United States was stepping up efforts to negotiate 
the CWC and strengthen the BWC, as well as taking the first steps to introduce 
military countermeasures, it continued to see supply-side denial tactics as the 
main pillar of its anti-proliferation strategy. 
However, only a year later, a senior official publicly articulated a much 
wider formulation: 
Of necessity, we have a multifaceted approach to non-
proliferation. This approach includes vigorous arms control 
measures, encouraging regional confidence building, 
export controls, multilateral supplier group efforts, focused 
intervention in specific cases, and sanctions (Clarke tst. 
1991: 82). 
The abrupt end of the Cold War, together with the sudden leap in concern 
about proliferation sparked by the Gulf War, had brought about a swift evolution 
in US nonproliferation doctrine, embracing a much more expansive approach. 
In part this involved publicly reorienting and redefining existing East-West 
activities, such as CBW disarmament and strategic trade controls, to serve this 
new North-South role. 17 Nonetheless, officials from the State and Defense 
departments continued to make it clear that denial strategies remained the 
primary focus of the evolving US nonproliferation strategy. The main goal was 
to strengthen the existing multilateral supplier regimes as much as possible (at 
the time explicitly defined as making them more like COCOM, with rigorous 
restrictions targeting specified proliferants and improving coordination between 
the supplier regimes) while going beyond these multilateral frameworks using 
additional unilateral and bilateral measures such as interdiction, sanctions, etc. 
(Clarke tst. 1991; LeMunyon tst. 1991; Smaldone int.; Sokolski int., tst. 1991; 
Verville tst. 1990). Indeed, this remains the basic US supply-side strategy. 
According to one official, unilateral or bilateral measures over and above the 
requirements of the various multilateral regimes account for probably up to 
ninety per cent of US nonproliferation activities, with participation in the regimes 
therefore representing just a small fraction of overall US denial efforts 
(Smaldone int). 
President Bush launched the first sweeping nonproliferation initiative, the 
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), on 13 December 1990. This 
17 Regional arms control was sporadically identified during this period, and to a lesser extent 
subsequently, as a 'demand reduction' component of proliferation response. However, evidence suggests 
that may have been a case of inventing a nonproliferation function for something that was, and would 
continue to be, done in any case primarily for other reasons (e.g. regional stability). The most telling 
indication that this was probably a case of the arms control bureaucracy trying to poach on an emerging 
priority is that these issues were generally not worked within agencies' nonproliferation offices. Indeed, 
when regional arms control was actually assigned to the Pentagon's nonproliferation directorate at the 
beginning of the Clinton administration, it was soon reassigned on the explicit grounds that the issue was 
not directly relevant to nonproliferation. 
81 
was a wholly supply-side venture, compns1ng a web of regulations under 
various existing legislative authorities (Clarke tst. 1991; OSD off. 1997b ). Its 
effect was to duplicate the full scope of longstanding regulatory authorities for 
nuclear nonproliferation in the CB/M areas. In addition to dramatically 
expanding the number of specific items requiring export licences (i.e. beyond 
the AG and MTCR lists), EPCI introduced so-called catch-all controls, requiring 
licenses for any item (i.e. items not on national control lists) known to be 
destined for a project of proliferation concern. The licensing role of the 
nonproliferation-minded departments of Defense and State was also expanded, 
for the first time including them in decisions on all Commerce Department 
licences deemed to be relevant to proliferation (Clarke tst. 1991 ). Prohibitions 
were also enacted against so-called off-shore procurement, allowing the 
government to deny government and commercial purchases that would provide 
financial support to proliferation programs (Clarke tst. 1990; McNamara tst. 
1995; Smaldone int.; Sokolski tst. 1990b ). Finally, the President was given 
discretionary authority to impose punitive economic sanctions on any foreign 
supplier or receiver of proliferation-related items, and automatic sanctions were 
put in place for proliferation-related transfers to Iran, Iraq, and Libya (OSD off. 
1997b). 
Following the pattern established in the 1980s, and having strengthened 
its own denial instruments, the United States pressured its Western partners to 
follow its lead. Even before EPCI was announced, a State Department official 
told a Congressional hearing: 
We believe that such steps need to be taken, but not only 
to block US exports from going to different countries and 
projects. They are also needed so the United States can 
continue to take the lead in building up the existing 
international consensus to establish such effective 
controls on a multilateral basis (Verville tst. 1990: 36). 
Sure enough, a few months after announcing EPCI the administration reported: 
'We have been vigorously seeking to convince other countries to adopt controls 
comparable to EPCl .... We have pursued EPCI through existing multilateral 
mechanisms and in our bilateral dealings' (Clarke tst. 1991: 89). 
The President then announced what was ostensibly a second major 
supply-side nonproliferation initiative in May 1991, the Arms Control Middle 
East (ACME) initiative. The White House envisioned a targeted suppliers cartel 
made up of the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council. Its 
primarily intended purpose was to curb the spread of WMD and missiles to the 
Middle East, and secondarily to prevent destabilising conventional build-ups 
(White House, 1991, 21 May). However, the United States was forced to 
deviate from the President's original vision during the ensuing negotiations. In 
the event, ACME turned out to have little or nothing to do with nonproliferation. 
According to an official involved throughout the process, almost as soon as the 
talks began, their focus shifted to conventional arms transfers rather than WMD 
and missile proliferation. 18 Although a set of 'Interim Guidelines Related to 
Weapons of Mass Destruction' was adopted at the third session in May 1992, 
18 In the end no significant progress was made on the conventional arms transfers issue either. 
The US aggressively pursued a pre-notification agreement. However, China pulled out of the talks 
following the Bush administration's decision in mid-1992 to approve the sale of advanced military aircraft 
to Taiwan. 
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this merely reiterated commitments that all the participants had already 
undertaken elsewhere, because China was unwilling to go any further on 
nonproliferation ([DOD] int.). Ergo, despite US efforts the enterprise never got 
off the ground as a nonproliferation regime. 
In the final year of the Bush administration, having aggressively pursued a 
wide range of anti-proliferation efforts following the Gulf War, the White House 
finally moved to craft a comprehensive, formal anti-proliferation strategy. In 
addition to codifying existing efforts, the White House wanted the United States 
to propose a grand bargain to recast the nature of Western nonproliferation 
efforts in the new post-Cold War environment. Specifically, National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted the United States to propose to agree to 
dramatically loosen the COCOM strategic trade control system, including giving 
up the US veto, in exchange for agreement by Western countries to abide by 
stricter rules in the nonproliferation export control regimes. But, according to a 
former White House official, elements of the deeply entrenched strategic trade 
bureaucracy successfully blocked this initiative, arguing (incorrectly) that 
COCOM was still needed and not going anywhere. As a result, this official 
describes the presidential directive that eventually emerged as 'thin gruel' that 
merely confirmed existing approaches (int.). 
President Bush signed National Security Decision Directive-70 (NSDD-70) 
on 13 July 1992, for the first time laying out a comprehensive set of internal 
anti-proliferation guidelines. It embraced four basic tenets: 1) the United States 
would seek to strengthen and broaden existing global norms against 
proliferation; 2) the United States would seek to focus additional efforts on 
regions of acute proliferation concern (i.e. Middle East, South Asia, Korean 
peninsula); 3) the United States would seek to foster the broadest possible 
multilateral support for [supply-side] prevention efforts; and 4) the United States 
would use a range of tools to address the problem including political, economic, 
intelligence, regional security, and export controls (L. Dunn et al. 1992). In other 
words, Washington would do more of everything that it had already been doing 
for at least the past year. 
A few months and one presidential election later, a new administration set 
about taking a fresh look at the US proliferation response strategy that it had 
inherited. Following an intensive interagency review, President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive-13 (PDD-13) in September 1993 to supersede 
NSDD-70 (White House off. 1993, 27 September). 19 Although PDD-13 parted 
ways with NSDD-70 on a number of specific policy issues, as well on nuances 
of emphasis, the general theme of the new strategy nevertheless was to do 
more of more of the same, thereby reaffirming the fundamental tenets of the 
post-Gulf War status quo so recently codified by its primogenitor. PDD-13 
remains the operative guidance for US proliferation response today. 
Consistent with PDD-13, the Clinton administration instituted several 
major policy initiatives. The first and highest profile of these was the Pentagon's 
December 1993 counterproliferation initiative, adding a third major approach to 
the US anti-proliferation quiver. (For some reason this does not appear to have 
been explicitly addressed in PDD-13 as a pending initiative.) Even before the 
formal announcement, a senior State Department official had noted that 
19 Presidential directives remain operative until revoked or superseded by another presidential 
directive. 
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counterproliferation would play an important role in the overall US response to 
proliferation (Davis tst. 1993). 
This initiative was a natural outgrowth of the direction charted by the prior 
administration, albeit on a far more ambitious scale. As one study notes, 
'Although the Bush administration ... began an exploration of proliferation 
countermeasures, the Clinton administration has expanded the scope and 
raised the priority of counterproliferation' (Pilat & Kirchner 1995: 156). The 
guiding principle was to apply longstanding Cold War concepts of WMD 
defence and deterrence to regional conflicts (Carter int.). According to former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchel Wallerstein, the elevation of 
defence and deterrence strategies to the status of an independent approach to 
proliferation response was the direct result of the pessimism about all aspects 
of nonproliferation that had been engendered by the unfolding lessons of Iraq: 
It became clear that Iraq had successfully evaded the 
provisions of virtually every extant non-proliferation 
regime .... The Administration's response to these lessons 
was to pursue a two track approach: On the one hand, 
seek to prevent proliferation wherever possible through 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; and on the other 
hand, be prepared to deter and defend against states 
possessing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and 
missile delivery systems (tst. 1998: 2). 
In announcing the initiative, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin explicitly stated 
that, while prevention remained the primary goal, the United States had 
concluded that 'efforts to prevent, stop, or reverse proliferation may not always 
succeed' (as quoted by OSD off. 1997a: 53). Therefore, relying solely on 
nonproliferation represented an incomplete response to proliferation (Carter 
int.). 
Although it started slowly, the initiative soon gained momentum. Total 
funding for counterproliferation acquisition for fiscal year 1996 - the second 
budget following the launch of the initiative - was a staggering $3.8 billion 
(CWC Bulletin [30] 1995).20 In early 1995 the new Defense Secretary, William 
Perry, gave the program a further boost by creating the Counterproliferation 
Council, to ensure that counterproliferation was treated as a priority by all 
elements of DOD (Miller tst. 1997). This high-level steering committee, headed 
by the Deputy Secretary, quickly added $141.5 million over several years to the 
initiative's coordinating program, over and above its existing annual budget of 
just under $110 million (CWC Bulletin [30] 1995).21 Thus, less than two years 
after its conception, the counterproliferation initiative was being shepherded at 
the highest levels within DOD, with a total annual budget of almost $4 billion. As 
its primary architect notes, 'Counterproliferation is now established and 
recognised' (Carter int.). 
Parallel to its own counterproliferation program, Washington aggressively 
sought to multilateralise the approach, urging its allies to participate in 
coordinated efforts. Despite marked European reluctance, the January 1994 
20 It should be understood that this did not represent a standing start in expenditure. Many 
programs that were designated as counterproliferation were simply reoriented versions of programs that 
had existed before to defend against Soviet capabilities. 
21 This relatively modest funding was over and above relevant acquisition programs, which were 
funded within the budgets of the military services. 
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NATO Summit acceded at the behest of the United States to establish a high-
level NATO committee to coordinate an Alliance military response to 
proliferation ( CWC Bulletin [23] 1994 ). The United States also pushed hard for 
similar cooperation with non-NATO allies such as Australia and Japan ([DOD] 
int.). 
Another major initiative the Clinton administration, conducted through 
quiet, hoc diplomacy, was to add a robust targeted dimension 
multilateral the U States wanted 
as rogue states be subject the draconian 
that had been reserved Communist 
countries. Just months into a meeting with his Western ropean 
counterparts, Secretary State Warren Christopher pushed for a total 
embargo of dual-use equipment and technology to Iran. He pleaded for a 
collective policy to contain Iranian WMD and missile programs. Despite a tepid 
response to this and subsequent proposals along the same lines, the Clinton 
administration has continued stringently apply a targeted denial strategy 
against rogue states, and has relentlessly urged others to do the same. 22 
A final major initiative of the Clinton period was to reform nonproliferation 
export controls by narrowing their scope. The goal was to focus on key 
technologies that were not readily available elsewhere (i.e. choke-points). 23 The 
administration announced this plan on 31 March 1994, in connection with the 
renewal of the Export Administration Act, which was set to expire in a few 
months (Bowen & Dunn 1996).24 This initiative sparked heated controversy, with 
critics charging that it amounted to loosening nonproliferation controls, 
presumably in the interests of facilitating foreign trade (US Cong. Senate. 
1998). The administration fiercely denied such contentions, responding that its 
reforms were in fact designed to strengthen the effectiveness of 
nonproliferation export controls by building higher fences around fewer items. 
As one senior Commerce Department official explained at the time: 
Our challenge is to identify specific 'choke point' items that 
can be effectively denied .... By focusing on items that are 
truly sensitive and would enable would-be proliferators to 
make significant advances, we ensure that our scarce 
licensing and enforcement resources are properly 
deployed. By narrowing our control lists to choke point 
items we are more likely to gain meaningful cooperation of 
our allies in the various nonproliferation regimes. 
Concentrating our resources in this fashion is most likely 
to result in actually halting transactions of true importance, 
which after all is the real objective of our nonproliferation 
export controls (Eckert tst. 1994: 7). 
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallerstein likewise insists 
that streamlining export controls was intended to strengthen rather than 
weaken them, noting that this was a necessary consequence of reorienting 
strategic trade controls to the nonproliferation mission. He recalls, 'We had to 
take a hard look at what was in fact controllable' (int.). He also points out that 
22 Even critics such as Sokolski (tst. 1996), who have charged the administration with being soft on 
proliferation generally, have praised these targeted denial efforts. 
23 Needless to say, this initiative applied only to US national export controls that went beyond the 
requirements of the nonproliferation regimes, and so did not effect the various multilateral lists. 
24 The Act was not renewed. However, its provisions have been carried forward by executive order. 
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the reform package resolved a long-standing bureaucratic turf battle between 
Commerce and the more nonproliferation-minded agencies by establishing a 
regularised high-level interagency review and appeal process through which 
any agency could challenge any licensing decision (int; tst. 1998). 
SECTION 2: CASE STUDY - CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
Relative Priority 
Notwithstanding an increase in its public expressions of concern, 
especially after 1988, CW nonproliferation represented an extremely low priority 
for the United States throughout the 1980s. Although it was seen as a more 
plausible potential threat than BW proliferation, it remained a lower priority than 
the nuclear and nuclear missile areas, receiving virtually no attention at senior 
levels. By and large, to the extent that senior policy makers worried about CW 
at all, their overwhelming focus remained Soviet capabilities (Harris 1992; 
McNamara int.; Perle int.).25 
The first public expression of any official concern about CW proliferation 
did not occur until 1984. This was sparked by Congressional hearings on Iraq's 
use of CW against Iran. Although the only high-level official to appear at these 
hearings expressed concern about CW proliferation as a potential problem, he 
took pains to stress that this was a personal rather than official assessment: 
Attention has been focused on the nuclear issue for a 
number of years, and that is understandable. But when I 
look at the remainder of this century and what kind of 
threats there are to security around the world, I personally 
put the threat of a nuclear war low, very low. I personally 
put the increasing use of chemical weapons around the 
world high (Alderman tst.: 34 ). 
Defense Department officials at the same hearings focused on the potential 
tactical utility of CW, as opposed to its threat as a mass destruction weapon 
(Feith tst.; Haeber tst. ). 26 
The burst of attention spurred by Iraq's violation of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol's ban on using CW was brief. It had made CW proliferation a 
recognised policy issue within the bureaucracy, but most of the attention 
remained on the Soviet threat. Indeed, almost total disregard for the 
proliferation dimension remained the rule at senior levels until at least 1988 
(Hinds int.). 
This inattention was shattered in 1988-89 by a combination of factors. 
First came nearly simultaneous public revelations in the summer of 1988 (the 
final months of the Reagan administration) that Iraq had used CW against 
Kurdish civilians at Halajba, and that Libya's nascent CW program was much 
25 An intelligence analyst who worked on CW issues in the mid-1980s offers an anecdotal 
illustration of the dominance of this East-West focus. He relates how in the mid-1980s, he forwarded a 
report for on the subject of Western assistance to CW programs in Iraq and Burma, only to have rejected 
by his superiors as irrelevant because it had no bearing on Soviet capabilities (int.). 
26 This threat was portrayed as especially high in regions such as the Middle East, where the 
combination of heat and lack of water for decontamination would make the need to don protective gear a 
serious tactical liability, degrading personnel performance by approximately fifty per cent (Haeber tst. 
1984 ). This presumably in part explains DO D's interest in being able to threaten retaliation in kind (i.e. 
ensuring an enemy is equally degraded}, even putting aside any deterrent imperative. 
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further along than previously known and, worse still, was continuing to benefit 
from Western assistance. In response to media reports on these issues, the 
State Department publicly promised 'vigorous action' to thwart CW proliferation 
in the Third World (Washington Post 9/15/88). Making good on this promise, a 
subsequent presidential initiative led to a conference of the world's foreign 
ministers several months later in Paris to discuss the issues of CW proliferation 
and use. This was followed by the inauguration of a new President who cared 
deeply about the CW threat generally. 27 In the first years of the Bush 
administration, Congress held a spate of hearings, and senior officials publicly 
expressed concern about CW proliferation (Bartholomew tst. 1989a; Burns 
1989a, 1989b; Holmes 1989b, 1989c; Webster tst. 1989a, 1989b ). 
Following the 1990 Gulf crisis, this budding awareness and sense of alarm 
bloomed into a perceived national security priority. One of many Congressional 
reports issued after the Gulf War aptly captures this mood of intense alarm, 
noting: 'The number of countries confirmed or suspected of having offensive 
chemical weapons programs is roughly double the figure of 10 years and triple 
that of 20 years ago' (US Cong. House. 1993: 12). It goes on to note that even 
as the longstanding Soviet CW threat had eased: 
The United States is presented with a chemical 
threat. .. that has decreased in magnitude in the absolute 
sense of quantities of weapons that might be employed, 
but has increased in potential diversity and frequency with 
which such weapons might be encountered (35). 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 'loose 
nukes' problem meant that nuclear proliferation took first priority (Davis tst. 
1993; Gallucci int.). But by 1994, former Assistant Secretary of State Thomas 
McNamara (int.) recalls that he considered proliferation in the CW area as a 
higher priority than even the nuclear area. While not all officials would 
necessarily agree with this exact prioritisation, there is no doubt that since the 
mid-1990s CW proliferation has represented been a significant concern. 
Capability-denial 
National Export Controls 
The United States has consistently applied relatively strict export controls 
on CW-related items over the past two decades. These have evolved primarily 
as unilateral measures, with an admixture of national implementation of 
multilateral arrangements (i.e. AG rules). The United States first imposed export 
controls on three dual-use precursor chemicals in the early 1960s as part of its 
system of strategic trade controls. The first nonproliferation controls as such 
were instituted in March 1984 in response to Iraqi CW use. These foreign policy 
controls were applied to the export of the three chemicals already controlled, 
plus an additional five precursors, to either Iraq or Iran (Burck & Flowerree 
1991; Adelman tst. 1984; Olmer tst. 1984). These very limited, targeted controls 
were modestly expanded in June 1986, soon after the beginning of the process 
that became known as the AG, to include exports of these same eight 
precursors to Syria, on the basis of intelligence that Syria was assisting Iran's 
27 Which is not to say that George Bush was not focused mainly on the Soviet dimension. 
However, having a President who worried about CW tended to elevate the attention given to all aspects of 
the problem. 
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CW program and pursuing one of its own (New York Times 616186). This left 
Washington controlling more than the AG's five Core List chemicals, but unlike 
some other AG countries, only applying these controls to a very limited number 
of destinations. 28 It therefore controlled more items to fewer destinations than 
some other AG partners during this period. 
In the final two years of the Reagan administration, the United States 
moved to apply CW-related export controls nearly universally (with an 
exemption for exports to AG countries.) By this time the AG list had caught up 
with US national controls. US implementation went beyond AG requirements, 
however, in that as a matter of national policy the United States automatically 
denied all export licence applications to the following countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Libya, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea (LeMunyon tst. 1989a). In 
other words, the US implemented targeted controls beyond AG requirements. 
As a retiring senior Commerce Department official testified at the close of the 
Reagan administration: 'The US currently maintains much stricter controls on 
these chemicals than the rest of the Australia Group' (Freedenberg tst. 1989). 
Moreover, most agencies had wanted to go even further, but were thwarted by 
the Commerce Department, which generally opposed expanding the scope of 
dual-use nonproliferation export controls, particularly on a unilateral basis 
([ACDA] int.). 
Incited by revelations of Iraqi use of CW against its own Kurdish 
population, and about Libya's CW program, the incoming Bush administration 
moved to further strengthen CW-related export controls within days of taking 
office. This once again served to move US controls well beyond AG 
parameters. Whereas the AG only specified controls on nine chemicals, in 
February 1989 the United States imposed controls on a total of eleven 
precursors to all destinations (except AG countries), and an additional 29 
precursors to more than a dozen specified destinations.29 The policy of 
automatic denial to specified destinations was extended to all forty of these. At 
the same time implementation was strengthened by assigning interagency 
licensing deliberations for the first time to a dedicated CBW nonproliferation 
group, rather than East-West oriented strategic trade control processes 
(Bartholomew tst. 1989a; Holmes tst. 1989b, 1989c). 
The Bush administration further strengthened CW-related export controls 
in early 1990. Mandatory controls were applied to twelve additional chemicals 
for exports to Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria, bringing the total to fifty for these 
sensitive destinations (Clarke tst. 1990). Washington at this juncture controlled 
more items than the AG required for all non-AG destinations, and more than 
five times as many items for targeted destinations, the latter also being subject 
to a blanket policy of automatic denial. 
As part of the EPCI initiative announced in late 1990 following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait, the United States extended export controls on all fifty 
chemicals controlled to sensitive destinations to all non-AG destinations. It also 
placed restrictions on US firms' involvement in the development or construction 
of any chemical plant manufacturing any of these chemicals in any non-AG 
country. Finally, it added new controls on dual-use production equipment to 28 
28 The AG's Core List comprised all items subject to export controls. 
29 Cambodia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Vietnam, and all COCOM proscribed 
destinations. 
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destinations. And of course EPCl's catch-all prov1s1ons explicitly applied to 
virtually any export to a project of proliferation concern (Clarke tst. 1991; 
LeMunyon tst. 1991 ). At the time these sweeping new restrictions went into 
effect on 13 March 1991, the AG Core List provided for controls on just thirteen 
chemicals. Thus, in early 1991 the United States controlled nearly four times 
the number of chemicals to all non-AG destinations, plus equipment and other 
forms of assistance not covered by the AG. 
AG controls essentially caught up with US export controls by the end of 
1991. US national controls and the AG Core List subsequently have remained 
roughly in balance, although in mid-1997 the US expanded its national controls 
to include additional dual-use equipment not covered by the AG (Disarmament 
Diplomacy [17) 1997). In addition, the AG still does not require catch-all 
controls. 
Multilateral Export Control Regime: Australia Group 
The United States has been far and away the most active proponent of 
robust CW-related export controls over the past two decades. Washington first 
proposed a multilateral ban on exporting CW and 'all analogous liquids' during 
the negotiations that led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but was unable to garner 
sufficient international support for the concept (Burck & Flowerree 1991; 
Thomas & Thomas 1970).30 There the matter of multilateral CW-related export 
controls rested, both for the United States and the international community 
generally, until the United Nations Secretary General in 1984 issued a report 
concluding that Iraq had used poison gas against Iranian troops. In response, 
Washington imposed controls on exports of five precursor chemicals to Iraq and 
Iran, and urged other industrialised countries to do likewise (Alderman tst. 
1984; Olmer tst. 1984 ). Most Western countries quickly heeded the American 
call. This modest, pragmatic initiative represented the first attempt to 
multilateralise chemical export controls in the Cold War era. It also marked 
genesis of the first nonproliferation suppliers regime outside the nuclear area, 
the Australia Group. 
What happened next is a subject of some contention. In June 1985, 
Australia hosted a meeting of the Western countries that had already 
implemented export controls in response to Iraqi use, in order to try to 
harmonise these national efforts. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
official responsible maintains that, although Washington had been considering 
similar initiatives, and was consulted before Australia took any action, the idea 
for this specific meeting originated in Canberra (Walker int.). 31 Another 
Australian official corroborates that this was how the initiative was characterised 
to other Australian agencies (int.). 
However, there is some circumstantial evidence to suggest that the 
initiative actually may have been suggested by American officials. One DFA 
official involved recounts that there were certainly rumours to this effect at the 
time (int.). A US official specifically recalls being told that US officials had 
informally approached Australian officials to ask them to undertake such an 
initiative. According to this official, Washington calculated that Australia's 
3° For unclear reasons, the US blocked a similar proposal at another conference seven years later. 
31 This official notes that it was widely assumed among Western European participants at the time 
that Canberra was fronting for Washington. 
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experience in World War I would give it both the interest and the moral 
leadership to get the job done ([ACDA] int.). (The clear implication is that 
Washington thought that the idea would be less likely to get a receptive hearing 
from some countries if it was seen as a US initiative.) At least one published 
account refers to declassified US documents that appear to support the notion 
that it was Washington that approached Australia, rather than vice versa 
(Findlay 1993).32 
Whether or not the Australian initiative per se emanated from Washington, 
there is no doubt that the United States had been considering the idea well 
beforehand. In June 1984, a full year before the meeting called by Australia, a 
top US official testified that the Reagan administration planned to pursue the 
following new steps to combat CW proliferation: 
Greater cooperation among countries, especially in the 
West, who have chemical industries in order to share 
export controls ... and to also share information .... There 
can be consultations and intelligence sharing, and 
anticipation of the kind of problems that we could have in 
the future and how to deal with them (Adelman tst. 1984: 
35). 
There is also no doubt that, when Australia formally approached the United 
States bilaterally to propose calling a meeting to coordinate export controls 
among suppliers, it received Washington's enthusiastic backing (Walker int.). 
Even before the first meeting the United States worked actively to nurture 
what was to become the Australia Group. That said, US policy makers initially 
did not envision a global regime, but rather a narrower mechanism to target the 
belligerents in the Iraq-Iran War (Feith int.). However, the interagency gradually 
came to the view that the emerging regime could be used to target CW 
proliferation on a broader scale. 
From the very first meeting, the United States worked to widen the scope 
and deepen the institutional structure of the process. The United States pushed 
hard for all of the precursors that it controlled to be included on a harmonised 
list, and worked to ensure that the regime-building process did not end there. At 
three subsequent meetings over the next few years, the United States pressed 
to add additional chemicals to what became known as the Core List (items 
requiring export controls), to create what became known as the Warning List of 
less sensitive chemicals (not subject to automatic licensing requirements), and 
to regularise meetings. However, the United States resisted suggestions by 
Australia and others that membership should be widened to include Third World 
states, fearing that this would erode the Group's cohesiveness as a cartel of 
like-minded suppliers (Walker int.). 
Notwithstanding its activist role during this early period, the United States 
had not pressed as hard to expand the scope of coverage as Defense, State 
and ACDA had wanted. This was due to resistance by the Commerce 
Department bureaucracy to creating additional dual-use export controls 
([ACDA] int.). But the Commerce bureaucracy was forced to relent under an 
onslaught of publicity about CW proliferation beginning in mid-1988. For the first 
time, policy decisions on AG issues began to attract the attention of more 
32 For exact reference see p. 13, footnote 19. The author notes that he did not have access to 
these documents himself, but was informed of their existence by a reputable colleague. 
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senior policy makers. Under these circumstances, Commerce essentially 
agreed to go along with any new AG controls, although it continued to resist 
new unilateral measures ([ACDA] int.). Defense, State and ACDA therefore had 
push as hard as possible to strengthen the regime, particularly with 
the the Bush ministration. 
Following almost two years German and Japanese refusal agree 
broaden press leaks in 1989 revealed that 
Japanese companies were assisting 
been a 
strengthening the 
result was ieved. agreed in May 1989 
to nine precursors, and the Warning List to 44 add 
1997b ). Partners also agreed US proposals share information on licence 
denials, and to pledge not to undercut one another's denials. 33 The United 
States also began to sound out the prospects for getting partners' support for 
steps to make the regime less ad hoc, for example establishing a permanent 
secretariat, and making decisions politically binding on members (Bartholomew 
tst. 1989). 
At the following meeting in June 1990, the United States successfully 
sought to expand the Core List to ten precursors, to expand the Warning List to 
fifty chemicals, and for the first time to add dual-use production equipment to 
the Warning List Additionally, it succeeded in having notification guidelines 
expanded to include licence approvals (ACDA off. 1997b; Clarke tst. 1990). 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a watershed in US efforts to 
strengthen the AG. Since then, there has been uniform agreement in the 
famously fractured interagency process - especially discordant in the 
nonproliferation, export control, and arms control spheres - on the need to build 
and maintain as robust an AG as possible. Indeed, according to virtually all 
interview subjects, this has been among the least contentious issues in the 
relevant interagency processes. Moreover, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Gulf War, the issue for the first time attracted the interest of top 
administration officials and influential figure members of Congress. 
US efforts to strengthen the AG reached fever pitch in the immediate 
aftermath of Iraq's invasion. At the December 1990 plenary meeting, the United 
States pushed the AG to adopt controls analogous to its new EPCI regulations. 
In effect, the United States was asking the Group to subsume the entire 
Warning List (including equipment items) into the Core List, as well as to add 
catch-all controls (Clarke tst. 1991 ). An Australian official who worked closely 
with the United States on behalf of the AG Chairman confirms that the United 
States brought intense and sustained pressure to bear on partners who 
resisted these stalwart reforms ([DFAT] int.). 
The United States did not get its way immediately. For example, the 
December 1990 meeting saw agreement on only a modest addition of three 
new chemicals to the Core List, bringing the total to thirteen. However, by the 
December 1991 meeting, after a year of intense bilateral and multilateral 
activity, the Core List had indeed grown to fifty chemicals plus dual-use 
33 This official source (Bartholomew tst. 1989) indicates that the no-undercut proposal was 
accepted. However, another official source (ACDA 1997b) indicates that the AG did not adopt a no-
undercut rule until 1993. It may be that a more informal understanding was approved in 1989. 
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equipment. Several months later four more chemicals were added, representing 
the last major addition to date (ACDA 1997b ). A mid-level State Department 
official directly involved at time makes clear that the dramatic development 
of the AG the 1990s in large measure was the by US policy 
(int.). As US participant recalls, U States 
it set out 
, this perspective is 
various agencies, and so there has not been any serious interagency 
disagreement in recent years on structure operation reg 
(Donadio ; Fitzgibbon int.; Rybka int.; Smaldone int.; Wallerstein 
Even as it laboured to strengthen the AG after the Gulf War, the United 
States was forced to fight a simultaneous rearguard not to 
these gains, but to preserve the very existence of the regime. the ewe 
negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) entered the crucial 
endgame phase beginning around 1991, many non-aligned movement (NAM) 
states became more insistent in questioning the need for the AG once the CWC 
was completed. What claim to legitimacy did an insular, self-appointed club of 
states have to continue to target ewe parties with discriminatory controls? 
Some CD members, for example Iran, threatened to build a coalition against 
the CWC unless Western countries agreed to disband the AG, or at least 
severely curtail its activities vis-a-vis CWC members. Faced with the prospect 
of the CWC negotiations unravelling, some AG partners were inclined to 
capitulate on the key issue of whether the AG had an indefinite future, or to at 
least compromise significantly on its future structure and operations (Donadio 
int.). By contrast, Washington never seriously even considered the option of 
compromising the AG to secure the ewe. 
us negotiators had been alert to the prospect that the ewe could 
undermine capability-denial efforts from the very beginning. Article X, providing 
for technical cooperation and assistance among States Parties was a source of 
particular concern, the fear being that this could impose legal obligations on 
suppliers to assist dual-use programs in developing countries. Therefore, the 
United States had taken the lead during the ewe negotiations to resist 
anything but extremely weak assistance and cooperation provisions (Nelson 
int.). As one key official recalls, 'We would not have agreed to a Convention 
that would have had a "poisons for peace" provision; just wouldn't have 
happened. And naturally, as we now know, the Senate would not have ratified 
such a Convention' ([State] int.). As for the related AG issue - short of 
technology entitlements, at least eliminating or curtailing AG restrictions - the 
Pentagon had anticipated pressure along these lines once the CWC 
negotiations began to show progress in the late 1980s. Consequently, long 
before the issue had surfaced as a serious point of contention in the Geneva 
negotiations, Defense successfully made the case in the interagency that the 
United States would have to be prepared to fight aggressively any attempt to 
trade the AG for the ewe (Fitzgibbon int.; Rostow int.). According to an ACDA 
official intimately involved in interagency deliberations at the time, there was 
never any dispute on this point (int.). Thus, when the issue surfaced during the 
CWC endgame, there was already a longstanding interagency consensus on 
how the United States should respond. All agencies agreed that, in seeking to 
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conclude the ewe, the United States should not agree to narrow or relax AG 
controls ([OSD] int.; Donadio int.; Mahley int.). In addition to repeatedly 
reaffirming this position, both at AG meetings and in the Geneva negotiations, 
the United States brought sustained bilateral pressure to bear on wavering AG 
countries to shore up their resolve to hold firm (Donadio int.). Indeed, the AeDA 
official directly in charge of coordinating interagency policy for the ewe 
negotiations at the time confirms in no uncertain terms that Washington had 
been fully prepared to let the ewe negotiations reach an impasse rather than 
accede to non-aligned countries' demands regarding the Australia Group 
(Mahley int.). 
In the event it did not come to an impasse. The quarrel between the NAM 
and AG countries was nimbly side-stepped, if not resolved, albeit in a way not 
entirely to Washington's liking. This was accomplished through a statement 
read into the record at the Geneva negotiations on 6 August 1992 by the 
Australian ambassador, speaking on behalf of the AG members collectively. It 
appeared to promise that AG controls would be eliminated or relaxed for ewe 
parties, but on close reading, and as interpreted by Washington, promised no 
such thing. 
As far as many US officials were concerned, this tactic was problematic, 
coming too near to casting the future of the AG in doubt. Indeed, it seems 
highly doubtful that Washington would have gone along with the so-called 
O'Sullivan Statement but for the fact that it had been skilfully manoeuvred by 
one of its own diplomats into a position where it was given little choice. 
The genesis of the O'Sullivan Statement still touches a raw nerve among 
many of those who were involved at the time on the Washington. A former top 
member of the US Delegation concedes that the Statement was conceived 
entirely by negotiators in Geneva. This initiative was led by US Ambassador 
Stephen J. Ledogar and his Australian counterpart, Paul O'Sullivan, but without 
Washington's authorisation or knowledge (int.). The ambassadors took the 
brash step of negotiating without a mandate from their governments out of 
concern that the AG controversy, and in particular the intransigent US position, 
would derail the ewe negotiations at a crucial juncture. Having finalised a draft 
among themselves, the Geneva delegations of the AG members sent this to 
their respective capitals as an agreed text. Moreover, they did so on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. 
The Australian Delegation is rumoured to have tipped off someone in 
Washington, through unofficial channels, about these machinations in Geneva. 
But otherwise all of the relevant agencies, including AeDA (which had the 
interagency lead on ewe), had been kept completely in the dark (Mahley int.). 34 
The agreed text, when it landed, caught the interagency utterly by utter 
surprise. 
Ambassador Ledogar argued that the Statement was consistent with US 
policy because it had been carefully worded so as not to put the AG in any real 
jeopardy. However, the entire interagency was unhappy with the formula, since 
it certainly conveyed the impression that the status of the AG would be put on 
the table at some future date. Even AeDA, which had the highest stake in 
successfully completing the ewe, was wary that the O'Sullivan Statement went 
34 The inference seems to be that the White House was warned, but kept this information to itself. 
In any case, if someone in Washington was alerted, it was not by the US Delegation. 
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too far (Mahley int.). The Pentagon in particular was up in arms. Former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense William lnglee recalls: 
problem 
bordering u 
a 
harmful.. 
in reality, 
it me was that it was disingenuous 
dishonest. I really felt it was contriving to 
something I was 
[CWC] signatories a blank check on 
regulations, or lead them believe 
the ). 
go strategy. 
agreement other 
ru out any modifications as part of this agreement, 
concluded that it had handed what amounted to a 
level State Department official recalls: 
The O'Sullivan Statement was put together by ... the 
Australian CD Representative, and worked on by 
Geneva delegations of the AG countries, and at the last 
minute foisted upon their capitals as a take it or leave it 
proposition. And so we basically took it...but a lot of 
people back in Washington ... were not exactly pleased 
with the evolution of that statement (int.). 
Defense fought the issue at the highest levels, but in the end was forced to 
concede that it would be impractical to attempt to walk back from something 
that had already been circulated so widely (lnglee int.). 
Having reluctantly gone along with the O'Sullivan Statement - and it 
having accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish (i.e. dodging the 
dispute long enough to wrap up the CWC negotiations) - Washington cleaved 
to a minimalist interpretation of the commitment therein implied. As far as the 
United States was concerned, the AG countries had merely agreed to review 
their export control practices. Having done so, and finding nothing inconsistent 
with the CWC, Washington considered the matter to be closed. Since then, 
there has been unwavering agreement among agencies that a robust AG will 
be needed indefinitely irrespective of the disposition of the CWC (Fitzgibbon 
int.; Mahley int.; Smaldone int.; [State] int.; Wallerstein int.) This consensus that 
the AG needed to be maintained and strengthened was formalised by 
presidential directive within days of the completion of ewe negotiations, and 
again the following year. Finally, the US Senate cemented this policy into law, 
by making it an explicit condition of its consent to ratify the CWC (US Cong. 
Senate. 1997, 24 April). Moreover, the Clinton administration made no effort to 
oppose this condition, since it was consistent with the President's standing 
guidance (Wallerstein int.). 
Far from contemplating scaling back or eliminating the AG now that the 
CWC has entered into force, the United States presently sees this as an 
opportunity to expand the scope of its activities. A mid-level State Department 
official (int.) familiar with current interagency deliberations notes that, inasmuch 
as the CWC is now up and running, the United States believes that the AG can 
afford to abandon its 'defensive crouch' of recent years. Consequently, the 
United States wants to see the group become more outwardly looking. 
Specifically, it plans to push the AG to move beyond just controlling exports by 
its members, and to begin as a regime to undertake efforts to curtail transfers 
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between non-members (i.e. a corporate interdiction program). 
Wider Control 
Washington has almost from the advent 
application of CW-related export 
the inaugural meeting, the U 
persuade 
Washington 
yielded a 
Following Iraq's use of poison gas against the Kurds, President Reagan 
called for a meeting of the world's foreign ministers to reaffirm support for the 
1925 Geneva Protocol's prohibition on CW use. However, the real US purpose 
was to use this conference as a venue to promote global support for CW export 
controls. The conference took place in Paris in January 1989, serving as the 
multilateral debut for incoming Secretary of State James Baker 111. Although the 
United States pushed hard for the conference to call for countries to institute 
controls on relevant exports, this initiative was blocked by a number of 
developing countries. In the end, Washington had to settle for a vague 
statement endorsing restraint in matters relevant to the subject of the 
conference, but with no explicit reference to CW-related transfers (Burck & 
Flowerree 1991 ). This was a far cry from the broad multilateral pledge to 
support export controls that Washington had envisioned when it had called for 
the conference. 
The United States had no intention of allowing the matter rest with this 
failure. It immediately set about organising a follow-up meeting, which would 
have promoting export controls as an explicit goal. Since Australia was the 
permanent chair of the Australia Group, it was seen as a natural host. Secretary 
Baker therefore telephoned his Australian counterpart to ask him to sponsor a 
high-level meeting of governments and representatives of their chemical 
industries (Evans int.). A major US goal for inviting the latter was 'enabling the 
chemical industry to contribute to ... helping us to better control the burgeoning 
trade in CW precursors and technology' (Holmes tst. 1989b: 13). Indeed, senior 
us officials indicated that, although other issues such as the ewe negotiations 
might also be addressed, the US saw promoting export controls as the primary 
objective. For example, a senior State Department official testified several 
months beforehand: 
We believe that this will be an excellent opportunity to 
involve industry and governments worldwide in the 
common effort to control the trade in chemical weapons 
precursors, as well as to gain industry support for the 
Geneva negotiations on a CW ban. We hope that the 
Conference will focus particularly on government and 
industry cooperative efforts to control the movement of 
precursors in international commerce (Bartholomew tst. 
1989a: 16). 
A senior Commerce Department official identified similar priorities: 
The idea for this conference came from the United States, 
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urge in 
and I think its the best hope we have for beginning to 
effectively control the means to produce chemical 
weapons. Perhaps the most important goal of this type of 
multilateral conference would be better enforcement 
coordination (Freedenberg tst. 1989: 1 
us~'"'"'"'',..,." 
controls with teeth, should do so' 
In the wake of these successive high-profile failures to forge broad 
multilateral adherence CW-related controls, the United States set out 
to bolster the role the emerging CWC in this regard. In August 1991, the 
United States introduced draft treaty language requiring CWC members to limit 
exports scheduled chemicals, equipment and technology to non-members 
through export controls ( CWC Bulletin [13] 1991 ). Although this proposal 
excluded intra-party transfers, it nevertheless succeeded in establishing a 
broad multilateral obligation to establish national export control systems. 
Additionally, Washington continued to promote wider adherence to AG norms 
through bilateral means. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Elizebeth Verville 
toured former Warsaw Pact countries in the summer of 1991 to urge them to 
adhere to Australia Group rules unilaterally (Clarke tst. 1991 ). As a carrot, 
Washington agreed to relax its CBW-related export restrictions to some of 
these countries, once they had export controls in place (LeMunyon tst. 1991 ). 
The following year, the United States began to provide funds under the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to assist Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhistan to develop effective export control systems, including 
explicitly in the CBW areas (Duffy tst. 1994; Eckert tst. 1994; State off. 1999).35 
Washington also pressed China to implement CW export controls, although it 
was unable to secure a satisfactory commitment from Beijing until 1998 ( CBW 
Conventions Bulletin [41] 1998). 
National Enforcement Mechanisms 
The US commitment to supply-side nonproliferation is most vividly 
demonstrated by the energy that it has expended to enforce export control 
norms. As in all of the proliferation areas, this commitment to enforcement 
begins with its own CW-relevant dual-use exports, in the form of longstanding 
programs run by the State and Commerce departments to verify the end-use of 
items that have been exported subject to end-use assurances. 36 However, most 
US enforcement efforts target transfers by other countries. Australia Group 
norms, as well as the blanket non-assistance obligation incorporated in the 
CWC, provide the general framework for these efforts. However, Washington 
has had no compunction about taking action against transfers from or to 
35 These efforts have been supplemented on a smaller scale by the State Department's 
Nonproliferation Fund, which unlike the CTR program has a global focus (State off. 1999). 
36 That said, Clarke and Johnston (1999) note that US implementation of pre-licensing checks and 
post-shipment verifications have and continue to be in practice too lax to deter diversion and retransfers 
of dual-use exports. 
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countries that are not members of these regimes, and/or involving items not 
covered by them. 
Washington began to interdict chemical transfers to countries of 
proliferation concern in the mid-1980s ([ACDA] int.). According to a State 
Department official, this was done through 'official demarches regarding 
detailed information we have received and specific action we expect to be 
taken' (Harrison tst. 1989). Such demarches were delivered through diplomatic 
channels and in face-to-face bilateral meetings. In 1989 a top official testified 
that these demarches over the previous few years had made a significant 
material impact on the number of companies assisting CW proliferators (Burns 
tst. 1989a). The most concerted such effort during the Reagan period targeted 
transfers to Libya's Rabta plant. Beginning in late 1988, Secretary of State 
George Shultz sent personal envoys to pressure the governments of countries 
with companies assisting the Rabta project to cut off any and all further 
assistance (Holmes tst. 1989b; Webster tst. 1989a). 
One of the first nonproliferation initiatives of the Bush administration was 
to regularise such ad hoc efforts by creating an interagency group to coordinate 
CBW interdiction: 
The group monitors intelligence, coordinates proposed 
demarches, and provides a centralized mechanism for 
obtaining clearance to downgrade and release intelligence 
information [to other countries] and ensure necessary 
follow up (Bartholomew tst. 1989a: 13-14). 
SHIELD (originally known as Operation Shield) systematically identified 
problematic commercial activities on an ongoing basis to raise with both AG 
and non-AG governments. In cases involving non-AG members, Washington 
often tried to get other AG countries to support its efforts by undertaking their 
own parallel demarches (Donadio int.) Since the SHIELD group was formed the 
United States has sent out approximately 80-130 demarches annually through 
regular diplomatic channels (not counting bilateral meetings) regarding specific 
CBW-related transfers, or up to more than ten interdiction demarches per 
month ([State] int.). In 1991, a senior official testified: 
Our [United States Government] USG interdiction groups 
for CBW ... have ... proven effective. These groups seek to 
identify illicit proliferation-related shipments and stop them 
through cooperation with foreign governments. We have 
succeeded in a number of cases (Clarke tst. 1991: 93). 
Interdiction efforts continued under the Clinton administration. It focused 
particular attention on problematic Chinese exports. Former Assistant Secretary 
of State Robert Gallucci (int.) recalls repeatedly raising concerns about specific 
transfers during his meetings with Chinese officials. Indeed, interdiction issues 
were raised with the Chinese even at the presidential level (Davis tst. 1996). 
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchel Wallerstein (int.) 
indicates that bilateral efforts to stop ongoing Chinese transfers of pertinent 
equipment and materials constituted the single key focus of the Clinton 
administration's CW nonproliferation policy until at least 1996. He recalls, 'They 
saw the export of chemical precursors or the export of chemical equipment. .. as 
a way of earning foreign exchange, end of story.' Moreover, he recollects that 
Washington did not receive very much help from its AG partners in responding 
to this problem: 
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other 
There were attempts at coordinating demarches. I was 
never convinced that many other countries were 
approaching China with the degree of seriousness and 
perspicacity that was needed China 
message. 
Department 
interd 
United States flirted 
1993, the US military weeks shadowed the Chinese cargo ship 
He, suspected of carrying CW-related chemicals to Iran. China refused to 
permit the US Navy a search on the high seas. However, 
intense diplomatic pressure Washington, consented to divert the 
ship to Saudi Arabia to be inspected. When the search med up nothing, 
China demanded a public apology, monetary compensation, and a pledge that 
no similar incidents would occur again. Washington rejected all of these 
demands (Washington Post 9/5/93), but has never again employed this tactic. 
Beginning in the early 1990s the United States supplemented its 
interdiction program with unilateral CBW nonproliferation sanctions tied to the 
proliferation behaviour of foreign firms and governments. Such sanctions had 
first been proposed by a presidential commission in 1985, although the 
recommendation was not taken up (Webster tst. 1989a). However, beginning in 
late 1988 Congress began considering a flurry of CBW sanctions bills, which 
attracted bipartisan support. The new Bush administration took an equivocal 
position on these legislative initiatives. On the one hand, it strongly supported 
giving the President the authority to sanction foreign firms for providing CBW-
related assistance to proliferators. For example, CIA Director William Webster 
testified in February 1989: 
Legislation authorizing the President to impose sanctions 
on ... companies which contribute to CBW proliferation, 
would address an inadequacy in existing law and would 
be an important step to deter the proliferation ... of CBW 
(1989a: 25). 
At the same time, the administration felt that such sanctions should not be 
automatic, since this would infringe on the President's flexibility to conduct 
foreign policy (Bartholomew tst. 1989a; Executive Office of the President off. 
1989, 28 June, 14 November; Webster tst. 1989a). 
The administration negotiated with Congress on different versions of 
sanctions legislation throughout 1989 and 1990. Ultimately, sanctions 
advocates in Congress felt that the administration was seeking too much 
flexibility. They therefore used a common Congressional tactic for avoiding a 
Presidential veto, by attaching sanctions legislation to a bill that the 
administration would be loath to veto, in this case the November 1990 
extension of the Export Administration Act of 1979. However. the President 
outmanoeuvred Congress by vetoing the bill, but then extending its provisions 
by executive order. The only difference between the vetoed legislation and the 
simultaneous executive order was that the CBW sanctions provisions provided 
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greater Presidential discretion (Congressional Research Service [CRS] off. 
1991 ). In a sop to Congress, however, the executive order provided automatic 
sanctions for transfers to Iran, Iraq Libya (OSD off. 1997b). 
than a 
recalls that the 
int.). 
US CBW sanctions are explicitly tied to AG, but rather apply the 
standards set US export controls (eRS off. 1997; OSD off. 1997b). 
However, the United States soug unsuccessfully have the adopt a 
similar multilateral measure. When this failed, it resorted to urging AG 
governments to adopt comparable sanctions on a national basis ([DFAT] int.). 
US CBW sanctions apply only to transfers to countries that are deemed to 
have used or prepared to use eBW since 1 January 1980. and to all of the 
countries on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. There is 
no exemption for entities from AG or ewe member countries, and in fact 
actions that are allowable under these instruments nonetheless may be subject 
to sanctions (e.g. Schedule 1 transfers among certain ewe parties) ([State] 
int.; [ACDA] int.). However, the President can waive sanctions if the 
government of jurisdiction undertakes specific and effective enforcement 
actions to prevent or punish the sanctionable activity. sanctioned entity is 
barred from exporting to the United States for at least a year, and thereafter 
until the President certifies that it is not longer aiding or abetting foreign CBW 
programs, or that providing a waiver is in the national security interests of the 
United States (CRS off. 1997; OSD off. 1997b). 
Responsibility for identifying potentially sanctionable activity has been 
assigned to the existing interagency interdiction group since the mandatory 
sanctions law came into effect (Clarke tst. 1991 ). Presidential authority to make 
sanctions determinations was devolved formally to the cognisant under 
secretary of state. The law has been invoked on a number of occasions in the 
intervening years. For example, three Thai companies were sanctioned in 
March 1994 for supplying workers to Libya's Rabta facility, following several 
months of diplomatic warnings by Washington (CWC Bulletin [24] 1994). Two 
Swiss firms were sanctioned later that same year for providing construction 
machinery to the same project (CWC Bulletin [26] 1994 ). Most recently, 
Washington imposed sanctions on two Chinese companies, five Chinese 
persons, and a Hong Kong firm in May 1997, for assisting the Iranian CW 
program (Disarmament Diplomacy [15] 1997).37 
37 However, it should be noted that Congressional critics have said that in this case the 
Government of China also should have been sanctioned in this case, charging that the administration's 
actions only 'met the bare requirements of US law' (US Cong. Senate. off. 1998: 13). 
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Other Capability-denial Responses 
Other than the general targeted initiatives discussed in Section 1 (e.g. 
been no apparent cases where United States has tried 
to against rams. 
moved an 
provoking a response resu in the downing hters 
Bulletin [3] 1989). Following this incident, however, the United States denied 
that it had ever had any concrete plans attack Rabta Bulletin [4] 
1989). But when the Rabta plant mysteriously caught fire du the 1990 Gulf 
Crisis, press reports suggested that the had been an intentional act 
sabotage. Indeed, the Washington Post editorial page went so far as to 
welcome the 'intriguing mystery' as 'perhaps the best news on the 
nonproliferation front since Israel bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor a decade ago' 
(4/18/90: 86). 
More than half a decade later, with nonproliferation efforts having 
prevented Libya from completing Rabta, Secretary of Defense William Perry 
told the press that, if and when Libya neared completion, the United States 
would consider a pre-emptive military attack. 'If you would like to consider that a 
warning to Libya,' he stated, 'you can so consider it' (as quoted, Disarmament 
Diplomacy [4] 1996: 44 ). Oddly enough, the only overt attack on a suspected 
CW facility (other than in the unique case of the Gulf War) happened with no 
warning or prior diplomatic initiatives, when the United States attacked an 
alleged CW factory in the capital of Sudan in August 1998.38 
Non-possession Norm-building 
Global Non-possession Norm: Chemical Weapons Convention 
For all but the final 2-3 years of the CWC negotiations, the United States 
did not regard the process as a means to respond to horizontal proliferation. 
Rather, until about 1990, Washington saw the Geneva talks almost exclusively 
in terms of addressing the strategic threat posed by Soviet capabilities. 39 From 
the US perspective, Third World proliferation simply did not enter into its CWC 
equation ([OSD] int.; Hinds int.; Mahley int.; Nelson int.; [State] int.). Although 
US agencies had different perspectives on the efficacy of a global CW ban, 
they all saw it as part of the larger bilateral US-USSR arms control process, 
multilateral trappings notwithstanding. Not surprisingly, then, to the extent that 
there was any real attention given to CW disarmament up until 1990, it occurred 
in bilateral channels behind the scenes. 
38 Press reports, and at least a few members of Congress, openly speculated that this attack was 
motivated by an embattled President's desire to distract public opinion from the mounting Monica 
Lewinsky scandal that eventually led to his impeachment. In any case, the United States later admitted 
that it did not have proof that the factory was being used as a CW facility, as evinced by a decision to 
settle out of court a lawsuit brought by its owner. 
39 Throughout the 1980s NATO's senior military commanders generally believed that the USSR 
had massive CW superiority, and that it would use CW in any war against the West (Adams 1989). 
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Given that the United States initially saw the CWC talks primarily as an 
East-West disarmament process, rather than a vehicle for nonproliferation, 
speaking few years of negotiations should be 
considered as proliferation That said, 
du final shaped its d 
agenda. As a official 
US positions on the 
understood in 
which they evolved. 40 
as a non instrument can 
context of the bilateral arms agenda 
The United States came CWC negotiations with a record 
of scepticism about CW disarmament. 41 The first meaningful US effort to pursue 
CW disarmament occurred in a US-USSR bilateral working group established 
by the Carter administration in 1977. These bilateral talks reached agreement 
on the scope of a notional treaty, but rapidly deadlocked on specific modalities. 
With no further progress being made, and bilateral relations deteriorating 
generally, this bilateral process was formally disbanded in 1981, with the two 
superpowers agreeing to remand the issue to the CD in Geneva (Burcke & 
Flowerree 1991 ). According to one official involved in the bilateral talks, once it 
had become clear that the Soviets were not serious, the United States lost any 
interest in trying to pursue CW disarmament. Washington therefore referred the 
issue to the CD - which it regarded as 'a place to get things done slowly, if at 
all' - specifically as a way to preclude further progress ([OSD] int.). 
The failure of the bilateral talks, and the subsequent putting of CW 
disarmament out to the multilateral pasture, did not displease most elements of 
the US Government, particularly in the new Reagan administration. Senior 
officials at the Pentagon actively opposed pressing ahead with serious 
negotiations - believing that the Soviets could not be prevented from cheating, 
and a treaty would undercut support for defensive and retaliatory programs -
while senior officials at other agencies were at best indifferent, with the notable 
exception of a single individual. As a White House aide recalls: 'In the Reagan 
administration the only person who cared about chemical weapons 
[disarmament] was George Bush, the Vice President' (Mahley int.). 
Washington effectively blocked any chance of progress in the multilateral 
talks by refusing to agree to give the relevant working group a mandate to 
actually try to negotiate a treaty. This straightforward strategy of declining to 
40 The intention here is not to provide a comprehensive negotiating history of the CWC, or even 
every nuance of the evolution of US negotiating positions over the years. Instead, this discussion is meant 
to convey the major issues and decisions that represent crucial antecedents to the more relevant 
developments after 1990. 
41 For example, along with its allies France and Britain, it rejected a proposal to ban poison gases 
put forward by Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan at the multilateral 1921 Washington Conference, arguing 
that such a instrument could not adequately ensure against covert CW acquisition by unscrupulous 
powers (Thomas & Thomas 1970). Washington likewise rejected a multilateral UNGA proposal in 1969 by 
Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate a global ban on CW, asserting that the inherent limitations of such a 
ban necessitated retaining deterrence through the ability to retaliate in kind. 
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negotiate, and likewise preventing others from doing so, prevailed throughout 
the administration's first term. Although the United States went through the 
motions of participating in Geneva, for example tabling a paper spelling out its 
broad objectives for a CW treaty in February 1983 (Emery tst. 1984 ), in reality it 
did nothing that would allow any real progress. 
This changed abruptly, when Secretary of State George Shultz 
announced in January 1984 during an unrelated speech to his counterparts in 
the CSCE that the United States soon planned to table a draft CW negotiating 
text at the CD. What accounted for this dramatic turnaround? Not, it appears, a 
consensus within the administration. 
According to DOD officials involved at the time, the decision to announce 
tabling a draft treaty was made without interagency consensus or White House 
approval (Feith int.; Gaffney tst. 1989; Perle int.). Moreover, it was not merely a 
case of an initiative that had not been properly vetted by the interagency 
beforehand, but rather one that had been vigorously and explicitly rejected. 
Based on a formal intelligence assessment that a CW ban could not be 
effectively verified, even regarding militarily significant violations, the 
interagency had weeks before overwhelmingly rejected a proposal by a mid-
level State Department official to allow the CD to begin formal negotiations. It 
was this official who slipped the draft text initiative into Shultz's speech, without 
telling him that it was an unauthorised initiative. Afterwards, the Pentagon went 
directly to the President to demand a retraction. However, after consulting with 
Shultz, the President decided that he could not undermine his Secretary of 
State's credibility by reversing a high profile public initiative (Feith int.). 
As one Defense official later testified, 'Having no choice but to act upon 
the initiative of the Secretary of State, we did the next best thing, which was to 
try to limit the damage' (Gaffney tst. 1989, p. 98). By all accounts, the Pentagon 
sought to accomplish this by inserting a provision for 'anytime, anywhere' 
challenge inspections into the draft treaty, as non-negotiable provision that the 
Soviets were certain to reject. A former NSC official recalls: 
Anytime, anywhere with no right of refusal was a formula 
that was generated by [Assistant Secretary] Richard Perle 
at the Department of Defense. And it was generated by 
Richard Perle with the plain statement within the 
interagency when he generated it that this is something 
the Russians will never agree to so therefore its a means 
we will block negotiation of the treaty, and we will be able 
to sit there with that demand on the table and we will not 
have to make progress on this silly treaty and will still at 
the same time be able to say that we're doing everything 
we can (Mahley int.). 
Members of Perle's staff at the time provide similar accounts ([OSD] ints.). One 
recalls: 
He deliberately forced into the treaty this article with the 
intention of killing the Convention, assuming ... that this 
made it non-negotiable; the Soviet Union would never 
accept it, and the Europeans wouldn't accept it either for 
different reasons. So he ... told the Joint Chiefs that the 
chemical weapons treaty was a bad idea, but Shultz had 
made a public statement promising its being presented by 
the United States, and that he had fixed it by putting this 
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poison pill into it and that they had nothing to worry about 
(int.). 
h Perle himself admits that anywhere' was his idea, is 
intention was to sabotage negotiations. 
saw it as a m 
no agreement to a yes', 
to 
was 
seen 
simple answer 
negotiating in order satisfy a Congressional requirement that the acquisition 
a new generation of reliable binary CW occur as part of a two-track 
, in to arms control talks (see ix 42 Then 
House aide Donald Mahley asserts: 
From the standpoint of the Defense Department, from the 
standpoint of the National Security Council, from the 
standpoint of the State Department, putting the new draft 
treaty that Bush put down on the table at the Conference 
on Disarmament was done purely because - not mostly 
because, but purely because - that was a Congressional 
requirement in order for the Congress to vote for binary 
production funds (int.). 
This Congressional requirement was reinforced by Vice President Bush, who 
privately let Army officials know that he would only support the binary program 
as a means to force the Soviets to the negotiating table ([DOD] int.). Richard 
Perle (int.) confirms that the only reason that he went along with tabling the 
draft treaty, even with the 'anytime, anywhere' provision, was the need to 
garner support for the binary program. 
The first attempt to interject an explicit nonproliferation element into the 
CW disarmament process came from the new Soviet leader, Gorbachev, 
following the tabling of the US draft treaty in Geneva. Since Moscow adamantly 
refused to consider the type of intrusive verification that the United States was 
seeking for the CWC, and Washington refused to show any flexibility in its 
position, Gorbachev suggested that the two superpowers side-step this 
stalemate. During a 1985 summit meeting he privately proposed a joint US-
USSR initiative to create a CW nonproliferation treaty analogous to the NPT -
with the US and USSR remaining haves and the rest of the world signing on as 
have-nots - as an interim arrangement pending future progress on superpower 
disarmament. This proposal was explored in a series of clandestine bilateral 
meetings, which the United States kept secret even from its closest allies 
(Nelson int.). However, in the end, Washington rejected the proposal, 
concluding that it would jeopardise its binary weapons program, locking in a 
Soviet advantage. Since US priorities focused on the Soviet threat rather than 
proliferation, any potential nonproliferation benefit was not considered worth 
this price (Mahley int.). When Moscow subsequently raised the idea publicly, 
42 This was identical to the strategy that was being pursued at the time in the nuclear field, where 
the deployment of INF missiles (Pershing II) in Europe was approved contingent on, and occurred in 
parallel to, negotiations to eliminate this class of weapons. 
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United States rejected it out of hand, stating that it preferred to support the 
ewe negotiations. 
this support, Washington had little 
the sidelines h personal interventions, a officials pressed 
at the working level flexibil the key agencies red an u 
negotiating posture. In addition to holding on 'anytime, anywhere' 
verification, the United States continued insist the CWC should 
enter into force if and when CW-capable states had joined 1988), 
effectively killing any realistic prospects for an operative treaty. 
lnteragency ambivalence and/or opposition was grounded in successive 
intelligence assessments concluding that even rigorous verification would 
provide only low confidence to detect cheating. 43 Indeed, far from considering 
greater flexibility, the interagency in 1987 agreed unanimously at very senior 
levels that, given the unverifiability of a CW ban, the United States should 
withdraw its formal support for the CWC negotiations. This recommendation 
was forwarded to President Reagan for approval, but this was derailed by the 
personal intervention of Vice President Bush (Gaffney tst. 1989; Hinds int.). 
Nevertheless, as a former senior Pentagon official later testified: 
It frankly would be hard to overstate the significance ... that 
every involved agency including ... the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense ... the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, the State 
Department. .. and the National Security Council itself had 
arrived - reluctantly, but nonetheless had arrived - at a 
recommendation that we must change our position in 
favor of...pursuit of a chemical weapons ban (Gaffney tst. 
1989: 79). 
Only a few months later, a blue-ribbon government panel co-chaired by former 
ACDA Director Fred C. lkle reached virtually the same recommendation in a 
public report delivered to the White House, concluding that it was unrealistic for 
the United States to continue to pursue an inherently unverifiable ban (CWC 
Bulletin [1] 1988). 
Then, suddenly, everything changed. Less than a year after the 
interagency had unanimously recommended abandoning even the pretext of 
trying to negotiate a CW ban, and just months after the lkle panel made the 
same recommendation, the only official above the mid-level bureaucracy who 
had ever ardently supported chemical disarmament was elected President of 
the United States. Whether the interagency liked it or not, suddenly the CWC 
negotiations had to be taken seriously. 
43 The Intelligence Community had consistently taken this position since at least the mid-1980s. It 
was publicly and unambiguously reaffirmed as late as 1989 (Webster tst. 1989a). 
104 
From the very beginning of his term, President George Bush made it clear 
to his senior political appointees in the different agencies that the ewe 
negotiations represented a personal priority (Alessi int.). Moreover, due 
dramatic in US-Soviet 
rams in 1989, 
to 
officials taking 
Taking ewe seriously the some agencies realised 
'anytime, anywhere' challenge inspections could seriously imperil sensitive 
programs that had to with CW. 44 In of the interagency 
consensus that even intrusive inspections could provide high confidence 
verification, agencies with defensive equities u to CW (sensitive 
programs that could be jeopardised) concluded that doubtful verification gains 
were not worth the high adjunct costs associated with intrusive 'anytime, 
anywhere' inspections (Alessi int.; Donadio int.; lnglee int.; Rybka int.).45 As a 
mid-level Defense official recalls: 
The people who you would normally look to as being the 
most ardent advocates of the toughest verification were 
actually forced, like myself, to have to make the decision 
to forgo some intrusive inspection regimes in order to 
protect black programs (lnglee int.). 46 
The upshot was that in the first half of 1989, three agencies - DOD, DOE, and 
the IC - laid down markers at very senior levels that they could not live with 
'anytime, anywhere' challenge inspections (Alessi int; Donadio int.; lnglee int.; 
Mahley int.). 
The White House secretly convened a high-level review of the US 
negotiating position in the summer of 1989.47 This revealed deep divisions 
within the new national security team about the merits of pursuing a global CW 
44 How is it that the US came to 'discover' this consequence of its own proposal so long after 
making it? According to officials involved, this happened because those outside the narrow arms control 
community - those in a position to judge the impact on unrelated national security programs - previously 
had taken no notice of the CWC negotiations because the US had never had any real interest in 
concluding a treaty (Mahley int.).44 Additionally, the CFE and INF treaties gave the US its first taste of 
intrusive inspections at a wide range of defence facilities, revealing the vulnerability of sensitive, unrelated 
programs (Mahley int.; Rostow int.). Many outside analysts have speculated that in reality 'anytime, 
anywhere' had always been a bluff, and that what happened was merely that the bluff was called. At least 
one observer (Krause 1992) disputes this interpretation, arguing that the change was a logical reaction to 
the reorientation of US goals from East-West disarmament to North-South nonproliferation. All of these 
explanations are plausible, and none are mutually exclusive. 
45 This consensus was based on longstanding Intelligence Community assessments that even 
intrusive measures would not provide high confidence verification (Rostow int.; Webster tst. 1989a). 
Defense's lnglee recalls: 'Even [among] the most ardent advocates in the interagency, ACDA, for 
example ... there was consensus on that....The difference was they thought it was maybe going to be 85-
90%, when in fact we were saying 50%' (int.). 
46 The term 'black program' refers to highly classified weapons programs under development, the 
very existence of which is often secret. 
47 This would have occurred in the context of the then ongoing formal review of overall 
disarmament and nonproliferation policies that had been initiated a few months earlier. 
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ban. Although ACDA and State favoured moving forward with the Geneva 
negotiations, OSD strenuously argued against pursuing the CWC. It insisted 
that, at a minimum, the United States should insist on a package of changes, 
including: being allowed to continue producing binary weapons after entry into 
force in a 'build-down' arrangement; being allowed to retain indefinitely and 
unconditionally a small CW stockpile; and, adding an explicit 'firebreak' clause 
that would allow the United States to halt reductions and re-evaluate the 
treaty's merits at a specified point during implementation. The Joint Staff 
refused to support even this proposal, arguing that the United States should 
withdraw from the ewe talks altogether, and instead negotiate reductions 
bilaterally with Moscow (Washington Post 9/10/89). 
Faced with stiff opposition within his Cabinet to key elements of the draft 
CWC, the President opted to compromise across the board. He signed a secret 
directive authorising the continuation of binary production during negotiations, 
committing the United States to negotiate the right to retain a small 'security 
stockpile' within the CWC framework until all CW-capable states had acceded 
to the treaty, and leaving the door open for the United States to seek to 
continue 'build down' production even after the ewe came into force 
(Washington Post 9/10/89). He also moved to detach the ongoing bilateral talks 
from the multilateral process, and to bring them to swift closure, in order to 
ensure that the bilateral agenda did not become hostage to the dubious 
prospects for multilateral progress (Mahley int.). 
This bilateral process occupied Washington's attention for the next ten 
months, effectively superseding the larger debate on CWC. On 23 September 
1989, Washington and Moscow concluded an intense round of high level 
negotiations, signing a bilateral agreement to exchange and verify data on their 
respective stockpiles. This involved not only detailed data exchanges, but on-
site inspections at declared facilities (ACDA off. 1998). Two days later, 
President Bush used a speech to the United Nations to propose a bilateral 
disarmament agreement, whereby each country would immediately begin to 
reduce its stockpile to an amount equivalent to 20 per cent of the current US 
stockpile, with a further reduction to 2 per cent within eight years after ewe 
entry into force. At the 2-3 December 1989 Malta summit, the President 
sweetened this offer by agreeing to drop plans to insist on continuing binary 
production after ewe (CWC Bulletin [7] 1990). After several rounds of high 
level negotiations, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BOA) was signed on 1 
June 1990. In a final concession, the United States had agreed to immediately 
halt binary production. However, the agreement gave each party the right to 
retain a 'security stockpile' equal to two per cent of the current US stockpile 
until at least eight years after ewe entry into force, at which point the continued 
retention of security stockpiles would be reviewed.48 
Securing a bilateral disarmament agreement with Moscow allowed 
Washington for the first time to treat the Geneva talks primarily as a 
48 As one official (Mahley int.) points out, the BOA represented an almost perfect arms control 
agreement from the US perspective. At the time, the ewe was still thought to be decades away, and 
might never be achieved at all. The US had already produced a significant amount of binary weapons, 
and was already unilaterally destroying its unitary stockpile. Since the BOA limits were set at precisely the 
level of the total residual stockpile that the US had planned to retain in any case, the BOA served to lock 
the Soviets into asymmetric reductions that would bring their stockpile down to the same level that the US 
was already reducing to unilaterally. 
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nonproliferation vehicle. This shift in objectives served to increase the internal 
pressure to modify longstanding US negotiating positions, which had been 
designed with Soviet stockpile in mind. Advocates the multilateral treaty, 
starting President himself, had to a formula would satisfy 
critics Richard 
to 
Wash also changed longstanding position on In 
1990 the United States notified the Western Group (WEOG) caucus in 
Geneva that it was withdrawing its support 'anytime, anywhere'. It tabled a 
new negotiating position reserving the ultimate right of a States refuse 
challenge inspections (Cousins off. 1991, 15 May).49 
By adopting a position on retention and use that was anathema to the 
Third World, and a position on verification that was unacceptable to the WEOG, 
the revised US negotiating position presented obstacles to progress on all sides 
(Ledogar 1991 ). The bottom line was that, without US concessions on these 
issues, the negotiations would not be going anywhere, anytime soon. This left 
the Geneva process to stagnate, while the interagency argued about whether to 
show greater flexibility, and if so, how much. This debate became so rancorous 
that even the smallest technical issues were elevated to the Cabinet level 
([State] int.). 
The most divisive issue remained multilateral (i.e. non-Soviet) challenge 
inspections.50 Having dropped 'anytime, anywhere', Washington needed to offer 
a detailed proposal to flesh out its new position. The Geneva delegation and 
ACDA pushed to return to a tough stance on verification. DOD, DOE and the IC 
insisted on protecting non-CW related US facilities against intrusive verification. 
State and Commerce occupied the middle ground, with State leaning towards 
ACDA and Commerce leaning towards the rest, while NSC remained neutral 
(Donadio int.). This line-up left verification supporters very much in the minority. 
As the former US chief negotiator bitterly recounts, the interagency was 
dominated by the defensive concerns of DOD, DOE and the IC (Ledogar int.). A 
prominent State Department participant likewise recalls: 'You had everybody 
except State and ACDA very much wanting to protect almost at the expense of 
being able to detect' (int.). 
In the end the 'defensive' coalition prevailed decisively. A participant 
recalls that, at end of a series of meetings chaired by the NSC staff, the 
Pentagon and its interagency emerged with almost all of the defensive 
provisions that they had sought in order to ensure that multilateral inspections 
would be relatively toothless (Bushong int.). 
In the spring of 1991, the United States dispatched a delegation to various 
49 It does not appear that the interagency ever took this absolute rejection of any type of 
mandatory challenge inspections very seriously. Rather, this categorical position seems to have been 
intended as a 'place-holder' while the interagency debated the issue. 
50 At this point it was assumed that verification of US-Soviet reductions would be carried out 
bilaterally under separate bilateral inspections procedures. 
107 
Western countries to preview its new position on verification, which it 
characterised as reflecting a British approach known as 'managed access' 
(Cousins off. 1991, 15 May). As one observer notes, 'It was such a retreat from 
"anytime, anywhere" as to amount to a neutering of the challenge inspection 
concept' (Findlay 1993: 33). Among its defensive features, the proposal allowed 
the inspected party to establish a delay inspectors for up to a week to negotiate 
a perimeter around the site, gives the inspected party the final say in setting the 
perimeter if these negotiations fail, allows the inspected party to forbid 
inspectors access on the ground within this perimeter, and strictly forbids 
searching exiting personnel and private vehicles (Findlay 1991 a). The United 
States also supported limiting routine inspections to facilities that had actually in 
the past produced at least 100 tonnes of CW precursors annually, rather than 
all facilities capable of doing so (Findlay 1992a). Ironically, this proposal moved 
the United States closer to the verification preferences of China and the NAM 
countries than to most of its Western allies (Donadio int.; [State] int.). Having 
persuaded Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom to reluctantly sign on as 
co-sponsors, the United States formally tabled this proposal in the WEOG in 
July 1991. 
At this juncture, the White House changed the interagency balance by 
effectively abandoning its role as a neutral arbitrator of interagency 
disagreements. Sensing that the post-Gulf War environment offered a narrow 
window of opportunity, and fearing that US inflexibility could derail the 
negotiations at this critical juncture, President Bush stepped in to reverse his 
earlier decisions on retaining a security stockpile and the right to retaliate in-
kind. This change of course was not agreed on in interagency. Rather, it was 
handed down as an edict from the White House. While Defense Secretary 
Cheney and others objected vigorously, in the end they had no choice but to 
defer to the President's decision ([ACDA] int.; Moodie int.; Nelson int.; Rostow 
int.) As one senior negotiator recalls, the reaction among many senior officials 
in Washington was: 'It may be a rotten treaty and we hate it, but you know this 
is what the President decided' (int.). 
These major concessions left the ongoing stalemate in the WEOG on 
challenge inspections as the lone key obstacle. 51 The Pentagon and its 
interagency allies consequently drew a line in the sand on this issue, 
ferociously resisting any compromise on challenge inspections. As a result, the 
United States spent months debating a single adjective in its proposal with 
other Western governments (Donadio int.; Moodie int.). 
However, when Australia took it upon itself to try to bilaterally broker a 
compromise behind the scenes (see Chapter 5), the White House once again 
abandoned neutrality, pressing for flexibility as these secret bilateral talks 
unfolded. A senior ACDA official recounts, 'At that point there was enormous 
[White House] pressure to get the thing done' (Moodie int.). A mid-level 
Defense official ruefully recalls that, as a result of the pressure brought to bear 
by the White House during the bilateral talks with Australia: 'As we got into it, 
basically we discovered that we had no friends ... and so whenever we looked for 
cover we suddenly found that we were alone, and none of our traditional 
allies ... came out to help us' (Rostow int.). 
51 Because the WEOG could not agree on a unified Western position, the debate on challenge 
inspections at this point had not yet reached the main negotiations. 
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In the end, the United States accepted a formula that, while not going as 
far as most of its Western allies would have liked, went much farther than many 
US agencies would have accepted absent sustained and irresistible pressure 
from the President and his NSC staff. Most officials involved readily admit that 
the United States almost certainly would never have accepted the treaty that it 
signed in January 1993, but for the personal interventions of President Bush. 
us ambivalence toward the ewe did not end with successful conclusion 
of the negotiations. It was now up to a new President to carry forward US 
support for, and participation in, the new treaty regime. In the absence of close 
management by senior White House officials, simmering divisions in the 
interagency reasserted themselves in relation to implementation issues being 
negotiated in the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) of the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). With CWC sceptics once again 
able to exert influence, the United States sought to put limits on intrusive 
verification, for example by restricting the equipment used by inspectors (int.). 
The Clinton administration failed to act quickly and decisively to secure 
Senate ratification. 52 • In part, this was due to becoming mired in a bitter 
interagency dispute over a decision by the NSC staff to change Washington's 
unilateral interpretation of the CWC's restrictions on the use of riot control 
agents (RCAs). This self-inflicted controversy not only delayed the ratification 
process, but raised concerns by the powerful and nearly universally respected 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Democrat Sam Nunn, and 
would remain a major source of contention between the administration and the 
Senate.53 Meanwhile, consistent with longstanding IC assessments, top 
intelligence officials testified that the treaty's verification provisions would not 
provide high confidence to detect cheating (Landry tst. 1994; Woolsey tst. 
1994 ).54 Along similar lines, then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch 
admitted: 'We recognize that the CWC may not be universal or universally 
complied with' (tst. 1994: 34 ). 
In response to concern that such statements generated in the Senate, the 
NSC staff exerted pressure on the IC and DOD to adopt a more positive 
assessment of the CWC's effectiveness. As a result, 'At the end of the day the 
Intelligence Community and .. .DOD reluctantly said that CWC was marginally 
52 On a more positive note, the administration used discrete bilateral diplomacy to make clear to 
friendly countries that had signed the CWC, but which the US suspected of having covert CW programs 
that it would not tolerate untruthful declarations (int. Gallucci). The US therefore appears to have been 
directly responsible for some of the unanticipated declarations following entry into force. 
53 Under a unilateral reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States had maintained 
the right to use RCAs under four specified circumstances. During the CWC negotiations, the US had 
insisted on being allowed to retain this reservation, refusing to back down under any circumstances. The 
issue was only resolved on the final day of negotiations by adopting intentionally ambiguous language, 
prescribed the use of RCAs as a 'method of warfare', without defining this term (Donadio int.). The Bush 
administration had made a legal determination that this allowed for all for US conditions of use to be 
retained (Donadio int.; Shalikashvili tst. 1994; Slocombe tst. 1994). However, even as the Senate was 
holding its first round of hearings on the CWC, a low-level official on the Clinton NSC staff pushed through 
a new legal interpretation, eliminating two of the four conditions of use (int.). This, in turn, led to a 
unanimous protest by the military's theatre commanders-in-chief (CINCs), word of which eventually was 
leaked to Senator Sam Nunn (Deutch tst. 1994). According to a very senior OPCW official, there was no 
multilateral pressure on the US to revise its position (int. ). Indeed, the only external pressure for this 
change, and the disastrous delay and recriminations that it engendered, seems to have come from a 
single Western ally ([OSD] int.). 
54 Although his classified testimony is highly redacted, comments by Senators at a later open 
session suggest that General Landry indicated that the IC had 'low confidence' of effective verification. 
109 
verifiable' (Wallerstein int.). However, the damage had been done. This was 
compounded by the administration's ongoing failure to promote the treaty 
aggressively. As one observer notes, 'All told, by the second anniversary of the 
Convention's signing, the President had publicly uttered fewer than 100 words 
about it' (Smithson 1995: 17 4 ), concluding: 'The NS C's insistence that 
ratification of the ewe was a central element of the administration's 
nonproliferation policy rang false without the involvement of Clinton, Gore, 
Christopher, Aspin, or his successor, William Perry' (177). 
With ratification going nowhere fast, its prospects took a series of blows in 
1995. First, the Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress, and 
Senator Jesse Helms, an avowed CWC opponent, assumed leadership of the 
main committee responsible for ratifying treaties. Then a few months later, 
existing doubts about verification were enhanced by dramatic revelations that 
Iraq had been able to conceal significant elements of its CW stockpile from 
UNSCOM inspections (int.). Shortly after these revelations, a senior intelligence 
official bluntly told Congress, 'Some chemical weapons-capable countries, such 
as Iran, have signed the CWC but show no signs of ending their programs' 
(Oehler tst. 1995). The administration also was forced to admit that it suspected 
Russia might be cheating on the BOA, by extension casting doubt on whether it 
would comply in good faith with the ewe (ACDA off. 1998; OSD off. 1997a; 
Washington Times 8/8/96). 
Even Secretary of Defense William Perry, sent along with Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher to reassure the Senate that the CWC was effectively 
verifiable, admitted under questioning that this assessment applied only to the 
destruction of declared stockpiles, and that verification of covert production and 
stockpiles remained uncertain (tst. 1996). 
At the same time that the Clinton administration was undertaking this tepid 
ratification campaign, a slew of high ranking former officials was publicly 
speaking out against it. Former Reagan administration officials Frank Gaffney 
and Kathleen Bailey had been actively attacking the treaty in editorial articles 
almost from the moment it was signed. However, the campaign against the 
Convention reached new heights in an extraordinary open letter sent to Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott on 6 September 1996 from numerous former top 
officials, including many involved in negotiating the CWC, urging the Senate to 
reject ratification. This devastating letter was signed by, among others, seven 
former Cabinet officers (including three secretaries of defense), two former 
national security advisers, twelve retired senior generals and admirals, and 
dozens of other former senior officials from NSC, State, Commerce, Defense 
and other agencies (Cheney et al. 1996). Judging that it would lose a Senate 
vote, the administration was forced to withdraw the CWC from Senate 
consideration. 55 
Faced with this humiliating foreign policy defeat, the Clinton administration 
made CWC ratification a high foreign policy priority as it entered its second 
term. Believing that the Senate would be compelled by the prospect of the 
CWC entering into force without the United States as an original States Party, 
55 Smithson (1997b) points out that Senate opposition in part arose from factors that had little to do 
with the treaty itself, for example presidential campaign politics, and later efforts by the Republican 
Congress to assert its influence on foreign policy issues. The Senate also felt that the treaty's prohibition 
on reservations impinged on its constitutional prerogatives. 
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administration tacitly precipitated this cns1s by discretely encouraging 
Hungary to start the six-month countdown to entry into force depositing its 
instrument of in late 1996 ([ACDA] int.). 56 
efforts. pains to 
ewe, 
Test 
the United States had successfully denuded Article X 
cooperation and assistance) had circumvented restrictions on the stralia 
p (see above discussion Australia Grau Moreover, the administration 
stressed that it did ue faith in treaty, repeatedly characterising 
it as a marginally useful tool that would make an incremental by 
'making clandestine weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, more 
risky, and more expensive' (Clinton 1998, 12 November: 4 ). However, the 
Senate remained unconvinced. 
Facing an uphill battle, the administration desperately scrambled to keep 
prospects for ratification afloat. It took the unusual step of de-coupling 
ratification from the associated implementing legislation, concluding that the 
latter had no chance of passing, and in failing could drag ratification down with 
it ([ACDA] int.). 57 It also fell back on the argument of last resort, that the 
international reputation of the United States was at stake, and that therefore the 
Senate should ratify regardless of its views on the merits of the treaty. Indeed, 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, in explaining his eleventh hour support for 
ratification, made it clear he did so only to preserve 'the credibility of 
commitments made by two presidents of our country' (as quoted by Arms 
Control Today 10/97). 
In the end the White House was forced to agree to a number of major 
substantive concessions in order to narrowly scrape by with ratification. Some 
of the most onerous were unrelated to the treaty (e.g. abolishing ACDA). Others 
sought to address specific concerns about the CWC itself. For example, 
President Clinton provided Senator Lott with a written commitment that the 
President, in consultation with the Senate, would withdraw from the CWC if 
other States Parties put US interests at risk by abusing Article X or Article XI 
(providing for cooperation and assistance) (Arms Control Today 10/97). The 
White House also agreed to allow the Senate to embed 28 separate conditions 
within the ratification legislation. 58 
56 As a compromise between having no provision for universality on the one hand and setting an 
impossibly high bar on the other, the treaty specifies entry into force after a specified number of countries 
had de~osited their ratification instruments. 
7 The implementing legislation was more problematic than ratification because: 1) it needed to be 
passed by the House as well as the Senate; 2) it highlighted many of the most controversial elements of 
the treaty (e.g. intrusive inspection procedures); and 3) the external deadline for becoming an original 
States Party did not apply. 
58 The term 'conditions' was used instead of the usual term 'reservations' because the latter are 
expressly prohibited under the terms of the treaty itself. Interestingly, one of the conditions is that the 
Executive Branch will never impinge on the Senate's constitutional prerogatives by accepting such a 
restriction on reservations in any future negotiations. 
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Some of these conditions were designed to ensure that the CWC would 
not undermine other anti-proliferation efforts. These included: securing 
assurances from all AG countries that controls would maintained in their 
whether 
declarations; 
defence assistance u 
Taken together, US ratification conditions amounted the most grudg 
imaginable approval, designed to send an unmistakable signal no 
confidence. As one analyst points out, if other countries opt to match these 
conditions, the treaty in effect will be eviscerated (Tucker 1998, July). 
Although ratification occurred in time to allow the United States to become 
a charter member of the OPCW, it still had no national implementing legislation. 
As a result, the United States was unable to meet its obligations to provide 
commercial data declarations, putting it in 'technical violation' of the ewe a 
month after it had joined. This state of membership limbo lasted for nearly two 
years. One observer, commenting on this period, concludes: 'The United States 
has been the malignancy in the midst of the CWC' (Smithson 1998). 
Congress and the administration finally agreed on implementing legislation 
on 21 October 1998. However, the administration failed to persuade Congress 
to soften the ratification conditions, which were codified in the implementing 
legislation (CBW Bulletin [42] 1998). Thus while the US faces the future as a 
full CWC States Party, it can hardly be characterised as a maximalist 
participant. 
Other Non-possession Responses 
The United States never promoted regional CW non-possession 
instruments prior to the advent of the CWC. The Reagan administration flatly 
rejected a proposal by the East German SEO party and the West German SPD 
party for a CW-free zone in Central Europe in September 1985 (Burck & 
Flowerree 1991 ). A similar proposal a few months later by then Senator Albert 
Gore Jr likewise garnered no meaningful support in Washington. The only 
successful CW-free zone, the Mendoza agreement, negotiated by Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile prior to completion of the CWC, does not appear to have 
involved Washington. Likewise, the United States has not participated in or 
59 Many CWC States Parties believe that some of these US conditions constitute de facto 
reservations in the formal sense. Moreover, the Senate considered, but in the end declined to pass, a 
number of even more onerous conditions, which the President said he could not accept. These included: 
requiring ratification by China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan; withholding deposit of the 
instrument of ratification until Russia had ratified and the President had certified that Russia was in full 
compliance with the BOA; Presidential certification that the US could detect militarily significant violations 
with high confidence; requiring the President to bar OPCW inspectors of nationalities of states that 
violated US nonproliferation laws; amending treaty to eliminate Articles X and XI (Arms Control Today 
4/97). 
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promoted regional instruments to complement the CWC. 60 
Consequence-mitigation 
Counterproliferation 
Counterproliferation against CBW threats, like other elements of 
proliferation response, evolved from concepts oriented towards the Soviet 
threat. The US maintained an extensive chemical defence program throughout 
the Cold War. These efforts were bolstered significantly during the first Reagan 
administration (L. Dunn et al. 1992). From the mid-1980s through the Gulf War, 
DOD maintained a steady annual budget of $500-600 million on its CBW 
defence program (US Cong. House off. 1993). The first explicit reorientation of 
these capabilities to countering the proliferation threat occurred prior to the Gulf 
War, under the aegis of the Pentagon's working group on proliferation 
countermeasures. However, it was the Gulf War that prompted a significant 
focus on so-called regional CW programs. In 1992 the Pentagon announced a 
coordinated effort to develop active and passive CBW defences to counter 
proliferation threats. The first active-defence element of this program came in a 
solicitation for bids by the Air Force in August 1992 for development of a 
warhead that could destroy or disable CBW and bulk agents (CWC Bulletin [17] 
1992). 
Expenditures on CBW counterproliferation have risen dramatically since 
the launch of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in late 1993. The total 
non-missile-related counterproliferation annual budget for the 1998 fiscal year 
was $4.9 billion. Moreover, the Quadrennial Defense Review augmented this by 
an additional $1 billion through to the 2003 fiscal year for CBW protective 
equipment (Disarmament Diplomacy [[17] 1997).61 Counterforce programs now 
include the Air Force's Agent Defeat Weapon program and Deeply Buried 
Target Defeat Capability program. Defensive programs now include 
development and acquisition of numerous systems to improve capabilities in 
contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination and treatment (OSD 
off. 1997a). The Pentagon has also trained and assigned National Guard units 
in ten states to assist civilian authorities in the event of a CBW attack, 
effectively the first civil defence program in decades (Washington Post 
5/23/98). In sum, proliferation-oriented chemical defence has become a major 
military priority, towards which the United States has increasingly directed 
significant resources. 
Deterrence 
Deterrence in kind represented the mainstay of the US response to the 
Soviet CW threat during the Cold War. As concern about non-Soviet CW 
programs emerged in the late 1980s, deterrence in kind was explicitly extended 
to cover these threats. As discussed above, President Bush's decision to 
renounce retaliation in-kind shortly after the Gulf War had been bitterly opposed 
by the Pentagon. However, the incoming Clinton administration asserted that 
the ewe did not obviate the need for effective deterrence against cw attacks. 
60 A general exception being support in principle for a Middle East WMD free zone in the context of 
the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group of the Middle East peace process. 
61 Even this spending level is likely to increase, given the subsequent agreement between 
Congress and the administration to dramatically increase overall defence spending in coming years. 
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It was willing to forgo retaliation in kind, but only because the Pentagon 
believed that it could attain effective and credible deterrence other means 
(Slocombe tst. 1994 ). 
In the first year of the Clinton administration, Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin directed his agency to conduct an review US nuclear doctrine, 
ing whether to on the recommendations of Reed panel 
(Washington Post 10/19/93). According to press reports, this issue a 
in the interagency, with some agencies worried that threatening nuclear 
retaliation against CBW attacks would violate existing US assurances that it 
would not threaten to attack NPT states with nuclear weapons. Because of this 
internal dispute, the US adopted an intentionally ambiguous CBW deterrence 
posture. For instance, when Aspin's Nuclear Posture Review was finally 
released, it did not mention CBW deterrence. However, at the attendant press 
conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch stated that, despite the 
document's silence on the issue, countries contemplating CBW use would have 
to take into account the possibility of a US nuclear response (CWC Bulletin [26] 
1994 ). When pressed by Congress to clarify this posture, another senior 
Defense official offered the following equivocal testimony: 
For obvious reasons, we do not choose to specify in detail 
what responses we would make to a chemical attack. 
However, as we stated during the Gulf War ... the response 
will be 'absolutely overwhelming' and 'devastating' 
(Slocombe tst. 1994: 3). 
In recent years the United States has moved towards a more explicit 
nuclear deterrence posture. When the United States signed the African 
Nuclear-weapon Free Zone Treaty on 11 April 1996, the White House issued a 
statement reaffirming testimony by Secretary of Defense Perry the month 
before asserting that the United States did not interpret this obligation as 
limiting its options to respond to a WMD attack by another party (Disarmament 
Diplomacy [4] 1996; Schwartz 1998). In 1997 the issue was formally revisited in 
a second review of US nuclear strategy. In the context of this review, a senior 
Defense official bluntly testified: 'The knowledge that the US has a powerful 
and ready nuclear capability is, I believe, a significant deterrent to proliferators 
to even contemplate the use of WMD' (Slocombe tst. 1997: 5). 
An explicit shift to nuclear deterrence was formalised in November 1987 
by Presidential Decision Directive-60 (PDD-60), revising US nuclear doctrine, 
which reputedly authorises nuclear weapons to be used against rogue states in 
retaliation for WMD use (Schwartz 1998). The new circumstances associated 
62 Interestingly, one criticism that has been leveled against the ewe is that it increases US 
reliance on the deterrent role of nuclear weapons (Spring 1996). 
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with the spread of chemical and biological weapons', a subsequent study notes, 
'have expanded the role of nuclear weapons to deter such use' (Joseph & 
Lehman 1998). That said, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter 
(int.) notes that while having the option of nuclear retaliation, the Pentagon also 
has concentrated on developing a range of intermediate non-nuclear 
responses, in order to provide a credible deterrent to the full range of CBW 
threats. 
SECTION 3: CASE STUDY - BIOLOGICAL WEAPON563 
Relative Priority 
Washington was nearly indifferent to BW proliferation throughout the Cold 
War. 64 Whereas in the 1980s concern about CW had marginally included Third 
World programs, there was no parallel anxiety about BW. Developments in bio-
technology raised fears that BW could become more militarily effective, but this 
new threat was seen strictly in terms of the Soviet Union (Mahley int.; 
McNamara int.). 
The Gulf War engendered sudden awareness of BW proliferation. 'So we 
then turn to the nonproliferation aspect', one official recalls, 'and lo and behold 
we discover that very small scale ... can become major problems' (Mahley int.). 
Given that the number of suspected BW programs had tripled since the BWC 
was signed in 1972, this was perceived as an acute new threat (Gallucci int.; 
Larsen 1995; US Cong. House. off. 1993). That said, it is unclear whether BW 
has received equal attention with the other proliferation areas. Recent Assistant 
Secretary of State Thomas McNamara (int.) states that BW was consistently his 
lowest nonproliferation priority, behind missiles, CW, and nuclear. Such 
inattention appears to derive from perceptions that it BW proliferation is the 
hardest to prevent. For the same reason though, a recent senior Defense 
official asserts that BW was the Pentagon's highest counterproliferation priority 
(Carter int.). 
Capability-denial 
National Exporl Controls 
Restrictions on biological agents and associated dual-use equipment were 
considered as early as 1984, when the United States instituted export controls 
on CW precursors (Olmer tst. 1984 ). However, it was not until 1989, the first 
year of the Bush administration, that any BW-related nonproliferation controls 
were put in place, covering just a few organisms. These modest unilateral 
controls applied to all destinations except Canada, with a policy of automatic 
denial for exports to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya (LeMunyon tst. 1989; [ACDA] int.; US Cong. Office of Technology 
Assessment [OTA] off. 1993). 
The Gulf War, and subsequent revelations that Iraq had obtained 
63 As noted in Chapter 1, there is a high degree of overlap between some aspects of CW and BW 
proliferation response. In the interests of minimising redundancy, this section omits information discussed 
already in the preceding CW case study. 
64 It should be noted that Wright (1993) asserts that awareness of the proliferation dimension of the 
BW threat emerged around 1985. However, she does not document the basis for this claim. 
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pathogens from U.S. companies, prompted the first serious effort to establish 
comprehensive BW-related nonproliferation controls. In addition to creating 
catch-all controls, President Bush in 1990 ordered Commerce 
Department expand u controls items, to 
in ate In 
As soon as United States instituted own unilateral BW-related 
controls in early 1989, it soug multilateralise this effort, proposing widen 
the scope of the to nonproliferation. As one official states, 
were ones who a big role in pushing biological controls' 
([State] int.). 
The agreed to add BW nonproliferation to its basic mission in June 
1990, although no specific rules were adopted (ACDA off. 1997; Clarke tst. 
1990). However, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait several weeks later, 
Washington significantly intensified its push for concrete measures. At the 
December 1990 meeting, the United States proposed specific SW-relevant 
controls, as well as CBW catch-all controls (Clarke tst. 1991 ). Following intense 
inter-sessional lobbying by Washington (Fox off. 1991 ), the Group adopted 
controls on biological agents, toxins, and associated equipment in December 
1991. These controls were expanded further in June 1992, including the 
addition of animal and plant pathogens (ACDA off. 1997). The following month, 
President Bush directed the interagency to seek to expand AG controls further 
on SW-related items (L. Dunn et al. 1992). In June 1993, the AG again 
expanded its lists of biological agents and dual-use equipment, fully meeting 
US expectations for comprehensive controls (ACDA off. 1997; [State] int.). 
The United States has been satisfied with the scope and operation of AG 
activities against BW proliferation in recent years (Smaldone int.; Fitzgibbon 
int.; [State] int.). However, Washington faces a new challenge to preserve the 
status quo. Just as some NAM states used the CWC negotiations to attack the 
AG, it is again under fire in ongoing negotiations to create a new BWC 
compliance regime (see below). Moreover, believing themselves to have been 
misled in the CWC context by the 1992 O'Sullivan Statement, it seems doubtful 
that opponents of the AG will again allow their demands to be sidestepped with 
vague assurances. Ergo, the United States and its AG partners are under 
intense pressure to agree to eliminate or weaken the regime as a condition for 
achieving a BWC protocol. 
Washington, for its part, has categorically maintained that it is will not 
brook any compromise on the AG in order to strengthen the BWC. The chief US 
negotiator for the BWC talks indicates that the interagency has been wary of 
this trade-off all along, and that the interagency remains fully prepared to stand 
alone to break consensus. He amplifies: 
My negotiating instructions right now make it very clear 
that I am not authorised to reach any agreement on behalf 
of the United States which will undermine our 
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nonproliferation regimes as a result.. .. The idea that this 
becomes a free shot at restricting our national sovereign 
right to work anti-proliferation is yes an issue, and one on 
which we have absolutely no flexibility (Mahley int.). 
Acting Under-Secretary of State John Hoium told the press much the same 
thing on 6 October 1998: 
We will not, in the name of strengthening compliance with 
this treaty, allow an undercutting of the regimes that 
presently limit proliferation of biological weapons. We think 
those are indispensable and need to be continued ( CBW 
Bulletin [48] 1998: 42). 
A number of officials privately observe that the Clinton administration is not in a 
position to soften this stance even if it wanted to, because the Senate would 
almost certainly refuse to ratify any agreement that undermined the AG. 
Wider Export Control Norms 
In the wake of the Gulf War, the United States started to promote wider 
application of BW controls in conjunction with its standing CW-related efforts. At 
the September 1991 Third BWC Review Conference (RevCon) - even before 
the AG had incorporated biological controls - the United States urged BWC 
members to implement national export controls and sanctions along the lines of 
its own, pursuant to implementing the treaty's general prohibition on assisting 
BW programs (Fox off. 1991; Wright 1993). 
Once the AG adopted comprehensive SW-related controls, Washington 
folded its efforts to widen biological controls into its ongoing campaign to 
promote universal adherence to AG rules. The Bush administration placed 
particular emphasis on the need to persuade FSU states, and especially 
Russia, to enact strict SW-related export controls (L. Dunn et al. 1992). 
The United States has continued to use the BWC as a legal justification to 
urge non-AG countries to adopt applicable export controls. Moreover, unlike in 
the case of the CWC, Washington has refused to concede any special 
exemptions for transfers between BWC members. For example, at the 1996 
Revcon the United States stated: 
Some would weaken the Convention by twisting Article Ill 
into a mandate to let all equipment and material transfers 
presumptively run free to States Parties. But surely we 
know, based on experience, that membership in a regime 
is no guarantee of compliance. The Article Ill prohibition 
on proliferant transfers and assistance is and must remain 
absolute. Its duty as to vigilance cannot be suspended as 
to members, but rather demands constant attention as to 
all (Hoium off. 1996, 26 November: 2). 
National Enforcement Mechanisms 
Washington was constrained in undertaking national efforts to prevent 
SW-related transfers in the 1980s by its own lack of export controls (Holmes tst. 
1989). However, since adopting export controls in 1989, the United States has 
extended virtually all of its national enforcement mechanisms for CW to also 
cover BW, including interdiction, sanctions, and incentives (see preceding 
section). 
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Other Capability-denial Responses 
Other than the general targeted initiatives discussed in Section 1 (e.g. 
ACME) there have been no apparent cases where the United States has tried 
to foster such arrangements specifically against BW programs. There also have 
been no apparent cases of sabotage or destruction targeting BW programs, 
other than in the unique case of Iraq. 
Non-possession Norm-building 
Global Non-possession Norm: Biological Weapons Convention 
Throughout the Cold War, the United States saw the BWC solely as a 
means to outlaw Soviet BW capabilities. It had agreed to the Convention in this 
context during Detente in the early 1970s. Although the treaty made no pretext 
at verification, Washington was not concerned about this weakness, regarding 
BW disarmament as inherently unverifiable and, in any case, having nothing to 
lose having unilaterally renounced BW already (Chevrier 1995; Harris 1987). 
The BWC attracted scant notice from American policy makers after 
entering into force. Although the United States supported adding a few anodyne 
transparency declarations at the first BWC Review Conference in 1980, it 
otherwise neglected BWC implementation. 
In the early 1980s the Reagan administration became convinced that 
Moscow was pursuing a large-scale offensive BW program in flagrant violation 
of the BWC. 65 Soviet non-compliance represented virtually the only US concern 
going into the 1986 BWC Review Conference. But, unlike some Western 
governments, Washington stoutly rejected trying to strengthen compliance by 
adding verification measures. The interagency unanimously agreed that, since 
meaningful verification was deemed impossible, it was better to have this 
clearly understood (Feith int.; Mahley int.). This position was bluntly articulated 
in a press leak well in advance of the multilateral meeting (Washington Times 
6/9/86). 
As an alternative to verification, the United States sought to get the 
Review Conference to mandate national declarations on prior BW stockpiles 
and production facilities, and whether and how these had been destroyed or 
converted (Sims 1990a).66 Although this initiative was blocked, US proposals to 
enhance the existing transparency declarations were adopted as a modest 
package of voluntary CBMs.67 However, the United States was so focused on 
Soviet non-compliance, and so convinced by this that the BWC was 
irredeemably flawed, that it actually blocked proposals to widen the treaty's 
normative nonproliferation role by having the Review Conference issue a 
statement encouraging new states to join (DFAT off. 1990, 1 June). 
By the next Review Conference in 1991, while remaining deeply 
65 According to Mahley (int.), who at the time was a strategist at NATO, some agencies had 
suspected that the Soviets were pursuing BW as early as the late 1970s. However, it was not until the 
early 1980s that Washington obtained compelling enough evidence to convince all parts of the 
interagency. 
66 Moscow did not acknowledge ever having had a BW program. Therefore, unlike the United 
States, it did not indicate that it had destroyed or converted its stockpiles and production facilities after 
accedin9 to the BWC. 
6 These transparency measures were aimed squarely at the USSR, since the information involved 
was readily available for Western countries from public sources. 
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concerned about Soviet non-compliance, the United States also wanted to 
strengthen the Convention's nonproliferation role as a global non-possession 
norm. Compliance was also a key factor in this regard, since the United States 
believed that several other States Parties were violating the BWC, for example 
China and Iran. In light of this new nonproliferation imperative, the interagency 
conducted a major review of the verification issue. However, this process 
merely served to reaffirm for all agencies that the BWC was inherently 
unverifiable, and that ineffective verification would be worse than no verification. 
Despite pressure from other Western governments at the 1991 Review 
Conference, Washington refused to budge on verification, insisting that 
enhancing existing CBMs was the only practical way to strengthen the treaty 
(Mahley int.; Moodie int.). 68 The chief US delegate recalls 'much of the rest of 
the world saying some verification is better than none, and the US position 
being bad verification is worse than none' (Moodie int.). Additionally, in the 
absence of verification, the United States ruled out any type of multilateral 
organisation to assist in implementing the treaty (ACDA & State tst. 1990). It 
likewise opposed proposals by many Western governments to develop 
indicative lists and associated quantitative thresholds to clarify what items and 
activities were prohibited in order to facilitate verification (GAO off. 1992; 
Moodie int.).69 
As a compromise, Washington agreed to go along with creating an ad hoc 
working group of verification experts (VEREX) to study the technical feasibility 
of verification. However, it did not intend for this process to lead to anything. 
'VEREX from the Unites States standpoint. . .was something which we were 
prepared to allow ... on the presumption that it would demonstrate the futility of 
the exercise' (Mahley int.). Accordingly, Washington insisted on an extremely 
restrictive mandate for VEREX, for example limiting its duration, precluding it 
from developing draft provisions (or even recommending options), excluding 
non-governmental participants, and most importantly requiring consensus on its 
final report (Australia off. 1991; DFAT off. 1991 b; GAO off. 1992). 
Not surprisingly, at the first VEREX session in early 1992, US scientists 
categorically averred that they knew of no way to make the BWC verifiable. The 
US Delegation also stated that it would oppose any measures that could 
impinge on either proprietary commercial information or military bio-defence 
programs (GAO off. 1992). 
Soon after VEREX began, Russian President Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly 
confirmed that the former Soviet regime had maintained an offensive BW 
program in violation of the BWC, which he pledged to terminate. Consistent 
with the pattern set in the CW area, the United States opted to address this 
disarmament opportunity bilaterally - or in this case trilaterally with the British -
in order to allow the type of intrusive on-site compliance measures that it was 
68 The US successfully proposed adding a new declaration on bio-defence programs, and 
enforcing wider participation in existing CBMs by making participation politically mandatory. However, only 
twenty States Parties actually met this requirement the following year, with only the US and Australia 
provided detailed declarations (Pearson & Sims 1998). The United States also urged states to voluntarily 
allow rapid and unconstrained international investigation of unusual outbreaks of disease as a useful 
means to detect use of BW or accidents involving BW programs (Mahley int.). 
69 One of the arguments against BWC verification is that the vague nature of its prohibitions make 
it difficult to ascertain what would constitute a violation. However, the US has consistently taken the 
position that further defining Article I would limit the scope of the treaty. This remains an issue of tension 
in current negotiations (see below). 
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opposing multilaterally (Goodby int.). 70 However, some agencies had opposed 
this process, arguing that it would give ammunition to proponents of BWC 
verification (Rostow int.). 
Notwithstanding this trilateral flirtation with verification, Washington held 
firmly to its opposition to any BWC verification. NSDD-70, signed at the end of 
the Bush administration, committed the United States to maintaining the status 
quo on the BWC (L. Dunn et al. 1992). At the penultimate third round of VE REX 
talks in May-June 1993, the new Clinton administration reaffirmed this position, 
stating that it would block consensus on any positive assessments in a final 
report (DFAT off. 1993, 27 September). 
Just as it seemed that VEREX would wind down to an inclusive finish -
which of course had been the US plan from the start - a dramatic policy 
reversal was hatched in the White House. PDD-13, signed by President Clinton 
in September to replace NSDD-70, contained language supporting new 
measures to help deter violations of the BWC (White House off. 1993, 23 
September). As a senior official explained to Congress: 
To strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 
we are parting company with the previous administration 
and promoting new measures designed to increase 
transparency of activities and facilities that could have 
biological weapons applications, thereby increasing 
confidence in compliance with the Convention (Davis tst. 
1993: 60). 
This change was the only major shift in the new Clinton administration's 
nonproliferation strategy. 
By all accounts, the White House took this step over the vigorous, 
unanimous objections of the interagency (Alessi int.; Mahley int.; [NSC] int.; 
Wallerstein int.; [State] int.). 'They simply said we're going to do it', recalls one 
official, 'and then turned around to the operating parts of the government 
afterwards and said "now you guys make it work'" ([ACDA] int.). In explaining 
this unprecedented action, officials from different agencies point to the personal 
agenda of one working-level member of the NSC staff, as well as a general 
desire by the White House to take credit for an innovative nonproliferation 
initiative ([ACDA] int.; [State] int.; Wallerstein int.). 
Stuck with a new negotiating process, the interagency launched a 
vigorous rear-guard effort to stall and rein in the entire endeavour. Almost 
immediately, the NSC was forced to clarify that the administration still 
unambiguously considered the BWC to be unverifiable ([ACDA] int.; [NSC] int.; 
Wallerstein int.; [State] int.). Accordingly, at the final VEREX meeting and 
subsequently, whereas the United States agreed to support a generally positive 
report, it nonetheless insisted that the goal for any future negotiations should be 
'transparency' or 'compliance enhancement' rather than 'verification'. It also 
insisted on a formal reservation insisting on the need to protect proprietary and 
national security information, and noting that this might prove infeasible (CWC 
Bulletin [22] 1993, [26] 1994; DFAT off. 1993, 21 October). It reiterated this 
70 After a promising start, the Trilateral Process, like the BOA in the CW realm, ultimately failed. 
Despite years of talks, Moscow stonewalled on allowing any inspections at military facilities ([State] int.; 
Goodby int.). Washington continues to allege that the Russian Federation, along with several other parties 
including China, is violating the BWC (ACDA off. 1997a; Einhorn tst. 1997; OSD off. 1997a; Washington 
Post 7/15/95, 2/26/98; Washington Times 818196, 8/16/97.) 
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stance at the 1994 BWC Special Conference that provided the mandate for an 
Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to negotiate a legally-binding compliance protocol (Dando 
1995). 
soon after the tal began, 
re of UNSCOM detect significant parts of Iraq's program, or even to 
prevent its further development, profoundly reinforced interagency scepticism 
about the AHG process ([State] ; Wallerstein int.). 
In May 1996, the NSC staff was isolated the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association RMA), representing one of the major domestic 
SW-relevant industries, announced its formal opposition to measures that 
would jeopardise confidential business information, including routine 
inspections of commercial facilities (Woollett 1998). 71 In November PhRMA took 
this position directly to the BWC Fourth RevCon (Thraenert 1997). 
The lack of agreement between the bureaucracy and industry on one 
hand, and the NSC staff on the other, led to the United States having no 
negotiating flexibility during the first three years of the AHG process. In practice, 
this left the United States with a minimalist stance. For example, in a speech to 
the UNGA in September 1996, President Clinton stated that the United States 
supported on-site inspections in cases of suspected BW use or unusual 
disease outbreaks (ewe Bulletin [34] 1996), conspicuously omitting any 
mention not only of routine inspections, but even challenge inspections of 
suspicious production or storage facilities. Many observers attribute the almost 
total lack of momentum in the AHG during this period to US unwillingness to 
consider compromises on key issues such as routine inspections (Chevrier 
1995, 1996; Dando 1997; MacEachin 1998; Smithson 1998b; Tucker 1998b ). 
In a bid to salvage the AHG process, the NSC in late 1997 put high-level 
pressure on the interagency to adopt a more forward leaning position ([State] 
int.; Wallerstein int.). In the face of stiff resistance from key Cabinet officers, a 
compromise was finally reached at a January 1998 meeting attended by 
Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and Secretary of 
Commerce Daly, just in time to be announced in President Clinton's State of the 
Union speech (Washington Post 1/28/98). However, this hard-won deal 
embraced only modest concessions, and more importantly remained subject to 
approval by private industry. 
Under the January 1998 initiative, the Clinton administration pledged to 
ask relevant US industries to consider a package including: voluntary visits (i.e. 
by invitation) at declared facilities; reasonable clarifying visits at declared 
facilities to address specific problems arising from national declarations; and, 
71 Tucker (1998a) points out that the pharmaceutical industry is more vulnerable to industrial 
espionage than the chemical industry, and that the US pharmaceutical industry is disproportionately 
vulnerable because it accounts for 36% of global research and development spending and enjoys a 
significant qualitative edge. 
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challenge inspections at undeclared facilities based on the approval of a simple 
majority of the implementing organisation's Executive Council. Significantly, this 
tentative negotiating position did not include any type of mandatory routine (i.e. 
random) inspections at any declared facilities, including even high-risk facilities 
(CBW Bulletin [39] 1998; Tucker 1998b). It also did not alter Washington's 
implacable view that the BWC is not verifiable, and its resultant unwillingness to 
permit references to verification (or even the looser term 'evaluation') in the 
draft text (Mahley int.; [State] int.). One recent independent assessment 
concludes that the Clinton package 'will prevent the erection of any meaningful 
system and thus make the protocol a void document' (Muller 1998). 
It remains uncertain whether even this relatively modest package of 
concessions will ever become the US negotiating position, and if so, whether it 
could achieve multilateral consensus. Industry continues to object to key parts 
of virtually every element of the President's January 1998 initiative, as well as 
aspects of the current US negotiating position. For example, PhRMA opposes 
routine inspections even on a voluntary basis. It also insists that: challenge 
inspections should require approval by a super-majority of the Executive 
Council; mandatory declarations should not be expanded beyond those 
required in the present voluntary CBMs; and, additional definitions are needed 
to clarify what items are prohibited (Tucker 1998b; Woollett 1998). 
Almost a year after his January 1998 initiative, because of continuing 
opposition by industry, President Clinton could only repeat that 'the United 
States will work closely with US industry to develop US negotiating positions 
and then to reach international agreement on: declarations, nonchallenge 
clarifying visits, and challenge investigations' (Clinton off. 1998, 12 November, 
p.5). As for those responsible for carrying out these tasks: 'The bureaucracy is 
not very happy with the whole thing, and the issue is plagued by major 
disconnects between the working-level bureaucracy and the working-level 
White House' (int.). 
Summing up the prevailing consensus in Washington, one key State 
Department official comments that, while the United States remains willing to 
consider measures that might usefully enhance transparency and deter 
violations, it believes that the exercise has marginal utility, and therefore is not 
willing to pay any high costs, especially since the Senate has no interest in 
ratifying an ambitious compliance instrument (int.). 
Other Non-possession Responses 
The United States has never attempted to supplement the BWC with 
regional/targeted non-possession arrangements. 
Consequence-mitigation 
Counterproliferation 
The United States all but abandoned bio-defence after the BWC entered 
into force. Although the Reagan administration revived the program in response 
to a perceived Soviet threat, it remained a far lower priority than chemical 
defence (Hinds tst. 1989b ). 
This legacy of inattention left a gap in US bio-defence capabilities when 
priorities shifted to counterproliferation in the early 1990s. A 1992 study notes 
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that in contrast to robust CW-related capabilities: 
Reliable BW agent-detection technologies do not yet exist, 
current stocks of US vaccines and medicines are 
inadequate, and US forces and civil defense personnel 
are completely lacking in training and other forms of 
preparedness for biological warfare (L. Dunn et al. 1992: 
IV-2). 
That same year, the Pentagon designated SW-defence as a priority acquisition 
requirement for the first time, increasing SW-related programs to over forty 
percent of the overall CBW-defence budget (CWC Bulletin [16] 1992). In its 
final budget request, the Bush administration the next year sought a significant 
additional increase in bio-defence funding (CWC Bulletin [20] 1993). 
The Clinton administration accorded highest priority to BW in its 
counterproliferation efforts (Carter int.). In recent years, the Pentagon has 
developed new detection and protective technology and equipment. It also has 
invested massively in programs to develop up to eighteen new vaccines for 
SW-related diseases, as well as prophylactic and therapeutic treatments for 
nerve agents. In May 1998, President Clinton approved a DOD program to 
vaccinate all 2.4 million US military personnel (i.e. active-duty and reserve) 
against anthrax, and to begin stockpiling SW-relevant vaccines and antibiotics 
for civilians, at a projected cost of billions of dollars (OSD off. 1997; Washington 
Post 5/21/98, 5/23/98; CBW Convention Bulletin [41] 1998) 
Its commitment to BW counterproliferation has also led the US to shoulder 
a high-profile, controversial dispute within the UN system. In December 1994, 
Washington and Moscow agreed to suspend plans to destroy the world's last 
known samples of the smallpox virus, which each held, contravening a 
consensus recommendation by the World Health Organization (WHO) (CWC 
Bulletin [23] 1994 ). 72 Over the objections of the Pentagon (as well as the British 
government), the NSC staff opted to compromise, agreeing to merely defer 
destruction for several years in order to allow further defensive research 
(int.;CWC Bulletin [27] 1995). However, as the June 1999 deadline loomed, the 
White House had second thoughts. A scientific advisory panel was convened to 
review the issue, concluding that the United States needed to retain its 
smallpox as a hedge against covert BW programs (Washington Post 3/15/99, 
3/16/99). Citing this defensive requirement, the United States announced in 
April 1999 that it was again shifting position to oppose destruction, compelling a 
special WHO conference to agree to suspend destruction indefinitely 
(Washington Post 4/23/99, 5/25/99). 
Deterrence 
Unlike for CW, the United States was willing during the Cold War to forgo 
in-kind deterrence against BW. That said, as an unnamed official stated to the 
press in the Reagan administration: 
The thought that you could deter the use of biological 
weapons through the threat of US strategic nuclear 
weapons being used was an important argument behind 
President Nixon's unilateral renunciation of biological 
72 WHO had reached a consensus recommendation to destroy these stocks in order to declare that 
this disease had been eradicated as a threat to humanity. 
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weapons in 1969 (Washington Times 6/9/86: 3). 
In the post-Cold War period, CBW deterrence has evolved as a single doctrine 
(see previous section). Unofficially though, it seems likely that nuclear 
retaliation has continued to be deemed more credible in the case of BW, given 
its far greater capacity as a mass destruction weapon. 
SECTION 4: CASE STUDY - MISSILES 
Relative Priority 
Missiles have always been distinguished from other military systems 
because of their organic link with nuclear weapons. Discouraging their diffusion 
therefore was a logical, albeit unarticulated, ancillary to US nuclear 
nonproliferation priorities almost from the beginning. The first de facto 
nonproliferation policy for nuclear-capable missiles was instituted in 1964 by 
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-294, 'US Nuclear and Strategic 
Delivery System Assistance to France', prohibiting transfers of strategic 
missiles even to close allies (Speier 1995; State off. 1997). 73 This was indirectly 
reinforced in 1972 by National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDD)-187, 
prohibiting technical assistance to foreign space launch projects, in part 'to 
avoid proliferation of foreign capabilities to develop and deploy advance 
weapons systems' (quoted by Speier 1995). 
Despite this longstanding recognition that missiles represented a sensitive 
military capability, it was only at the beginning of the Reagan administration that 
long-range missiles were explicitly identified as an enabler - or in other words a 
latent choke-point - for nuclear proliferation. In 1981, the new administration set 
up an interagency task force to study the threat posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear-capable missiles (Ozga 1994 ). This led to NSDD-70, 'Nuclear Capable 
Missile Technology Transfer Policy', establishing nuclear-capable missiles as a 
distinct proliferation area, and making missile nonproliferation per se a formal 
US objective for the first time (Reagan off. 1982, 30 November).Long-range 
nuclear-capable missiles were thus distinguished from conventional missiles as 
equivalent to nuclear weapons themselves. 74 This represented the first explicit 
attempt to expand the concept of nonproliferation beyond nuclear weapons. It 
was also the only other area at the time in which US policy was focused on the 
Third World rather than the Soviet Union (McNamara int.). 
During the mid-1980s missile proliferation received more attention than 
the other areas at senior levels in the Pentagon ([OSD] int.; Feith int.; Perle int.; 
Speier int.). However, it only became a national priority in 1987-88. This 
heightened attention was prompted by a convergence of events, each attracting 
public notice. These included: the so-called War of the Cities between Iran and 
Iraq, China's sale of IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, and intelligence revelations about 
the progress of the Argentina-Iraq-Egypt-Libya Condor II IRBM program 
(Bowen 1997; Speier int.). Also in the late 1980s, with concerns emerging 
about CBW proliferation, Washington began to see a wider relevance for 
73 Because of this policy, Washington refused to honour an Israeli request for the nuclear-capable 
Pershing I missile in 1973, despite Syrian attacks with nuclear-capable SCUD missiles supplied by the 
USSR. Instead, the US gave Israel the non-nuclear Lance system (Karp 1989). 
74 NSDD-70 specified that transfers of other short-range missiles fell under a separate policy, the 
earlier NSDD-5 on conventional arms transfers. It specified that it took explicit precedence over NSDD-50 
on space cooperation for any issue that might be relevant to missile proliferation. 
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missile nonproliferation (Burns tst. 1989). One study (Rubenson & Slomovic 
1990) circulated among senior DOD officials concluded that CW-armed missiles 
posed a more serious potential threat to US security than nuclear missiles. 
Overall, Washington increasingly adopted the view that, in terms of its 
nonproliferation priorities, 'Ballistic missile programs are as important a 
target...as the weapons they carry' (Webster tst. 1989c). 
This burgeoning concern soared after the Gulf War. A steady stream of 
Congressional hearings and press reports reinforced already acute public 
awareness. Not only was the problem seen to be growing, but to pose an 
increasingly direct threat to US interests. For example, CIA Director James 
Woolsey testified in early 1993: 
Countries are developing ballistic missiles that will have 
sufficient range to threaten Europe, Japan, and other US 
allies and US forces abroad, and ... these can be adopted 
to carry nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons .... After 
the turn of the century ... some countries that are hostile to 
the United States might be able to acquire ballistic 
missiles that could threaten the continental United States 
(1993a: 28). 
Moreover, critics charged that US intelligence agencies were 
underestimating the peril. An intelligence estimate promulgated in 1995, NIE-
95-19, 'Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years', 
proved especially controversial. It reiterated that the United States would not 
face a direct missile threat for at least fifteen years, based on the assumption 
that all suppliers would abide by their missil,e technology export control 
commitments, as well as discounting the capabilities of non-hostile states such 
as India (Karp 1998; Washington Times 5/14/96). However, a high-level 
bipartisan commission appointed by Congress to examine this issue recently 
issued a report contradicting such assessments, concluding: 'The threat to the 
US posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving 
more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the 
Intelligence Community.' (Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to 
the United States [Commission] off. 1998). This finding subsequently was 
bolstered by the apparently unexpected tests of new medium-range missiles by 
Iran and North Korea, leading the IC to concede that some hostile countries 
may be acquiring capabilities faster than previously anticipated and, 
specifically, that North Korea, Iran and Iraq may be able to threaten North 
America in less than a decade (Tenet tst. 1998; Washington Post 9/10/99.). 
One dimension of the issue that has only recently started to get senior-
level attention is cruise missile proliferation. 75 For example, in 1989, a top 
official publicly discounted cruise missile proliferation as an imminent risk 
(Webster tst. 1989c). Although some Defense experts had sounded earlier 
warnings (Hinds tst. 1989a; Sokolski tst. 1991 ), Washington only began to 
focus in earnest on this aspect of the problem in the mid-1990s. A 1995 report 
by a key Defense advisory panel seems to have prompted concern at senior 
levels, concluding that cruise missiles are a more effective means of CBW 
delivery than ballistic missiles, and furthermore pose a greater proliferation risk 
(Defense Science Board [DSB] off. 1995). Public intelligence assessments 
75 This is not to say that the cruise missile issue previously had been ignored completely. This 
dimension had long been recognised among government experts. 
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have recently started to highlight cruise missile proliferation as an emerging 
threat (National Air Intelligence Center [NAIC] off. 1998; NPC off. 1995). 
Capability-Denial 
National Export Controls 
The United States embargoed all transfers of nuclear-capable missiles 
from the 1960s. In the early 1970s, it restricted the export of SLV-related 
technology, establishing a system of case-by-case licensing decisions. 
However, these were not really nonproliferation controls. Instead, they were 
intended chiefly to protect the commercial interests of US space launch 
providers, as well as to extend strategic trade controls to what had become 
recognised as a militarily relevant technology (Ozga 1994; Karp 1989; Speier 
1995). 
Unilateral missile nonproliferation controls as such were instituted in 1982 
as part of the missile nonproliferation policy conceived by NSDD-70. These 
regulations required case-by-case licensing on a comprehensive array of 
equipment and technology relevant to ballistic and cruise missiles and SL Vs. 
Individual licensing decisions were governed by a policy to deny any exports 
that would make more than a marginal contribution to any foreign missile 
program, although waivers could be considered for friends and allies (Reagan 
off. 1982, 30 November). 
Once the MTCR became operative in 1987, the United States continued 
to implement missile technology controls universally, with no automatic 
exemption for MTCR members (except Canada) (US Cong. OTA. off. 1994). At 
the same time, Washington maintained a strict policy of denying exports of 
MTCR items to specified countries of concern, as well as to specified projects 
of concern in other countries (LeMunyon tst. 1989b ). 76 
Washington has been among the most rigorous of the MTCR partners in 
its national interpretation and implementation of the Regime's guidelines over 
the past decade.77 For example, it has been reasonably consistent in denying 
exports that would contribute to space launch programs, from the onset 
refusing to distinguish such civilian projects from military missile programs 
(Holmes 1989a tst.). 78 As a Bush administration official testified in 1991: 'While 
76 It should be noted that, even after the creation of the MTCR, there was no regular interagency 
licensing process for missile nonproliferation in the Reagan era. Instead, it was left to State and 
Commerce to evaluate whether exports under their respective authorities were potentially relevant for 
missile nonproliferation, and if so, to consult other agencies. This led to ongoing suspicions by the 
Defense and State departments that the Commerce Department was undercutting US nonproliferation 
policy by approving relevant dual-use exports without appropriate interagency consultation (Hinds tst. 
1989c; Speier int.; Zimmerman int.). However, the Bush administration resolved this problem in 1989 by 
creating the Missile Technology Export Committee (MTEC), which reviews all applicable licence 
applications (Clarke tst. 1990). 
77 That said, some observers point out that Washington has been willing to violate its own export 
control.faolicies, and to stretch the MTCR rules, in cases involving Israel (Ozga 1994; Khromov 1998). 
8 One controversial exception was the State Department's approval in the late 1980s for a US 
company to participate in the construction of a spaceport facility at Cape York, Australia. Although this 
represented indirect assistance to an SLV project in a non-MTCR country, and therefore undermined 
Washington's own interpretation of the MTCR Guidelines, it was authorised due to domestic political 
pressure in a key state (California) in a presidential election year, as well as intensive lobbying by the 
Australian Government (Speier int.; Zimmerman int.) .. However, the administration stressed that this was 
a one-time exception, rather than a shift in policy {Clarke tst. 1990). The only apparent subsequent case 
of assistance to a new non-MTCR SLV program, in which a US company received the State Department's 
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launch services must be available on the world market, launch vehicles must 
not' (Sokolski tst. 1991, pp. 126-127). That said, in late 1992 the Bush 
administration relaxed this policy for some close allies within the MTCR (Speier 
int.; [State] int.). The Clinton administration soon after specified that, while the 
United States would not encourage any SLV programs (including within the 
MTCR), an absolute prohibition on transfers would apply only to new SLV 
programs outside the MTCR, thus permitting space cooperation with Russia 
and Ukraine (White House off. 1993, 27 September). Nonetheless, the United 
States retains among the strictest national prohibitions on assisting SL V 
programs. 
The scope of US export controls generally has tracked with the MTCR 
since it was established, with changes first being negotiated multilaterally. 
However, the Bush administration instituted some unilateral restrictions beyond 
MTCR requirements. For example, on 5 June 1989 it instituted a ban on 
exports of satellites and associated components to China as part of wider 
sanctions in the response to the Tianammen Square massacre. This ban was 
expanded a few months later to prohibit Chinese launches of US satellites 
without a case-by-case presidential waiver. On 27 May 1991, the White House 
further strengthened this prohibition for nonproliferation reasons, announcing 
that as a matter of policy it would no longer provide such waivers, and that 
henceforth it would deny licences for exports of high-speed computers that 
could be used to assist Chinese missile development (Rennack off. 1996). 
Additionally, catch-all controls were introduced in 1990 under EPCI regulations. 
Finally, the United States uses export controls and other tactics to block 
companies from purchasing missile- or SLV-related goods or services from 
foreign entities that it suspects are involved in proliferation, in order to cut off 
proliferators from indirect financial support (Smaldone int.).79 
The Clinton administration sought to ease to some extent a few of these 
unilateral measures. In 1993 it loosened restrictions on mid-range computers 
(i.e. under 1,500 MTOPs), and in 1996 again lowered this threshold, citing wide 
international availability due to rapid advances in commercial technology. 
However, Congress partially rolled back these reforms the following year 
because of proliferation concerns (US Cong. Senate. off. 1998). Also in 1996, 
the administration eased restrictions on civilian access to the most accurate 
version of the Defense Department's Global Positioning System (GPS) 
(Washington Post 3/30/96). 8° Case-by-case presidential waivers to allow US 
companies to launch their satellites on Chinese SL Vs had also been reinstated 
early in the administration. Again, responding to evidence that some 
inappropriate technology transfers may have occurred, Congress in 1998 
imposed a total ban on Chinese launches of US satellites, and re-classified all 
types of satellites as weapons licensed by the State Department rather than 
permission to heat-treat rocket-casings for the Brazilian SLV program, was acknowledged at the time to 
have been an error (Fitzgibbon int.). 
79 This 'no offshore procurement' policy is implemented by requiring (and denying) export licenses 
for US firms to provide the technical specifications that a foreign firm needs to bid on supplying 
components. In cases where this proves impractical, the policy is enforced through Treasury Department 
import licences for Defense-related items (Smaldone int.). 
80 This decision was based largely on the recommendations of a major RAND study (Pace et al. 
1995). Although the Pentagon went along with the decision, accepting the White House dictate that the 
economic benefits outweighed the proliferation risks, a 1998 DOD report to Congress subsequently 
asserted that foreign missile programs had already been assisted by the newly available GPS capabilities 
(Washington Post 6/20/98). 
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dual-use items licensed by the Commerce Department (New York Times 
5/21/98, 9/18/98; Washington Post 7/18/98, 5/12/98). 81 
The United States on balance retains stringent unilateral controls beyond 
MTCR requirements, especially targeting specific countries of proliferation 
concern. 
Multilateral Export Control Regime: Missile Technology Control Regime 
The November 1982 Presidential directive establishing unilateral missile 
nonproliferation export controls also mandated simultaneously trying to 
multilateralise this effort (Reagan off. 1982, 30 November). Beginning with 
Britain, the United States put out feelers to its G-7 Economic Summit partners 
almost immediately to sound out their willingness to participate in an export 
control regime (Ozga 1994 ). As one US participant explains this choice of 
interlocutors, 'The group was large enough to influence the rest of the world 
with its policies but small enough to try to keep the talks under wraps' (Speier 
1995, p. 19). The unambiguous US objective going into this process was to get 
the most stringent regime possible, explicitly using COCOM as a model 
(McNamara int.;[State] int.). 82 
In March 1993 the United States initiated what would prove to be a long 
and rancorous multilateral negotiation by circulating a confidential paper called 
'Missile Technology Control', proposing common G-7 export control guidelines 
for ballistic and cruise missiles and associated technology. These would include 
provisions for consultations and revisions, and would be implemented nationally 
using a detailed annex of equipment and technology to be updated yearly, with 
national participation codified by the exchange of confidential diplomatic notes. 
Although vague on details, this proposal laid out the basic structure and 
procedures of what would become the MTCR (Speier 1995).83 
Prior to the first round of secret multilateral negotiations in June 1983, the 
United States circulated a detailed technical proposal that had been developed 
by DOD. This package defined nuclear-capable missiles as systems capable of 
carrying a 500 kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometres with an accuracy 
of 10 kilometres' circular error of probability.84 It explicitly stated that civilian 
81 This issue was entangled in the larger corruption scandal of the 1996 Democratic presidential 
campaign, with charges that US firms such as Loral Space and Communications and Hughes Electronics 
traded donations for presidential waivers over the objections of the bureaucracy to permit the Chinese to 
launch their satellites (New York Times 5/17/98, 12/15/98; Washington Times 7/30/98). President Clinton 
emphatically denied these charges (Washington Post 5/18/98). However, these cases instigated the 
formation a special select Congressional committee which eventually promulgated the bipartisan Cox 
Report on Chinese penetration of US missile and nuclear secrets. They also remain the subject of 
ongoin~ criminal investigations by the Justice Department. 
2 Interestingly, the MTCR negotiations were assigned to the nuclear nonproliferation offices at 
OSD and ACDA, but to the COCOM offices at the departments of State and Commerce. The latter 
naturally thought of the MTCR as a North-South variation of strategic trade controls (i.e. targeted against 
hostile states). It was not until 1989 that MTCR policy was being handled by the nonproliferation 
bureaucracies in all agencies (Speier int.; [State] int.; Zimmerman int.). 
83 I would like to thank Dr Speier for generously making available his unpublished history of the 
MTCR negotiations, along with associated documentation. It is my understanding that this manuscript -
partly a detailed, well documented chronicle of the US role in negotiating the MTCR, partly a fascinating 
first person memoir, rich in opinions, personalities, and more than a few quirky anecdotes - may be 
released as a monograph by the United States Institute of Peace, which along with the Carnegie 
Endowment for Peace sponsored the research. 
84 According to Speier (1995), this range was based on the minimum assessed to be strategically 
significant for the Korean Peninsula, which was selected because it represented the most compact region 
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Sl Vs would be treated the same as offensive missiles under this definition. It 
also provided a specific 'short list' of key items to be controlled, including 
missiles, major sub-systems, and complete production facilities. Finally, it 
proposed developing a 'watch list' of less sensitive dual-use items. At the 
meeting, Washington obtained agreement in principle on this technical package 
(Speier 1995). 
Despite this promising start, the interagency had been unable prior to the 
inaugural meeting to agree on the guidelines by which listed items would be 
controlled. The Pentagon wanted to propose an absolute prohibition on 
transferring 'short list' items to non-members other than by unanimous consent. 
But State and ACDA wanted a more flexible system. After intensive interagency 
debate at senior levels, a compromise formula was agreed that leaned heavily 
toward the Pentagon's position: Category I items would require unanimous 
consent for export to non-members; Category 2 items would be subject 
consultations prior to export to non-members; and, all licence applications 
would be pre-notified to all members (Speier 1995). 
Washington encountered fierce resistance when it tabled these draft 
guidelines at the second round of talks. There was widespread resistance to 
COCOM-style consensus rules for Category I, prior consultations for Category 
2, and prior notification of any licence applications. Additionally, two countries 
remained implacably opposed to including civilian SL Vs in Category I. The 
session ended in a tense deadlock that was destined to last almost two years 
McNamara int.; Speier 1995). 
Throughout this period, senior Defense officials successfully resisted 
interagency suggestions to consider flexibility in the US negotiating position. 
Instead, in an all out bid to sell its position, the United States launched an 
intensive series of bilateral meetings beginning in mid-1984 (Speier 1995). As 
the chief US negotiator recalls, 'We had to basically badger the Europeans and 
push them into doing things ... which required political and bureaucratic 
measures that were difficult for them to take' (McNamara int.) In November 
1995, bowing to this diplomatic offensive, the last government resisting the US 
position on Sl Vs relented, allowing Category I to be finalised at a multilateral 
meeting the following month.85 However, Washington had been unable to 
convince some countries to go along with requiring consensus approval on 
Category I transfers (Speier 1995). 
Faced with seemingly no possibility of getting multilateral agreement, the 
State Department requested another interagency review. In a compromise 
hammered out at senior levels, the Pentagon reluctantly comprised: the 
interagency would harden its proposal on transfers of Category I production 
facilities to an absolute prohibition, but soften its position on other Category I 
transfers to a 'strong presumption of denial' except on rare occasions. 
of proliferation concern. The payload was based on the weight of the smallest nuclear weapons that were 
assessed to be attainable by Third World countries at the time. The accuracy was based on what would 
be required to inflict significant damage on an urban area using a small (20-kiloton) warhead. 
85 However, ambiguous language was inserted into the Guidelines specifying that they were not 
intended to impede national space launch programs as long as such programs could not contribute to 
systems for the delivery of WMD. Given that the US had always insisted that SL Vs inherently pose a 
proliferation risk, and more importantly that the Annex explicitly treats SL Vs as being identical to ballistic 
missiles, Washington viewed (and continues to view) this clause as having no practical effect. To the 
extent that the US has ascribed any meaning to this clause, it is along the lines that its intent can is met 
through the availability of launch services rather than SL Vs as such. 
129 
Moreover, no explicit restrictions would be put on inter-partner trade. The 
United States tabled this package in February 1986. It warned that this 
represented a major concession, amounting to weaker rules than Washington 
had wanted, and that it was absolutely unwilling to compromise further. 
Although negotiations continued for another year, this compromise ultimately 
was accepted, with minor modifications (McNamara int.; Speier 1995). In the 
end, Washington had succeeded in fashioning a multilateral instrument in the 
image of its own national policies. 
The fundamental tensions between Washington and its European allies 
did not end with the successful culmination of the MTCR negotiations. Indeed, 
friction surfaced almost at once over how to divulge the existence of the new 
regime, with the Europeans objecting to US plans for a high-profile 
announcement by President Reagan. Washington was forced to scale back its 
announcement to a nonetheless well publicised statement issue by the White 
House press secretary in the President's name, along with a State Department 
press conference (New York Times 4/17/87; Speier 1995; Washington Post 
4/18/87, 4/20/87). This discord foreshadowed a struggle within the fledgling 
Regime, with the United States fighting to assert its interpretation of the 
compromises embodied in the sometimes vague and contradictory language of 
the Guidelines and Annex. 
In the MTCR's first years, the United States worked to solidify its 
interpretation that the Guidelines applied to all Category I programs, regardless 
of whether these were civilian Sl Vs, or the country concerned did not have a 
nuclear weapons program. However, some partners, in particular France, 
resisted this strict interpretation (Holmes tst. 1989a; Sokolski tst. 1990a, 1990b; 
Verville tst. 1990; Zimmerman int.). 86 The United States also sought to 
strengthen implementation by proposing that the Regime adopt a common list 
of programs and countries of concern. Again though, some partners refused, 
leaving Washington to circulate its own such list, which it urged partners to 
consider in their national implementation (LeMunyon tst. 1989b; Zimmerman 
int.). 
In addition to continuing to work to build support for US interpretations of 
the Guidelines, the Bush administration pressed to strengthen and expand the 
Regime's institutional scope. In October 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle 
publicly called for all European Community (EC) states to join. The 
administration soon expanded on this proposal, suggesting that membership 
should include all EC, NATO, European Space Agency, and ANZUS countries 
(Clarke tst. 1991 ). 
The Gulf War provided both impetus and opportunity for Washington to 
renew its efforts to strengthen the MTCR, leading to a flurry of US proposals at 
the March 1991 plenary. These reflected 'US determination to impose progress 
on the Regime and gather multilateral action in conformity with its own 
tightened non-proliferation regulations' (DFAT off. 1991, 4 April). For instance, 
having tried since 1989 to widen the Regime's objectives to encompass CBW-
as well as nuclear-capable missiles (Holmes tst. 1989a), the United States was 
finally able to obtain agreement (Ozga 1994 ). 87 At the same meeting, the US 
86 France refused to acknowledge that MTCR rules prohibit support to Category I SLV programs 
until Jul¥ 1992 (Ozga 1994). 
8 The Guidelines were revised accordingly in January 1993, based on the recommendations of a 
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asked the Regime to adopt catch-all controls comparable to its new EPCI 
regulations (LeMunyon tst. 1991) Although it failed to get such controls added 
to the Guidelines, it continued to push in subsequent meetings and through 
bilateral diplomacy, with the result that a majority of MTCR states now 
implement them nationally.88 Finally, in order to implement these reforms within 
just nine months, the United States proposed, and offered to host, an 
unprecedented second plenary meeting later that same year (DFAT off. 1991 a). 
By the end of the Bush administration, the Annex and Guidelines had 
been strengthened, membership had been expanded to include virtually all 
Western states, a regularised intercessional consultative mechanism had been 
established, and major internal differences regarding interpretation had been 
largely resolved in Washington's favour. 
Satisfied that the MTCR had become a mature export control regime, the 
incoming Clinton administration set out to get it to take collective action against 
proliferation between non-members. It also sought to expand membership to 
include significant non-Western supplier countries, in order to expand its reach 
as a supply-side cartel. 89 Since this latter policy entailed bringing hitherto 
targets of the Regime into the fold (e.g. Argentina, South Africa), Washington 
sought to institute safeguards to prevent the MTCR from becoming a 
'technology supermarket' for incoming members. These included seeking to 
bolster the rules constraining inter-partner trade, only admitting countries that 
were already significant potential suppliers of missile technology, and only 
welcoming states 'that subscribe to international nonproliferation standards, 
enforce effective export controls and [except Russia and China] abandon 
offensive ballistic missile programs' (White House off. 1993, 27 September). 90 
In the event, modest membership expansion went forward, but the United 
States failed to win support within the Regime for any of these countervailing 
safeguards. It therefore has resorted to the extremely contentious practice of 
imposing its restrictive membership criteria unilaterally by exercising its 
consensus veto on membership applications, imposing these requirements on 
new members such as Argentina, Brazil, Hungary and South Africa. 
Washington also delayed approving Russian membership for several years until 
it was satisfied that Moscow had established a track record of responsible 
export behaviour. It is also presently delaying applications by a number of other 
candidates like South Korea (Karika int.; [State] int.). 
At the same time that the United States has been chastised by many of its 
MTCR partners for unilaterally imposing restrictive membership criteria (Karika 
int.), the Clinton administration has faced the opposite criticism from Congress 
and others, that these requirements are in fact too lax in that countries can 
technical working group on how to implement this decision (Ozga 1994). 
88 Including the EU states, Australia, Japan, and South Africa. The US has also exerted substantial 
pressure on Moscow to follow suit. 
89 In addition to strengthening the Regime's scope as a cartel, membership expansion was 
designed to serve the secondary function of giving the MTCR credibility as a de facto non-possession 
norm (see below). 
90 The latter requirement was suggested by ACDA specifically to avoid 'putting the chickens and 
the foxes together in the same place' (Smaldone int.). This was not a problem in the AG or NSG, since the 
BWC, CWC and NPT ensured that candidate members for those suppliers regimes had already 
renounced the applicable weapons. China and Russia were exempted from the requirement to give up 
MTCR-class missiles because their status as NPT nuclear weapons states entitled them to possess 
nuclear delivery systems. 
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retain SLV programs (Davis tst. 1993; Bertsch & Zaborsky 1997; Bowen 1997; 
Jones & McDonough 1998; Sokolski 1995b, tst. 1996; Speier 1999; 
Washington Post 3/23/98; ). 91 Such scepticism apparently was shared by DOD, 
which had vigorously opposed the policy of allowing new members to retain 
SLVs during (Speier int.; Wallerstein int.). Moreover, the recent decision to 
exempt Ukraine from having to forgo offensive missiles (Arms Control Today 
316198) has raised concerns that the administration is backing away from even 
these requirements, although it contends that Ukraine represents a unique 
case. 92 Nonetheless, Washington indisputably remains the leading advocate of 
retaining stringent membership requirements to ensure that the Regime 
remains an effective supply-side cartel (Karika int.; Smaldone int.; [State] int.). 
Washington's main focus in recent years has been to enforce strict 
compliance and otherwise maintain the status quo. One new US initiative which 
is still being negotiated, however, has been to try to strengthen MTCR controls 
on stealthy cruise missiles (Gormley 1998; Khromov 1997). The United States 
has also supported a European proposal to modify the format of the Annex to 
correspond to European Union control lists in order to harmonise 
implementation. 
Wider Export Control Norms 
Persuading outside suppliers to implement export controls in line with 
MTCR norms has consistently been a critical priority for the United States. 
Indeed, even as it initiated the MTCR talks with the G-7, Washington was 
mindful of the need to secure cooperation from the two other major suppliers, 
the Soviet Union and China. However, fearing that Moscow and Beijing would 
make unacceptable demands if they were invited to participate in the 
negotiations - for example guaranteeing international access to SLV 
technology, or trying to prohibit US missile defence programs - the United 
States opted for a strategy of approaching them after the fact and inviting them 
to adhere unilaterally (Speier int.). This tactic was seen as relatively low risk 
from a proliferation standpoint, because the Soviets in particular were already 
practicing unilateral restraint in exporting missile technology (McNamara int.). 
Once the MTCR was up and running, Washington made securing Soviet 
and Chinese cooperation one of its highest nonproliferation priorities. This effort 
began in earnest following the sale of Chinese CSS-2 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia in 
1988 (Holmes tst. 1989a). The United States initiated talks with Beijing and 
Moscow in May 1988 to request a moratorium on any further sales of MTCR-
class missiles to the Middle East (Washington Post 5/26/98). Secretary of State 
George Shultz followed this up several weeks later by requesting full-scale 
consultations with China on global missile proliferation (Washington Post 
7/15/98). These initiatives led to a series of US-Soviet meetings beginning in 
September 1988 (Ozga 1994 ). Although China declined to participate in a 
similar process, the United States pressed Beijing on MTCR adherence at 
91 In 1995 Brazil became the first new member under this policy to join the MTCR while retaining 
its space launch program. Critics assert that, although designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
MTCR as a cartel by luring in as many suppliers as possible, this membership expansion policy facilitates 
intra-regime proliferation of relevant technology to countries who are both suppliers and receivers, 
particularly given the subsequent US failure to secure tougher controls on inter-partner trade 
92 This decision initially was opposed by virtually the entire nonproliferation bureaucracy, which 
was eventually overruled by senior officials concerned about damaging this key bilateral relationship 
(Bertsch & Zaborsky 1997; Fitzgibbon int.; Karika int.; Wallerstein int.). 
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nearly all high level bilateral meetings (Holmes 1989a). 
As a result of these bilateral efforts, the United States and Soviets issued 
a joint ministerial communique in February 1990, and then signed a joint 
summit declaration in June, pledging to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR (which 
the Russian Federation reaffirmed in January 1991 following the collapse of the 
USSR.) The Chinese, on the other hand, would do no more than provide 
private assurances that they would refrain from exporting complete long-range 
missiles to the Middle East (Clarke tst. 1990; Ozga 1994 ). Getting a Chinese 
commitment therefore remained a priority US objective. 
Washington also tried to promote MTCR adherence generally. It had 
explicitly invited all nations to adhere unilaterally when it first announced the 
MTCR, pursuant to the provision in the Guidelines to this effect, and in 1990 
masterminded an invitation by the Regime partners collectively. In parallel to 
the central Sino-Soviet effort, the United States launched a bilateral campaign 
targeting other key non-members - both established suppliers (e.g. 
Switzerland, Sweden) and emerging suppliers (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Israel) -
urging them adhere to the MTCR as an international export control norm 
(Clarke tst. 1989; Verville tst. 1990). In the two years after the MTCR was set 
up, the United States conducted bilateral missile nonproliferation talks with at 
least ten non-member governments (Carus 1990). These efforts were largely 
unsuccessful though, with even close allies like Israel firmly rebuffing such 
overtures (Clarke tst. 1990). 
After enacting unilateral missile nonproliferation sanctions in 1990 (see 
below), Washington adopted a de facto strategy of exchanging sanctions 
waivers and conditional future immunity, in return for formal bilateral 
agreements committing non-member governments to adhere to the MTCR.93 
Largely due to this coercive tactic - in some cases reinforced with the carrot of 
access to the lucrative US space launch market - Washington was able to 
negotiate a series of export control agreements with key suppliers, including 
Israel (1991 ), Russia (1993), South Africa (1994 ), and Ukraine (1994) (Bertsch 
& Zaborsky 1997; Bowen 1997; Ozga 1994; Pikayev et al. 1998; State off. 
1994; Washington Post 4/10/91 ). 
The Clinton administration also used linkages to promote unilateral MTCR 
adherence. For example, the United States insisted on making such adherence 
a formal prerequisite for membership in the new Wassenaar Arrangement. 
Given that many states were extremely eager to join this successor to COCOM, 
governing conventional arms and technology transfers, this requirement 
created a powerful incentive for wider MTCR adherence (McNamara tst. 1995; 
Tarbel tst. 1995). 
These same carrot-and-stick tactics have continued to produce only 
marginal results with China. In December 1991, in return for relief from recently 
imposed missile sanctions, Secretary of State James Baker Ill received a verbal 
promise from Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to adhere unilaterally to MTCR 
export norms. However, in seeking to formalise this commitment in writing two 
93 Immunity against future sanctions was provided by conferring on such countries the status of 
MTCR adherent for the purpose of US law, thus invoking the exception that the law provided for MTCR 
members (CRS off. 1997). Only countries that sign a formal bilateral MOU (i.e. not unilateral adherence) 
qualify for this status (Lumpe 1994). However, this immunity was conditional, in that the US reserved the 
right to revoke these agreements in the event of non-compliance. 
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months later, the Chinese backpeddled, agreeing only to abide by the original 
1987 version of the Guidelines, and refusing explicitly to recognise any version 
of the Annex (Rennack off. 1996).94 Three years of intensive bilateral diplomacy 
at senior levels, along with a second sanctions waiver, yielded another Chinese 
ministerial statement in 1994 (Hoium tst. 1998; McNamara int.). Unfortunately, 
this new pledge did little more than reaffirm Beijing's equivocal stance. 
In early 1998, Washington sought to resolve this issue once and for all, 
secretly proposing a grand bargain: The United States would provide an 
extensive package of incentives - including a blanket waiver to Tianammen 
Square sanctions and guaranteed access to a much larger share of the US 
satellite launch market - in exchange for an unambiguous commitment to fully 
and faithfully adhere to MTCR standards. But when only weeks later allegations 
surfaced that this offer had been motivated by improper campaign 
contributions, it was quickly dropped (Arms Control Today 3/98; Washington 
Times 3/23/98, 4/29/98). Getting a firm Chinese commitment to adhere fully to 
the MTCR thus remains an unfulfilled US goal. 
In recent years, the United States has also targeted North Korean 
adherence. During the 1994 Agreed Framework talks on nuclear proliferation, 
the chief US negotiator explicitly specified that restraining missile technology 
exports was a concern that the DPRK needed to address before 
implementation could move forward (Gallucci int.). Consequently, the United 
States has held several rounds of inconclusive bilateral talks in which it has 
sought adherence (US Cong. Senate. off. 1998; Washington Post 11/20/98, 
9/13/99). 95 However, US intelligence reports apparently indicate that North 
Korea apparently has continued to increase its missile-related exports during 
this process (Washington Times 10/28/99). Washington has recently also 
worked both bilaterally and through the MTCR to induce key transhipment 
countries (e.g. Singapore, Malta, Cyprus) to adhere unilaterally. 
National Enforcement Mechanisms 
In the total absence of multilateral compliance mechanisms for missile 
nonproliferation, the United States has been especially vigorous in its national 
enforcement efforts in this area. On average Washington sends up to twenty or 
more interdiction demarches per month on missile-related transfers - plus 
raising such in bilateral meetings - or more than twice the number for CW and 
BW combined ([State] int.). Indeed, the bureaucracy typically devotes more 
energy to bilateral enforcement than to multilateral issues (Karika int.; 
Smaldone int.). Interdiction targets include MTCR members, adherents, and 
other supplier or transhipment countries. 
The United States sought to interdict missile-related transfers to 
developing regions even before it had a fully articulated missile nonproliferation 
policy. For example, in the 1970s it intervened bilaterally to block German and 
94 This odd formulation in essence nullifies any commitment. The 1987 Guidelines do not include 
CBW-capable missiles, nor the key concept of range/payload trade-off. Moreover, the Annex represents 
an essential implementing requirement for any version of the Guidelines. 
95 The US has also sought a freeze on North Korea's domestic missile programs, followed by a 
some type of peninsular disarmament arrangement. In an apparent sign of progress on what is essentially 
an arms control initiative, North Korea apparently has agreed to an interim freeze on further ballistic 
missile tests in exchange for sanctions relief (New York Times 8/18/99, /9/13/99; Washington Post 
9/13/99). 
134 
Italian firms from assisting missile and SL V programs in the Middle East (Karp 
1990). The Reagan administration began to intervene routinely to cut off foreign 
transfers to programs of concern after instituting a national missile 
nonproliferation policy in 1982. This required a high degree of delicacy, 
however, because most such transfers involved firms from the countries with 
whom Washington was secretly trying to negotiate the MTCR. Consequently 
the United States was hesitant to unsettle its negotiating partners (Speier int.). 
Once the MTCR was announced, Washington dramatically sharpened, 
broadened, and institutionalised its interdiction efforts. It established a special 
interagency process, the Missile Technology Analysis Group (MTAG), to 
monitor intelligence and coordinate responses (Clarke tst. 1989). In the 
Regime's first two years, the United States aggressively intervened against 
transfers by MTCR partners that were inconsistent with its interpretation of the 
Guidelines. For example, in 1989 the Bush administration sent a succession of 
increasingly senior delegations to Paris to protest planned sales of rocket 
engines and technology to the Brazilian and Indian space programs (Clarke tst. 
1990; Ozga 1994 ). During this period it also sent demarches to block a series 
SLV-related transfers by German and Italian firms (Bowen 1997). This 
immediate post-MTCR period also saw interdiction involving non-adherent 
countries. For example, almost at once the United States launched an intensive 
bilateral campaign against transfers by Swiss front companies acting for Third 
World missile programs (Zimmerman int.). The United States also protested at 
the highest levels to Israel about its aid to the South African missile program 
(Sokolski tst. 1989b ). 
The primary focus of US enforcement efforts since the Gulf War has been 
to promote Russian and Chinese compliance with their respective MTCR-
related commitments. In December 1990, the Bush administration protested 
forcefully against Soviet plans to sell cryogenic engines and technology to the 
Indian space program. After the collapse of the USSR, Secretary of State Baker 
raised this issue in one of his first meetings with the new Russian foreign 
minister, warning that it was a grave bilateral irritant, while at the same time 
hinting at greater space cooperation if the deal was terminated. 96 Although the 
Bush administration subsequently imposed nonproliferation sanctions, and in 
parallel liberalised Russian access to US satellite launches, the Yeltsin regime 
refused to back down. 
Responding likewise to Chinese plans to sell M-9 and M-11 missiles to 
Syria and Pakistan respectively, Secretary of State Baker used unusually harsh 
diplomatic language in a public warning that such transfers would have 
'profound consequences' for the overall Sino-American relations. He then 
dispatched a senior aide to Beijing to privately deliver this message 
(Washington Post 6/13/91 ). In response, China agreed to abandon both deals, 
ostensibly resolving the issue (Fitzgibbon int.). 
The Clinton administration inherited the active dispute with Russia over its 
planned sale to India, giving it considerable attention at senior levels (Gallucci 
int.; [NSC] int.). Carrying forward the carrot-and-stick approach of his 
predecessor, Secretary of State Christopher successfully negotiated a 
96 For a comprehensive study of this issue see Pikayev et al. (1997). Interestingly, these authors 
assert that this dispute was the primary factor in ending the pro-Western orientation of the Russian 
Federation. 
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settlement in mid-1993. Both Vice President Gore and President Clinton had 
been directly involved in the negotiations, during which the United States 
threatened to broaden existing sanctions, cut off wider financial aid, block 
Russian entry into GATT, and delay COCOM liberalisation. Under the final 
package, the Russian entity, ISRO/Glavkosmos, was permitted to sell a 
specified number of rocket engines to India. Additionally, Russian space launch 
providers received a higher quota of commercial space launches, and the 
Russian Space Agency was invited to join the International Space Station 
project. All told, almost a billion dollars worth of incentives were used. In return, 
Moscow agreed to cancel plans to transfer production technology along with 
the engines, as well as to formalise its MTCR adherence in a bilateral 
agreement that included a compliance mechanism to resolve any future 
disputes (Pikayev et al. 1998). 
Despite these ostensible successes, covert Russian and Chinese 
transfers have continued to prompt almost constant US enforcement actions in 
recent years. For example, over the past several years US officials have raised 
at every opportunity specific cases of ongoing assistance by Chinese entities to 
the Iranian and Pakistani missile programs (Washington Post 11/13/98; 
Washington Times 12/7/98). Allegations of massive Russian assistance to 
missile programs in Iran and elsewhere have also been an increasing source of 
US concern. Following dozens of formal diplomatic protests over at least two 
years, Vice President Gore raised the issue during a meeting with then Prime 
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in February 1997. In the following months, 
President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Secretary of State Albright 
repeatedly pressed their counterparts to take action to cut off these transfers. 
Finally, in July 1997, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to appoint special 
envoys to resolve the problem.97 Following two years of regular meetings, 
Russia agreed to allow US teams to monitor its implementation of export 
controls. It is unclear, however, whether Washington is satisfied that its 
concerns have been addressed (Clinton off. 1998, 12 November; Commission 
off. 1998; Einhorn tst. 1997; New York Times 4/27/98, 12/17/98; Reuters 
4/25/98; US Cong. Senate. off. 1998; Washington Post 1/18/98; 2/12/98; 
Washington Times 12/15/98). 
Although US interdiction efforts have relied mainly on bilateral diplomacy, 
it has also been willing occasionally to use more muscular tactics. In January 
1992, Washington provided intelligence that enabled Israel to turn back a North 
Korean ship thought to be delivering missile-related equipment to Syria by 
threatening to sink it (Washington Times 1/24/92). A few months later, the 
United States itself publicly threatening to intercept a North Korean freighter 
suspected of carrying missile-related equipment to Iran and Syria. However, a 
US military task force searched for ten days without finding the ship, which then 
managed to deliver its cargo (Washington Post 3/8/92, 3/12/92, 3/14/92; 
Washington Times 3/10/92, 5/18/92, 7/16/92). Following this debacle, the 
United States resorted to acting through transhipment governments, rather than 
attempting to seize shipments directly. For example, after Moscow refused US 
requests to block a sale of Russian rocket fuel precursor to Libya in early 1993, 
97 President Clinton named Ambassador Frank Wisner, a recently retired senior diplomat, as his 
special presidential envoy for Russian missile proliferation. Yeltsin appointed Yuri Koptev, the head of the 
Russian Space Agency. In 1998 Wisner was replaced by Ambassador Robert Gallucci, another retired 
senior diplomat. 
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the United States induced Kiev to seize the shipment while it was passing 
through Ukrainian territory (Washington Post 6/24/93). Less than a year later, 
Saudi authorities acting on a US request boarded the German freighter Asian 
Senator, seizing its Chinese cargo of rocket fuel ingredients (Washington Post 
1/23/94; Washington Times 1/26/94). Most after Russia failed 
a US request, Azerbaijan acted on information seize an overland 
shipment specialty steel bound Iran Times 4/25/98). 
Begin in 1990, United States 
nonproliferation sanctions. ress 
legislation in 1989. with CBW sanctions, Bush administration supported 
the idea in principle, opposed automatic triggers. It vigorously opposed 
any sanctions that would target MTCR members, arguing that this would impair 
cooperation within the Regime (Clarke tst. 1989; Executive Office of the 
President off. 1989, 4 May; Wulf tst. 1989b; Sokolski tst. 1989b ). The 
administration worked with Congress to develop legislation that addressed the 
latter concern by exempting MTCR members. Although still not pleased by its 
automatic requirements, the White House did not veto the Missile Technology 
Control Act when it was attached a major authorisation bill in November 1990. 
Although strictly unilateral, US missile sanctions are explicitly tied to 
violations of MTCR standards. The United States tried to get the MTCR to 
adopt a similar measure multilaterally, but was unsuccessful. Failing this, it 
urged MTCR governments to institute comparable national measures 
([DFAT]int.). 
The US missile sanctions law requires severe automatic sanctions for a 
period of two years against foreign entities (e.g. companies) that knowingly 
supply or receive MTCR Annex items that contribute to a Category I program in 
a non-MTCR country. 98 It makes no allowances for economic or political 
considerations, only allowing the President to waive sanctions if doing so is 
deemed 'essential for US national security' 99 It has been amended on several 
occasions to broaden its scope and to close perceived loopholes. For example, 
the so-called Helms Amendment extends sanctions to all missile-related 
industries in states with non-market economies (e.g. China), making sanctions 
potentially worth billions of dollars in lost trade (CRS off. 1997; OSD off. 1997). 
In addition, the Bush and Clinton administrations have supplemented this law 
with additional discretionary sanctions through various executive orders. All in 
all the missile area has the toughest nonproliferation sanctions on US books. 
The Bush administration set about using this new enforcement tool with 
marked zeal. Just two years after enactment, it had imposed sanctions on ten 
separate occasions, including against entities from Russia, China, India, South 
Africa, Israel and Pakistan (Ozga 1994 ). 
The Clinton administration likewise pledged: 'We are prepared to pursue 
our nonproliferation goals vigorously even when such efforts involve sanctions 
and may risk friction in critical bilateral relationships' (Davis tst. 1993: 3-4 ). In 
98 For transfers of Category II items, the sanctioned entity is restricted from receiving any MTCR 
Annex items from the United States. In the case of Category I transfers, the entity is banned from 
receiving virtually any weapons-related items. If the transfer is deemed to have made a substantial 
contribution to the Category I program, the entity is also banned from exporting to the United States. 
99 This extremely high waiver threshold is much stricter than for CBW sanctions, which merely 
require a waiver to be in US national interests. Moreover, the President is required formally to justify all 
such waivers to Congress. 
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the intervening years, however, it has been widely criticised for its reluctance to 
punish missile-related transfers, legal obligations notwithstanding. For example, 
in the four years from 1994-1997, the US has imposed sanctions only twice, 
and then only against North Korean and Iranian entities, which were already 
by blanket trade embargos (Jones & McDonough 1998). 
Criticism of the administration's record on missile sanctions has 
particular on its sanction Chinese entities assisting 
and lran. 100 Allegations that the pressured into finding 
loopholes avoid sanctioning entities are several 
interviews. A former senior intelligence official - press reports icate 
antagonised the White House by providing unwelcome information on Chinese 
transfers - also substantiated such claims in recent Congressional testimony 
(Washington Post 10/22/97; Washington Times 6/12/98). In fact, President 
Clinton inadvertently admitted as much himself, remarking (unknowingly) in 
front of a reporter that automatic sanctions have created 'an enormous amount 
of pressure in the bowels of the bureaucracy to fudge the finding' (New York 
Times 4/28/98, p. 1 ). Nevertheless, Washington has continued to use the threat 
of sanctions to pressure China to cut off transfers, and Congress is likely to 
press the administration to respond forcefully to any future Chinese transfers. 
Alarmed by what it perceived as Moscow's wanton miscreance in 
permitting Russian entities to assist missile programs in Iran, India, and China, 
Congress moved to enact a new missile sanctions law in mid-1998. This in 
effect would have revoked Russia's immunity as a MTCR member. The 
measure passed with veto-proof bipartisan support (90-4 in the Senate and 
392-22 in the House), but President Clinton vetoed it. The White House then 
deftly circumvented a near certain Congressional override of this veto by pre-
empting it by imposing discretionary sanctions on nine Russian entities (Arms 
Control Today 6-7/98; Associated Press 7/15/98. Less than six months later, 
the administration imposed such sanctions on two additional entities, prompting 
angry protests from Moscow (Washington Post 1/14/99). 
Other Capability-denial Responses 
Other than the general targeted initiatives discussed in Section 1 (e.g. 
ACME) there have been no apparent cases where the United States has tried 
to foster such arrangements specifically against missile programs. 
It is unclear if the United States has ever used or sanctioned sabotage 
against missile programs other than in the special case of the Gulf War. There 
has certainly never been any official confirmation, or even threat, of such 
10° For example, in the face of overwhelming evidence that China had transferred M-11 missiles to 
Pakistan in contravention of its bilateral commitments, the White House in 1993 opted to impose lesser 
Category II sanctions for the transfer of M-11 equipment, claiming it lacked sufficient proof that complete 
missiles had been shipped. Moreover, it further reduced these Category II sanctions by removing 
satellites from the list of banned exports. (The net effect of these manoeuvres was to reduce the 
economic impact of the sanctions that were imposed by approximately ninety percent.) The White House 
then continued to resist imposing Category I sanctions despite the accumulation of additional evidence 
from multiple intelligence sources that: additional complete missiles had been transferred; these missiles 
had become operational; nuclear warheads had been successfully developed for them; and, that China 
was helping Pakistan build a complete M-11 production facility (New York Times 6/12/98; Rennack off. 
1996; Speier 1999; Washington Post 7/3/95, 8/3/95; 6/18/96, 8/25/96; Washington Times 8/26/93, 
6/12/96, 6/15/98). The administration has also apparently failed to act on evidence that Chinese evidence 
have provided ongoing assistance to Iranian missile programs since at since at least 1995 (Washington 
Post 6/17/95; US Cong. Senate. off. 1998). 
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activity. That said, a former official notes obliquely that there was a series of 
'mysterious explosions' at facilities associate with, or providing assistance to, 
the Condor project in the late 1980s, hinting that this may have involved some 
of covert anti-proliferation activity by the United States or some other 
GOU (Speier ). 
Proposals 
U States has been a longstanding opponent proposals 
to augment supply-side missile nonproliferation with a global 
idea was first proposed by other governments during the 
negotiations. According to the chief US negotiator, however, Washington 
refused even to consider this proposal. The US responded that a ban would not 
address the problem because missile technology posed a greater threat than 
finished missiles. In addition, it argued that the Third World would never agree 
to an acceptable missile ban, because: 1) the US and other NPT nuclear states 
insisted on retaining nuclear delivery systems (i.e. necessitating a 'have/have-
not' arrangement); 2) the United States refused to distinguish between missiles 
and SLVs (i.e. necessitating a ban on civilian technologies which the Third 
World would see as perpetuating technological dependency); and 3) missiles 
were not seen as actual weapons in and of themselves (McNamara). 
In the late 1980s, as the bilateral INF negotiations were reaching fruition, 
Assistant ACDA Director Kathleen Bailey was a lone voice in the interagency 
pushing to multilateralise INF into a nonproliferation norm, even going so far at 
one point as to have her staff draft an illustrative text. However, the rest of the 
interagency argued that a global norm would undermine the MTCR, while not 
contributing much in return. Because all agencies staunchly opposed the idea, 
and it was never strongly backed by top echelons within ACDA, the Bailey 
proposals never received serious consideration (Hinds int.; Smaldone int. ). 101 
The first meaningful deliberation on the merits of seeking a global ban 
occurred in the context of the incoming Bush administration's review of arms 
control and nonproliferation in 1989. However, officials expressed public 
scepticism about the concept even before finishing this review (Hinds tst. 
1989a; Lehman tst. 1989; Wulf tst. 1989a). Predicably, since the United States 
was unwilling to give up missiles beyond its bilateral obligations, and the review 
reaffirmed the longstanding technical assessment that SL Vs could not be 
safeguarded against missile applications, the interagency concluded that a 
discriminatory 'have/have-not' treaty, prohibiting SLVs as well as missiles, was 
not negotiable on acceptable terms (ACDA & State tst. 1990; Speier int.). In the 
end, Washington satisfied itself with a joint statement with the Soviet Union 
opining that INF demonstrated to other nations that eliminating missiles could 
enhance common security (US & USSR off. 1990). 
The idea of a global non-possession norm was resurrected by Canada 
within the MTCR, taking up an initiative first raised by Australia. At the 1994 
MTCR plenary Ottawa called on partners to endorse negotiating a universal 
101 That said, an apparently off-hand reference by President Reagan to his dream of one day 
achieving a world free of missiles at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit prompted a brief flurry of academic 
debate. See for example various articles in the summer 1987 International Security 
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legal instrument banning INF-range ballistic missiles. This proposal envisioned 
a NPT-like 'rockets-for-peace' arrangement, with intrusive multilateral 
verification combined with a codification of the legal right to develop and 
possess civilian Sl Vs (Canada off. 1994; Sinclair 1995). 
initiative to yet another lopsided debate in 
Washington. departments State, Defense, and Commerce reaffirmed 
their absolute opposition to even exploring the idea. was 
arms control traditional bilateral business was d 
up) expressing interest the working level, while the nonproliferation bureau 
sided with the rest of interagency. Opponents rehashed familiar ments 
that negotiations would pressure on the United States to put its own 
residual missiles above and below the INF thresholds on the table, for a treaty 
that, if it legitimised Sl Vs, could do more harm than good by undercutting 
existing supply-side nonproliferation. Once again, the interagency quickly and 
decisively reaffirmed its resolute opposition (Smaldone ; [State] int.). 
The United States responded negatively to a follow-up Canadian initiative 
in early-1995 to convene a special intercessional seminar to consider further its 
proposal before the next plenary meeting. It circulated a highly critical paper to 
all of the MTCR members, laying out an array of objections (DFAT off. 1995, 7 
April). Although the Canadians pressed ahead with a seminar, they withdrew 
their proposal from consideration in the face of near-consensus opposition, led 
by the United States (Darling int.; Speier 1999). Washington was satisfied with 
this outcome, and continues to have no inclination to reconsider its position 
(Fitzgibbon int.; Smaldone int.; [State] int.). 
Other Non-possession Responses 
While it has consistently opposed trying to create a global non-possession 
norm, the United States has fitfully tried to promote non-possession in ways 
that would not undermine either supply-side strategies, or its own national 
interests. For instance, in late 1988 the United States offered to sponsor 
missile-related arms control talks for the Middle East (Washington Post 
12/28/98). In early 1990 the United States and Soviet Union renewed this effort 
by jointly offering their 'good offices' to promote regional missile talks (US & 
USSR off. 1990). Following the Gulf War, the ACME initiative likewise 
envisioned Middle East states agreeing to implement a regional missile-freeze 
as a first step to some type of missile-free-zone arrangement (White House off. 
1991, 21 May). 102 The US subsequently made similar 'good offices' efforts to 
sponsor regional missile talks for South Asia and the Korean Peninsula (US 
Cong. Senate. off. 1998; Wulf tst. 1993). But none of these initiatives so much 
as got off the ground, because key regional states showed no inclination to 
renounce their missiles. 103 
102 Along with other WMD, missiles in theory were included in the long-term agenda of the US-
sponsored Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group of the Middle East peace process. 
There is no indication, however, that this issue was ever addressed before ACRS was discontinued. 
103 Although since April 1996 North Korea has sporadically participated in bilateral missile talks 
with the United States, until recently it has only been willing to discuss curtailing exports, categorically 
rejecting US attempts to introduce its indigenous missile programs to the agenda. The US recently offered 
a substantial package of carrots and sticks to induce North Korea to negotiate about its missiles 
(Washington Post 6/26/99). In an apparent breakthrough, North Korea recently agreed to discuss, and 
appears now to have signed on, to what amounts to an interim testing freeze at the most recent round of 
talks (New York Times 8/18/99, 9/13/99; Washington Post 9/13/99). 
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In addition to regional initiatives, the United States has opportunistically 
pressured friendly countries to forgo missile programs. For example, the Bush 
administration was able to use bilateral leverage to get a formal commitment 
from South Korea to forgo trying to acquire MTCR-class missiles (Bowen off. 
1991 ). 104 Argentina likewise was pressured into abandoning the Condor II 
program, including allowing US destruction of its eleven unfinished missiles 
(Escude 1998). South Africa not only was pressured into giving up its missiles, 
but also its space launch program and associated infrastructure, and to submit 
to supervised destruction. Washington used incentives as well as coercion, 
paying for the destruction of missiles and associated infrastructure in several 
countries (State off. 1999). By 1991, the Bush administration reported that its 
bilateral efforts had eliminated up to eight missile programs (Clarke tst. 1991 ). 
In 1993 the Clinton administration formalised this policy through its MTCR 
membership criteria. This represented a conscious effort to use the MTCR to 
build a de facto non-possession norm (Davis tst. 1993; [NSC] int.; [State] int.; 
Wallerstein int.). 'That's really a unilateral US norm ... in the nascent stage', a 
State Department official observes, 'But in effect we're trying to create a 
possession norm'. This same official notes that, by allowing these countries to 
retain Sl Vs, this policy poses some of the same risks as a global treaty norm. 
However, these are greatly reduced because it is narrowly targeted, with the 
United States having absolute say over who joins, and openly discriminatory, 
with the United States and other existing members remaining 'haves' (int.). 
Even so, the policy has been controversial, sparking strong bipartisan 
protests in Congress requiring personal intervention by Vice President Gore. It 
also was opposed by some within the interagency. These critics asserted that it 
was a mistake to try to tack on a cooperative non-possession dimension to the 
MTCR, because this could detract from its primary supply-side function ([NSC] 
int.; Sokolski tst. 1996; Wallerstein int.). Moreover, according to a former 
official, the administration subsequently backed away from aggressively 
promoting the MTCR as a global non-possession norm: 'In retrospect. .. they 
took a wrong turn ... and then realised that in fact this made no sense and that it 
could have negative ramifications' (Wallerstein int.). 
Consequence-Mitigation 
Counterproliferation 
Because missiles are not weapons in themselves, deterrence does not 
apply to them directly, but rather is calibrated to the weapons they deliver. By 
the same token, missile (and air) defence is one of the main countermeasures 
against all types of WMD, and virtually the only way to protect against nuclear 
weapons. Consequently, missile defence programs have been a cornerstone of 
US counterproliferation efforts, representing a staggering $100 billion 
investment to date (New York Times 5/24/99). 105 
Like the other elements of counterproliferation, missile defence concepts 
104 The so-called NHK-11 Arrangement actually restricts South Korean missiles to below a range of 
180km, well below the MTCR's 300km limit. This Bush era agreement apparently formalised a 1979 
understanding that Washington obtained after discovering that Seoul had covertly converted US-supplied 
Nike Hercules air-defence missiles into an offensive ground-to-ground system (Jones & McDonough 
1998). 
105 Including SDI expenditures during the Cold War. 
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originated during the Cold War. President Reagan's original Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) envisioned an impenetrable strategic shield that would eliminate 
reliance on deterrence to protect the United States against a massive nuclear 
attack. However, Bush administration reoriented SDI to primarily a 
counterproliferation role its global against limited strikes 
(GPALS) (Clarke tst. 1991; off. 1992). The Clinton administration 
trend, recasting SDI as ballistic defence 
encompassing theatre missile defence 
the latter representing 
this 
counterproliferation initiative. 
From 1995 1997, the US intensified its emphasis on TMD, expanding 
and accelerating programs against both ballistic and cruise missiles. These 
incorporate an array of major weapons systems in various stages of 
development, including Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Navy Area 
Defense, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Navy Theater Wide 
Defense; Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADs); and HAWK Air 
Defense System. The TMD program also includes research into advanced 
concepts such as airborne laser weapons. Many of these programs involve 
cooperative efforts with allies such as Japan (OSD off. 1996, 1997a). The 
United States also has funded Israel's highly promising Arrow-2 system (New 
York Times 9/15/98). 
The United States also has continued to pursue NMD against both 
residual and emerging threats. In the mid-1990s the Clinton administration 
instituted a plan, dubbed 3-plus-3, that called for developing such a system so 
that, by the year 2000, it could be fully deployed on three years notice. The 
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review called for an additional $2 billion for NMD to 
ensure that this schedule could be met (Disarmament Diplomacy [17] 1997; 
OSD off. 1997a). 
The 3-plus-3 program implicitly reflected the assumption of a 1995 
intelligence estimate (NIE-95-19) that emerging missile programs did not pose 
a short-term homeland threat to the United States. However, as this assumption 
was increasingly undermined by rapid advances in missile programs in 
countries like Iran and North Korea, Congress began to press for faster action. 
In response, the Pentagon's January 1999 budget proposal added $7 billion 
over six years (New York Times 1/7/99). At the same time, the Senate passed a 
measure with overwhelming bipartisan support to force the administration to 
significantly accelerate scheduled deployment. Following a parallel House bill 
passed several weeks later with a similar majority, the administration agreed to 
field NMD systems as soon as technologically feasible (New York Times 
3/17/99, 3/18/99, 3/19/99, 5/21/99). 
Recent technological breakthroughs appear to make both TMD and NMD 
imminent prospects. Two successive successful tests of the prototype THAAD 
system, in both the upper atmosphere and space, and a similar success for the 
Patriot 3, ended a string of technical failures (New York Times 6/11/99; 
Washington Post 6/11 /99, 8/3/99, 10/4/99). Based on these successes, the 
Pentagon has announced that it will move immediately to move THAAD into the 
production stage (Washington Post 8/20/99). Subsequently, the first successful 
test of a prototype NMD system was conducted, knocking out an ICBM in space 
over the Pacific, more than four thousand miles from its launch site 
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(Washington Post 10/4/99; Washington Times 10/4/99). 
The US commitment to NMD entails high diplomatic costs, in that it will 
require either renegotiation or abrogation of one the oldest bilateral arms 
control instruments, the Treaty. Secretary Defense Aspin 
likelihood the counterproliferation was launched in 
[23) 1994 ). The United States formally 
in January 1999 Times 1 
pressed Moscow 
results, stressing an urgent 
'6/29/99). 
SECTION 5: SUMMARY NGS 
The US approach to anti-proliferation has consistently relied on a mutually 
reinforcing combination of capability-denial and consequence-mitigation 
strategies over the non-possession norm-building approach. Washington has 
used the full spectrum of capability-denial instruments, including: frequently 
instituting national export controls beyond multilateral requirements; 
consistently pushing for the creation and strengthening of tough suppliers 
regimes; consistently using a variety of bilateral and multilateral tools to push 
for wider export-control norms beyond the suppliers groups; repeatedly trying to 
establish more stringent targeted strategies (e.g. ACME, rogue states); 
undertaking constant national enforcement actions with a variety of tools (e.g. 
interdiction, sanctions) and at all levels; and, occasionally threatening or using 
sabotage/destruction against emerging capabilities. This has been the case 
over time and across the different proliferation areas. It has also pursued every 
possible avenue of proliferation management to respond to what it sees as 
increasing proliferated capabilities. 
Although the compromises that have emerged from the adversarial, 
frequently chaotic US interagency process, as well as Congressional versus 
Executive Branch interaction, have led to frequent and erratic policy lurches on 
minor issues, these have occurred within the parameters of the above 
preferences. Moreover, the perspectives of individual agencies within the 
interagency system, and to a lesser extent among a bipartisan majority in 
Congress, have remained remarkably constant over almost two decades. 
Likewise, while major policies have evolved over time - particularly in response 
to dramatic events in the international environment such as the Gulf War, as 
well as the internal policy reviews accompanying changes in administration -
the unifying pattern has always been to emphasise strict nonproliferation, 
augmented by proliferation management. To the extent that decisions have 
been made that subverted such tools, these have not been in favour of 
alternative normative instruments, but rather competing national priorities (e.g. 
trade, bilateral relationships). 
Washington nonetheless has increasingly recognised the importance of 
non-possession norms as a complementary approach, not least as a means to 
bolster capability-denial efforts106 As one State Department official observes: 
We are legitimised in trying to interdict shipments and 
106 It is arguable, however, that this recognition is relatively recent. Given that prior to the Gulf War, 
the United States saw the BWe and ewe almost exclusively in terms of bilateral disarmament, capability-
denial may be seen as the only US proliferation response during the Reagan and early Bush periods. 
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sanctioning people and controlling exports and all of that 
because there is this global norm ... and so that fact helps 
us do all these other things that really carry the bulk of the 
nonproliferation effort (int.). 
it has displayed inclinations to institutionalise normative 
across the different proliferation areas, largely 
technical assessments regarding the susceptibility 
technologies to cheating and break-out, as well as the costs its own 
perceived national interests . preserving its missile 
consistency in non iteration across d 
areas, while differentiating its support for cooperative non-possession norms, 
reinforces the conclusion that the latter represents a subsidiary anti-proliferation 
strategy. The proof of this is that whereas Washington has repeatedly been 
willing to undermine normative instruments to bolster capability-denial and 
consequence-mitigation, it has in virtually every instance resisted damaging the 
latter for the sake of the former. 
Washington also has consistently been unwilling to pay other high costs 
(e.g. exposing commercial or national security secrets) in order to secure or 
strengthen non-possession instruments. For example, in part because of such 
costs, the United States resisted highly intrusive verification arrangements for 
the CWC, and continues to resist a full-scope verification regime to strengthen 
the BWC. By contrast, the United States has been willing to expend vast 
political and economic capital on developing and enforcing capability-denial 
instruments, and building counterproliferation and deterrent capabilities. 
Even the conditional support that Washington has given to applicable 
normative treaty instruments would have been less than was the case had it not 
been for idiosyncratic factors. It is unlikely that the United States would ever 
have gone along with the complexity of current CWC arrangements if it had not 
inherited an even more intrusive structure from its own bilaterally-oriented 
disarmament proposals from the Cold War period. Even so, it is clear that the 
United States would never have agreed to the CWC had it not been for the 
idiosyncratic determination of President Bush. Likewise, the current US 
willingness to consider upgrading the BWC with intrusive features, albeit 
extremely tepid, has seemingly only occurred because a single NSC staffer has 
been willing and able to override the interagency consensus. Finally, the 
interagency would never have even thought about various versions of a 
multilateral missile ban had it not been for the singular determination of one 
ACDA official. 
In summary, the United States has strongly favoured the capability-denial 
approach across the board, supplemented by robust consequence-mitigation 
strategies, with sometimes reluctant support for norm-building as a 
supplementary approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROLIFERATION RESPONSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive accou of 
responses proliferation. Its structure parallels the 
1: 
Non-nuclear proliferation response priorities have been set by successive 
Australian governments with almost no outside pressure or even attention. No 
Parliamentary committee has ever held a relevant oversight inquiry. 1 Few 
pertinent questions have ever been posed during Parliamentary debate.2 As for 
the press, other than post-Gulf War stories about Iraq, there has been relatively 
little coverage of either relevant proliferation threats, or policy responses by 
Australia, its anti-proliferation partners, or the international community 
generally. For example, since 1992 the Sydney Morning Herald has carried only 
sixteen stories mentioning any aspect of CB/M proliferation. 3 During the same 
period, there were just over twenty stories reporting on responses to 
proliferation - the majority about US nonproliferation sanctions against China -
only one of which involved action taken by the Australian Government Priorities 
therefore have been internally rather than externally driven. 
Unlike most of its Western counterparts, Australia displayed relatively little 
interest in disarmament and nonproliferation during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Siracusa & Cheong 1997).4 This changed at the bureaucratic level once the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) began to participate directly in multilateral 
disarmament negotiations when Australia joined the CD in 1979 (Findlay int). 
Nuclear disarmament became a national priority following the election of 
the Labor government of Bob Hawke in 1983. This emphasis was generated at 
the highest political levels and handed down to the bureaucracy to implement 
However, such political attention was narrowly focused on nuclear issues: 
primarily superpower disarmament, and secondarily nuclear nonproliferation 
(Butler 1990, int; Harris int; [DFAT] int; Walker int). For example, a 1986 
Parliamentary report (Parliament off) on national disarmament priorities only 
mentions non-nuclear issues in passing. 
The reasons for the Hawke government's keen interest in nuclear 
1 As noted above, a report in the mid-1980s by the committee with oversight authority for foreign 
and defence policy (Parliament off 1986) concentrated heavily on nuclear disarmament, with nuclear 
proliferation receiving secondary attention, and other types of proliferation mentioned briefly or not at alL 
2 Based on a subject-index review of both the House and Senate Hansards and multiple key-word 
searches of the Parliamentary Library's comprehensive on-line database. 
3 Data on other newspapers are not readily available, because the Sydney Morning Herald is the 
only indexed newspaper in Australia. However, as one of the major national newspapers, it seems 
reasonable to infer that its coverage is representative of other outlets. 
4 For example, Australia dawdling five years before ratifying first the NPT and then the BWC. It was 
particularly unenthusiastic about the NPT because at the time it still had its own nuclear aspirations 
(Walsh 1997). Since it had no such ambitions regarding BW (see Appendix 2), it is unclear why Australia 
failed to ratify the BWC until 1977 other than general disinterest At the same time, Findlay (1991 b) notes 
that even in this context of general disinterest in disarmament, Australia had always maintained an 
interest in limiting CW because of its experiences in World War L 
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disarmament were largely rooted in internal Labor Party politics.5 Prime Minister 
Hawke was determined to shed Labor's anti-American image by promoting a 
strong bilateral security relationship. However, the Party's left wing fiercely 
opposed the ANZUS alliance generally, and the Joint Facilities in particular, as 
well as Australia's role as a major exporter of nuclear material.6 Hawke and his 
foreign minister, former Labor leader Bill Hayden, therefore explicitly regarded 
anti-nuclear activism as a means to placate this core political constituency on 
these issues (Butler int.; [intelligence] int.; Harris int.; Mediansky 1992; Miller 
1988; Walker int.; White int.).7 Accordingly, Hayden created a high-profile 
position of roving Disarmament Ambassador, making it clear to the first 
incumbent that the job had a critical domestic component. 8 Indeed, although 
based in Geneva, Ambassador Richard Butler spent a significant portion of his 
time back home on speaking tours (Butler int.).9 
The domestic disarmament imperative had largely dissipated with the 
thawing of the Cold War beginning in the mid- to late 1980s. But as one long-
time senior official observes, by then it had become a habit within the 
bureaucracy (White int.). 10 Although nuclear disarmament had been the priority 
in all of this, the growth of disarmament assets and expertise at DFA had a 
spill-down effect. Because activism in other areas bolstered Australia's 
exposure in disarmament fora, such efforts were seen to complement its 
nuclear disarmament agenda. For this reason, soon after taking office Foreign 
Minister Hayden instructed the disarmament bureaucracy to boost Australia's 
international profile on any and all disarmament issues (Gee int.). 
Consequently, non-nuclear issues, particularly CW disarmament, became 
supplementary priorities at the senior bureaucratic level as early as the mid-
1980s.11 
5 Unlike in the US system where party factions exert only nominal influence other than indirectly as 
the constituents of elected officials, internal factions within the Labor Party can exert almost continuous, 
direct influence between elections through consensus resolutions at biannual party conferences (Evans & 
Grant 1991 ). 
6 The Joint Facilities are jointly operated US-Australian military intelligence-gathering installations 
in Australia integrated into the US strategic warning system. In addition to being perceived by the 
Australian public as contributing to US nuclear force posture, these facilities were thought (correctly) to be 
targets for a Soviet nuclear strike. 
7 The resonance of the nuclear disarmament issue at the time was borne out in 1984, when more 
than half a million Australians turnout out for anti-nuclear demonstrations, and the upstart Disarmament 
Party won nearly seven per cent of the national vote with nuclear disarmament as its single issue 
(Siracusa & Cheong 1997; White int.). 
8 The formal title of this position is Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament, accredited 
to both the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations and responsible for virtually all arms 
control, disarmament, and nonproliferation matters. 
9 At the same time, Prime Minister Hawke privately warned Butler to avoid damaging the broader 
bilateral relationship with Washington (Butler int.). Australia therefore tried to strike a delicate balance 
between pushing the anti-nuclear envelop (and domestically being seen to do so) while not antagonising 
its nuclear ally. 
10 As noted elsewhere, in the Australian system all officials other than the actual Minister are 
career civil servants. This is a dramatic contrast to the US system, where political appointees dominate 
senior levels, and extend all the way down to the mid and even working levels. Consequently, the 
bureaucracy is far more influential in Canberra than in Washington. 
11 Desk officers through section directors are generally referred to herein as working-level, 
assistant secretaries as mid-level, and first assistant secretaries or above as senior-level. Ministers and 
department secretaries are sometimes referred to as top- or high-level. See Annex 1 for comparison of 
Australian and US official ranks. It should also be noted that, whereas even mid-level positions in the US 
are typically occupied by political appointees, Australia's career bureaucracy extends to the department 
secretary level, meaning that only Ministers have an overtly political mandate. 
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The focus on non-nuclear issues was reinforced in the late 1980s by the 
ascension of the follow-on Labor government of Paul Keating, whose new 
foreign minister, Gareth Evans, was eager to make his own mark, and therefore 
less invested in his predecessor's nuclear priorities. By the early 1990s, the 
non-nuclear proliferation areas had officially been accorded equal priority 
(Jones int.), and in the case of CW in reality received more attention (Evans 
int.; [DFAT] ints.). 
Unlike in the nuclear area, where an East-West nuclear exchange could 
threaten Australia directly, the focus in the other areas as early as the late 
1970s was on horizontal proliferation rather than the Soviet threat and 
associated East-West disarmament. 12 This focus was derived from a perceived 
security imperative to keep WMD, particularly CW, out of Australia's strategic 
region (Butler int.; Findlay int.; Harris int.; Reese int.; Walker int.; White int.). At 
the same time, regional proliferation was not seen to pose any immediate threat 
in the 1980s. Canberra therefore perceived proliferation as a latent problem 
that needed to be pre-empted, rather than as the kind of clear and present 
danger that forward-deployed American forces faced (White int.). 
Even after global proliferation rose to the fore of the international agenda 
in the early 1990s, Australia's main concern remained regional and 
prophylactic. A succession of Defence white papers have identified preventing 
WMD proliferation in Australia's immediate region (Southeast Asia and the 
South Pacific) as a key strategic interest, while noting the absence of any such 
threat (Defence off. 1987, 1994, 1997).13 Consequently, although proliferation 
response has unquestionably been an important priority, it nonetheless has not 
been at the very top of the Australian national security agenda. For example, 
throughout the 1990s anti-proliferation has been a lower priority for senior 
DFAT officials than efforts to strengthen regional security architecture ([DFAT] 
int.). 
Australian anti-proliferation priorities remained unchanged with the advent 
of the conservative Coalition government of John Howard in 1996, both in terms 
of both declaratory policy and resource allocation (ints.}. 14 Although the new 
government's foreign policy white paper promised to realign priorities to stress 
national interests rather than altruistic concepts such as good international 
citizenship, it explicitly identified preventing proliferation regionally, and 
implicitly by extension globally, as representing just such a pragmatic national 
interest (DFAT off. 1997). 
12 The strategic relevance of the Joint Facilities made them a likely direct target of any large-scale 
Soviet nuclear strike. Moreover, beginning in the mid-1980s, the 'nuclear winter' theory suggested that 
even a nuclear exchange between the US and USSR could harm Australia. In contrast, even a large-scale 
CW confrontation would have been limited to Central Europe. 
13 Other than a serious but brief scare beginning in the very late 1980s that some regional 
countries were flirting with CW and missile programs, Canberra has never confronted proliferation locally 
(Berry int.; Darling int.; [ONA] int.; [DFAT] int.; [DOD] int. ; White int.). According to a former top ONA 
official, the most serious threat perceived is that North Asian proliferation might some day create a domino 
effect leading to proliferation closer to home [int. Reese). That said, long-time senior Defence official Hugh 
White (int.) notes that DOD in principle also has been concerned that Australian forces could conceivably 
face CB/M threats if deployed to support a coalition conflicts in distant regions such as the Persian Gulf. 
But he notes that this represents perhaps ten per cent of the concern about proliferation, compared with 
the ninety per cent for keeping the immediate region WMD-free. 
14 The political alliance between the two major centre-right parties, the Liberal Party and the 
National Party, is referred to as the Coalition. 
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General Doctrine and Policy Initiatives 
Canberra has never promulgated a formal anti-proliferation doctrine as 
such. However, there has been a cohesive, longstanding national consensus 
on the means by which to pursue Australia's interests preventing proliferation 
in Southeast Asia. The linchpin this strategy has best way 
regional proliferation is to conduct a pre-emptive forward defence by 
global nonproliferation measures. From the start this effort has 
centred on ilding strengthening cooperative norms against possession. 
Australia a cogent su this strategy in a 1990 classified 
presentation to Washington: 
Australia's preferred approach non-proliferation is 
multilateral, seeking to ach conventions which would 
contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and 
lock in to specific agreements the maximum number of 
countries. We would wish to avoid alienating Third World 
countries in the process of checking weapons 
proliferation, if only because Third World countries are 
themselves becoming proliferators, and south-south trade 
in armaments is an increasing phenomenon (DFAT off. 
1990, 11 December). 
Foreign Minister Evans made essentially the same point publicly the following 
year, stating that, although supply-side nonproliferation regimes were useful as 
interim arrangements, a web of universal treaties banning possession 
represented the only permanent solution (Evans off. 1991, 28 May). A later 
internal policy document likewise pointed to the importance that Australia 
attached to 'the treaty network needed to underpin global norms against the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction', noting, 'The maintenance of strong 
global norms against the acquisition of such weapons is central to our interest 
in preventing proliferation in our region' (Bird off. 1994, 28 July). 
The consensus underpinning Australian anti-proliferation policy has been 
so strong that it has precluded interagency discord on major policy questions. 
Only one relevant dispute, on CW-related exports controls (see below), has 
ever needed to be taken to Cabinet for decision (Evans int.; Gee int.; White 
int.). For its part, DOD has always been content to cede policy management to 
DFAT, while providing technical support as needed. 15 The only limited 
exceptions have been in the missile realm (see below), but these have usually 
been quickly and amicably resolved at relatively low bureaucratic levels ([DOD] 
ints.). As a senior Defence official comments, 'We've left it to DFAT because 
they've been very good at it, and they haven't been trying to achieve anything 
that we haven't been trying to achieve' (White int.). Nor has there been any 
notable internal strife within DFAT, with the regional and trade components 
generally deferring to the disarmament branch (Evans int.; Harris int.; [DFAT] 
int.). 16 
15 This has been in marked contrast to DO D's aggressive opposition to DFA T's activist inclinations 
on conventional issues such as supporting a global landmine ban or curtailing conventional arms 
transfers, where Defence has had actual assets at stake. Consequently, Australia has been far less 
forward-leaning in these areas {Cheeseman 1997; Evans int.; White int.). 
16 This has allowed most decisions to be made at the First Assistant Secretary level or below. The 
one exception during the Hawke period was that any policy that could lead to broader bilateral friction with 
Washington was often reviewed by Foreign Minister Hayden (Harris int.). 
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Interestingly, the ascension of the centre-right Howard government in 
1996 did not lead to any meaningful change in the Canberra's anti-proliferation 
strategy ([DFAT] ints.). This is somewhat surprising, since Foreign Minister 
Downer consciously shifted Australian foreign policy away from global and 
multilateral activism towards a more bilateral and regional emphasis, as well as 
cleaving closer to US leadership (DFAT off. 1997; [DFAT] ints.). However, 
proliferation response policies appear to have been exempted from these 
trends, reflecting both continuity of senior career officials - for example DFAT's 
Kim Jones has managed these issues continuously at senior levels since 1988 
- and a solid bipartisan political consensus ([DFAT] ints.). 
This assessment seems ubiquitous, including among knowledgeable 
members of the political opposition. According to the chief foreign policy staffer 
for the Labor Party, the Howard government supports virtually every 
nonproliferation position in Labor's foreign policy platform (Darling int.). Even 
disarmament stalwarts from prior Labor governments like former Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans (int.) and former Disarmament Ambassador Richard 
Butler (int.) share this assessment. The latter observes: 
Speaking objectively, I think there's been almost no 
fundamental or substantive difference in the shift from 13-
14 years of Labor to this rather stridently conservative 
government of John Howard on these issues .... At the 
fundament of policy I would perceive virtually no 
difference. 
Notwithstanding this constancy in approach, Canberra has instituted few 
policy initiatives spanning proliferation areas. The only notable exception was 
the introduction of sweeping catch-all controls through the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Defence off. 1998c ). 
Although Australia had initially rejected US calls starting in 1990 for other 
Western countries to institute catch-all controls, a series of potentially 
embarrassing exports over the next few years convinced the Keating 
government that such measures were in fact necessary to preserve Australia's 
reputation as a steadfast opponent of proliferation ([DFAT] int.). 17 
While Australia has tended to avoid sweeping initiatives, it has had to 
react to such initiatives by others. For example, it worked behind the scenes 
over several years to derail post-Gulf War efforts by the United States and other 
Western states to strengthen institutional cooperation between the 
nonproliferation supplier regimes. This opposition was based largely on 
concerns that such institutionalisation might harm global treaty-norms by 
antagonising Third World countries (DFAT off. 1993, 22 April, 22 November; 
Jones off. 1991, 15 March). 
Australia also firmly rebuffed US overtures beginning in 1994 to cooperate 
on counterproliferation. Despite determined American wooing, culminating in a 
detailed US proposal offered during a visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
17 Additionally, the following year export licensing rules were consolidated under a single 
regulation, with a unified list of items, administered by a single licensing authority under the auspices of 
the Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel (Defence off. 1998a). (Previously, multiple 
regulations governed different lists, and were administered by several different agencies.) However, this 
initiative did not affect the scope of controls, but rather was intended to simplify the licensing process for 
industry. It therefore did not really constitute a nonproliferation initiative. 
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Defense Mitchel Wallerstein, Canberra showed no interest. 18 US participants 
recall it becoming obvious during the Wallerstein visit that Canberra had no 
intention of even considering the proposal, with senior Australian Defence 
officials expressing polite lack of interest, while DFAT officials voiced open 
hostility ([OSD] int.; Wallerstein int.). 
Australian officials acknowledge that both DFAT and DOD had agreed 
beforehand to reject the idea. 'We conveyed more or less politely that we share 
your objectives', recalls a senior Defence official, 'but we don't think this is a 
particularly smart way to do it' (White int.). DFAT, for its part, was concerned 
that Western cooperation on counterproliferation would hurt multilateral treaty 
norms, by undermining the perception of shared interests with developing 
countries ([DFAT] int.). Defence shared this concern, and additionally was 
sceptical about the military effectiveness of such programs, as well as whether 
the costs involved would be justified in the absence of any regional WMD 
threats ([DOD] int.; White int.). This judgement is manifest in its most recent 
white paper (Defence off. 1997), which does not mention needing to be 
prepared to operate in a WMD environment, nor defending against ballistic or 
cruise missiles. 
SECTION 2: CASE STUDY - CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
Relative Priority 
The relative priority that Canberra has given to the individual proliferation 
areas has been somewhat process driven, depending on the opportunities that 
have been available to exert influence. During the 1980s CW nonproliferation 
was by far the highest non-nuclear priority on the Australian disarmament 
agenda. This focus was originally prompted by the multilateral agenda. When 
Australia's application to join the limited-membership CD was accepted in 1979, 
DFA wanted Australia to achieve an active profile as a new member, and 
perceived CW disarmament as a promising field in which to achieve a 
prominent role ([DFAT] int.). This agenda item therefore received particular 
Australian attention in Geneva. 
This established track record, as well as vestigial public loathing of CW 
based on national myths from the First World War, led the incoming Hawke 
government (1983) to see CW disarmament as a natural compliment to its 
political strategy of aggressively promoting nuclear disarmament. As one key 
participant states, 'It first proceeded from the ideological predisposition of a 
Labour government to also go for a Chemical Weapons Convention then under 
negotiation in Geneva' (Butler int.). 
Concern about CW proliferation received a boost from recurrent 
allegations of Iraqi use beginning in 1984. Even in the absence of any local 
threat, this had a disproportionate impact on the consciousness of the 
Australian Government. This was due to the participation of an Australian 
expert, Peter Dunn, in the UN investigations that authenticated charges against 
Iraqi, who returned to Canberra with what one official recalls as a messianic 
determination to persuade his government to tackle CW proliferation as an 
urgent global problem ([Intelligence] int.; McCormack 1993; Walker int.). By 
18 This openly negative reaction was in marked contrast to other US allies who, to varying degrees, 
had already subscribed to formal cooperative programs. 
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1986 DFA officially characterised CW as a global threat second only to nuclear 
weapons (Parliament off.). Foreign Minister Hayden that year asserted during 
Parliamentary debate: 
The Government, as part of its disarmament policy, is 
making a special effort to develop effective international 
measures against chemical weapons ... The Government 
has greatly expanded Australia's involvement in efforts to 
resist the spread of chemical weapons, and to conclude 
the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, to the point where 
foreign commentators have spoken of 'Australia's 
Leadership' in this area (tst.: 224 7). 
Despite this declaratory rhetoric, CW nonproliferation did not become a 
priority at the highest levels until Hayden was replaced as foreign minister in 
1988 by Senator Gareth Evans under the new Keating government. According 
to Evans, in addition Australia's obvious national security interest in keeping its 
region free of CW, he selected the issue as a priority because it was the most 
promising disarmament area in which to promote his broader agenda of 
boosting Australia's reputation as a good international citizen, especially once 
Australia's profile was raised by organising and hosting the high-level 1989 
Government-Industry Conference at Washington's request (Evans int.). This 
factor is evident when Evans shortly afterwards observes: 'The outstanding 
example of the sort of role Australia can play in multilateral disarmament issues 
is the effort we have been making for some years now in relation to the 
abolition of chemical weapons' (Evans & Grant 1991: 87). 
At about the same time, 'quite firm' intelligence reports raised concerns 
that some regional countries were considering clandestinely acquiring CW 
capabilities ([DFAT] int.). However, one official closely involved in the issue 
recounts that boosting Australia's international reputation always remained a 
primary consideration, particularly since an actual regional threat never 
materialised ([DFAT] int.). In any case, this combination of factors led to CW 
surpassing even nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation as a bureaucratic 
priority by the early 1990s ([DFAT] ints.). 
CW remained the highest priority within the DFAT disarmament branch 
until CWC entry into force became assured in 1996. Once the CWC 
negotiations were completed in late 1992 though, senior levels began to pay 
increasing attention to competing priorities, such as extending the NPT and 
strengthening the BWC ([DFAT] ints.). Under Foreign Minister Downer, the CW 
area has explicitly become a secondary priority to BW, if only because in recent 
years Australia has been satisfied with the status quo in both the CWC and the 
Australia Group, leaving no active CW-related negotiations to manage (Jones 
int. ).19 
Capability-denial 
National Exporl Controls 
Australia instituted restrictions on the export of eight CW-related 
chemicals to Iraq and Iran in the latter part of 1984. This was a reaction to the 
19 Although not indicated by interview subjects, it seems likely that the Gareth Evans' close 
association with this issue was also part of the explanation, with Alexander Downer inclined to find an 
issue on which to put his own stamp. 
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UN Secretary General's findings that Iraq had used CW against Iran. The 
specific action was taken in direct response to bilateral pressure from the 
United States, which after implementing such controls in March had pressed 
allies such as Australia to do the same ([DOD int.; Olmer tst. 1984 ). Beginning 
in August 1985 (i.e. following the first AG meeting) these licensing requirements 
were changed to apply universally to any destination. This non-specific 
approach was designed to minimise the discriminatory appearance of export 
control measures ([DOD] int.; Peter Dunn 1989). 
Like the United States, Australia's initial controls covered a few more 
precursor chemicals than the five that were eventually adopted in the initial AG 
process. When the AG finalised both its core and warning lists at its fourth 
meeting in May 1996, Australia and other delegations announced that they also 
planned to institute national controls on most items on the voluntary Warning 
List. This was designed to show leadership in the effort (see below) to expand 
the Core List beyond just five chemicals, by setting a good example. The 
forward-leaning strategy prompted a rare interagency rift, however, with the 
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, the Business Regulation 
Review Unit, and the Defence Support organisation (responsible for defence 
industries) raising vigorous objections. This dispute remain unresolved for 
almost a year, despite being fought all the way up to the ministerial level. In the 
end the decision needed to be taken to Cabinet, where the ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and Defence (who had previously overruled Defence Support on 
the recommendation of his policy and technologies divisions) prevailed ([DFAT] 
int.). On 29 May 1987, Australia therefore added controls on 22 additional 
chemicals (Peter Dunn 1989; Hayden tst. 1989). Subsequently, Australia never 
again instituted national measures beyond those agreed multilaterally among 
AG partners (other than in the case of general catch-all controls). 20 
Canberra has tended not to exceed standard AG practices in 
implementing its export controls. For example, it has consistently eschewed 
applying tougher rules for sensitive destinations such as e.g. rogue states. Its 
export controls have been applied universally, with no presumed embargo on 
certain countries. At the same time, it has been scrupulous in its national 
implementation of AG standards. For example, notwithstanding the formal 
universality of its controls, in practice Australia rarely if ever approves licences 
for CW-relevant exports to the countries that Washington terms rogue states 
([DOD] ints. ). 
Multilateral Export Control Regime: Australia Group 
Australia has had a complicated and ambivalent relationship with the 
multilateral suppliers regime that bears its name. 
It is important to note that Australian attitudes regarding AG have always 
to some extent been influenced by its position as the regime's Chairman and 
namesake. One Australian official observes that just because it is the Australia 
Group does not mean that Australia has any particular attachment to it ([DFAT] 
int.). But of course most officials readily admit that in reality Australia's unique 
role inevitably has had an impact on its national perspective. In addition to 
20 The one technical exception was Canberra's implementation of 'interim' controls on items that 
had been agreed by the AG, but before this multilateral requirement formally had gone into effect (DFAT 
off. 1991, 24 May). 
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always having had the responsibility to seek and represent consensus 
positions, Australia has derived considerable prestige and influence in other 
disarmament areas. For example, it was largely because of its association with 
the Washington asked Canberra to host the 1989 Govern 
Industry Conference on CW, that cemented Australia's leading role in 
the CWC negotiations. wider benefits have not lost on Canberra. A 
1991 internal reporting cable from an AG meeting notes: 'The 
standing in the field arms control. .. is substantial, considerable 
Western Group flowing in the Australia 
3). lauds 'the 
, 5 June: Indeed, one pivotal official remarks that 
have been much less interested in the Group had it 
having such leadership responsibilities and privileges ([DFAT] int.). 
Australia has played an equivocal role in multilateral export controls in is 
area from earliest involvement. In 1985 Canberra initiated the process that 
over time became the , but there have been credible suggestions that the 
idea may actually have originated in Washington (see Chapter 4 ). 21 Whether or 
not Australia was acting independently or at Washington's behest, it had 
complex political motivations for undertaking the initiative. For example, Foreign 
Minister Hayden had previously incurred the ire of Prime Minister Hawke for 
creating strains in the bilateral relationship with Washington by being too 
aggressive in promoting nuclear disarmament proposals that were patently 
unacceptable to the Reagan administration. 22 Consequently, the DFA officials 
who came up with the proposal knew that Hayden was eager to offer a 
proposal at high-level US-Australian disarmament consultations in early 1985 
that the United States would welcome, and on which Canberra and Washington 
could work together cooperatively ([DFA] ints.). 
Australia certainly did not foresee what it was getting into when it 
volunteered to host an inconspicuous meeting at its Brussels embassy so that 
export control officials from various Western countries could compare notes on 
the recent measures that they individually had taken to cut off transfers of CW 
precursors to Iraq and Iran. This was envisioned as nothing more than an 
informal consultation to discuss an immediate, narrow problem. Officials 
anticipated that there would be just the one meeting, with some suspecting 
privately that perhaps a follow-up meeting might prove necessary ([DFA] int.; 
Walker int.). In line with these modest expectations, Australia sent only 3-4 
delegates to run the meeting, who arrived with no definite ideas to propose 
(Gee int.). 
The DFA officials who organised the initiative never imagined that it would 
lead to the creation of a new multilateral suppliers regime, or even to the 
21 As noted in the preceding chapter, the Australian official responsible denies that the suggestion 
to organise this specific meeting came from Washington. At the same time, he notes that the US had 
certainly been considering similar concepts, and that at the time Western European participants widely 
assumed that Canberra was fronting for Washington (Walker int.). 
22 This tension appears to have flared in particular over the creation of the position of Disarmament 
Ambassador, and simultaneous appointment of Richard Butler, which Hayden announced without the 
Prime Minister's knowledge or permission. Butler himself waggishly recounts how, after receiving a 
brusque warning from Hawke upon taking up this post about not angering the Americans, he travelled 
directly to Washington for a series of courtesy visits, culminating in shouting matches with prominent US 
officials such as ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman (who Butler claims used to refer to him behind his back 
as 'Red Richard') and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle (Butler int.). 
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adoption of additional national controls, or even necessarily to informal 
harmonisation of existing measures (Walker int.). As one official involved 
directly in the original planning recalls: 
Initially there was no commitment that this was something 
we were going to be doing for a decade or more. It was 
just really .. .'here's a problem, let's everyone sit down 
around a table,' and once they got around a table they 
decided it would be useful to get around a table again in a 
few months time, and so it went ([DFA] int.). 
For the next two years, this dynamic led Australia to host a series of 
meetings, in each case without knowing if it would be the last ([DOD] int.). The 
main Australian goal in this process was to expand the 'least common 
denominator' Core List to include all of the chemicals that Iraq was actually 
trying to acquire for its CW programme. This was seen as a minimal necessity 
to rationalise controls, which as things stood, for example, controlled potassium 
fluoride but did nothing about functionally equivalent sodium fluoride (Gee int.). 
Although these meetings were vigorously supported by their Australian 
chairman, Assistant Secretary Ronald Walker, others within DFA were uneasy 
about this ongoing activity. 'Some people thought we were sticking our necks 
out too much,' a former official recounts, concerned that 'this would be seen in 
the same way as the Nuclear Suppliers Group was seen, as rich countries 
depriving developing countries of ... technology' (Findlay int.). 
As the process evolved, Australia found itself in the ambiguous position of 
supporting further progress in instituting additional controls, while at the same 
time trying to avoid fostering a discriminatory mechanism that could undermine 
or compete with a future CW ban. This was an explicit concern from the onset, 
both in Canberra and many European capitals. Australia tried to offset such 
trepidation by pressing as early as before the second meeting to invite non-
Western participants, so that the nascent process would not be perceived by 
outsiders as a discriminatory 'rich man's club', although this proposal was 
blocked by the United States (Gee int.; Walker int.). Australia, in turn, rejected 
US suggestions to institute a list of target countries that would be subject to 
more stringent controls, again to avoid discriminatory appearances (Gee int.). 
Most importantly, it forcefully stressed at the very first meeting that it regarded 
export controls arrangements as interim measures, pending completion of the 
CWC negotiations. 23 Australian officials reiterated this point repeatedly as the 
process moved forward (Butler int.; Gee int.; [DOD] int.; O'Sullivan int.; Walker 
int). Indeed, when Foreign Minister Hayden in 1987 finally authorised 
recognising the meetings as an ongoing process, he conditioned his approval 
on Australia formally recapitulating its understanding that this was a transitional 
arrangement that would be replaced by the CWC ([DOD] int.). 
Because it saw the AG strictly as an interim mechanism, and believed that 
such a stop-gap measure was urgently needed to address short-term problems 
such as Iraq's blatant efforts to acquire CW-related assistance from Western 
23 The first meeting was held at Australia's small Brussels embassy rather than at its mission in 
Geneva, so that other CD delegations would be less likely to find out about it, as well as to emphasise 
that there was no connection to the CWC talks. When it became obvious that more space would be 
needed after the first several meetings, Canberra opted to avoid hosting meetings either at home, or in 
Geneva, choosing instead its Paris embassy. For this reason the process was originally referred to as the 
Paris Group (Gee int.). 
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companies, Australia was happy to continue to use its authority as Chairman of 
the newly institutionalised process in order to promote wider controls. It acted in 
close cooperation with a small cluster of governments that shared this agenda, 
including the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, arrayed against a 
majority of fence-sitters, and a core group that staunchly resisted any additional 
controls, including Germany, France and Japan (int.). Australia's activist 
posture during this period was based not only on the perception that the ewe 
was still a long way off, but that even strengthening the AG would yield an 
extremely modest endeavour. A DFAT official explains the reasoning at the 
time: 
The Australia Group after all was only an informal meeting 
to compare policies .... lt was never designed to be a 
multilateral. .. enforcement mechanism. And since there are 
billions of meetings run by billions of people every day in 
the world, why shouldn't these particular people turn up at 
some place in Paris and have a meeting to talk about 
what they do on a national basis (O'Sullivan int.). 
Any potential tension between strengthening the AG and concluding and 
implementing the ewe therefore was abstract enough in the period to 1990 
that senior officials in Canberra did not give it any real thought, while the 
Australian CWC Delegation in Geneva remained uninvolved in the issue (Jones 
int.; O'Sullivan int.; Reese int.). On the CWC side of the equation, however, 
Australia was not concerned about preventing CWC provisions that could 
undermine AG operations (since it assumed the CWC would replace the AG if 
and when it was completed). For example, far from joining US-led negotiating 
efforts to dilute Articles X and XI (on technical cooperation and assistance), 
Australia supported providing States Parties with enhanced access to 
technology as an incentive for Third World participation. It played a key behind-
the-scenes role in convincing Washington at a minimum to accept the 
ambiguous language that was included in the final treaty (Gee int.). 
The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis complicated Canberra's thinking about the AG 
and its relationship to the ewe, but at first did not alter the fundamental 
Australian equation. Although the crisis raised the prospect of real progress in 
Geneva, the end of the ewe negotiations was still nowhere in sight. 
Meanwhile, the menace of Iraq's WMD programs, and revelations that they had 
continued to be aided by Western companies, created an urgent short-term 
imperative to strengthen the AG. Australia therefore went along with US-led 
efforts during and immediately following the crisis to strengthen the regime, 
without worrying, or changing its basic assumptions about its future if and when 
the CWC was finalised ([DFAT] ints.; Jones int.). However, it did not play an 
active role in forcing these developments, instead allowing external events to 
shape a consensus ([DFAT] int.). 
This delicate balance in the Australian position regarding the AG shifted 
some time in the middle of 1991. The reasons were twofold, both relating to the 
CWC. Firstly, it became apparent that an agreement in Geneva was seriously in 
the offing. Secondly, Washington, having never ascribed to the Australian 
position that the AG represented an interim arrangement, began explicitly to 
challenge the notion that it should be eliminated, or even substantially modified, 
after the ewe entered into force. 
Australia became increasingly wary of US plans to continue to strengthen 
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the AG. As a pivotal middle-level official recalls: 
If there was one problem ... that caused ruptures ... it was 
the intense interest of the US administration in using the 
Australia Group suddenly to launch export controls on the 
world following the Iraq crisis. Our view was that they were 
simply reaching far too far, far too fast, and in ways which 
were simply not sensitive to making progress in this field. 
[DFAT] int.) 
Consequently, Canberra consciously sought to obstruct any further expansion 
of the regime. For example, it opposed US efforts to have the Group adopt a 
spate of national measures such as catch-all controls that Washington had 
instituted from late 1990 ([DFAT] int.). 
These developments prompted an internal policy review in Canberra on 
the future of the Group. The prevailing view that emerged reaffirmed the 
longstanding position that the AG in any shape or form should be eliminated 
once the CWC was finished. But a minority thought that there might be scope 
for complementarity between the ewe and some type of modified suppliers 
arrangement, analogous to relationship between the NPT and NSG ([DFAT 
ints.). Even this latter minority agreed, however, that the AG should be treated 
as expendable if this proved necessary in order to attain the CWC. The point of 
total consensus therefore was: 
We should not let the Australia Group get in the way of the 
conclusion of the negotiation of the Convention, and if 
ditching the Australia Group is the price that we have to 
pay for getting the Convention, then let's look seriously at 
getting rid of the Australia Group (Gee int.). 
By early 1992, it was clear that the AG issue was threatening to derail the 
Geneva talks at a sensitive stage, perhaps irredeemably. Canberra was 
determined to use its influence as Chairman to force the AG partners to 
confront this question directly. On the other hand, Washington was making it 
clear not only that it would block consensus within the Group on any suggestion 
to even consider eliminating the AG, but that it would be profoundly irked if 
Australia supported such a proposal in its national capacity. 
Based in large part these considerations involving the United States, as 
well as Australia's consensus-building role as Chairman, Foreign Minister 
Evans opted to steer a middle course. He directed his staff to push for 
concessions in terms of significantly curtailing the scope of the Group's 
activities, while avoiding any direct call for its automatic dissolution on a date 
certain (DFAT off. 1998, 7 October; Gee int.; [DFAT] int.).24 This represented a 
retreat from the longstanding Australian stance, but nonetheless showed 
considerable flexibility in addressing Third World concerns. 
Canberra circulated a confidential paper to its AG partners on 18 May, 
24 Because DFAT refuses to declassify the applicable 6 May 1992 decision memorandum (DFAT 
Ministerial Submission 920758), as well as a subsequent reaction from the Australian CWC Delegation, 
the precise content of the decision is not known. It is also impossible to know precisely what options were 
presented to Evans. However, interview data suggests that his decision reflected the recommendations of 
his staff, based on the prior intra- and inter-agency policy debate. It seems likely that access to these 
documents was denied because they show that Canberra would have preferred eliminating the Australia 
Group, and was willing to go further than the subsequent O'Sullivan Statement formula, inconsistent with 
current policy. 
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laying out its new national position on the Group's future. After recalling that 
Australia had always described the Group as an interim arrangement, including 
in bilateral exchanges with Third World countries, the paper stated: 
We have been conscious that if the Geneva negotiations 
continue to fail to produce a Convention soon, the 
Australia Group activities would then face an indefinite 
and probably expanded future as the only, albeit 
inherently unsatisfactory and limited, international line 
against CW proliferation. On the other hand, if a CWC 
along the lines we have been proposing is achieved in the 
near future some significant modification to the Australia 
Group's activities is inevitable over the next few years. 
[emphasis added] (DFAT off. 1992, 18 May: 1-2). 
It concluded that, if the AG were to continue after ewe entry into force - a 
question that was left pointedly open - then its basic functions, procedures, and 
even name would need to change significantly. Specifically, the paper asserted 
that any vestigial suppliers arrangement outside the CWC framework should 
limit itself to items not covered by the CWC (e.g. non-CWC chemicals, 
equipment and technology, and SW-related items). 
Tensions erupted with the United States when this position was debated 
at the AG plenary meeting a few weeks later. Far from being willing to consider 
reigning in the Group, the United States was still pressing to strengthen it 
further. A classified diplomatic cable that the Australian Delegation sent to 
Canberra reported: 
Some in the Group are deeply committed to export 
controls and value the Australia Group as the prime 
mechanism for working against CBW proliferation. 
[Sentence deleted]. It required some effort on the part of 
those, including pre-eminently ourselves, who attach 
primacy to the successful conclusion of a ewe this year, 
to reign in those who wanted to take measures ... to 
strengthen the Regime irrespective of the presentational 
impact such a development would have ... in Geneva 
(DFAT off. 1992, 5 June, p. 3). 
A US official recounts the same dispute from the opposite perspective: 'At that 
point the Australians ... were pretty much willing to do anything to close the 
Convention' (lnglee int.). The meeting ended with no agreement on what 
specific action, if any, AG members take. 25 
Into this impasse stepped the US and Australian CD ambassadors who, 
with the collusion of their counterparts from the other AG states, hatched an 
audacious cabal to negotiate a compromise between themselves, without the 
authorisation or knowledge of their respective governments. These walk-in-the-
woods talks produced what became known as the O'Sullivan Statement, which 
said on the one hand that AG governments would review their export control 
procedures in light of the ewe, but on the other promised no definite action as 
a result. This formulation was agreed to by the WEOG in Geneva in mid-July, 
25
. The meeting agreed on a press release affirming that AG activities would need to be consistent 
with a future ewe if and when it entered into force (DFAT off. 1992, 5 June). However, this language was 
essentially meaningless, since assuming that the United States and other AG states were ewe States 
Parties, they would have a binding legal obligation not to undertake any activities inconsistent with their 
treaty obligations. 
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and only then sent to capitals for approval on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Although the unexpected arrival the O'Sullivan text did not generate the 
kind of inflamed reaction in Canberra that it did in Washington, DFAT was not 
happy with the flimsiness of this pledge. Its concern was that this intentionally 
ambiguous language did not go far enough, and was not explicit enough, to 
address the concerns of the Group's critics. However, Ambassador O'Sullivan 
personally weighed in to defend the text. He argued that he was convinced 
beyond any doubt that this non-committal formulation was the most that 
Washington would even consider, that any attempt to modify it would lead to 
the fragile compromise unravelling, and that even this was going to be a hard 
sell in Washington. Based on this judgement by its senior disarmament 
diplomat, Canberra concluded that it had no choice but to embrace it ([DFAT] 
ints.). 
DFAT aggressively sought to sell the compromise to the other AG 
members, sending a 'flying team' of senior officials to Washington and other 
capitals. According to Australian and US participants in these meetings, in 
Washington this team stressed the lack of commitment involved, while stressing 
the extent of the commitment involved to partners such as Canada and Sweden 
that, like itself, wanted to go further. It then presented the same maximalist 
interpretation to the Chairman of the CWC negotiations, who passed this 
rendering on in explaining the text to non-aligned delegations. Australia thus 
consciously sought to mask the unresolved rift among AG partners by 
encouraging them, as well as the NAM, to interpret the ambiguous text in 
different ways ([DFAT] int.; Mahley int.). In diplomatic terms, it did what is 
known as 'papering over' the issue. 
The O'Sullivan Statement fulfilled its immediate purpose, satisfying the 
NAM at a crucial juncture, and allowing the CWC negotiations to proceed 
rapidly to a successful conclusion. However, the circumstances by which the 
Statement had been agreed within the AG, and accepted by others, rendered 
conflicting interpretations inevitable. Such different understandings of what had 
been agreed existed not only between AG and NAM governments, but among 
AG governments themselves. The CWC now in hand, the AG needed to decide 
on its future in earnest. 
Not surprisingly, Canberra's interpretation of the O'Sullivan Statement 
leaned towards its longstanding preferences. An internal memorandum to 
Foreign Minister Evans prior to December 1992 AG meeting, the first after the 
completion of the ewe negotiations, warns: 
Achievement of a common position in the Group on its 
future direction, particularly with respect to the relationship 
with the ewe, will not be an easy task [remainder of 
sentence deleted] .... We will have our work cut out to 
ensure that an export controllers' frolic does not frighten 
the CWC horses! (Dauth off. 1992, 24 November) 
The memo proposes a strategy to meet this goal while avoiding open conflict, 
wherein Australia would seek to reaffirm the O'Sullivan Statement (presumably 
without further clarification), while dampening any efforts to expand or 
strengthen the Group beyond refining its existing practices. 
While Washington adamantly adhered to its minimalist reading of the 
O'Sullivan Statement, Australia continued to publicly articulate a more forward-
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leaning interpretation. For example in his speech at the CWC signing ceremony 
on 13 January 1993, Foreign Minister Evans emphasised that one of the 
Convention's chief benefits would be to enhance peaceful trade in dual-use 
chemicals. He then observed: 
It was in this context that my country and other members 
of the Australia Group announced on 6 August last year in 
the Conference on Disarmament their commitment to 
review their policies on harmonisation of export controls, 
with he aim of removing restrictions so as to benefit states 
parties acting in full compliance with the convention 
[emphasis added] (Evans off. 1993, February). 
Clearly, this was pushing the boundaries of the commitment that some other 
AG states perceived in the O'Sullivan Statement. 
But over the next three years, Canberra did not fight the status quo, 
abandoning active attempts to scale back the Group's activities. Instead, 
Australia adopted a defensive strategy, concentrating its energies on heading 
off any initiatives that could been seen as further entrenching the AG 
institutionally. It also called on other members to shoulder a larger share of the 
burden of responding to continuing attacks on the Group's legitimacy by radical 
NAM states such as Iran. Meanwhile, as the Chair, it continued to perform its 
duties managing the Group's smooth operation. Finally, in a tacit 
acknowledgment that the Group would continue to exist for the foreseeable 
future, Australia dropped its opposition to allowing new members to join - this 
policy had been adopted as part of its anti-entrenchment strategy - returning to 
its earlier support of geographic diversification as a means to offset perceptions 
that the Group was discriminatory North-South arrangement (Bird off. 1994, 6 
May, 19 November; DFAT off. 1993, 10 December, 1994, 22 March, 20 May, 
30 October, 1995, 20 October; Steele off. 1993, 25 May). 
By the time CWC entry into force became assured in 1996, Australia had 
quietly stopped referring to the interim nature of the AG, even internally ([DFAT] 
int.). This change was explicitly acknowledged in an internal paper for new 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer following the change in government. It 
explained that although the AG had been previously regarded as an interim 
arrangement pending the CWC, Australia now believed that it continued to play 
a useful, complementary role. However, the same paper comments: 'In our 
view supply-side measures, such as export controls, cannot equate with the 
effectiveness of ... a legally-binding global norm against these weapons (Steele 
off. 1996, 9 October: 1 ). Moreover, at a subsequent AG meeting Australia 
continued to pursue all of the same priorities, including resisting further 
entrenchment (DFAT off. 1996, 18 October). 
Although Australia has recently reconciled itself to retaining the AG in its 
current form for the time being, it still does not necessarily see this as an 
indefinite state of affairs. Canberra was therefore quite alarmed by the United 
States' CWC ratification condition requiring the AG to retain controls on exports 
to non-AG states that are at least as effective as those in place at the time of its 
ratification. The Australian view is that a final decision is still pending, but that 
this needs to be deferred until the effectiveness of the CWC can be assessed. 
As a classified reaction to the US ratification condition stated: 
It would be premature for the Group to seek to make 
adjustments to AG controls pursuant to the O'Sullivan 
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Statement or otherwise. However, we do not think that the 
door should be completely shut on the possibility of 
adjustments to AG controls at some future time (DFAT off. 
1997, 18 August: 3 ). 
According to a middle-ranking official closely involved in these issues, the 
prevailing view within DFAT is that the question of whether the AG should 
continue to exist, and if so in what form, will need to be reconsidered in the next 
2-3 years, after the CWC has had a chance to establish itself ([DFAT] int.). 
Wider Exporl Control Norms 
Although Australia has ceaselessly pressed for the AG to be as 
transparent as possible about its operations, and has often taken it upon itself 
bilaterally to explain the Group's activities to non-members, it has tended not to 
favour bilateral or multilateral efforts to induce non-members to adhere 
unilaterally to AG export control standards. 26 This was less true in the formative 
two years of the AG, when Canberra encouraged a few other potential 
suppliers such as South Korea and Turkey to adopt national measures, so that 
they would be able to join the consultations in order to widen their geographic 
participation (Gee int.). At one point Australia on its own initiative even prodded 
East Germany to try to start a parallel process among Warsaw Pact members 
(Walker int.). 
By the time the AG had solidified, however, Australia was shying away 
from any effort to hold it up as a model for others to emulate. This inclination 
against pushing export controls beyond the Group has been a consistent 
feature of Australian policy for at least the past decade. The main reason for 
this has been concern that aggressively promoting wide adherence to export 
controls would undermine cooperation on the CWC, first in its negotiation, and 
later in its implementation ([DOD] int.). 
Canberra has not confined its role in encouraging wider application of 
export controls to benign neglect. On at least one notable occasion, it actively 
'hijacked' a high-level multilateral initiative by the United States to promote this 
agenda. After failing to get restrictions on CW-related transfers endorsed at a 
high-level, global conference that it sponsored in Paris in January 1989, the 
United States set out to try again in a more conducive multilateral fora. 
Washington hit upon the idea of focusing on export control issues by involving 
representatives of national chemical industries (see Chapter 4 ). Eager to set 
this initiative in motion with an announcement at a meeting to which he was 
travelling, Secretary of State James Baker placed an impromptu telephone call 
from his plane to Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, explaining the idea 
and asking if Canberra would be willing to play host to such a meeting. Evans 
(int.), who received this call at home, in the middle of the night, without any 
advanced warning, recalls: 'So I said on the spot OK'. 
According to a participant, the bureaucracy was dismayed when learned 
that the Minister had spontaneously agreed to have Australia play a prominent 
role in promoting the wide application of export controls. 'We recognised that 
that was a very divisive issue, and we decided for ourselves that rather than 
making it something getting support to the Australia Group, what we should be 
26 Whereas MTCR members at least nominally must support unilateral adherence, by virtue of a 
provision to this effect in the Guidelines, the AG has no formal charter. Thus, promoting wiser adherence 
to AG standards is strictly a matter of national discretion. 
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doing is getting industry to support the CWC.' Consequently, in taking the 
initiative forward, 'It was twisted around from being 
conference a CWC support conference' (int.). 27 Evans 
acknowledges that in up ball and runn 
original purpose 28 
codified 
responded: 
a nonproliferation 
) himself readily 
it, 
could be called a second alternative 
the Chemical Weapons (Hawke 1989: 1689-1690). A few 
weeks later, Foreign Minister Evans likewise assured delegates the CD in 
Geneva that purpose the conference was contribute ress in the 
CWC negotiations (ewe Bulletin [5] 1989). These public statements were 
reinforced with private bilateral pledges to several NAM governments that the 
subject of export controls would not be discussed at all (int.). True to this intent, 
Australia not only kept export controls off the agenda, but at the conference 
itself Australia used its position as host to deflect US attempts to raise the issue 
of restricting transfers (Burck & Flowerree 1991; Findlay 1989). 
Since the completion of the CWC, Australia has been more supportive of 
encouraging governments to implement national export controls, pursuant to 
the treaty's non-assistance obligations ([DFAT] int.). That said, it has never 
been a prominent supporter of the CWC's non-assistance element, instead 
focusing on the provisions for verifying non-possession (see below). Moreover, 
as noted above, at the same time it has supported Articles X and XI (on 
technical cooperation and assistance). These clauses in effect counterbalance 
the CWC's non-assistance obligations. In addition to supporting relatively 
robust language for these articles during the negotiations (Gee int.), Australia 
subsequently has led efforts effectively to implement positive technical 
cooperation. It has sought an active role for the OPCW in this regard akin to 
that played by the IAEA in the nuclear field. For example, it was an active 
participant in the OPWC PrepCom's working group on this issue, in which it led 
the fight to provide a separate budget item for this, and subsequently has 
fought to increase this budget item ([DFAT] int.; George int.; Taubman off. 
1994, 27 March). 
National Enforcement Mechanisms 
At first glance, Australia's national capacity to enforce export control 
standards is paltry compared with that of the United States, or even other larger 
Western powers (Britain, Germany, Japan), irrespective of its inclinations. 
However, as former Foreign Minister Evans observes about Canberra's general 
capacity to bring effective bilateral pressure to bear, Australia has a great deal 
of clout in the Asia-Pacific region, and holds regular high-level bilateral 
contacts with important regional players including China. Australia also has 
27 As discussed in Chapter 4, the United States was amenable to also using the Government-
lndustr~ Conference to build support for the CWC negotiations, but as a secondary priority. 
8 Although he characterises this as merely a case of Australia becoming more ambitious than 
Washington once it began to run with the initiative, rather than derailing Washington's original concept. 
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accumulated international clout on CW-related matters beyond what it might 
normally wield in other areas. Additionally, its bilateral actions can reinforce 
those of the United States and others (Evans int.). For example, as one official 
notes, 'We do a lot of [bilateral] activities to get people to sign up to the treaties' 
([DFAT] int.), such as strenuous high-level bilateral efforts to get governments 
globally and regionally to sign and ratify the CWC (see below). Moreover, 
DFAT's emphasis on bilateralism generally has increased markedly since 1996 
under the Howard government, including in the disarmament sphere ([DFAT] 
int.). In other words, it has certainly been within Australia's scope to contribute 
to enforcing restraint on CW-related transfers. 
Australia has deliberately refrained from undertaking national interdiction 
actions against CW-related transfers by third parties. Although it has often had 
intelligence on pending transfers of proliferation concern, Canberra has not 
attempted to intervene with the governments involved, beyond urging restraint 
in general terms. 29 On a number of occasions Washington has approached 
Canberra with such information and asked it to intervene with relevant 
governments - whether AG members or not - but, as a rule, these requests 
have been rebuffed. 30 In declining to take action in such cases, Australia has 
reminded Washington that AG implementation is left to national discretion, and 
that external enforcement is therefore inappropriate; all the more so for non-
adherents like China ([DFAT] ints.; [DOD] int.; Gee int.). 
Australia has no nonproliferation sanctions whatsoever other than those 
required under international law (e.g. UNSC sanctions on Iraq) ([DFAT] int.). 
Whereas Canberra has not necessarily been distressed that Washington has 
reinforced the AG through its interdiction activities, despite its own disinclination 
to do so ([DFAT] int.), it has worried that unilateral US sanctions might be 
associated somehow with the AG. Australia has taken the firm position that 
sanctions of any kind are inappropriate means to enforce export control 
regimes ([DFAT) int.). 
Other Capability-denial Responses 
There have been no apparent cases where Australia has used other 
denial measures against CW programs such as targeted denial, or sabotage or 
destruction. 
Non-possession Norm-building 
Global Non-possession Norm: Chemical Weapons Convention 
Australia joined the limited-membership CD in 1979, just before the issue 
of CW disarmament was remanded to Geneva following the collapse of bilateral 
talks between the superpowers. Because Australia was eager to find a niche in 
29 Gee (int.) notes that two minor exceptions occurred during his tenure. One was an instance in 
the late 1980s when Australia expressed concern to Thailand about press reports that its companies were 
supplying workers to the Libyan CW program. The other was a case in which Australia, acting in its 
capacity as AG Chairman, used a specific transfer as an example by which to clarify the Group's rules to 
a new member. Other officials recall no other subsequent exceptions ([DFAT] ints.). 
30 Several officials point out that often Australia is not free to act on intelligence which it owns 
jointly with the United States or other friendly governments. However, these same officials concede that 
this merely requires asking permission through intelligence liaison channels, which would almost certainly 
be granted. Moreover, this explanation does not explain why Australia would turn down specific requests 
to take action on intelligence that had been provided for this purpose. 
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which to make its mark in the CD, bolstered by its acute historical aversion to 
gas warfare, it decided to concentrate particular attention on this fledgling 
agenda item ([DFAT] int.). 
From the beginning, the main Australian priority was to ensure that a 
global CW ban included stringent verification provisions. A former Australian 
negotiator recounts: 'We were very keen to get proper verification in there, and I 
think we were pretty much at the cutting edge in terms of were pushing for 
really intrusive verification' (Findlay int.). Therefore, like most other Western 
countries, Australia never considered the Soviet preference to get a quick, lean 
treaty by applying the BWC model (i.e. a legal prohibition without complex 
verification and compliance mechanisms). Unlike most of the WEOG, the 
Australian focus was not on verifying Soviet disarmament, but rather on 
verifying Third World non-possession (nonproliferation) (Findlay int.; Walker 
int.). 
Prior to the US tabling its 1984 draft text, the Australian delegation 
focused its energies on chipping away at resistance, primarily from the United 
States, to even taking the first step towards a meaningful process by 
establishing an actual negotiating mandate (Findlay int.). One of the few 
substantive CW issues debated by the CD during this period was Australia's 
proposal to include a fresh prohibition against use in a new treaty. This initiative 
had the novel distinction of being opposed by all NATO and Warsaw Pact 
members.31 Unfazed by nearly universal opposition, the Australian delegation 
exerted a great deal of effort assembling a 'coalition of the willing', comprising a 
handful of small neutral and non-aligned states, which eventually won over the 
opposition. While Australia did sincerely want to see this addressed, it also had 
an ulterior motive for pressing the issue - to perpetuate debate on something, 
in order to keep the CW negotiations alive (Walker int.).32 
Australia enthusiastically welcomed the US draft text, tabled at the CD by 
Vice President Bush in April 1984, both for opening the door to real 
negotiations, and more importantly because its 'anytime, anywhere' approach 
to verification was very similar to Canberra's own position. Australia was the 
only country in the CD immediately to respond positively to the initiative, and 
subsequently worked actively behind the scenes to persuade other delegations 
to support the 'anytime, anywhere' concept (Butler 1990; Findlay int.; Walker 
int.). A month after the US draft was tabled, in a public speech during a state 
visit to Moscow, Foreign Minister Hayden expressed strong support for the 
proposal generally, and in particular for the verification provisions that his 
Soviet hosts had angrily scorned as an insincere propaganda ploy by the 
Reagan administration (Hayden off. 1984 ). 
For the next several years, Australia intrepidly worked to generate 
momentum in the negotiations. Its major contribution was to spearhead 
31 The US and others argued that at best this was redundant, since the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
already banned use comprehensively, and at worst the suggestion that the Protocol needed to be 
replicated would undermine its status as customary international law. This latter consideration was seen 
as especially problematic by Washington, since it had no real intention of negotiating a global CW ban 
any time soon, if ever, and which in any case viewed the prospects for universal adherence to such a 
treaty as remote. 
32 It is more than slightly ironic that in recent years Australia has opposed an Iranian initiative to 
add an explicit prohibition against use to the BWC, arguing that such a provision would be redundant 
because the existing ban on possession implicitly bars use and the 1925 Geneva Protocol explicitly does 
so (DFAT off. 1997, 28 May, 3 June). 
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development of the technical schedules (i.e. lists) of CW-relevant chemicals. It 
volunteered a succession of talented diplomats to chair the relevant multilateral 
working group, one of only three in the CWC negotiations at the time, and 
contributed significant technical resources to this effort (Butler int.; Findlay int.; 
Hayden tst. 1986). It also took on the role of WEOG coordinator beginning in 
1985 (Parliament off. 1986). Based on this prominent involvement, Australia's 
Foreign Minister was able to proclaim: 'The Government has greatly expanded 
Australia's involvement in efforts ... to conclude the Convention, to the point 
where foreign commentators have spoken of 'Australia's Leadership' in this 
area' (Hayden tst.). Prime Minister Hawke echoed this sentiment, noting that 
Australia was playing a 'prominent and almost pre-eminent role' in the CWC 
negotiations (Hawke tst. 1989). 
In addition to this active multilateral involvement, almost as soon as the 
United States proposed the idea of 'anytime, anywhere' challenge inspections, 
Australia began unilaterally to examine how this hazy principle could be made 
to work effectively in practice. Defence officials noted that procedures would 
need to be developed to guard against frivolous or malicious targeting of non-
CW related facilities, especially sensitive sites such as the Joint Facilities. DOD 
and DFAT cooperatively developed a national position that addressed these 
concerns while preserving the principle of unrestricted 'anytime, anywhere' 
inspections (Walker int.; White int.). 33 
DFAT also early on solicited suggestions from the Australian chemical 
industry in order to ensure that any inspection procedures being developed 
would work in the real world. As part of this effort, Australia in January 1986 
staged an unprecedented national trial inspection at a commercial facility in 
Melbourne, reporting positive results to the CD in a formal paper a few months 
later (Findlay int.; Freeman & Mathews 1988; O'Sullivan int.). Australia also 
pushed ewe negotiators to look ahead to structural/organisational questions. 
Specifically, it advocated diverse regional representation in the decision-making 
body of the future implementing organisation, so that the Third World would not 
see the CWC as a tool of the Western industrialised states (Butler int.). 
Australia's multifaceted activism throughout the mid- to late 1980s is quite 
surprising when one considers that its context was a moribund negotiating 
environment in which most key players - the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and the NAM collectively - showed no desire to make meaningful progress. 
What is not surprising, however, is that Australian activism increased 
dramatically when the multilateral climate rapidly began to improve from 1989.34 
In retrospect, the September 1989 Government-Industry Conference 
marks the onset of the CWC end-game, broadly defined. It also was a 
watershed for Australia's engagement, with his personal involvement through 
33 DOD appears to have been fully satisfied with a relatively unrestrictive mechanism that would 
allow some significant majority of an executive body to block patently frivolous or malicious requests for 
challenge inspections at sites with no relationship to CW. This 'red light' approach, which ultimately was 
incorporated into the treaty, was far less restrictive than the procedures that some states favoured during 
the final stage of the end-game negotiations. Interestingly, because by then Washington had already 
decided to rely on managed access to address its defensive concerns, it never expressed any strong 
preferences in this debate (Bushong int.). 
34 As noted already, this occurred for a confluence of reasons, including the thawing of the Cold 
War, the personal interest of a new President in Washington, and widespread international concern about 
the Iraqi and Libyan CW programs. The Gulf War following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
dramatically heightened this already mounting political will to get serious about banning CW. 
164 
chairing this meeting leading Foreign Minister Evans to escalate the CWC 
negotiations to among DFAT's highest priorities (Evans int.). Henceforth, the 
issue was managed at very senior levels, characterised by the routine 
involvement of Deputy Secretary Michael Costello (Mahley int.; Sydney Morning 
Herald 5/27/93).35 Perhaps partly due to this high-level oversight, there would 
arise virtually no serious internal fissures on ewe negotiating positions during 
the intense and often volatile end-game years; not between the Geneva 
Delegation and Canberra, nor between agencies, nor within agencies, nor 
between the government and the political opposition, nor between government 
and industry ([DFAT] int.; Reese int.). 
Immediately after the Government-Industry Conference, Foreign Minister 
Evans instructed Disarmament Ambassador David Reese to sound out his 
counterparts in Geneva about convening a CD meeting at the ministerial level 
in order to give a political boost to the CWC negotiations. However, this 
proposal was firmly rebuffed by the United States, which asserted that there 
were still far too many unresolved negotiating issues to even contemplate such 
an initiative (Reese int.). 
Australia was dismayed when a few months later the United States 
changed key, longstanding elements of its negotiating position. The first blow 
came in June 1990, when the United States insisted on producing and retaining 
a residual 'security stockpile' of binary weapons, pending universal adherence 
to the CWC by all CW-capable states. Although its public reaction was muted, 
Canberra privately beseeched the Bush administration to rescind this proposal, 
arguing that it would make the Convention unsaleable to Third World countries 
(Gee int.; Walker int.).36 
A second, arguably more serious, blow to Australian aspirations for a 
robust CW ban came in August. Without warning or discussion, the United 
States withdrew its support within the WEOG for 'anytime, anywhere' challenge 
inspections, insisting that States Parties should retain an ultimate right of 
refusal (Cousins off. 1991, 15 May). Knowing that some in Washington were 
unhappy about this new stance, Canberra launched an orchestrated, high-level 
bilateral campaign to persuade Washington to reverse its reversal. 37 According 
to numerous Australian officials, this represented a conscious effort to bolster 
the leverage of agencies (e.g. ACDA) that were arguing for more rather than 
less intrusive verification. 
Parallel to these behind-the-scene efforts to respond to developments in 
the WEOG, Australia worked to sustain political momentum in the broader 
CWC negotiations. In March 1991, Foreign Minister Evans wrote to each of his 
counterparts in CD member states to revive the idea of convening a CD 
ministerial meeting as soon as possible before the end of the year. He 
35 Costello subsequently was promoted to Secretary within months of the ewe signing ceremony 
in January 1993. Interestingly, many of the officials involved in the end-game negotiations received 
subsequent promotions, including ambassadorships for both Assistant Secretary Richard Starr and one of 
his principal CWC aides, Martine Letts. 
36 Although Amb. Walker was serving as Australian Representative to the UN in Geneva at the 
time, and so not directly responsible for CWC issues, he was involved in developing the Australian 
position on this issue, as well as responding to Washington (Walker int.). 
37 It seems likely that this greater focus on the 'anytime, anywhere' reversal, rather than the 
security stockpile issue, was based on a pragmatic calculation that, because the US was completely 
isolated on the latter, it would eventually have to back down. By contrast, the new US position on 
verification tracked closely with the views of many non-aligned CD members. 
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explained that such a meeting was needed to address the many thorny 
outstanding issues at a political level, including verification, universality, 
technical assistance and cooperation, and organisational structures (Evans off. 
1991, 27 March). He reiterated this call publicly in May at a UN conference, and 
then promoted the initiative in bilateral meetings with various counterparts 
(DFAT off. 1991c, 1991e; 1991g; Evans off. 1991, 28 May). 
Meanwhile, the tempo of behind-the-scenes developments quickened. 
Washington sent a delegation to Canberra on 2 May 1991 to preview a new 
proposal on challenge inspections. According to the lead Australian official at 
this meeting, the United States stressed that its proposal was loosely based on 
the British concept of 'managed access', albeit a more restrictive version, and 
therefore was more forward leaning than its August position. US officials also 
made it clear that this position was the product of a bitter and protracted 
interagency struggle, and that as such it represented the full measure of US 
flexibility (Cousins off. 1991, 15 May). Secretary of State Baker reiterated this 
latter point personally to Foreign Minister Evans a short time later (O'Sullivan 
int.). 
Canberra's initial assessment was that 'the new US position ... is a 
substantial advance on their previous position' on challenge inspections, given 
that it not longer embraced an absolute right of refusal (Cousins off. 1991, 15 
May: 2). Even so, while Australia welcomed this as a step in the right direction, 
it still saw the specific proposal as unacceptable. For example, Australia told 
the United States that a number of glaring loopholes would need to be 
tightened, including procedures for defining site perimeters and for securing the 
site during delays in access, the precise degree of access when managed 
access was evoked, and the allowable reasons for it could be evoked (Cousins 
off. 1991, 15 May). 
Canberra's perceptions of the new US position on challenge inspections 
were doubtless enhanced by President Bush's surprise announcement less 
than two weeks later on 13 May that the United States would abandon its 
insistence on retaining a security stockpile, and that it would immediately 
renounce in-kind retaliation. Australia publicly welcomed this step as a major 
US concession (Evans off. 1991, 28 May). In the face of the positive 
atmosphere created by this development, and having been convinced that the 
US interagency had been pushed as far as it would go, senior officials decided 
not to oppose the new US position as a basis for further negotiations within the 
WEOG, while instructing the Geneva delegation to rally support for the changes 
that Canberra felt were needed to make it minimally acceptable (Cousins off. 
1991, 15 May). 
Washington then approached Australia (along with Britain and Japan), 
asking it not only to accept the new US proposal as a basis for further 
negotiations, but actually to co-sponsor it in order to forestall other WEOG 
members' rejecting it out of hand. This request presented Canberra with an 
unpalatable choice. The working-level bureaucracy vehemently argued against 
associating with a position that grossly violated Australia's fundamental tenets 
on verification ([DFAT] int.; [DOD] int.). After an agonised internal debate, 
however, senior officials sided with Disarmament Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, 
who asserted that, tactically, it was better to go along with the United States 
now, and then try to improve the proposal in negotiations within the WEOG. 
Otherwise, O'Sullivan warned, there was a strong possibility that WEOG 
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negotiations would stall indefinitely, or even worse, that the United States would 
be driven to circumvent the WEOG altogether by tabling its proposal in the 
broader negotiations, where it would likely find considerable support from key 
non-aligned members (Cousins off. 1991, 15 July; O'Sullivan int.). A 
memorandum afterwards explaining the rationale for this decision to the 
Foreign Minister stated: 
We are more concerned to put a workable CWC in place 
as soon as possible in order to establish norms which can 
help to constrain CW proliferation pressures which are 
already evident in our region and elsewhere. In this 
respect we are more concerned to promote a reasonably 
satisfactory regime which is adopted by the CD and 
achieves wide and early adherence rather than allow a 
search for an elusive optimal formulation to remain locked 
up in interminable negotiations in Geneva (Cousins off. 
1991, 15 July: 3-4 ). 
Events unfolded rapidly once the US proposal was tabled in the WEOG in 
early July as a joint US, Australian, British and Japanese paper. The Australian 
delegation immediately began to lobby other WEOG delegations bilaterally, on 
the one hand to convince those opposing any restrictions on access to accept 
the US proposal as the basis for negotiations rather than rejecting it outright, 
while on the other to garner the broadest possible support for specific 
improvements that Australia believed were essential to make it minimally 
acceptable (Cousins off. 1991, 15 July). According to an internal account: 
We utilised our position to play a bridging role with some 
success. A separate tactical question is whether we 
moved too soon in accepting the US proposal as a basis 
for further negotiations. We deliberately took this position 
in the knowledge that others [deleted] had adopted a more 
outspokenly critical approach at the beginning. One factor 
was our desire to keep the US engaged in negotiations 
with other Western Group members, with a view to 
improving their proposals, rather than run the risk of the 
US deciding to push its proposals unilaterally amongst the 
full CD membership (Cousins off. 1991, 15 July, p. 2). 
The same document went on to aver that co-sponsoring the US proposal 'will 
not constrain our ability to work for further improvements during the next stage 
of negotiations' (5). Sure enough, as soon as the proposal was accepted by the 
WEOG as a basis for negotiations, Australia began pressing the United States 
bilaterally to tighten its many loopholes ([DFAT] int.). 
Having co-sponsored the US position, Australia's avowed goal was to inch 
it as far as possible towards the original, less restrictive British conception of 
managed access. For example, by late September, thanks to intense external 
pressure from the allies and internal White House intervention, the verification 
proponents in the US interagency had garnered shaky support for a new 
compromise position that moved the United States closer to British-style 
managed access (see Chapter 4 ). This occurred just as Australia sent yet 
another delegation to Washington to lobby for just such flexibility, led by DFAT 
Deputy Secretary Costello and Assistant Secretary Richard Starr. In a meeting 
on 21 September, ACDA Director Ronald Lehman spelled out this new stance 
as a position that Washington tentatively was considering. He asked the 
Australians to front for the United States by tabling it as an Australian 
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compromise, which the United States could then negotiate on whether to 
accept, depending on the reaction of other WEOG members (Mahley int.). 
Australia promptly agreed to this in order to foster negotiating momentum. This 
episode typifies the pragmatic, opportunistic role that Australia played behind-
the-scenes as the WEOG haggled over the details of managed access. 
At some point during these behind-the-scenes bilateral dealings with 
Washington in the autumn of 1991, Australian officials came up with an 
audacious plan to bilaterally negotiate a comprehensive compromise with 
Washington that would address all of the outstanding disputes in Geneva, great 
and small, as reflected in bracketed language in the rolling negotiating text. The 
goal would be to come up with a package that would address the many 
concerns of many governments, but in a way that Washington could accept. 
This bold idea was triggered by an off-hand remark by ACDA Director Lehman, 
who mused to a senior Australian official that, when he had been chief START 
negotiator, he had always liked to have a complete treaty in his breast pocket 
that he knew he could sign on the spot, in order to help himself focus on the big 
picture during intricate technical negotiations. To Lehman's Australian listener, 
this passing remark suggested a way for Canberra to contribute decisively to 
the progress of the CWC negotiations (Mahley int.; O'Sullivan int.). 
In effect, Australia proposed to take upon itself the task of negotiating with 
the United States bilaterally on behalf (unbeknownst to them) of the interests of 
all of the other CD delegations. As one observer notes, this represented a 
'crash through or crash' approach (Findlay 1993: 19). Another comments: 'The 
decision to attempt to draft acceptable solutions to all the unresolved issues 
was an adventurous undertaking' (McCormack 1993). 
The process itself involved an intense series of highly secret bilateral 
negotiating rounds in Washington, with Australia trying to press the envelop of 
US flexibility. The lead US negotiator in these talks recalls: 'When Gareth 
Evans put that text down, he know that the US could sign it because of six 
months of work that we had had very quietly .... There were a lot of fights 
bilaterally in that process' (Moodie int.). Another US participant ruefully recalls 
that the bilateral process was so intensive that talks were not even suspended 
for Thanksgiving, perhaps the most sacrosanct American family holiday ([OSD] 
int.). 
At the end of the day, Australia would have preferred a much more 
rigorous treaty than the one that emerged from this process, particularly in 
terms of stringent verification. But it had obtained major US concessions on a 
number of key issues. Based on its protracted talks in Washington, it concluded 
that the resulting draft text embodied the maximum flexibility that could be 
obtained from Washington, and that in the final analysis it was better to have a 
less rigorous treaty than no treaty ([DFAT] ints.). 38 
Bilaterally agreed text in hand, Australia moved on to the next challenge -
selling it to the rest of the CD as a 'model compromise' that would allow the 
CWC negotiations to proceed to a quick and successful conclusion. Even as 
38 Among the concessions obtained by Australia, the US had agreed to remove the most glaring 
restrictions that it had sought on challenge inspections, for example shortening the time between 
notification of an inspection and access within the perimeter from 228 to 168 hours. The US also had 
expanded routine inspections to included all facilities capable of producing 100 tonnes of CW precursors 
annual, as opposed to only facilities that had actually done so in the past (Findlay 1992a). 
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Foreign Minister Evans tabled the Australian draft text in Geneva on 19 March 
1992, Australian officials were travelling to some 33 capitals to explain and 
promote it in face-to-face meetings (CWC Bulletin [16] 1992; Findlay 1992a). 
This marked the beginning of intensive Australian involvement at the highest 
levels to push the negotiations to closure. 
The Australian text succeeded in changing the fundamental dynamic of 
the negotiations. As one of its primary authors notes: 'The Australian initiative 
was instrumental in shifting the negotiating climate in the CD from a circular, 
unproductive issue-by-issue negotiation, to a comprehensive, package 
approach for completion of the treaty text' (Letts 1992). For the remaining 
months of the negotiations, Australia would play a central role in facilitating 
compromises. Foreign Minister Evans returned to Geneva relatively frequently, 
often remaining for unprecedented, extended periods, in order to resolve 
specific problems in bilateral meetings on the margins of the negotiations. He 
recalls: 
A lot of it was sort of ego massaging .... you had me as the 
Minister fighting it out on an equal basis with these lowly 
disarmament ambassadors, who didn't think of 
themselves as lowly and who were quite sort of chuffed by 
the attention they were given (int.). 
For the most part, Australia focused on finding common ground, rather than 
promoting its own national agenda. However, it continued to press certain 
national priorities, for example holding the line on tough verification, and urging 
that early attention be given to structural/organisational issues so that the treaty 
could be implemented effectively as soon as it entered into force (O'Sullivan 
int.). 
Australian activism in the CWC negotiations culminated in a campaign on 
behalf of the final text agreed in Geneva. It was among a handful of 
governments, along with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States, to 
engage in intensive bilaterally lobbying once this text had been remanded to 
CD capitals for final approval (Findlay 1993).39 Subsequently, Canberra lobbied 
for a favourable vote in the UNGA to endorse the treaty, and then for the widest 
possible number of signatures. It was especially active in urging China to 
become an original signatory. Later it worked bilaterally to secure the post-
signature ratifications needed to allow the treaty to enter into force. 40 It was 
particularly successful at delivering the support of the countries in its immediate 
region with which it had been laying the groundwork for several years (see 
below) (DFAT off. 1992, 2 December, 1994, November; [DFAT] ints.; Findlay 
1993). 
As the prospects for US ratification stalled in the Senate over the next 
several years, Australia likewise worked publicly and privately to encourage 
progress (Parliament. Senate off. 1995, 8 June; O'Sullivan int.). Once 
Hungarian ratification in late 1996 triggered the countdown to entry into force, 
Canberra stepped up its public calls for both the United States and Russia as 
the only declared possessor states to ratify in time to become original States 
39 Findlay notes that this 'final' draft was in fact amended once before becoming the actual final 
text. 
40 Because the CD is a limited-membership body, its work needed to be endorsed by the wider 
international community in the UNGA. 
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Parties (Downer off. 1996, 1 November).41 
Australia itself was only the sixth signatory (and one of the first Western 
governments) to accede to the treaty on 6 May 1994. Both houses of 
Parliament unanimously had passed the ratification legislation unamended on 
25 February with the support of all parties, including independents and minor 
parties (e.g. Greens, Democrats). This bill included several hundred pages of 
detailed procedures to govern national implementation. Parliamentary debate 
was limited to speeches on behalf of the major and minor parties to express 
unconditional support for CWC ratification, and to commend Foreign Minister 
Evans and DFAT for their decisive roles in shepherding the negotiations to a 
successful conclusion (Attorney's-General Department off. 1998; Evans off. 
1994, 7 May; Parliament. House off. 1994, 9 February; Parliament. Senate 
1994, 2, 3, 9 February).42 
Canberra remained engaged on CWC issues at very senior levels 
throughout the extended work of the PrepCom in The Hague. This keen 
political interest in what was ostensibly a technical process was based on the 
perceived need to insure that, under the guise of developing implementation 
procedures, other governments were not permitted to dilute the terms of the 
treaty, particularly in terms of verification. 'That was our main focus in the 
PrepCom process', a middle-ranking official recollects, 'to make sure there 
wasn't any watering down of those provisions' ([DFAT] int.). A particular 
concern at very senior levels was that the United States was not doing anything 
to counter attempts by both Israel and France within the WEOG, and some 
NAM countries in the wider forum, to 'walk back' intrusive on-site inspections. 
This was all the more irritating to Canberra because it had been Washington 
that had insisted that Israel be allowed to join the WEOG. Indeed, some 
Australian officials suspect that Washington, or at least certain elements of the 
interagency, was intentionally using Israel as a stalking horse in the WEOG to 
undermine verification. Australia consequently was forced to fight a rear-guard 
action. It complained bilaterally to Washington, saying that it expected US 
support in maintaining the hard-fought compromises that had been negotiated 
in Geneva ([DFAT] ints.). 
Prior to entry into force, Foreign Minister Downer made a special trip to 
the PrepCom in order to send an unmistakable signal that Canberra remained 
committed at the highest levels to full and effective implementation (CWC 
Bulletin (35) 1997). Although Canberra remains concerned about the unilateral 
conditions that the United States has applied pursuant to the terms of its 
ratification, it has been generally satisfied with the operation to date of the ewe 
since entry into force ([DFAT] ints.). 
Other Non-possession Responses 
Australia is perhaps the only Western government that actively tried to 
promote regional non-possession structures as well as a global ban. The pre-
41 In the event Washington scraped in by a matter of days (see above}, while Moscow missed the 
deadline, ratifying too late to be counted as a charter member. 
42 It should be noted the Australian Parliament has far less of a role in treaty ratification than the 
constitutional prerogatives of the US Senate. The applicable bill therefore in essence represented 
implementing legislation, rather than consent to ratification per se. Parliamentary involvement in treaty 
ratification has been increased since ewe ratification, with new procedures introduced in May 1996 
creating a standing consultative committee on treaties. 
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eminent example of this is the Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative (CWRI), 
launched with considerable fanfare by Prime Minister Hawke in June 1988 
(CWC Bulletin [2] 1988). The process involved 22 governments, representing 
most of the countries of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, participating in a 
series of annual political seminars, plus additional technical workshops (DFAT 
off. 1994, November; McCormack 1993).43 As noted above, this initiative 
ultimately facilitated ewe entry into force by laying the groundwork for early 
regional ratifications. Its primary purpose, however, was to ensure strong 
regional implementation within the global treaty structure. This strategy 
reflected the fact that the main Australian interest in the global CWC was to 
prevent proliferation locally ([DFAT] int.). 
Australia also flirted with bone fide CW-free zones. In the internal 
deliberations that eventually led to the CWRI, DFAT gave serious consideration 
to proposing a regional CW-free zone as an immediate step. However, because 
such instruments had previously been proposed by Warsaw Pact states as 
alternatives to a universal instrument, the concept ultimately was rejected for 
fear of undermining the CWC negotiations (Findlay int.; Walker int.). 
Nonetheless, according to an official directly involved in the process, CWRI was 
always seen as laying the groundwork for a regional CW-free zone as a hedge 
against not achieving a global ban. He states: 
Of course, while the CWC negotiations process was alive, 
we used the regional initiative as a means to drive 
countries' in the region level of awareness of the potential 
problem, hoping to get them on board the CWC. [But] if 
the ewe hadn't worked out, we would have tried to turn 
the regional initiative into some kind of regional chemical 
weapons free zone ([DFAT] int.). 
Further, during the Gulf War, Australia privately urged Washington to 
consider sponsoring a CW-free zone in the Middle East as an interim measure 
pending completion of the CWC (DFAT off. 1990, 11 December).44 The primary 
Australian motive for participating actively after the Gulf War in the multilateral 
security talks associated with the Middle East Peace Process, which did not 
specifically address proliferation, was as a means to address the underlying 
conditions that were creating demand for WMD.45 This was explicitly seen as a 
way to foster eventual participation in global non-possession norms, and in 
particular the ewe, in a region that represented a cauldron of proliferation 
([DFAT]int. ). 46 
Australia thus has actively promoted regional non-possession 
43 Technically at least CWRI remains an ongoing process. However, in reality DFAT stopped 
expending resources around the mid-1990s, once regional CWC ratifications had been achieved ([DFAT] 
int.). 
44 Noting that Egypt and other regional countries would never accept a ban on CW while Israel 
remained outside the NPT, this memorandum suggests that the only viable way to achieve a regional ban 
on CW might be through a wider WMD-free zone. 
45 Interestingly, Australia has not had the same motives for participating in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF). Although it has certainly raised the issue of proliferation, its overwhelming motive for 
pushing the ARF process has been to foster regional dialogue as a means to promote regional stability for 
its own sake. 
46 As discussed in Chapter 4, the United States claimed to subscribe to similar 'demand reduction' 
motives for pursuing regional security arrangements in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, there is 
little evidence to suggest that this was ever a significant motivation compared with promoting regional 
stability for its own sake. 
171 
arrangements and associated initiatives for a variety of purposes: as interim 
measures pending a global ban, as fall-back measures in case an acceptable 
global instrument failed to materialise, and in the event as supplemental 
measures to reinforce participation in, and implementation of, the global 
instrument. 
Consequence-mitigation 
Counterproliferation 
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DTSO) has engaged 
in research on CW defence for several decades. This effort has always been 
exceedingly limited though, and has focused on disarmament verification issues 
in addition to military applications. DTSO has also concentrated on niche 
research, rather than trying to pursue a comprehensive program with extremely 
finite budgetary resources (Brabin-Smith tst. 1997; Punch tst. 1995). 
Additionally, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has maintained an 
inventory of basic protective equipment (i.e. gas masks), as well as limited 
personnel training in its use. However, these programs have been modest in 
the extreme. For example, when Australia deployed a relatively small 
contingent of mostly naval forces as part of the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition, the 
ADF was hard pressed to find enough gas masks to equip it, since most of its 
inventory were reaching the end of their useful lives (Ray tst. 1990). Moreover, 
in spite of this experience, DOD does not appear to have sought to acquire new 
equipment prior to the 1999 budget (Moore tst. 1999). 
The limited extent of Australia's defensive capabilities has not been the 
inadvertent result of dereliction or oversight. Instead it has reflected quite 
conscious policy decisions to forgo counterproliferation. The 1987 Defence 
White Paper (Defence off. 1987) specifies that the ADF would only maintain 
very basic CBW protective capabilities, representing a low priority. US overtures 
in the mid-1990s for enhanced counterproliferation cooperation, which Australia 
rebuffed, had focused primarily on the CW area ([OSD] int.). Subsequently, 
Australia's recent foreign policy white paper states: 
The global treaty banning chemical weapons ... advances 
Australia's national security by ... removing from the 
Australian Defence Force the onerous requirement to be 
equipped to operate in an environment where chemical 
weapons are being used (DFAT off. 1997: 47). 
In recent testimony, the head of DTSO noted that, although US Defense 
Department assessments had made a strong case for the need to develop new 
CBW counterproliferation capabilities, there had been no consideration given at 
the ministerial level to augmenting Australian activities in this area (Brabin-
Smith tst. 1997). Interviews with current officials confirm that Canberra's 
disinterest in CBW countermeasures remains firmly intact. 
Deterrence 
To the extent that Australia has any deterrent capability against CBW 
attack, it is derived largely from the extended deterrence that it receives as a 
close ally of the United States. In this sense, Australia's policies on CBW 
deterrence therefore boil down to its measure of for US deterrent postures. 
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It has already been noted that Australia was actively hostile to US 
attempts to preserve its in-kind deterrent capabilities during the ewe 
negotiations, most notably by opposing the Bush administration's security 
stockpile proposal (see above). 
As for nuclear deterrence, Canberra has not taken a formal position on 
recent US decisions to expand the umbrella of nuclear deterrence to cover 
CBW attacks including against US allies (White int.).47 However, it has implicitly 
acted to undermine the US position. In 1995 the Australian government argued 
before the World Court that, if the Court were to render an opinion on the 
legality of nuclear weapons, then it should find the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons illegal under all circumstances (DFAT off. 1996, March).48 The 
next year, the government-sponsored Canberra Commission for the Elimination 
of Nuclear Weapons explicitly rejected the notion that nuclear weapons could 
have value or legitimacy in deterring CBW attacks. In its lengthy analysis of this 
issue, the Commission's report asserts that, rather than deterrence, the 
appropriate response to CBW threats was to strengthen and effectively 
implement the CWC and BWC (Canberra Commission off. 1996).49 
SECTION 3: CASE STUDY - BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
Relative Priority 
Prior to the 1990 Gulf War, BW proliferation received virtually no attention 
at senior levels within the Australian government ([DFAT] ints.; Harris int.). 
Even for the working-level bureaucracy, BW nonproliferation was at the lowest 
rung of acknowledged priorities. For example, on the eve of the Gulf War, the 
sum total of DFAT personnel assigned to BW was a single junior desk officer on 
a part-time basis, who had never done anything more than write a few 
background papers which had never received any attention ([DFAT] int.). 
The Gulf War served marginally to heighten concern about the latent 
threat posed by BW proliferation. The Office of National Assessment (ONA) 
was prompted to conduct a national intelligence assessment, although this 
seems merely to have re-validated the standing assessment that Australia 
faced no BW threats in its strategic region (DFAT off. 1991, 18 July; Defence 
off. 1994 ). Bureaucratic awareness of the BW issue was also reinforced by 
multilateral processes: the 1991 BWC Review Conference (RevCon) and the 
expansion of the AG to include BW. Nonetheless, the issue remained a 
relatively low bureaucratic priority, and was still virtually ignored outside DFAT's 
disarmament branch ([DFAT] ints.). Then Foreign Minister Evans recalls: 
47 By contrast, Australia has a longstanding policy of formally supporting the use of US nuclear 
forces to deter a nuclear attack against Australia (White int.). 
48 That said, Australia hedged its position by recommending against the Court rendering any 
opinion whatsoever, as well as by acknowledging the necessity of a transitional period before nuclear 
weapons could feasibly by eliminated. 
49 It should be noted that the report's 'official' status is somewhat ambiguous. The Commission 
was initiated and sponsored by the government of Prime Minister Keating, and Australian officials 
explicitly stated at the time that the significance of the Commission was that its final report would be 
officially transmitted from a Western government to other governments (Lingerer 1998/99). The Howard 
government continued this sponsorship, but did not identify the recommendations in the final Report as 
expressing formal Australian policy. Foreign Minister Downer appeared to walk a fine line on the Report's 
status when he presented it to the CD in Geneva in January 1997, urging its consideration without 
formally endorsing its specific recommendations (Downer off. 1997, March). 
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'Biological I wasn't really that focused on because we were doing such a heavy 
press on chemical and it was the priority' (int.). 
The BWC element of the issue began to attract senior-level attention in 
1993, with progress on launching negotiations on a verification protocol 
occurring nearly simultaneously with the completion of the CWC negotiations. 
But it was not until 1996 that the issue rose to the very top of the Australian 
disarmament agenda. This was because incoming Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer quickly singled it out as one of his personal priorities (Jones int.). This 
development does not appear to have been based on any reassessment of the 
BW threat, so much as a judgement that the BWC talks represented the only 
active multilateral disarmament process that showed any chance of short-term 
progress ([DFAT] ints.). 
Capability-denial 
National Export Controls 
Australian exports of biological material and SW-related equipment were 
totally unregulated prior to the AG adopting applicable multilateral guidelines in 
the early 1990s (Australia Group [AG] off. 1990; DFAT off. n.d.a, 1991, 24 
May). Canberra quickly implemented new AG requirements once they were 
agreed, for example distributing the Group's 1990 BW warning list widely to 
relevant domestic industries (AG off. 1990). But it has only ever imposed 
relevant licensing requirements in strict accordance with the agreed AG lists.50 
Multilateral Export Control Regime: Australia Group 
Unlike the leading role that it played in establishing multilateral export 
controls on CW-relevant items, Australia followed the American lead in 
expanding the scope of the AG to include BW nonproliferation ([State] int.). 
Canberra did support the original US initiative in early 1990 to address BW 
proliferation through warning guidelines to facilitate voluntary corporate 
vigilance (DFAT off. 1990). Yet even this mild step engendered caution. 
Australia informed the AG that, consistent with its position regarding the CWC, 
it considered this to be a strictly temporary measure, pending negotiation of a 
BWC verification protocol, although it recognised that unlike the CWC this was 
still a distant prospect (DFAT off. 1990; [DFAT] int.). 
Australia responded warily to subsequent US efforts to enact actual 
controls on SW-relevant items. In bilateral disarmament consultations in 
November 1990, just before the first AG meeting since the start of the Gulf 
Crisis, Australian officials voiced deep scepticism about trying to go beyond 
voluntary industry guidelines. They asserted that an informal organisation like 
the AG could not regulate such heavily dual-use exports, and that therefore the 
best solution to the BW problem would be to enhance the BWC (Fox off. 1990). 
In the face of US determination, however, Canberra accepted that some BW-
related controls could be useful, and that this was not necessarily incompatible 
with its higher priority goal of strengthening the BWC (DFAT off. 1991, 3 May). 
Once real prospects for enhancing the BWC emerged in late 1994, 
Australia and its AG partners once again faced the threat that the NAM would 
5° Catch-all controls could be considered a generic exception. Additionally, symbolic restrictions on 
the export of BW per se have existed since the late 1970s under BWC implementation legislation. 
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hold this process hostage to their still unsatisfied demands that the AG be 
disbanded once and for all. Throughout the VEREX process to explore the 
feasibility of BWC verification, a number of states repeatedly expressed 
displeasure with AG members' failure to make good on the implied promise of 
the O'Sullivan Statement. Iran sought to insert the issue of cooperation and 
assistance into any new negotiating process by having it noted in the final 
VEREX report. Like most other Western governments, Australia opposed this 
move, but backed down when Iran threatened to derail a negotiating mandate 
by blocking consensus on the VEREX report (DFAT off. 1993, 21 October, 
1994, 22 July). 
The future of the AG has been squarely on the AHG table since the 
negotiations began in Geneva, with hard-line NAM states demanding its total 
elimination as a quid pro quo for supporting a compliance protocol. Because no 
agreement is imminent, however, this issue has not yet posed a negotiating 
crisis. Canberra's strategy is to hope that moderate non-aligned states 
ultimately will prevail on the others to pull back from a showdown ([DFAT] int.).51 
It therefore has made no formal effort to consider bottom-line positions. 
Informally, the prevailing mood appears to be that additional concessions will 
be needed ([DFAT] ints.). As one official notes: 
You can't ignore the fact that a lot of countries are only in 
this process because they want to get out of it something 
on the technical cooperation side. And that probably isn't 
our priority, but for a number of countries it is, and we're 
going to have to be a bit more forthcoming on those sorts 
of issues if we're going to get the powerful disarmament 
side and the verification side that we want ([DFA T] int.). 
Precisely how far Canberra will consider going to address the NAM's demands 
remains to be seen as the AHG negotiations unfold. 
Wider Export Control Norms 
Australia's reluctance to promote the AG as a wider export control norm in 
the CW field has, if anything, been more pronounced in the BW sphere. To the 
extent that Canberra has been at all willing to promote wider export control 
norms, it has been almost exclusively in the context of BWC Article Ill. For 
example, prior to the September 1991 BWC Third Review Conference, Foreign 
Minister Evans briefly stated in a lengthy speech on disarmament: 'The Final 
Declaration of the Conference should spell out measures that States Parties 
could adopt as non-proliferation measures under Article Ill' (Evans off. 1991, 28 
May).52 
Notwithstanding this understated but reasonably supportive public stance, 
classified internal documents prior to the 1991 RevCon reveal significant 
scepticism about trying to bolster implementation of Article Ill. DFAT assessed 
that the robust measures that Washington envisioned were of dubious value 
given the dual-use nature of the technology involved, and also unlikely to 
51 According to this official, the prevailing view in Canberra is that many of these states are merely 
posturin~ about the AG as a means to squeeze Western concessions on other issues. 
5 The 1991 RevCon marked the first significant effort by the United States and others to use 
Article Ill as a basis to promote broad export controls. Although Article Ill was considered in passing at the 
two previous RevCons in the 1980s, the focus of these meetings had been squarely on compliance with 
Article I (i.e. non-possession). 
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garner Third World support (DFAT off. 1991, 18 July; Starr off. 1991, 22 
August). In this context, the Australian delegation to pre-RevCon consultations 
in the WEOG was instructed to express only conditional support for US non-
transfer ideas (DFAT off. 1991, 18 July). 
In the event, Australia opted merely to support encouraging participants to 
exchange information on all of their national implementing measures (including 
those relevant to Article Ill). Even this unmistakably meek proposal was further 
diluted by being couched in an extremely restrictive interpretation of Article Ill; 
namely, that it forbids the transfer of BW per se, but does not address dual-use 
items (DFAT off. Starr 1991, 22 August). In other words, Australia declined to 
support any concrete measures to urge BWC members to regulate transfers of 
BWC-related equipment or technology. Moreover, the instruction cable to the 
Delegation explains that Australia had decided to take even this patently 
milquetoast stance only due to 'our role as Australia Group chair and 
consequently expectations from other Australia Group members that we would 
support strong non-proliferation rhetoric and measures' (DFAT off. 1991, 10 
September: 5). 
An internal DFAT paper explains the basis for this reluctance to support 
US-led efforts to strengthen Article 111: 
We recognise the need to give support in principle to non-
proliferation action in the BWC framework. In our view the 
question of the effectiveness of non-proliferation 
measures is critical. We do not see value in supporting 
measures which only serve to alienate the Third World 
parties to the Convention without constraining the spread 
of BW (Starr off. 1991, 22 August: 5). 
A mid-level official at the time publicly made the same points in more 
straightforward language: 
Of course non-proliferation measures are the instinctive 
US response to any arms control issue .... Export controls 
in whatever framework tend to make Third World countries 
jittery .... There is a danger that in emphasising controls on 
proliferation of overwhelming the treaty which is about in 
the first instance disarmament. Non-proliferation is a sub-
objective of disarmament and the two objectives cannot 
be pursued as if they are compatible (Fox off. 1991: 9). 
During the VEREX process, Australia expressed modest support for using 
future protocol negotiations to strengthen Article Ill, possibly by linking export 
controls to an illustrative to elaborate Article I (DFAT off. n.d.b; Dauth off. 1992, 
27 March). However, this does not appear to have been an active priority during 
the subsequent AHG process, in which Canberra has focused on provisions to 
verify non-possession. 
National Enforcement Mechanisms 
As with CW denial, Australia has conspicuously refrained from 
undertaking enforcement actions; if anything, its position has been even more 
low key. There does not appear to be even a single case in which Canberra 
has attempted to interdict specific transfers, or even to express concerns after 
the fact. Again, Australia has not implemented any nonproliferation sanctions 
other than those required under international law. 
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Other Capability-denial Responses 
There have been no apparent cases where Australia has used other 
denial measures against BW programs. 
Non-possession Norm-building 
Global Non-possession Norm: Biological Weapons Convention 
Australia's participation in the 1980 First BWC RevCon was extremely low 
key. But by the next RevCon in 1986, Australia's growing involvement in CW 
disarmament led it to take a more activist role, as a complement to its efforts in 
the ewe negotiations. 
Although Australian officials regarded the Convention as grossly 
inadequate due to its lack of verification, they also recognised that the 
implacable opposition to BWC verification by the two superpowers and many 
Third World countries meant that there was virtually no prospect for rectifying 
this perceived shortcoming. Instead, Australia set out to promote the more 
achievable outcome of promoting voluntary, modest CBMs (data declarations). 
A secondary aim was to work to ensure that US allegations of Soviet non-
compliance did not distract from achieving such positive goals, by neutrally 
stressing that the dispute highlighted the need for some type of verification 
(Walker int.; Gee int.). 
Australia played an active role during and after the 1986 RevCon in 
instituting voluntary CBMs, proposing specific measures and nominating the UN 
Department for Disarmament Affairs to coordinate data exchanges. Australian 
Disarmament Ambassador Butler shepherded these proposals forward in the 
pivotal role of chairman of the drafting committee (DFAT off. 1990, 1 June; 
Sims 1989). The Australian delegation also was responsible for crafting a 
compromise that side-stepped an attempt by India and other non-aligned states 
to hold CBMs hostage to creating a new organisation to implement the peaceful 
cooperation obligations provided for in Article X (Sims 1990b ). 
Following the 1986 RevCon, Australia played an active role in the 
intersessional working group that developed modalities (e.g. formats) for data 
exchanges according to the mandate provided by the RevCon (Starr off. 1991, 
21 January). Finally, concerned that it had been one of only four governments 
(with New Zealand, UK, US) to submit declarations (Pearson & Sims 1998), 
Australia co-sponsored resolution at the UNGA in late 1989 asking the 
Secretary General to report on participation in the voluntary BWC CBMs (CWC 
Bulletin [7] 1990). 
In June 1990, Australian diplomats met with the Austrian disarmament 
officials who would preside over the September 1991 RevCon to discuss 
preparations well in advance. Australia indicated that it saw little point in 
aggressively promoting verification given continuing superpower opposition and 
competing priorities: 
A thoroughgoing attempt to reform the BWC could not be 
sustained and may dissipate energies best devoted to the 
CWC. Modest progress on the BWC ... has more chance of 
success (both for the BWC and in terms of not 
undermining the CWC negotiations (DFAT off. 1990, 1 
June: 6). 
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Canberra therefore indicated that it would prefer to see the RevCon focus on 
improving the scope and implementation of existing CBMs and other modest, 
incremental measures. 
The swift changes in the international climate brought about by the Gulf 
War, as well as Moscow's decision to drop its categorical opposition to BWC 
verification, dramatically energised Australian aspirations on BWC verification. 
By November 1990 Canberra had concluded that 'the pressures for work on 
BW verification are mounting' (DFAT off. 1990). Although still mindful of 
distracting attention from the CWC negotiations, and aware that Washington's 
unyielding opposition would be difficult to overcome, senior DFAT officials 
decided cautiously to pursue a more ambitious agenda for the September 1991 
RevCon. During senior-level bilateral disarmament talks with the United States 
that month, Australia stated that, although it was aware of the difficulties 
involved, it nonetheless wanted to explore verification options (Fox off. 1990). 
Australia was less circumspect during bilateral meetings with other 
Western governments. It lobbied for concrete action on verification at the 
upcoming RevCon, calling for states to use the intervening period to examine 
the feasibility of negotiating a full-scope verification instrument. The instructions 
for these meetings explained: 'A central objective of Australian policy ... is to 
move US thinking beyond confidence building measures (additional measures, 
improvements to existing measures) to support a BW verification regime, 
modelled on the ewe regime' (DFAT off. 1990: 2). 
Canberra went on record with this position at the beginning of 1991. Its 
'national position paper' for a Dutch-sponsored meeting to prepare for the Third 
RevCon stated: 'Australia believes that a verification regime based on the CWC 
model should be technically feasible and appropriate' (Starr off. 1991, 21 
January: 7). It went on to state that while Australia supported immediate steps 
such as strengthening existing CBMs, its main objective for the Third RevCon 
would be to take steps to set verification negotiations in motion, specifically by 
creating an ad hoc group with a mandate to negotiate a full-scope verification 
protocol in time for the Fourth RevCon in 1996. An later internal background 
paper noted that the primary obstacle to moving this position forward would the 
US position characterising BW verification as technically impossible (DFAT off. 
1991b). 
Having staked out an aggressive diplomatic position, Australia moved to 
raise the political profile of the verification issue. In a May 1991 speech to a UN 
disarmament conference, Foreign Minister Evans not only called for the 
RevCon to approve a negotiating mandate, but also launched a thinly veiled 
attack against the United States: 
At the Third Review Conference ... a central issue will be to 
make progress on verification against the belief held in 
some quarters that verification is not possible. I believe it 
is possible, particularly if the sources of ambiguity in the 
text of the Convention - which allegedly make it 
unverifiable - are resolved through explication and 
elaboration (Evans off. 1991, 28 May, pp. 8-9).53 
53 One of the practical obstacles to verifying compliance with the BWC is that non-compliance is 
poorly defined because the treaty does not specify what agents are prohibited, and allows possession of 
unspecified quantities of any agent for poorly defined allowable purposes. 
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Despite this uncompromising public rhetoric, Australian officials revealed 
in private talks with New Zealand several weeks later that they were already 
planning a tactical compromise. Given that the United States and others were 
certain to reject its calls for a negotiating mandate, Canberra would instead 
seek an experts group with a mandate to examine feasibility and options. This 
more palatable step could then lead more or less automatically to bone fide 
negotiations. In order to ensure progress along these lines after the RevCon, 
Australia would also push to establish a separate working group to develop lists 
to elaborate Article I, and an intersessional oversight committee to oversee 
these working groups and implementation of CBMs (DFAT off. 1991d). 
At about the time when Australia was finalising its position in late July, 
Washington informed Canberra that it had reluctantly decided not to go along 
with an intersessional group with a narrow mandate to examine the technical 
feasibility of verification. Australia responded during senior-level bilateral 
consultations in August that it viewed this concession as inadequate, telling the 
United States: 
We believe that progress on verification is a major - if not 
the major - issue facing the Review Conference. We will 
argue for the establishment of an expert working group on 
verification to examine not just questions of feasibility but 
to develop verification options. Unlike the US we are not 
convinced at this stage that the group should not be given 
a negotiating mandate, (DFAT off. 1991f: 1) 
Foreign Minister Evans signed off on a final negotiating position for the 
RevCon following this bilateral exchange. Canberra would oppose US 
suggestions to make CBMs legally-binding, on the grounds that 'they may be 
superseded in due course by a verification package' (DFAT off. 1991, 18 July: 
8). Instead it would sponsor a comprehensive package of proposals: 
Advancing the issue of BW verification is our most 
important objective. We have therefore given priority 
support to a proposal to initiate a process which 
addresses verification from the feasibility study stage to 
the negotiation of a verification protocol or annex. Any 
verification regime will be modelled on the ewe 
verification regime and will contain the same components 
of annual data reporting and various kinds of inspection. 
As well as a process which would set in train serious 
examination of BW verification, we have also given priority 
to putting in place as confidence building measures the 
components of a future verification regime. Linking these 
proposals is a measure for the establishment of an inter-
conference BWC organisation (Starr off. 1991, 22 
August). 
The classified instruction cable to the Australian delegation explained that this 
package was designed as 'a workable compromise' to bridge the unresolved 
differences between the preferences of Australia (and other Western states) for 
a negotiating mandate 'versus the more limited objective of a study group on 
the feasibility of verification' (DFAT off. 1991, 10 September: 2). The heart of 
this compromise was a set of interrelated proposals that would lead quickly and 
more or less automatically from an initial feasibility study to a follow-on 
negotiation. The cable bluntly tells the delegation to use Australia's institutional 
influence as RevCon Vice President to promote this national agenda, as well as 
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to deflect US attempts to raise concerns about Soviet compliance that might 
distract attention from it. 
In the event, Australia did not achieve most of its goals. Its proposals for 
an intersessional working group to elaborate Article I with lists and thresholds, 
and for an interim oversight organisation both were blocked. Its proposals to 
significantly expand the scope of CBMs in a way that would lay the groundwork 
for a full-scope verification regime was also largely unsuccessful (DFAT off. 
1991, 27 September). However, it did succeed in leaving the door open to a 
Special Conference of States Parties in the event that the verification experts 
(VEREX) group concluded that verification was feasible. In this regard, 
Australia stated during the RevCon that it fully anticipated that this process 
would confirm the need for intrusive verification measures (O'Sullivan off. 1991, 
12 September.). 
Throughout the VEREX and subsequent AHG processes, Australia's 
purpose for any new protocol was only secondarily that it should be able to 
detect non-compliance with any certainty. The main benefit that Canberra had 
ascribed to a BWC verification regime was rather to enhance the normative 
value of the Convention. A verification protocol would contribute to this by 
requiring States Parties to participate in the political acts of negotiating, signing, 
and ratifying what would amount to a new treaty, and by creating an ongoing 
process through which members could cooperatively affirm their compliance 
and gain confidence from others doing likewise. From this norm-building 
perspective, Australia was confident in its conviction that imperfect verification 
was better than no verification, and that the goal therefore was simply to get as 
much verification as possible (Bird off. 1994, 28 July; Butler 1998, 19 June; 
[DFAT] int.; Starr off. 1991, 22 August). 
Canberra faced an uphill struggle in the VEREX process, with the United 
States, China, and key developing states such as India united in staunch 
opposition to moving ahead with verification (DFAT off. 1993, 27 September). 
As the late 1993 deadline loomed, Canberra intensified bilateral efforts to 
convince key opponents not to block consensus on a favourable final report 
(DFAT off. 1992; DFAT off. 1993, 3 September). Australia was therefore 
extremely gratified when the new US administration dropped its categorical 
objections to a positive report at the final VEREX meeting in September 1993, 
although it remained frustrated by the persistence of what it saw as 
unwarranted US concern about protecting sensitive commercial and national 
security information (Bird off. 1994, 28 July; DFAT off. 1993, 21 October).54 
Having unexpectedly obtained a reasonably positive VEREX outcome, 
Australia lost no time in making the most of it. It delivered a strong statement at 
the UNGA, calling for a BWC Special Conference to be convened in order to 
rapidly move the process forward (DFAT off. 1993, 15 October). Canberra then 
launched a concerted bilateral effort at the Foreign Minister level to persuade 
key States Parties to support a formal request for such a meeting, reinforcing 
this ministerial effort with diplomatic demarches to all States Parties (DFAT off. 
1993, 10 October, 6 December). 
In the lead-up to the September 1994 BWC Special Conference, Foreign 
54 This internal DFAT document credits Australian efforts with a large measure of the credit for the 
Clinton administration's qualified policy reversal. However, US officials reveal that this decision was 
influenced more by internal dynamics than external diplomatic pressure (see Chapter 4). 
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Minister Evans approved a coordinated bilateral campaign targeting all Western 
states, and in particular the United States, as well as states in its region, to 
encourage support for a negotiating mandate for a full-scope verification 
protocol. The aim of this campaign was to avert consideration of any lesser 
outcomes, for example a mandate merely to strengthening CBMs (Bird off. 
1994, 28 July; DFAT 1994, 19 September). It also volunteered Disarmament 
Ambassador Richard Starr, a highly respected diplomat, to serve as the Vice-
Chairman of the Special Conference to facilitate this outcome. 
Australia from the start played a central role in the resulting AHG 
negotiations, not only serving as Vice-Chairman of the process, but later also 
taking on the critical role of 'Friend of Chair' for legal issues (Tucker 1998b ). 
Unlike Washington, Canberra's enthusiasm for BWC verification was not 
dampened by revelations at the start of the AHG process about the failure of 
UNSCOM to detect Iraq's residual biological weapons programs despite scores 
of highly intrusive inspections over several years, nor by the parallel failure of 
the Trilateral Process to resolve concerns about Russian compliance ([DFAT] 
ints.).55 
Throughout the ongoing AHG talks, Australia has refused to back away 
from its support for intrusive routine and challenge inspections. In early 1996 it 
conducted a national trial inspection at a corporate biotechnology facility, 
submitting a report to the AHG that concluded that managed access could 
adequately protect proprietary information, and that routine inspections of this 
type would significantly deter BWC violations (Pearson 1997b ). A classified 
internal document in mid-1997, while noting that many key issues remained 
unresolved after nearly two years of negotiations, firmly ruled out any 
compromise that did not include at an absolute minimum: compulsory 
declarations of relevant facilities/activities, infrequent routine visits to declared 
sites, and short-notice challenge inspections (DFAT off. 1997, 3 June). 
In the absence of dramatic breakthroughs nearly a year later, despite the 
adoption of rolling text in July 1997, and what appeared to be a renewal of US 
political commitment in President Clinton's January 1998 State of the Union 
speech, Foreign Minister Downer announced on 2 March 1998 that Australia 
would henceforth consider spurring progress in the AHG as one of its top 
priorities, citing Australia's role in the CWC negotiations as a model. The 
centrepiece of this initiative was a call for a meeting of BWC foreign ministers to 
give political momentum to the AHG negotiations ([DFAT] int.; Downer off. 
1998). In an unmistakable reference to Australian frustration at the continuing 
absence of a sincere US commitment, a senior official explains that this 
initiative was motivated by 'a feeling that the BW negotiating process was 
drifting, and importantly some key countries, friendly countries, were content 
with that' ([DFAT] int.). 
Foreign Minister Downer's BWC ministerial meeting was held in New York 
in September 1998.56 It achieved its core objectives to the extent that it was 
55 As noted elsewhere, this failure was revealed as a consequence of the defection of a high-level 
Iraqi official. The scope of the failure was such that, at the time of this defection in August 1995, 
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, the head of UNSCOM, was within weeks of issuing a final report giving Iraq a 
clean bill of health on BW (Butler 1998, 19 June). 
56 Through an unhappy quirk of fate, Downer himself was unable to chair the meeting as planned, 
because for domestic political reasons Prime Minister Howard called a federal election for soon after the 
scheduled meeting. (Australian law prohibits ministers from participating in such high-profile public events 
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widely attended and focused high-level political attention on the AHG process. 
Participants reaffirmed their commitment to negotiating an effective compliance 
instrument, and pledged to hold another high-level meeting in 1999 to review 
progress. Australia's prospects for achieving its larger negotiating objectives, 
however, remain uncertain. 
In addition to the challenge of ultimately securing NAM support, Australia 
and most other Western states remain at an impasse with the United States on 
the crucial issue of routine inspections. Although the gap recently has narrowed 
- with Australia now referring to 'random visits' rather than 'routine inspections', 
and Washington willing at least to consider voluntary 'no cause' visits and 
clarification visits - Washington still refuses to accede to Canberra's demand 
for some type of mandatory 'no-cause' inspections (int.; Tucker 1998).57 
Additionally, while Australia has bowed to US objections and abandoned its 
earlier insistence on developing lists to elaborate Article I, it is still insisting on 
far broader declarations and lower threshold quantities than the US is willing to 
consider (ints.). 
Other Non-possession Responses 
Although in many respects Australia's approach to BWC enhancement 
has followed its basic ewe script, it has not attempted to replicate its cw 
regional initiative. That said, it has actively tried to promote comprehensive 
regional adherence to the BWC, particularly in the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf 
Crisis. For example, in late 1990 Foreign Minister Evans wrote letters to the 
foreign ministers of regional states that had not yet signed and/or ratified the 
BWC, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, and Brunei, urging them fully to 
accede. The initial effort was supplemented by raising the issue in diplomatic 
demarches, bilateral ministerial meetings, and finally a second round of 
ministerial letters to an expanded list of governments (Dauth off. 1992, 25 
February; DFAT off. 1991, 15 February; Evans off. 1991, 27 March; Starr off. 
1991 , 21 January). 58 
Consequence-mitigation 
Counterproliferation 
Before the mid-1990s Australia did not have any research programs on 
BW defence. Moreover, other than those coincident with CW defence, 
Australian forces had no operational equipment or training to defend against 
BW (Ray tst. 1991 ). Indeed, DOD capabilities at the time were so limited that it 
could not furnish a single technical expert to advise DFAT prior to the 1991 
BWC RevCon (Starr off. 1991, 22 August). 
DTSO was authorised in the early 1990s to initiate limited research on 
defences against toxins, but this still did not involve biological agents (Brabin-
once an election has been called.) DFAT explored rescheduling the ministerial meeting, but concluded 
that it would be impractical to try to rearrange the schedules of dozens of foreign ministers. Therefore 
New Zealand's foreign minister was asked to represent Australia as the meeting's chairman ([DFAT] int.). 
57 Clarification visits represent an intermediate measure between no-cause routine inspections and 
political!~ charged challenge inspections that Australia strongly supports (Tucker 1998). 
5 This regional recruitment campaign was so successful that in just over a year, Burma was left as 
the only major state in Southeast Asia that had still not ratified the BWC. 
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Smith tst. 1997).59 This charter was then expanded to cover BW in early 1995, 
albeit on a very modest scale (Punch tst. 1995). It does not appear that this 
program has involved the use of BW agents. 
Australia has advocated positions that do not support the BW defence 
programs of the United States' and others. At the 1991 BWC RevCon, it 
unsuccessfully sought an interpretive declaration that Article I prohibited either 
modification of existing BW agents or development of new agents for defensive 
purposes (Australia off. 1991 ). In the mid-1990s, Australia refused to support 
US and British attempts to reverse or, failing that, delay a WHO decision 
recommending destruction of the last acknowledged samples of smallpox. 
Canberra rejected claims that these samples were needed for 
counterproliferation purposes. Indeed, an Australian official recalls making an 
off-the-record telephone call to a sympathetic NSC staffer to argue the case for 
destruction ([DFAT] int.). Australia continued to argue against continuing 
delays, including most recently at a special WHO meeting in May 1999 
(Washington Post 5/25/99). 
Deterrence 
The Australian stance on CW deterrence discussed above applies equally 
to BW. 
SECTION 4: CASE STUDY - MISSILES 
Relative Priority 
The missile area has consistently been Australia's very lowest proliferation 
priority. Officials at different levels and from different time periods all attribute 
this to two factors. One is the absence of any emerging missile threats in 
Australia's immediate region. This was, and continues to be, seen as even 
more pronounced than in the CBW areas due to the complexity, expense, and 
sophisticated infrastructures required to produce ballistic missiles ([DFAT] ints.; 
[intelligence] int.).60 However, several officials also point to the lack of a 
normative treaty, or any reasonable prospects of ever even attempting to 
negotiate one, as another significant factor in explaining why senior Australian 
officials have consistently accorded scant attention to the topic ([DFAT] ints.; 
Darling int.).61 
The issue of missile proliferation virtually did not exist as a recognised 
issue during the 1980s. According to officials from that period, the sum total of 
DFA's interest or activity in this area amounted to monitoring reports about 
relevant activities by the United States and other G-7 states ([DFA] int.; 
59 Toxins represent something of a grey area between BW and CW. Because they are not living 
organisms, they are not strictly speaking BW. At the same time, because they are produced by living 
organisms, they share many important characteristics, for example being able to produce militarily 
useable quantities from small stockpiles in short periods of time. 
60 That said, Mack (1991, 1992) points out that the larger Asia-Pacific region, including South Asia 
and Northeast Asia, throughout this period has been second only to the Middle East as a site of missile 
proliferation, as well as a significant source of missile proliferation. 
61 The only comprehensive academic survey of Australian nonproliferation and disarmament 
policies (Mathews & McCormick 1995) expressly omits missile nonproliferation on the grounds that, 
because the issue lacks a global treaty-norm, it is not on the same level of significance as the other 
nonproliferation areas. This explicit scholarly judgement appears to reflect accurately the implicit attitudes 
of Australian policymakers. 
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O'Sullivan int.).62 Even this bare level of interest seems to have been motivated 
in part by concerns that these policies could affect Australian access to relevant 
technologies, rather than by interest in missile nonproliferation as such (Walker 
off. 1987, 27 May). 
The disarmament bureaucracy first began to focus on missile proliferation 
in the very late 1980s, when Australia was urged by the United States and 
others to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR, and then invited to join. This was 
bolstered by a brief, unwarranted scare during the same period that Indonesia 
might try to develop long-range missiles under the guise of a space launch 
program ([DFAT] int.). 63 However, such attention remained confined to the 
working-level bureaucracy ([DFAT] int.). 
Having opted to embrace missile nonproliferation, Australia did not want to 
see these efforts confined to nuclear-capable systems, reflecting its specific 
regional security concerns about CBW proliferation (DFAT off. n.d.c., 1990, 4 
April). Even before joining Canberra put the MTCR on notice: 
Australia's interest in the whole question of proliferation of 
missile technology is wider than nuclear armed missiles -
it includes chemical and biological warheads. We 
therefore see the MTCR as covering the broader question 
of missile proliferation rather than only nuclear warhead 
missiles (DFAT off. 1990, 4 April: 1). 
Again, joining the MTCR did not elevate the missile issue from its rank at the 
bottom of anti-proliferation priorities ([DFAT] int.). 
The zenith of Australian interest in the missile area occurred when it 
assumed the rotating chair of the MTCR in 1993. This relative upsurge in 
attention appears to have been driven partly by the bureaucratic demands of 
fulfilling this role, and partly by the hope that its Chairmanship would afford 
opportunities to argue the case for negotiating a global missile norm. Even 
during this period of peak interest, however, missiles remained the lowest 
nonproliferation priority ([DFAT] ints.). This was reflected in both high-level 
disinterest and extremely limited resource allocation at the working-level. These 
factors severely limited the scope for bureaucratic initiative. For example, the 
official most closely involved with Australia's chairmanship of the MTCR relates: 
I can well remember actually just feeling embarrassed in 
terms of the inability of Australia to take steps that I felt 
would be useful. ... Fulfilling the sort of fully effective 
diplomatic role of nonproliferation that we had in other 
areas, we just simply couldn't do it ([DFAT] int.). 
The magnitude of Australian disinterest in missile nonproliferation, even during 
this high-water mark period, is vividly illustrated by classified instructions to 
62 Numerous documents confirm this interview data through conspicuous omission. For example, a 
700-page Parliamentary report on all aspects of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, failed to 
mention the issue even in passing (Parliament off. 1986). A DFA publication enumerating the full 
spectrum of Australian disarmament activities - while discussing issues as diverse as the Indian Ocean 
Zone of Peace, the Questionnaire on Reduction of Military Budgets, the Year of Peace, the World 
Disarmament Campaign education program, and the creation of a Peace Research Centre at the 
Australian National University - also failed even to mention missile proliferation (DFA off. 1987). As late 
as the end of 1988, an address by departing Disarmament Ambassador Richard Butler on Australian 
disarmament priorities, missile proliferation likewise is omitted entirely (Butler 1990). 
63 This program never got beyond the embryonic stage, and quickly disappeared altogether. 
Therefore this strategic concern does not appear to have had time to take root in Australian thinking. 
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Australian diplomats in India, Pakistan and China, warning them not to follow up 
on missile proliferation issues that had been raised in recently concluded 
bilateral talks. Despite India and Pakistan being among the most active missile 
proliferators, and China a worrisome supplier to Pakistan and others, the 
embassies were instructed: 
In your on-going exchanges on arms control/non-
proliferation issues ... we do not want you to place any 
particular emphasis on the MTCR, though as current Chair 
we felt bound to raise it on this occasion. As you will 
know, our priorities are more focused on the nuclear (NPT 
and proliferation) and CBW areas (DFAT off. 1993, 15 
July: 1 ). 
After Australia relinquished the MTCR Chair in 1994, interest in the missile 
area declined even further (int.). Within DFAT the issue was assigned on a less 
than half-time basis to a single desk officer in the conventional and nuclear 
disarmament section, whose primary responsibilities were nuclear disarmament 
and nonproliferation, while within other policy agencies no personnel were 
assigned to the issue specifically (Darling int.). Following the collapse in mid-
1995 of a Canadian initiative to test the waters on a global missile treaty, 
residual interest at senior levels fell away altogether, leaving the issue to settle 
comfortably among DFAT's lowest disarmament priorities, and at the very 
bottom of its proliferation response agenda (Darling int.; [DFAT] ints.). 
Capability-Denial 
National Export Controls 
Australia did not institute any nonproliferation export controls on missile 
technology prior to joining the MTCR in 1990.64 At that time, it simply 
promulgated new regulations under the legislative authority of the Custom's 
Act, requiring individual export licences for all items listed in the MTCR Annex, 
with decisions based on the MTCR Guidelines. There have been no preferential 
procedures for exports to other Regime members (DFAT off. 1993, 7 June). 
Although Australia has not been a significant exporter of relevant items, for 
example far less so than in the other proliferation areas, it is widely perceived to 
have a solid record of implementing the MTCR conscientiously. 
Multilateral Export Control Regime: Missile Technology Control Regime 
Australia has been extremely ambivalent about participating in the MTCR 
throughout its involvement, far more so than the other suppliers groups. 
According to officials involved at different times over the past decade, this 
discomfort has been based on the absence of relevant global norm, which is 
seen to call into doubt the legitimacy of the entire missile nonproliferation 
enterprise (Courtney int.; Darling int., [DFAT] ints.). As a former official directly 
in charge of missile nonproliferation issues observes: 'A global norm makes 
suppliers regimes less discriminatory clubs and more complementary, 
acceptable bodies' (Courtney int.). A current official with similar responsibilities 
explains Australian reservations about the MTCR as follows: 
64 Missiles per se would have been captured by general controls on sensitive military items 
(Walker off. 1987, 27 May). However, since MTCR-class missiles are not produced in Australia, this would 
not have been relevant. 
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Its go an air of ad hoc-ery and almost Cold War-ishness 
about it which the others don't have .... lt began in a much 
more limited way than the Australia Group or NSG. Both 
of those ... despite the attacks on their credibility and their 
right to exist, they can stand very firmly on long 
established international norms ([DFAT] int.). 
The perceived flaw of having no legally enshrouded normative basis has 
been exacerbated by concerns about specific features of the MTCR, including: 
its overtly discriminatory 'have, have not' structure. This is illustrated by the 
following aspects: all of the AG members have renounced CBW through the 
BWC and CWC, and even before the ewe had renounced CW use and were 
at least in the process of addressing possession; its narrow Western-oriented 
membership; its explicit refusal to distinguish between civilian (i.e. SL V) and 
military technology; and (initially) its failure to cover CBW-related delivery 
systems (Courtney int.; Darling int.; [DFAT] int.). Indeed, a former official 
speculates that these considerations would probably have posed more serious 
obstacles to Australian participation if top officials had ever bothered to pay 
more attention to the issue (Darling int.). 
Australia did not participate in, and indeed was unaware of, the protracted 
negotiations that led to the MTCR. Soon after the G-7 states publicly 
announced the new Regime, the United States and several other members 
bilaterally approached Canberra to urge it to adhere unilaterally. Despite such 
pressure, the Australian response was non-committal, saying that careful 
interagency study would be needed (DFAT off. n.d.c; Walker off. 1987, 27 
May). More than two years later, when the issue was raised during ministerial 
talks in Washington, Foreign Minister Evans told Secretary of State Baker that 
Australia still had not made a formal decision about adhering unilaterally, but 
that it was favourably inclined (DFAT off. 1989, 6 November). Before any 
further action was taken though, the idea of unilateral adherence was overtaken 
by an implicit invitation to join the Regime. 
DFAT has blocked release of documents pertaining to Australian 
deliberations immediately before and after it became a Regime member, either 
in whole or part (DFAT off. 1998, 7 October). It is therefore unclear whether 
Australia considered turning down the invitation to join the MTCR. Interviews 
certainly suggest that Canberra had serious qualms, and the very fact that this 
material has been denied for FOi declassification at least hints it may allude to 
reservations that would be inconsistent with Australia's current status as a 
Regime member. Another issue that may still be regarded as sensitive was that 
Australia had an ulterior motive for joining the MTCR; namely, securing access 
to commercial SLV technology. 65 As then First Assistant Secretary Kim Jones 
(int.) notes, while the desire for MTCR items was not the primary factor in 
Australia's decision to join, it was certainly a relevant factor, and one that 
Australian space officials subsequently have overtly espoused (Farrow tst. 
1995). 
Canberra's July 1990 public announcement that it would join the MTCR 
appears to have been intentionally designed to play down the significance of 
65 In 1989 the United States had blocked an export license for a US firm to participate in an 
Australian project to build a commercial space-port at Cape York, Queensland, citing the MTCR's 
prohibition on supporting space-launch capabilities in non-MTCR countries (Speier int.). The domestic 
importance of Cape York is revealed by the fact that Foreign Minister Evans was explicitly prepared to 
address this issue in announcing the Australian decision to join the MTCR (DFAT off. 1990, July). 
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the decision, characterising it merely as part Australia's larger nonproliferation 
involvement. Moreover, the final press release put out jointly by the foreign and 
defence ministers was markedly more understated than an early draft prepared 
by the disarmament staff, to the point that it was ambiguous about whether 
Australia was actually becoming a full-fledged member (DFAT off. 1990, 11 
July, 20 July.) This down-playing theme is also apparent in Foreign Minister 
Evans' talking points to respond to questions from the press, which noted, 
'Australia currently manufactures for export little that would be covered by the 
MTCR' (DFAT off. 1990, July). 
Once it joined the Regime, Australia set about to address its various 
specific concerns about it (Courtney int.). Its first initiative was to promote 
expanding the Regime's objectives to cover CBW-related missiles. This was 
achieved in principle at its very first meeting in July 1990, thanks to a parallel 
US initiative. DFAT therefore tasked Defence scientists to come up with a 
specific technical proposal to operationalise this decision in time for a planned 
February 1991 technical meeting (DFAT off. 1990, 21 September). As a result 
of this work, Australia proposed adding the concept of range/payload trade-offs 
to the basic Category I definition, as well as specific methodologies for 
calculating such trade-offs. 66 The intention of this proposal was in effect to lower 
the threshold to correspond to lower CBW payloads (DFAT off. 1991a; Pope, 
Irvine & Retallick off. 1994 ). Australia enthusiastically supported the eventual 
decision at the 1992 Oslo plenary that formally incorporated CBW delivery 
systems into the MTCR Guidelines (Evans off. 1993). 
Australia also began a low-key effort to promote other reforms in the 
Regime's structure and policies, for example broadening membership and 
clarifying the Guidelines (DFAT off. 1990, 11 December; Evans off. 1991, 28 
May; Jones off. 1991, 15 March).67 Australia in particular wanted clarification 
that the MTCR was not intended to impede civilian SLV programs generally, 
and in particular that the 'strong presumption of denial' on Category I items 
should be 'qualified' for the civilian programs of Regime members. An internal 
paper comments: 
At the [March 1993] Canberra Plenary we argued that 
consistent with the intent of the MTCR Guidelines, 
transfers of controlled items for space launch programs 
should be allowed, particularly to Partners, on a case-by-
case basis with a country's nonproliferation credentials an 
important determinate. This preserves the Australian 
Space Office interests in transfers of technology and 
equipment for Australian space launches. The US has in 
the past not accepted this interpretation (Starr off. 1993, 
26 October: 3). 
Although Australia was unable to get US support for this reform, it successfully 
lobbied the Bush administration bilaterally to drop its opposition to the Cape 
York space-port project now that Australia had joined the MTCR, which de facto 
had much the same affect by setting a precedent (Speier int.). 
66 The concept of range/payload trade-offs (i.e. inherent capability) was adopted, but Australia's 
specific methodology was rejected. 
67 Australia also informally suggested possible measures to strengthen the MTCR to the United 
States, for example creating a permanent Secretariat to assist in coordinating implementation (DFAT off. 
1990, 11 December). However, it does not appear to have itself pursued such initiatives within the 
Regime. 
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Australia pushed for consideration of further minor reforms prior to the 
November 1993 Interlaken plenary. At the same time, it reacted warily to the 
ambitious package of proposals brought forward by the new Clinton 
administration. For example, although it did not support automatic access to 
technology for members, Australia also opposed US efforts to add new 
restrictions on inter-partner trade that might impede its own access to SLV 
technology and Category I Tomahawk cruise missiles (Courtney int.; DFAT off. 
n.d.e; Darling int.; Evans off. 1994, 7 February; Starr off. 1993, 26 October.) 
Australia also was wary of Washington's restrictive membership requirements, 
fearing that they would impede regional diversification (Courtney int.; Darling 
int.; [DFAT] ints.; Starr off. 1993, 26 October).68 An internal document states: 
'We think there is value in as many countries as possible joining the regime as 
a demonstration of their commitment to non-proliferation of missiles' (DFAT off. 
n.d.e: 7). 
Even when Australia took firm positions, it did not play a leading role on 
any of these issues. Australia's involvement in the Regime's debates was 
markedly low profile, having consciously decided to avoid trying to play a 
prominent role. Since the mid-1990s, this already modest involvement has been 
scaled back even further, with Australia offering no significant national 
proposals for political, structural, or technical reforms over the past several 
years. Beginning in 1996 Australia also downgraded its level of representation 
at plenary meetings from an assistant secretary to a section head. 
Wider Export Control Norms 
In principle Australia has supported encouraging non-MTCR states to 
adhere unilaterally to MTCR standards. However, its position has been that this 
should be done on a national basis by individual members, according to their 
own strategies and interests, rather than for the Regime as such to push for this 
as the United States and some others would prefer (Courtney int.; [DFAT] int.). 
For its part, Australia occasionally has encouraged governments to 
adhere to the MTCR during bilateral meetings, especially key Asian states like 
China and Singapore (DFAT off. 1991c, 1992, 2 December, 1993, 24 May; 
[DFAT] int.). 69 However, interview data and documentary evidence suggest that 
Australia has limited this effort to a just a few key governments, and even then 
has tended not to highlight the issue (DFAT off. 1993, 15 July: 1 ). As one 
official sums up Australia's reservations about vigorously promoting wider 
MTCR adherence: 'It is not realistic or fair to expect states to adhere to regimes 
of which they are not members and which they have not been permitted/invited 
to join' (Courtney int.). 70 
68 However, key officials note that Australia has not had to play an active role in opposing US 
membership restrictions, because the Western Europeans have been extremely aggressive in voicing 
opposition due to their political interest in having Warsaw Pact states be allowed to join as a means of 
integrating them into Western security structures ([DFAT ints.). 
69 Australia and Japan are formally responsible for maintaining liaison with non-member APEC 
states on behalf of the Regime. 
70 In this regard, on the occasions when Australia has urged China unilaterally to adhere to the 
MTCR, it has always been careful to 'reiterate our national position ... of supporting China's full 
membership in the Regime on the basis of its firm adherence to and full implementation of the Guidelines 
as revised' (DFAT off. 1993, 24 May, p. 3). 
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National Enforcement Mechanisms 
Consistent with the other proliferation areas, Australia has shied away 
from raising concerns about missile-related transfers with other governments. 
This has sometimes necessitated resisting explicit US requests for Australia to 
undertake such efforts based on specific intelligence in order to reinforce its 
own interdiction efforts ([DFAT] int.). 
On at least one occasion, probably in 1991, Australia does appear to have 
expressed concern at a high level in Beijing about press reports that China was 
planning to export complete MTCR-class missiles to Pakistan and the Middle 
East. This relatively uncharacteristic action was apparently the result of bilateral 
prompting from Japan, which explicitly asked Canberra as the only other Asia-
Pacific member of the MTCR to reinforce its own bilateral protests (DFAT off. 
n.d.d). Australia has also expressed concern to Moscow about recent press 
reports concerning missile assistance to Iran, although without taking any 
position of the veracity of the allegations ([DFAT] int.). Such cases are 
exceptional, however, involving wide press coverage of flagrant violations of 
those countries' stated commitments. 
Australia has no missile-related nonproliferation sanctions. It has also 
been especially wary of US missile sanctions, because they are tied directly to 
the MTCR, albeit unilaterally. Australia has taken a firm position that sanctions 
should not be associated with any of the export control regimes ([DFAT] int.; 
Starr off. 1993, 26 October). It therefore never even considered US calls to 
have the MTCR emulate its national sanctions, or for individual members to 
endorse them nationally. After the United States passed its sanctions law, 
Australia politely expressed displeasure bilaterally that Washington had 
instituted sanctions tied to the MTCR without obtaining the Regime's approval 
(Courtney int.; DFAT off. 1993, 11 December; [DFAT] int.). 
Other Capability-denial Responses 
As with CBW, there have been no apparent cases where Australia has 
used other denial measures against missile programs such as targeted denial, 
or sabotage or destruction. 
Non-possession Norm-building 
Global Missile Treaty Proposals 
Australia has been at the forefront of efforts to explore the scope for a 
treaty-based global missile norm since becoming a member of the MTCR in 
1990. Just months after joining the Regime, Canberra privately noted to 
Washington: 'In the longer term the constraint on proliferation of missile 
technology will require a broad approach .... [including] verification (e.g. on-site 
inspections) for states who wish to conform with the objectives of the MTCR' 
(DFAT off. 1990, 11 December: 7). 
While using such oblique references with others, Canberra had initiated 
internal deliberations to consider whether to push openly for a global treaty-
norm to underpin the MTCR. The cognisant section director within DFAT 
recalls: 'I argued the case for a global norm strongly and that view prevailed.' At 
the same time she notes: 'We were aware, however, of the complexity and 
unlikelihood of getting far with it' (Courtney int.). Former Foreign Minister Evans 
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(int.) likewise recounts that he strongly supported exploring this issue, but did 
not make it a high priority because of the dim prospects for success. 
Modest expectations notwithstanding, Australia decided cautiously to test 
the multilateral waters, beginning with its MTCR partners. In a carefully 
balanced speech to the March 1993 Canberra plenary meeting, Evans called 
for consideration of a global treaty-norm to ban missiles to underpin the MTCR. 
While acknowledging the complexities that such a negotiation would entail, he 
noted that efforts to establish global norms were 'centrally important' in the 
battle against proliferation (Evans off. 1993). Canberra then followed up this 
initiative several months later with a statement to the entire UNGA. Although 
Disarmament Ambassador O'Sullivan had wanted explicitly to call for a global 
missile ban, he was instructed to make a less specific statement, urging 
'comprehensive international action on missiles' (DFAT off. 1993, 15 October, 
p. 4 ). The tactical reason for this circumspection is explained afterwards in an 
internal paper, which noted that, although Australia had opted to promote a 
global missile ban, this 'could only be realised in the long term and after 
complex negotiations (Starr off. 1993, 26 October).71 
Canada took up the Australian call from the year before at the 1994 
MTCR meeting, tabling a formal proposal for the Regime to endorse 
negotiations for a global ban on medium-range missiles; essentially a proposal 
to globalise the INF treaty (Canada off. 1994; Sinclair off. 1995).72 In response 
Foreign Minister Evans formally approved pursuing negotiations on a global 
missile treaty. However, Australia had objections to the Canadian formula. 
Specifically, because the proposal was limited to medium-range systems, it 
excluded ICBMs, and therefore would codify a de facto discriminatory 'have, 
have not' status quo. Recognising that a more comprehensive ban on 
possession stood no chance of even being considered by the United States 
and other 'haves', Canberra opted to champion a ballistic missile test ban 
treaty, along the lines of the CTBT rather than the CWC, BWC and NPT. DFAT 
concluded that this approach would: effectively establish an anti-missile norm; 
impede missile development (particularly for rudimentary programs); not 
impinge on dual-use transfers for civilian space programs; allow for verification 
mechanisms; make use less likely by undermining confidence in the 
effectiveness of existing systems; and, achieve all of this in a utterly non-
discriminatory manner (Cousins off. 1994, 15 December; Dorling int.). 
Rather than tabling a counter-proposal, Australia privately raised the idea 
of a missile test ban treaty with Washington. However, in a series of bilateral 
discussions, the United States categorically rejected any proposal along these 
lines (Dorling int.).73 Faced with this implacable opposition, Canberra 
pragmatically retreated to a less ambitious alternative. At the January 1995 
MTCR intersessional meeting, although Australia vigorously defended the 
Canadian initiative against scathing US criticism, it suggested that a better 
approach might be to consider a global missile/SL V launch pre-notification 
71 In an article published just a few months later, after departing his post as Disarmament 
Ambassador, O'Sullivan (1994) called for some type of missile treaty to be negotiated in the CD in 
Geneva. 
72 Except that the Canadian proposal lowered the 500km INF range floor to the 300km MTCR 
Categocy I range parameter. 
7 DFAT denied release of the instruction and reporting cables for these meetings in their entirety 
on the grounds that it could damage Australian foreign policy interests (DFAT off. 1998, 7 October). 
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agreement, noting that this mirrored a 1993 French proposal in the CD 
(Australia off. 1995).74 
Australia's intention had been to send a team afterwards to Washington in 
order to lay the groundwork to secure US support for this alternative as an 
acceptable compromise. The plan was to feel out divisions within the 
interagency, assess how far the United States might be willing to go, and then 
tailor a formal proposal that Washington would at least consider. But at 
precisely this juncture, France announced that it would resume nuclear testing 
in the South Pacific, sparking a major, protracted crisis for the Australian 
disarmament bureaucracy. As a result of this distraction, DFAT was unable to 
lobby Washington prior to the special August meeting to consider the Canadian 
proposal (Darling int.). Although Australia continued to promote its idea in 
MTCR channels, convinced Canada to add consideration of a launch 
notification agreement to the agenda, and then tabled a detailed proposal at the 
meeting itself, the proposal did not receive any serious consideration (Australia 
off. 1995; DFAT off. 1995, 7 April; Darling int.; Sinclair off. 1995 
Australia remained interested in promoting some type of global missile 
treaty after this setback. However, given the shrill opposition engendered by the 
Canadian proposal, and the disinclination to consider even the extremely 
modest Australian alternative, a political decision was made afterwards to 
abandon any active efforts until and unless the international climate improves 
([DFAT] int.). This remains the position of the current government ([DFAT] int.). 
That said, in June 1998 the opposition Labor Party's 'shadow' Foreign Minister 
gave a Parliamentary speech urging the government to reinvigorate its efforts to 
promote a multilateral missile treaty, asserting that the South Asian nuclear 
crisis lent new urgency to this issue (Brereton tst. 1998). In the federal election 
later that year, Labor's foreign policy platform included only three disarmament 
and nonproliferation initiatives, one of which was to pursue a multilateral treaty 
to constrain ballistic missiles (Australian Labor Party off. 1998). 
Other Non-possession Responses 
Despite its support for a global missile-norm, Canberra has opposed the 
US strategy of promoting a targeted, de facto non-possession norm by requiring 
new MTCR members to forgo MTCR-class missiles. Australian objections are 
based on two considerations. Firstly, that this unilateral US requirement has 
hampered non-Western states joining, particularly Asian countries like South 
Korea. More importantly, Australia has been uncomfortable with the 
discriminatory character of this requirement (Courtney int.; Darling int.; [DFAT] 
int.). 
Anticipating the dim prospects for negotiating a global missile norm, DFAT 
was entertaining the idea of a fall-back regional arrangement even as it pressed 
ahead to explore the scope for a global ban (Starr off. 1993, 26 October). 
Specifically, it considered a 'Regional Missile Free Zone' treaty, or if that proved 
infeasible, a less ambitious 'Regional Register of Missile Free Countries' (DFAT 
off. n.d.e). 
74 In additional to special intersessional meetings, the Government of France hosts a monthly 
'Point of Contact' meeting attended by diplomats from Paris embassies. This process serves in the 
absence of a regular secretariat to enable partners to exchange material and take decisions 
intersessionally. 
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After the collapse of any real prospects for global negotiations, Canberra 
began to consider more seriously whether to promote some type of regional 
missile ban, possibly through the existing ARF process. However, the Defence 
Department weighed in against the idea at senior levels, arguing that it would 
foreclose its missile acquisition options.75 As a result of this continuing 
interagency disagreement, a final decision on whether to pursue a regional 
alternative has yet to be reached ([DFAT] ints.). 
Consequence-mitigation 
Counterproliferation76 
Australia opposed the US SDI program in the 1980s, arguing that 
verifiable arms control agreements represented the best means to prevent war 
and to ensure international stability (Evans tst. 1987). However, when the 
United States began to reorient its missile defence efforts from strategic 
defence to counterproliferation after the Gulf War, Australia dropped its 
unconditional opposition. In 1992 the Australian Defence Department quietly 
began to consult regularly with SDIO in order to monitor developments and 
explore the scope for cooperation (Sydney Morning Herald 5/19/95). The 1994 
Defence White Paper noted that the growing threat of missile proliferation 
raised the potential for cooperation with the United States on missile defences. 
In April 1995 Australia agreed to a high-level US request to cooperate in 
this area. However, Australia specified in writing that this cooperation would be 
modest, that it would be consistent with its opposition to any activity that would 
violate the US-Russian ABM treaty, and that it would be based on its own 
national needs and priorities. Examples specified included the exchange of a 
single scientist, and conducting joint space tracking of civilian NASA launches 
for purposes of missile defence research, with total costs anticipated at under 
A$500 thousand. In explaining this policy to Parliament, the Keating 
government noted that its motive was not to acquire missile defence capabilities 
for Australia, but rather to demonstrate that Australia was a cooperative ally, as 
well as to attain spin-off technology for conventional military applications (Ray 
tst. 1995). 
The Howard government recently expanded this cooperation on a limited 
basis, agreeing to establish a test range in remote Western Australia for a 
series of four US test-launches over water so that BMDO could assess its 
ability to detect distant launches during the launch phase. Again though, in 
announcing this initiative the government stressed that it was not acting out of 
any particular interest in missile defence, but to demonstrate alliance 
cooperation (Mclachlan off. 1997, 8 August). 
SECTION 5: SUMMARY FINDINGS 
The Australian response to proliferation has consistently accorded 
unambiguous primacy to the non-possession norm-building approach. 
Canberra has favoured using a full spectrum of non-possession tools, including 
75 It is unclear why DOD did not likewise oppose a global treaty, which presumably would have the 
same result. 
76 As noted in the previous chapter, there is no discussion of deterrence in this section because 
deterrence does not apply to missiles directly, but rather to the weapons that they deliver. 
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global and regional instruments. It has expended tremendous multilateral and 
bilateral energy to contribute to negotiating, strengthening, and effectively 
implementing a web or normative treaties. This has been the case over time 
and across the different proliferation areas, although at any given time it has 
tended to devote the most attention to areas where multilateral progress 
appeared most promising. 
In contrast, Canberra has been consistently ambivalent about supply-side 
regimes, and generally has refrained from embracing additional capability-
denial instruments beyond the least common denominator commitments of the 
multilateral suppliers regimes. Canberra has shown little or no inclination to 
take enforcement action against other governments, even in concert with its 
anti-proliferation partners. Moreover, even this modest level of support to some 
extent has been based on ulterior motives - wider prestige and influence in the 
case of the AG, and access to technology in the case of the MTCR. At the 
same time, unlike some Western governments, it has been consistently diligent 
in policing its own exports to ensure that Australian firms do not contribute to 
proliferation directly. Australia has also eschewed all but the most humble 
national consequence-mitigation efforts, as well as generally declining to 
cooperate with US-led efforts. In virtually every case where trade-offs have 
existed between norm-building and capability-denial and/or consequence-
mitigation, Australia has opted to support the former. 
Whereas the previous chapter notes consistent patterns in US behaviour, 
despite variations over time and across areas, Australia's consistency has been 
far more pronounced. Indeed, it has used what almost amounts to a single, 
unchanging script. Although it has often been forced to compromise in order to 
achieve results, its preferred outcomes have always remained constant. 
Moreover, there have been no meaningful internal bureaucratic or political 
divisions regarding these preferences. 
In summary, Australia has strongly favoured the norm-building approach 
across the board, with sometimes reluctant support for capability-denial as a 
supplementary approach, and little or no support for consequence-mitigation 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPARATIVE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This concluding chapter seeks to compare the findings from the two sets 
of case studies, explore possible explanations for the major comparative finding 
discerned and suggest areas for complementary research. The study concludes 
by briefly considering the public-policy implications of its comparative findings. 
COMPARATIVE FINDINGS 
Comparison of the preceding case studies unveils considerable discord 
between the United States and Australia on numerous specific policy issues 
across proliferation areas and over a period of nearly two decades. Indeed, 
instances where the two governments have agreed, for example on the need to 
expand the scope of controls in the early years of the AG, have been relatively 
few, short-lived, and far between. Ironically, the most notable case where they 
ostensibly saw eye to eye for an extended period on a major policy issue, was 
during the 1980s regarding 'anytime, anywhere' ewe verification, and this was 
based on such contrary motivations and intentions that it can be fairly 
characterised as the exception that proves the rule. 
This discordant record has not been lost on either government. Interviews 
attest that past and present officials on both sides are widely aware that they 
have tended to disagree oftener than agree on specific policy questions. For 
example, a mid-level Bush administration official notes: 
There are a lot of important differences below the macro 
level objectives between Australia and the United States. 
In fact it doesn't take long for that to break down below the 
macro in terms of beginning to see the differences ... There 
is a definite difference of opinion in terms of how you 
implement achieving those objectives (lnglee int.). 
Awareness of these differences seems to be perceived most acutely by 
working- and mid-level officials, who have been immersed in the details of 
policy. But former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (int.) notes that 
even at high levels, differences have been readily apparent, and that these 
differences have gone well beyond trivial contrasts in diplomatic style. 
Awareness of national differences is particularly strong on issues pertaining to 
individual treaty-norms. 
The organisation of the case studies into two embedded sets, based on a 
common conceptual framework, reveals that these many instances of 
divergence fall into an unmistakable pattern of opposing national preferences 
towards the three major approaches to proliferation response. The United 
States has accorded primacy to the complementary approaches of capability-
denial and consequence-mitigation, while treating norm-building as a 
subordinate approach. Australia has put norm-building above all else, treating 
capability denial as subordinate, and largely eschewing consequence-mitigation 
altogether. This preference pattern is discernible for each actor across 
proliferation areas and over time. There has not been a single major case of 
deviation that contradicts this primary empirical finding. 
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An opinion survey of officials conducted in conjuncture with research 
interviews shows that the national divergence revealed in the case studies is 
mirrored in corresponding differences in the underlying personal attitudes of 
officials. (See Appendix 3 for full description, analysis, and data tables.) These 
include: pronounced bias towards capability-denial versus non-possession 
norm-building (see Figure 4); perceptions of one another's national approach 
(see Figures 5-6); and, optimism about the past and future effectiveness of 
nonproliferation generally (see Figures 7-8). Survey responses also suggest 
that there is considerable frustration and bafflement on each side regarding the 
other's perspectives. These survey results reinforce the major empirical finding 
that there has been a consistent, persistent, and pervasive divergence in US 
and Australian proliferation response preferences. 
Figure 4: Survey Question 2 - Preferred Approach 
Hypothetically, if you had to choose, which of the following would you 
consider to be more important in promoting your country's anti-proliferation 
goals: 
Option 1) 
Option 2) 
Building and maintaining strong multilateral treaty-norms 
against the possession of these weapons; or 
Preventing specific transfers of these weapons and 
associated equipment and technology to programs or 
countries of concern? 
US Officials 
Australian Officials 
• Option 1 • Option 2 D Don't Know 
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Figure 5: Survey· Question 3a - Perceptions of US Approach (Top 9) 
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Figure 6: Survey Question 3b - Perceptions of Australian Approach (Top 9) 
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Figure 7: Survey Question 4a - Perceptions of Past Effectiveness 
Do you believe that efforts by Western states to prevent 
proliferation over the past 10-15 years have been effective? 
US Officials 
Australian Officials 
5% 
• Yes 
ml No, somewhat 
DDon't know 
ml Ves, somewhat 
• No 
D Different between areas 
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Figure 8: Survey Question 4b - Perceptions of Future Effectiveness 
Do you believe that efforts by Western states to prevent 
proliferation over the coming 10-15 years will be effective? 
US Officials 
Australian Officials 
• Yes 
m No, somewhat 
DDon't know 
rm Yes, somewhat 
• No 
D Different between areas 
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It should be noted that, beyond the primary divergence detected, the 
empirical case studies also reveal a number of interesting secondary findings. 
For example, US policies have displayed greater inconsistency, both over time 
and across the different proliferation areas. Although not central to the 
analytical objectives of the current study, such subsidiary findings may be 
useful for future research on the overall foreign policy behaviour of these 
actors. 
CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
Analytical Objectives 
Having empirically detected a significant and consistent divergence in how 
these two so-called like-minded actors have responded to proliferation, it 
remains to explain this primary finding. The remainder of this section seeks to 
utilise the existing conceptual tools offered by the foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
and cognate theoretical IR literatures in order to help explain the principal 
finding of the preceding chapters. 
The analytical objectives of the study are grounded in the well established 
injunction that it is necessary to apply 'multicausal models' in seeking to explain 
any aspect of foreign policy behaviour (Charles Hermann 1978b ). 1 As Rosenau 
notes: 'Foreign policy springs from a multiplicity of sources, and the analytic 
challenge is to discern the effects of the various sources on the plans and 
courses of action that officials follow' (1976: 19). Kegley and Wittkopf further 
state: 
Whether one is attempting to explain a single foreign 
policy event or a whole sequence of related behaviors, no 
single source category fully determines outputs. Rather, 
the source categories are interrelated and collectively 
determine foreign policy decisions ( 14 ) .... Foreign policy 
actions almost invariably result from multiple sources; 
therefore we are well advised - if we are to avoid 
oversimplification and capture the complexity of reality - to 
think in terms of multiple causes (1991: 17). 
The dominant analytic template in FPA - emerging from decades of 
descriptive case studies - is that foreign policy decision making is a multi-
dimensional rather than unitary process, and that therefore applying a loosely 
connected set of sub-theories affords the best analytical means to comprehend 
any specific pattern of foreign policy behaviour (Steiner 1983). 
Consistent with this paradigm, the structure of the present analysis draws 
heavily on an environmental conception of FPA (Papadakis & Starr 1987). A 
salient feature of this model is that it synthesises multiple FPA perspectives. 2 It 
therefore takes into account a number of simultaneous structural (e.g. 
international system, international relations) and agent-specific (e.g. societal, 
governmental, individual) influences on foreign policy behaviour. This broad 
1 Note that in this way FPA, with its actor-centric analysis, contrasts sharply with IR theory's typical 
'black box' approach to analysis. This imagines individual states as billiard balls whose behaviour is 
controlled by external variables, and which sets as its objective isolating the systemic factor that explains 
a particular action or set of actions. 
2 The authors explicitly cite the Sprout's 'milieu', Roneau's 'pre-theories', Singer's 'levels of 
analysis', and Starr's own 'opportunity and willingness' perspectives. 
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FPA framework is further enriched in the present analysis by incorporating 
cognate aspects of wider IR theory, for example the literature on the causal 
relationship between national attributes (size, power) and foreign policy 
preferences. This integrated frame of reference yields a number of potentially 
relevant explanations of why the United States and Australia have diverged in 
their national responses to proliferation (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Possible Explanations for Divergence 
Structural 
• National Attributes 
super/major-power versus small/middle-power methods/ 
leverage, interests 
• Geopolitics 
different perception of proliferation threats due to 
variance in geography, alliance commitments, 
deployment/vulnerability of forces, etc. 
Agent-specific 
• Competing Sub-national Interests 
different levels of competing interests (e.g. economic) 
• Worldview 
different perceptions of international system/relations 
• Governmental/Bureaucratic Structures 
Different governmental systems, bureaucratic structures/ 
processes 
• National Identity/Political-strategic Culture 
• Domestic Politics 
• Idiosyncratic Leadership 
The aim of this explicitly multicausal model obviously is not to isolate a 
single one of these variables as the sole explanation for the finding in question. 
Rather, it is to assess their proportionate importance, with the expectation that 
the answer lies in a combination of factors, some more important than others. 
Note that such a result - simultaneously embracing structural and agent-
specific causality - inherently cuts across what many have seen as opposing 
theoretical perspectives. As one scholar observes: 
International relations theorising has long been divided 
between those who see position in the international 
system as the dominant factor in state behaviour, and 
those who believe that domestic sources are more 
important determinants of foreign policies (Ravenhill 1998: 
324). 
For example, whereas structural explanations correspond to Waltz's (1959) 
neo-realist 'third image' of state behaviour, or Allison's (1971) 'rational actor' 
model of foreign policy decision making, agent-specific explanations tend to 
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undercut these paradigms. 3 Needless to say, this would pose a serious problem 
if theory-testing were the main analytical objective of the present study. Again 
though, consistent with the basic tenets of FPA, the aim here is not to use the 
empirical findings to 'test' (i.e. propound or refute) a given theory, but rather to 
enlist existing theoretical tools to illuminate the empirical findings, and in so 
doing also lay a basis for future theory building. 
Possible Explanations 
National Attributes 
At first glance, the most intuitively evident explanation for this or any other 
foreign policy differences between the United States and Australia would seem 
to be the dramatic difference in their national attributes. They certainly are very 
different in terms of size and power within the international system. But it is 
uncertain just how important this factor is in explaining divergent anti-
proliferation preferences. The theoretical predictions that can be derived from 
national attributes do not appear to go very far in explaining this difference. 
The notion of American exceptionalism seemingly offers a logical 
explanation for any divergence. This concept holds that for a variety of reasons, 
some having to do with national attributes, for example its current status as the 
world's lone superpower, the United States is different from other states. 4 
Accordingly, US behaviour on any issue can be expected to diverge from that 
of other states. However, this idea has not been well developed as theory, and 
certainly has never been convincingly demonstrated through rigorous empirical 
testing. 5 Moreover, it is usually propounded in the context of comparative 
politics rather than international relations. Therefore assumptions about foreign 
policy exceptionalism are merely extrapolated from differences in its culture, 
political system, etc. Kegley and Wittkopf summarise this reasoning with the 
formula: 'American foreign policy may be uniquely different from the policies of 
other states because the United States itself is different' (1991: 249). Needless 
to say, while perhaps true, such an underdeveloped, untested hypothesis 
carries little presumption of credibility. 
It is impossible to assess the explanatory relevance of this concept for the 
present two-actor comparison without additional empirical research. In order 
reasonably to consider this as a convincing explanation, it would be necessary 
at a minimum to demonstrate that Washington has been unique in its 
preferences. Anecdotal evidence from the case studies is indeterminate, 
offering numerous cases in which other Western states were arrayed together 
against US preferences, but also cases where Australian preferences were at 
variance with the positions of other Western states. Moreover, the latter cases 
have involved instances in which other states were leaning further towards the 
3 These are merely the most obvious examples. The same could also be said for the dominant 
contemporary paradigms of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which although competing in their 
perspectives on the nature of the international system, both subscribe to the realist orthodoxy that it 
represents the primary determinant of foreign policy behaviour (Jim George 1997). 
4 Most of the reasons suggesting American exceptionalism in fact are not based on its size/power, 
but instead focus on agent-specific factors such as system of government, national identity, etc. 
5 If it ever were, then much of IR theorising, as well as comparative FPA, would to a great extent 
be marginalised by the field of American studies. The implications moreover would likely extend further, 
since it would then be logical to assume that other actors might also be exceptional. China offers a case 
in point, as the only emerging superpower, which also has a unique, hybrid Communist-capitalist system. 
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capability-denial or consequence-mitigation approaches than Canberra (e.g. 
British opposition to destroying smallpox samples), or further away (e.g. 
widespread initial resistance to establishing the AG). This suggests that there 
may be a spectrum of Western preferences among the approaches. To the 
extent that this is true, American exceptionalism can not explain this wider 
variation. But this represents mere speculation based on insufficient evidence. 
Further complementary research is needed in order to determine whether such 
variation exists, and if so where US and Australia preferences fall along such a 
spectrum. 6 
On the Australian side of the equation, the modest literature on small 
state/middle power behaviour offers an alternative explanatory tool that is also 
based on national attributes. This theory suggests that, regardless of whether 
US behaviour is exceptional, the behaviour of a middle power such as Australia 
will diverge from that of a major power in predictable ways. However, this body 
of theory represents an extremely limited theoretical tool generally, and even 
more so in explaining the present case. 
Generally, the national attributes literature is divided on whether 
'smallness' affects merely the available quantity of the same means (e.g. 
diplomatic leverage, military power) with which to pursue the same types of 
national interests (e.g. prosperity, security), which is the traditional perspective, 
or whether additionally it influences the very nature of such interests (Thakur 
1991; Papadakis & Starr 1987). Both perspectives accept that 'smallness' 
causes different behaviour. But traditional theorists such as Fox (1977), Handel 
(1981 ), Holbraad (1984 ), Rothstein (1968), and Vital (1967) tend to see this 
difference in terms of tactical accommodations necessitated by comparatively 
limited resources. This perspective therefore concentrates on the style rather 
than the content of middle-power statecraft. A more recent, ambitious school 
accepts these differences, but seeks to go further, suggesting that small/middle 
powers have manifestly different goals, for example the desire actively to 
behave as 'good international citizens' (Cooper 1997; Cooper, Higgott & Nossal 
1993; Hocking 1997; Nossa! 1993; Papadakis & Starr 1987; Wood 1988). 
The established body of middle-power theory, to which both schools 
subscribe, is able to provide only a few predictions. The most empirically 
validated of these is that such states prefer to work (either as leaders or joiners) 
through multilateral institutions or ad-hoc coalitions of like-minded states, rather 
than pursuing interests on their own. This is seen as particularly true for global 
issues (Cooper, Higgott & Nossal 1993; Fox 1977; Jensen 1987; Keating 1993; 
Nossal 1993; Papadakis & Starr 1987; Thakur 1991; Wood 1988). Following 
from this, they are also thought likely to be inclined to support multilateral 
institution- and norm-building generally, in order to maximalise such 
opportunities (Cooper, Higgott & Nossa! 1993; Nossal 1993; Thakur 1991 ). In 
doing so, they are thought to favour an activist approach, stressing 
entrepreneurial flair and technical competence, in order to compensate for their 
relative lack of other sources of leverage (Cooper, Higgott & Nossal 1993; 
Nossal 1993). At the same time, facing relatively constrained resources, they 
6 It should be noted that data from one of the few existing comparative studies on national 
proliferation response (Center for Counterproliferation Research n.d.) suggests that several NATO states 
may lean towards the Australian approach and away from the US approach as defined and observed in 
the present study. However, the differences in focus, scope, and methodology between this and the 
present study make any attempt to compare findings problematic. 
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are also considered likely to concentrate on 'niches' rather than trying to take 
on everything at once, again especially regarding global issues. These niches 
are chosen based on both national interests and the likelihood of being able to 
play an effective role in a particular process (Cooper 1997; Hocking 1997; 
Leaver 1997a; Porter 1996/97). For a variety of reasons they are also thought 
more likely to embrace compromise positions, and to facilitate others doing 
likewise (Cooper, Higgott & Nossa! 1993; Fox 1977; Lyons 1995). Fox (1977). 7 
of these predictions in essence relate to tactics which middle powers can 
maximise their leverage. 
These tactical predictions help to explain some of the secondary 
comparative findings revealed by the case studies. Indeed, the style of 
Australian diplomacy has rather consistently displayed characteristic middle-
power methods. For example, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) note that 
Australia's role in the CWC negotiations typifies classic middle-power tactics. 
The enterprise involved multilateral institution- and norm-building. It featured 
opportunistic activism, using entrepreneurialism and technical expertise, as well 
as mediating compromises. Niche tactics also explain differences in the relative 
priority accorded to the different areas, with the Australian agenda being far 
more process-driven. 
However, middle-power tactics do not plausibly explain the consistent 
divergence in US and Australian preferences between anti-proliferation 
approaches. This is especially the case for differences regarding the two 
approaches to prevention: capability-denial versus non-possession norm-
building.8 Middle-power tactics could apply equally to either capability-denial or 
non-possession norm-building. For example, the creation of the AG equally 
represents a classic example of Australia using middle-power tactics on behalf 
of capability-denial. Indeed, participation in supplier regimes, in which all 
members participate as sovereign equals, is perfectly consistent with middle-
power methods. The fact is that denial strategies of various types offer ample 
scope for multilateral institution- and norm-building and coalition action, which 
overall Australia opted to pursue less vigorously than it could have. Even in 
terms of unilateral and bilateral national enforcement actions (e.g. interdiction, 
sanctions), Australia has explicitly and consistently refused to act in unison with 
a coalition of supply-side partners. At the same time, Canberra frequently has 
7 These include being in a position to act as bridges between major-power allies and smaller 
states, greater insight into the domestic constraints faced by major-powers, the practicalities of 
assembling or joining broad coalitions of the willing, etc. At the same time, Fox (1977) notes that this 
willingness to compromise occurs in the context of a willingness initially to propose risky initiatives, 
knowin~ that the major powers would insist on changing anything harmful. 
It is unclear whether middle-power considerations are relevant regarding consequence-mitigation. 
Jensen (1987) asserts that middle powers tend to confine themselves to diplomatic rather than economic 
and military instruments in pursuing their foreign policy interests. This would appear to suggest a plausible 
explanation for Australia's disinclination to embrace consequence-mitigation strategies. However, 
Jensen's claim is not widely embraced within the middle-power literature. Moreover, Thakur (1991) notes 
that middle powers face fewer constraints in diplomacy than in the military or economic arenas. This 
suggests that any preference for diplomatic instruments may simply reflect available leverage. If so, then 
this would not explain negative attitudes towards benefiting from US deterrence, or cooperating with other 
Western states on counterproliferation. Other middle powers such as Canada have been willing to 
cooperate on counterproliferation via NATO. Also, Australia is far from a pacifist power, having been 
willing to use or support others' use of military force in support of other interests. Moreover, any 
disinclination to use military force would appear less relevant for consequence-mitigation strategies than 
for other uses, since neither deterrence nor counterproliferation involve the use of force, but merely the 
capability to do so in response to a WMD attack. Finally, Australia's actual objections to consequence-
mitigation centre on its incompatibility with non-possession norms, which is a different issue. 
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been willing to employ aggressive bilateral means in furtherance of non-
possession norm-building interests, especially within its own region.9 Australia 
likewise has frequently instituted unilateral, punitive sanctions on behalf of other 
issues like human rights (Nossa! 1994 ). In other words, Australia has not 
availed itself of available opportunities to use middle-power methods in 
furtherance of capability-denial, while at the same time it has been willing to 
depart from these methods in furtherance of treaty-norms. 
Given this failure of middle-power tactics satisfactorily to explain the 
divergence, we would have to turn to the more ambitious school of middle-
power theory, which asserts that national attributes can explain not only the 
manner in which middle powers pursue their interests, but also the type of 
interest that they are likely to have. Unfortunately, it is precisely in this 
ambitious attempt to predict interests (vice tactics) that the fundamental 
soundness of the theory becomes highly dubious. 
Thakur argues convincingly that similarity in attributes cannot provide 
even weak universalisable predictions about foreign policy preferences. 
'Instead, it is specific to the actor, context, issue, region, and time' (1991: 279). 
He continues: 
This is not to say that size can serve no explanatory 
purpose at all .... But the importance of size as an isolated 
factor should not be exaggerated: small countries are a 
heterogeneous group which do not have uniform 
behavioral characteristics and cannot be expected to 
respond the same way to similar stimuli (282). 
So while Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Indonesia, South Africa, and South 
Korea may all by some measures be roughly comparable in terms of their 
attributes, and indeed may evince certain tactical similarities compared to major 
powers in pursuing their separate interests (i.e. the traditional 'smallness' 
prediction), it is difficult to discern that such similitude has extended to those 
interests per se. 10 Ravenhill notes: 'Intra-category variation ... [is] likely to vitiate 
the utility of the category for making predictions about the states' likely foreign 
policy behaviours' (1998: 310). Thakur concludes specifically regarding 
Australia: 
While the size of a state can be used to describe an actor 
in international relations as small, the concept of the small 
state lacks explanatory content and theoretical utility: 
analysis of Australian ... foreign policies as small state 
behaviour will confuse more than clarify (241 ). 
This general explanatory weakness is especially pronounced when it comes to 
security issues such as proliferation response. The proponents of ambitious 
middle-power theory such as Cooper, Higgott and Nossa! (1991) readily 
9 This highlights a problematic nuance of middle-power theory. As Thakur (1991) points out, 
whereas Australia is a medium power globally, it is a major power regionally. The implication is that even 
regarding global issues such as proliferation, Australia may employ non-middle power tactics in its 
regional dealings. 
10 This illustrative list is not intended as a definitive grouping of comparable middle powers. In fact, 
the question of how to define and quantify the attributes that should be used to group countries (e.g. 
geographic size, population, economic capabilities, military strength) remains an active subject of debate 
in the middle-power literature (Holbraad 1984; Thakur 1991 ). Ergo, the actors listed above are merely 
characteristic examples of a rudimentary definition of middle powers as actors that have less influence 
than major powers and more influence than weak/small powers. 
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acknowledge that commonality in middle-power behaviour is most evident 
regarding elements of the economic and social agendas of international 
relations, rather than elements of the security agenda. 11 
Proponents of expansive middle-power theory have sought to get around 
the problem of intra-category divergences by narrowing their focus to what 
Cooper (1997) terms 'self-identified middle powers', citing as examples 
Australia, Canada, Sweden, and Norway. This seems a promising avenue, 
since it yields predictions that correspond with Australia's anti-proliferation 
preferences. Specifically, these 'self-identified' middle-powers are said to have 
an unusually strong common interest in altruistic 'good international citizenship'. 
This interest is reflected in activism on global causes that reflect the interests 
the international community as a whole rather than parochial national or block 
interests, and which emphasise cooperation rather than coercion as the basis 
for world politics (Cooper 1997; Cooper, Higgott & Nossal 1993; Evans & Grant 
1991; Nossal 1993). 
The problem with narrowing the focus to this type of artificially delineated 
sub-set of middle powers is that, because the refinement is based on self-
selection, it removes national attributes from the predictive equation. 12 As 
Ravenhill (1998) observes, this boils down to defining middle-powers not by 
quantitative factors (e.g. size, military power), but by how they behave. It is 
therefore at best a descriptive rather than a predictive grouping, based on 
shared inclinations more than common attributes. 13 Therefore, while these 
states may well have common interests (e.g. promoting international 
cooperation), this could be explained by other underlying common factors. For 
example, the fact that these states are located in conspicuously safe and stable 
regions suggests that geopolitical commonality could be a factor. Alternatively, 
they are all members of what Findlay (1991 b) describes as the 'left wing' of the 
Western group of countries, suggesting that another explanation might be 
similarities in either worldview/ideology or national identity/political-strategic 
culture. 14 Ravenhill suggests as much when he notes that, following the election 
of a conservative government in the mid-1990s, Australia's enthusiasm for the 
predicted types of middle-power activism has fallen. 
11 Inexplicably, the authors in passing note that nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation 
represents an exception to this rule, without explaining why this should be, or why it should not apply to 
other areas of disarmament and nonproliferation. 
12 In fairness, much of this literature is overtly prescriptive rather than descriptive or predictive. This 
is quite understandable when one considers that the field is dominated by Australian and Canadian 
scholars. Nossa! (1994) offers a striking example of this, arguing not that middle powers do not 
(descriptive) or will not (predictive) use punitive unilateral sanctions, but rather that in doing so they are 
misguided because such instruments do not follow the logic of middle-power diplomacy. Dibb (1996) 
illustrates that such prescriptions, based on the guiding tenets of middle-power theory, can apply to 
defence as well as foreign policy. 
13 By way of illustration, imagine a bar in which, among the crowd, there are a number of people 
with red hair, who have various types of drinks among them. If one then were to dub a sub-group of those 
drinking beer as 'self-identified redheads', one could of course accurately describe this category of 
redheads as liking beer, and furthermore predict with some confidence that any one of them would be 
more likely order beer than wine or spirits. However, this would in no way demonstrate a causal link 
between hair colour and a preference for beer. Indeed, one assumes that whatever explains this group's 
preference for beer, they share it more with the blonds and brunettes drinking beer than with the other 
redheads drinking wine or spirits. 
14 Findlay includes the following countries in this category: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Findland, Norway, Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden. He also identifies Japan as a sometime 
fellow-traveller. 
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Geopolitics 
Another structural explanation for the divergence between US and 
Australian responses to proliferation is geopolitical disparity. This can be 
thought of as the flip-side of national attributes theory, in that whereas national 
attributes predictions are based on the relative distribution of power (e.g. 
economic and military capabilities) within the international system, geopolitical 
predictions are based on the relative distribution of threats (e.g. proximity, 
intentions) within the international system (Thakur 1991; Walt 1987).15 Although 
less intuitively apparent than balance of power theory, balance of threats theory 
in fact proves to be a far more persuasive explanatory factor in the present 
case. 
Theorists generally recognise that 'one of the most important influences 
on a state's foreign policy behavior is its location and physical terrain' (Kegley & 
Wittkopf 1991: 41 ). 16 But as two continental, geographically remote states, it 
would not necessarily appear that the Australia and the United States are 
sharply differentiated in this regard. After all, neither is threatened by WMD 
within their region, leaving WMD-armed ICBMs as the only plausible military 
threats to their homelands. 17 And whereas the proliferation of WMD and long-
range missiles could potentially expand this threat, China and Russia currently 
remain the only potentially hostile states with such capabilities. However, using 
a more dynamic conception of balance of threats, as the contemporary 
literature on critical geopolitics suggests - taking into account all manner of 
threats and relationships - significant differences separate these actors 
generally (Dalby 1996). More to the point, the empirical case studies manifestly 
reveal that such broadly conceived geopolitical divergence has been 
consistently apparent regarding proliferation threats. 
During the early to mid-1980s, geopolitical differences led the United 
States to focus on the Soviet threat in these areas more than the comparably 
minor threat of proliferation, and vice versa for Australia. However, even then, 
the proliferation threat was far greater in absolute terms for the United States 
than for Australia. For the entire period covered by the present study, 
particularly the 1990s, large numbers of US military forces stationed 
permanently in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and southern Europe and 
Turkey, have faced potential CB/M threats by hostile states. Some portion of 
globally deployed US naval forces are likewise usually in harm's way. The 
immediacy of these threats has steadily increased over the past decade, as 
proliferation has preceded apace in hostile states as Iran, Libya, North Korea 
and Syria - particularly in terms of effective delivery systems - and the US 
military presence in adjacent countries has increased. Additionally, the US has 
15 Walt formulates the notion of balance of threats specifically in regard to alliance formulation, 
rather than foreign policy behaviour generally. However, the fundamental premise is widely applicable, 
particularly for the present case in which the Western anti-proliferation coalition could be seen as an 
alliance of sorts. 
16 Which is not to embrace the tendency of geopolitical analysis to treat the state as a 'black box' 
(i.e. ignoring internal factors) operating on the basis of rational individualism. As noted already, FPA 
scholars have long rejected this notion (although of course they often disagree on which agent-specific 
factors are the most crucial). As one states: 'Quite obviously the strategic, geopolitical "black box" model 
is not 'true' because it is not really a description of reality '(Hilsman 1990: 4 7). The emerging constructivist 
school, which stresses the importance of how individual states perceive themselves and others, likewise 
stresses agency over structure (Kowert 1998/99). The post-modernists on the other hand are inclined to 
dismiss structural explanations altogether. 
17 Other than the threat of WMD terrorism. 
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close allies in proliferated regions, who are under the gun of proliferation, and 
that the United States is obligated to protect. 
Beyond these immediate threats to allies and its own forces, proliferation 
globally threatens to degrade US power projection capabilities by 
asymmetrically off-setting its conventional superiority. example, Iran's WMD 
doctrine explicitly focuses on neutralising US military power in the Persian Gulf. 
This danger is exacerbated by the increasing percentage of US mobility forces 
that are homeland-based, and which therefore rely for crisis deployment on 
enroute and in-theatre ports, airfields, and maritime chokepoints (e.g. Suez 
Canal, Strait of Hormuz) that as 'soft targets' are especially vulnerable to CB/M 
disruption (Commission off. 1998; Desutter 1997; Hinds tst. 1989; Larsen 1995; 
Rauf 1998; Starr 1997). As one analyst warns: 'America's vastly superior 
conventional forces ... can't fight, if they can't get there' (Larsen 1995, p. 3). This 
consideration greatly broadens the existing geopolitical threat that proliferation 
poses to the United States. 
In contrast, Australia has been described as 'arguably one of the least 
militarily threatened states on the planet' (Dalby 1996: 59). Even the lingering 
fears of prior generations, who saw their country as an isolated Western 
outpost in a potentially hostile Asia, had largely given way to benign 
perceptions of the region by the early 1980s (Dalby 1996; Walker int.; White 
int.). This propitious geopolitical circumstance has been especially notable 
regarding proliferation threats. Australia has no significant forces permanently 
stationed outside its territory. Not having done so since the Vietnam War, it also 
has little expectation of ever undertaking a large-scale deployment beyond its 
own strategic region. 18 As for this strategic region - which it defines as including 
the eastern Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the southwest Pacific - it has 
never experienced proliferation or even a real threat of proliferation (Defence 
off. 1987, 1994, 1997; DFAT off. 1997; Dibb off. 1986; Evans & Grant 1991; 
Reese int.; White int.). 
At a purely conceptual level, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
different approaches to anti-proliferation to a great extent depend on the nature 
of the threat envisioned (see Chapter 3). For example, proponents of the non-
possession norm-building approach do not claim that it is the most effective in 
countering active, determined proliferators in the short to medium term. Instead, 
they maintain that its strength is as a long-term prophylaxis, whose tangible 
impact on today's proliferation 'hard cases' may take considerable time. In other 
words, the approach focuses in the present on preventing the emergence of 
new proliferators, rather than coping with the ones that already exist. By the 
same token, advocates of the denial and proliferation management approaches 
do not claim that they offer permanent, stable, long-term solutions. Rather, they 
support these approaches as the best way to counter today's proliferators. 
Longer term solutions are seen in terms of buying time for demand to be 
18 Notwithstanding the Army's official doctrine calling for the capability to deploy an expeditionary 
force as far away as Northeast Asia. Even during the Gulf War, Australia's military involvement was 
limited to a token force, none of which fought on the ground. It has frequently contributed to UN 
peacekeeping activities. However, other than operations within the region (e.g. Cambodia, East Timor) it 
has not contributed significant forces. Moreover, peacekeeping operations by their nature are likely to be 
less risky in terms of potentially facing WMD. (Consistent with its involvement in peacekeeping, Australia 
has strongly supported the US position that the CWC should not preclude using RCAs under limited 
circumstances.) It remains to be seen whether its relatively large-scale peacekeeping involvement in East 
Timor will fundamentally alter Australia's perceptions of its strategic interests. 
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reduced through indirect means such as democratisation, regional stability or, 
indeed, even norm-building. 
In a sense, the different strengths of the two nonproliferation approaches 
can be compared to preventative and palliative (i.e. traditional) medicine. Most 
would agree that some combination of both is desirable. The emphasis, 
however, would depend overwhelmingly on whether one actually had the 
disease. A patient with cancer would be ill-advised rely primarily on a healthy 
diet rich in antioxidants. A healthy patient would be equally ill-advised to 
undergo surgery or chemotherapy. take this analogy a step further, a 
healthy patient at extremely high risk might consider pre-emptive surgery, 
only if the risk was dire, and even then every effort would presumably be made 
to minimise the procedures, and the primary emphasis would remain on 
preventative measures. 
Although this medical analogy is imperfect, it does capture the logic of 
why one state actively imperilled by proliferation, and another facing only a 
latent danger, would logically emphasise different responses. Thus, during 
interviews, many US officials complain that, while treaty-norms might be useful 
to contain the further spread of proliferation, they are ineffective when it comes 
to the clear and present danger posed by proliferant rogue states. At the same 
time many Australian officials complain that, while denial strategies may be a 
short-term necessity, relying on them as the primary response to proliferation is 
myopic, putting immediate concerns ahead of long-term solutions. 
Australian officials are fully cognisant that different geopolitical 
circumstances are a major reason for the contrasts between Australian and 
American anti-proliferation preferences. One very senior, long-serving Defence 
official states: 'I do think that a lot of the differences between our approaches 
can be quite easily traced back to differences in our strategic situation' (White 
int.). A former senior, long-serving DFAT official (int.) notes that Australia's anti-
proliferation approach 'reflects the situation that whereas proliferation anywhere 
is a threat to everybody, proliferation some distance from us doesn't present the 
same sort of national threat as it would if there was proliferation in Southeast 
Asia.' Indeed, more than a few past and present Australian officials of various 
rank speculate that, if a meaningful proliferation threat were ever to emerge in 
its region, Australia's response would probably move closer to a US-style 
approach ([DFAT] ints.; [DOD] int.; Darling int.; White int.). This is a compelling 
indication that threat perception represents a decisive explanatory variable. 
Competing Sub-national Interests 
Proliferation response often competes with other elements of national 
interest, for example promoting trade and maintaining cordial diplomatic 
relationships. It is therefore possible that if the United States and Australia have 
different levels of relevant competing interests, this could influence their 
respective anti-proliferation preferences. However, while such differences in 
competing interests clearly exist between these states, and probably have 
affected their anti-proliferation behaviour, the indications are mixed about 
whether this factor has contributed to the overall pattern of divergence in 
question. 
Australia and the United States see anti-proliferation as being in their 
national interest. Analytically, however, it is rather more complicated. The FPA 
literature generally recognises that, notwithstanding its ubiquitous use by 
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governments to explain their behaviour, the concept of national interest is 
problematic as a conceptual tool. One problem is that the term is used variously 
to denote very different concepts, for example: the aggregate of a country's 
collective concerns; or a fixed set of determinates outside the government 
decision-making process; or mutable government objectives. Although the 
former is what governments usually mean, it is also most amorphous, 
therefore least theoretically useful sense of the term. theorists therefore 
tend to focus on the latter meanings (Frankel 1 · Plischke 1988; Rosenau 
1980). In this context, they widely recognise that states do not have a single 
national interest, but rather a set of sub-national interests. The literature 
generally divides these into three broad categories: security/military; 
economic/trade, and political/diplomatic (Frankel 1970).19 Because they often 
cannot be obtained simultaneously, states often are forced to prioritise among 
them (Clinton 1994 ). 
Anti-proliferation, first and foremost, represents a security interest. 20 That 
said, the case studies provide frequent examples where it has explicitly 
competed with other security interests as well as economic and political 
interests. It is thus possible to have competing intra-category interests. In this 
respect, the United States has had rival security interests that would be 
undermined by treaty-norms, which Australia has not shared. The most 
conspicuous of these is that, unlike Australia, it has stood to lose existing 
weapons arsenals (see Appendix 2). In the CW area initially, and still in the 
missile area, the United States operated as a status quo 'have'. This was 
certainly a factor in US wariness of the CWC, and remains a significant factor in 
Washington's opposition to trying to negotiate a global missile norm. As for 
Australia, it is naturally easier to support disarmament when it is others who do 
the disarming. Canberra's reluctance to foreclose its missile options through a 
regional mechanism, and its wariness of the Ottawa Convention banning 
landmines as a new category of abhorrent weapon - the first time that its own 
weapons were at stake in any of its disarmament activities since the 
Washington Naval Talks in the 1930s - shows that this has been a tangible 
factor in its support for non-possession norm-building. 21 
However, although possession (or lack of it) clearly is a reinforcing factor 
on both sides, it does not appear to be a decisive variable in explaining the 
overall divergence in preferences over time and across the different 
proliferation areas. After all, the United States had unilaterally renounced BW 
long before any of the contemporary debates on strengthening the BWC, 
unilaterally decided to destroy the bulk of its CW stockpile and later to renounce 
in-kind retaliation in the midst of the ewe negotiations, and bilaterally gave up 
INF-range missiles before rejecting attempts to negotiate a global ban on such 
systems. Moreover, Australia has pushed for a global missile ban, 
notwithstanding its own missile aspirations. 
A second asymmetric, competing security interest is the need to protect 
19 As noted below in the discussion of bureaucratic factors, these sub-national interests also tend 
to correspond to the major bureaucratic division of responsibilities among agencies. 
20 As noted below, political or economic objectives may also be involved. However, unlike 
conventional arms transfer policies, where the primary goal is frequently economic or political, it is the dire 
security threat posed by WMD that distinguishes anti-proliferation from most other policy areas. 
21 Cheeseman ( 1997) observes that the same dynamic explains the relative lack of Australian 
enthusiasm for constraints on conventional arms transfers. 
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sensitive military and intelligence installations against intrusive challenge 
inspections. While both governments have such sites, Australia, unlike the 
United States, does not have super-secret weapons development projects, so-
called 'black programs', the very existence of which is highly classified. Also, 
with just a handful of sensitive sites, Australia can institute defensive 
precautions, such as training, on a scale that would be impossible for the 
thousands of sensitive American military sites around the world (Donadio int.). 
Again, its easier for Australia to insist on sweeping intrusiveness when it has 
relatively little to hide. 
However, like possession, this factor does not explain consistently 
divergent preferences over time and across the different areas. Having 
reluctantly accepted 'anytime, anywhere' challenge inspections in ewe, the 
issue of challenge inspections subsequently has not been an overriding 
concern for Washington in the BWC context, nor would it be for a missile treaty, 
because the vulnerability already exists from CWC. Moreover, given that 
combating proliferation has been considered a top US security interest since 
the late 1980s, and its very top national security priority in recent years, it would 
be illogical for Washington to sacrifice a proliferation response option for the 
sake of competing security interests if it believed that that option was the best 
means to achieve its anti-proliferation goals. Again, while these competing 
security interests in some cases reinforce each actors' divergent national 
inclinations, it seems unlikely that they represent a root cause. 
In addition to intra-security tensions, anti-proliferation competes with the 
other main elements of national interest. One analyst notes that proliferation 
response 'is an extremely complex affair ... because a delicate balance must be 
preserved between security concerns, matters of foreign policy, and 
commercial interests' (Van Ham 1993: 5). US Officials, for their part, readily 
acknowledge these tensions. According to senior officials from the last two 
administrations: 'There are frequently competing and legitimate interests at play 
- national security, foreign policy, and export promotion, to name three. The 
result is a balancing act' (Clarke tst. 1991: 99); and, 'We very much appreciate 
[that] the complex nature of the task of promoting nonproliferation ... deals with 
tough and interrelated issues of security, economics, jobs, and trade' (Davis tst. 
1993: 4 ). In other words, proliferation response can damage other sub-national 
interests, and vice versa. 
There are dramatic differences between the United States and Australia in 
their levels of competing economic interests. Industries relevant to missiles, CW 
and BW each comprise major export sectors of the US economy. 22 In contrast 
Australia has no significant aerospace industry. Its small chemical industry does 
not represent a significant export sector of the Australian economy. Even its 
robust bio-technology sector, while a significant exporter, does not begin to 
approach its US counterpart as a percentage of GDP. Put bluntly, the United 
States has far more at stake in terms of competing economic interests across 
all of these areas. 
22 For example, the chemical industry is the largest export sector of the US economy, employing 
well over a million Americans, with an annual $12. 7 billion positive balance of trade (US Cong. House. off. 
1993). The $100 billion US pharmaceutical industry is the largest and most technologically advanced in 
the world, with PhRMA members accounting for the development of ninety per cent of new medicines 
globally (Tucker 1998b; Wallett 1998). And of course the US aerospace industry remains a global leader 
in both civilian and military sales and technology. 
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Despite this disparity, there is nothing to suggest that this helps to explain 
the main comparative finding in question. If anything, indications point toward a 
contravening explanation in this regard. It is widely acknowledged that the 
economic costs supply-side strategies are far higher than for treaty-norms. 
One analyst notes that the costs export controls are especially onerous for 
the technology-driven US economy: 
Although the United States has an interest in controlling 
the proliferation weapons technologies through export 
controls, current export controls also have an adverse 
effect on the ability of US industries to export these 
technologies for peaceful rposes ... US corporations are 
limited in their ability to promote international sales of 
cutting-edge technologies and to tap into the global 
technology market because of ... export controls on 'dual 
use' technologies (Hiestand 1995: n.p.). 
Indeed, studies by the National Academy of Science estimate that in 1985 
(before sweeping nonproliferation restrictions had been enacted) controls on 
high technology exports were already costing the US economy $9 billion and 
nearly 200,000 jobs annually, and that by the mid-1990s these figures had 
more than doubled (Moodie 1995; Hiestand 1995). Nonproliferation sanctions 
further spike the economic costs of supply-side nonproliferation. For example, 
even a single missile sanction on China could cost the US economy at least 
several billion dollars in trade. 23 Conversely, treaty-norms tend to facilitate 
trade, either implicitly or explicitly. 
Higher levels of competing economic interests are a likely explanation for 
greater US inconsistency in implementing capability-denial strategies (e.g. 
uneven licensing or sanctions decisions). 24 This factor does not, however, 
explain the fundamental divergence in preference. Given the steep trade costs 
associated with supply-side strategies compared to treaty-norms, the United 
States' higher economic stakes would lead one to expect Washington to be 
less enthusiastic about supply-side measures than Canberra. 25 Since the actual 
empirical finding is the opposite, this suggests that the divergence has occurred 
not because of different levels of competing economic interests, but in spite of 
them. 
Of course verification provisions associated with treaty-norms pose the 
counterbalancing economic threat of industrial espionage. US bio-technology 
industries have maintained significant technical advantages over their 
counterparts in even advanced industrialised states. This advantage puts them 
23 This assumes Category I sanctions applied pursuant to the Helms Amendment (requiring 
indust~-wide sanctions for non-market economies). 
4 Indeed, the charge most often levelled against the Clinton administration is that its rhetorical 
commitment to nonproliferation has been weakened in practice by undue attention to competing economic 
considerations. As one impartial study observes: 'The Clinton administration's initial urgent prioritisation of 
non-proliferation, however, appeared to quickly fall foul of its pressing domestic economic agenda' 
(Bowen & Dunn 1996: 122). On a more partisan note, Senator Fred Thomson recently scolded, 'The 
current [export licensing] review process appears rigged in favor of commercial interests rather than our 
national security interests' (as quoted by Opal-Rome 1998, p.4; Washington Post 6/26/98: A09). As noted 
in Cha1Jter 4, the administration has repeatedly and categorically denied such assertions. 
25 Both Australian and US officials note in interviews that some other Western states ( France, 
Germany, Japan) have been more reluctant than either the United States or Australia to embrace supply-
side measures, precisely because they accord higher priority to their economic interests. This suggests 
that this factor may be significant in explaining differences in other cases. However, additional research 
will be required validate such an assumption. 
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at particular risk from industrial espionage in that they have relatively more to 
lose. This indisputably has contributed to US reservations about intrusive BWC 
measures. However, this was far less of a consideration for the CWC, where 
the chemical industry was less at risk, and in fact at some junctures during the 
negotiations supported stricter measures than the government. Such concerns 
would be a negligible factor potential missile ban. the Australian side 
of the equation, although it faces much higher economic risks in this regard for 
its well-developed bio-technology sector than it did the chemical area, it has 
pursued virtually identical verification policies for both the CWC the BWC. 
factor therefore has reinforced US wariness of BWC verification, it 
does not offer a persuasive explanation for divergent US and Australian 
preferences across the board. 
Assessing the causal relevance of competing foreign policy interests 
likewise yields an indeterminate prognosis. This factor is relatively unconvincing 
in the case of the United States. The fact that the United States has had strong 
bilateral ties to some countries of proliferation concern (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, 
South Korea) certainly explains any inconsistency in its application of universal 
nonproliferation standards in these cases. But it does not explain its larger 
proliferation response preferences. Again, capability-denial generally tends to 
be more costly than norm-building in terms of bilateral diplomacy, because it is 
inherently more coercive. For example, US efforts to compel and enforce 
Russian and Chinese compliance with export control norms has been a major 
irritant to two of Washington's most important bilateral relationships. Therefore 
as with its trade interests, Washington leans toward capability-denial despite, 
rather than because of, its relatively high level of competing diplomatic 
interests. 
On the Australian side, this factor appears to be more significant, although 
the assessment remains mixed. On the one hand, Canberra has a 
disproportionate interest in maintaining good relations with certain non-aligned 
governments that are hostile to discriminatory, coercive denial strategies. 
Whereas relations with Indonesia and Malaysia have been high on Canberra's 
foreign policy priorities, such states are far less important in Washington's 
international relations. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Australia feels 
more secure today than it did a few decades ago is that it has been able to 
forge stable, cooperative strategic relationships with its neighbours. 26 Therefore, 
pursuing discriminatory approaches is potentially damaging to Australia's core 
bilateral interests (Walker int.). In addition, beyond its bilateral relationships, 
Australia has much wider political interests in bolstering the UN collective 
security system, pursuant to its general philosophy of world politics. Treaty-
norms contribute to the UN system, of which they are a part, unlike the limited-
membership export control regimes (see next section). 
On the other hand, non-aligned states' vehement opposition to intrusive 
verification - which has often seen them arrayed with the United States against 
Australia - has not inhibited Canberra from fighting hard for tough verification of 
global treaty-norms, including through aggressive bilateral diplomacy with 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, the Howard government has to some extent 
reoriented its foreign policy away from supporting global cooperation for its own 
26 It remains to be seen whether tensions surrounding its current intervention in East Timar will 
change this situation, and if so with what affect. 
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sake, and towards bilateral diplomacy based on specific national interests. 
Overall, the different levels of competing interests offer an assortment of 
influences pushing and pulling for and against the divergent anti-proliferation 
preferences of these governments. It is therefore difficult to assess whether 
these influences collectively do more to explain or to confound the 
comparative finding. none of the factors that would explain the divergence 
appears to be apply consistently for actors across all areas. 
therefore not appear be decisive variables, at least on balance. 
Worldview 
There is an undeniable between the discernible differences in 
worldviews between US and Australian decision-making elites and the 
observed divergence in proliferation response preferences. It is unclear, 
however, whether worldview is an independent causal variable, or simply a 
manifestation of more fundamental factors. 
It is widely recognised within FPA literatures that agent-specific 
perceptions of the external environment (i.e. objective and subjective 
awareness) are as important in influencing foreign policy as the actual systemic 
reality of that environment. At the basic level of objective awareness, this 
suggests that divergent understandings of the proliferation problem could 
explain differences in national responses to it. However, the extensive 
intelligence sharing between Australia and the United States in these areas 
would appear to minimise differences in objective knowledge as an explanatory 
factor in the present comparison (although it might be highly significant in other 
cases where intelligence disparities exist). 
Beyond straightforward objective awareness, a number of subjective 
factors are thought to affect the outward-looking perceptions of foreign policy 
elites, such as belief systems, ideology, and psychological influences. IR 
theorists remain sharply divided about the importance of these perceptual 
lenses in shaping foreign policy behaviour. For example, traditional systemic 
and rationalist perspectives inherently disregard such considerations. But even 
within theoretical orientations that stress such considerations (constructivism, 
FPA), there are dozens of sub-literatures pointing in different analytical 
directions, and offering any number of typologies for categorising the internal 
filters that can affect decision makers' external perceptions (Ripley 1993; Smith 
1988; Maclean 1988). 
For the present case, however, most of these perceptual factors can 
safely be set aside, because they are not helpful in distinguishing American and 
Australian leadership elites. For instance, there are no competing civilisational 
(e.g. Islamic) or meta-ideological (e.g. Communist) belief systems, and the 
various psychological determinants on decision making are unlikely to be 
especially different for American and Australian elites. Given this relative 
similarity in leadership perspectives, the appropriate focus would appear to be 
ideology, as the term is used within the mainstream political parameters of 
Western democracies. However, the domestic-political concepts of 
'conservatism' versus 'liberalism' are ill-defined and frequently misleading when 
applied to foreign policy. Instead, it is more useful to think in terms of the 
mainstream Western perspectives on the nature of international relations, 
realism/neo-realism versus liberalism/neo-liberalism, recognising that these are 
loosely identified with conservatism and liberalism respectively. The focus then 
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is not on neo-realism and neo-liberalism as predictive scholarly theories by 
which to analyse and explain events, but rather as descriptive (and therefore 
implicitly prescriptive) worldviews internalised by foreign policy decision makers 
(knowingly or otherwise). 
Prior studies suggest that during the period in question there have been 
discernibly different national leanings between the foreign and national security 
policy elites in Washington and Canberra. The American foreign and national 
security policy establishment has been seeped in neo-realist perspectives, 
evolving from classical realism of the Kissinger ilk. This has been the case 
under both political parties, although the Democratic Carter and Clinton 
administrations have been seen to flirt with tinges of liberalism (Olson & Onuf 
1985; Haas 1995, 1997). However, because these impulses have been 
episodic and limited within these administrations, and also usually tempered by 
divided government (i.e. Republican control of at least one part of Congress), 
realist/neo-realist perspectives have always remained predominant. 
In contrast, Australian foreign policy circles during the Labor period 
embraced a self-consciously neo-liberal worldview, evolving from the English 
school of Grotian rationalism (Jim George 1997; Kerr 1999; Mathews & 
McCormick 1995).27 At the same time, Kerr (1999) finds that defence elites 
have interlaced a strong dose of realism into their worldview, even under Labor 
governments. This is not very relevant in the present case, however, since as 
we have seen: 'By and large the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
monopolises the initiation, formulation and conduct of Australian arms control 
policy' (Findlay 1991 b: 15). Although the conservative Howard government has 
adopted a more realist tone over the past few years, it is unclear whether this 
has shifted the fundamental neo-liberal tilt of Australian foreign policy. 
The neo-realist and neo-liberal paradigms paint very different pictures of 
the nature of the international system and relations within that system. At the 
most general level: 'Neo-realists concentrate on capabilities rather than 
intentions, whereas neo-liberals look more at intentions and perceptions' (Smith 
1995: 23). Reflecting the inheritance of the classical realism of Carr, 
Morgenthau, and Kissinger, neo-realism is especially concerned with states' 
innate pursuit of power in the form of military capabilities (Halliday 1990). As 
regards international norms and institutions, Wendt observes that neo-realists 
see these as reflecting state interests, whereas neo-liberals additionally see 
them as affecting states' conceptions of their interests over time. Therefore he 
notes that in the neo-realist worldview: 
Any international institutions which are created will be 
inherently unstable, since without the power to transform 
identities and interests they will be 'continuing objects of 
choice' by exogenously constituted actors constrained 
only by the transaction costs of behavior change (1994: 
403-404). 
In other words, the two perspectives fundamentally disagree on the ability of 
27 Halliday (1990) characterises the English School as lying between the extremes of traditional 
realism and liberalism. The Grotian perspective sees the international system characterised by neither the 
realists' anarchy nor the liberals' rule of law, but instead as a 'society' of states that interact according to a 
web of conventions including international law, balance of power, and force. Kerr (1999) finds that the 
English School, although often described as a variation on realism, lies closer to neo-liberalism than neo-
realism. 
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norms and institutions to alter or constrain state behaviour, especially in the 
long term. 
Even at this level of gross generalisation, the two perspectives point to 
obvious prescriptive preferences vis-a-vis the three broad approaches to anti-
proliferation. the suggests, capability-denial is all about inherent 
capabilities, with intentions considered secondarily or at all. For example, a 
state might have perfectly peaceful intentions its SL V program, the 
MTCR would see it as a I system by name. one analyst 
states, the US emphasis on denial strategies reflects a 'realist worldview that 
linked national secu to military strength and military strength dominance in 
science and technology' (Wright 1993: 141 ). Consequence-mitigation likewise 
focuses overwhelmingly on capabilities rather than intentions. 28 In contrast, 
intentions are embedded in the cooperative norm-building formula, where 
states are explicitly or implicitly granted access to capabilities in return for 
promising not to misuse them (and demonstrating this benign intention through 
verification). 
A neo-liberal looking at the norm-building project can comfortably overlook 
short-term weaknesses in deference to the expectation of a slow, ongoing 
synthesis of interests that over time promises to solve the problem 
permanently. For a neo-realist on the other hand, what time lends to a norm is 
the ever-greater possibility of breakout as real capabilities accumulate behind a 
lulling veil of good intentions. Thus, a neo-liberal would see capability-denial as 
at best a necessary but temporary evil to hold the line while the effects of norm-
building are taking root. As a primary long-term approach, however, a neo-
liberal would see it as inherently short-sighted, locking in an indefinite, 
ineffective, costly and ultimately unnecessary struggle between suppliers and 
recipients. As for consequence-mitigation, neo-liberalism would regard this as 
an additional long-term cost necessitated by the gormless insistence of relying 
on denial strategies, which would not be needed if normative strategies were 
used to good effect. 29 The neo-realist would not necessarily dispute the 
imperfection of denial strategies, but without norm-building as a viable 
alternative, would see this as requiring steps to manage inevitable proliferation. 
(In the present case, the dramatic differences in long-term optimism about 
preventative nonproliferation shown in Figure 8 are fully consistent with these 
two sets of expectations.) 
Ideological orientation influences more than just opinions about the 
efficacy of one or the other anti-proliferation approach. To the extent that anti-
proliferation represents a high priority on the international agenda, the 
approach chosen will bolster different visions of world politics. Norm-building fits 
in neatly with an international system based on collective security, whereas 
capability-denial and proliferation management represent what amounts to a 
concert of powers, or occasionally even unilateralist, approach to international 
relations. Ergo, in explaining the ideological basis of criticism that is often 
28 Arguably less so, however, since in principle denial strategies are applied equally to friend and 
foe, whilst proliferation management is based on the assessment that there is a threat from hostile 
proliferators. Thus, the US cooperates on TMD with missile proliferators like Israel and South Korea. 
29 Muttimer (1998) draws an analogy between nonproliferation approaches and anti-drug 
approaches, with capability-denial representing law enforcement and norm-building representing 
education and treatment programs. What is interesting is that this analogy can be extended to ideology, 
since in domestic terms the former is closely associated with conservative perspectives, and the latter 
with liberal. 
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levelled against supply-side strategies, Karp observes: 
The challenge ultimately is a question of world order: Will 
future international security affairs be dominated by the 
pursuit of distinct national interests organised through us-
against-them alliances, or will they give a greater role 
collective secu organisations based on u 
principles? Most supplier governments are 
such issues (1996: 27). 
Roberts (1993) argues along same lines that supporting the ewe is 
only to address CW reats, but also as a means to bolster 
larger UN system of collective security. Thus, the prescriptive implications of 
these competing worldviews apply only to se, but to 
wider political agenda of world order. It is presumably in just this sense that one 
analysis of Australian disarmament policies concludes: 'In the context of 
Australian foreign policy as a whole, disarmament and arms control policy has 
thus far been overwhelmingly shaped by political objectives rather than security 
or economic objectives' (Findlay 1991 b: 16). Indeed, a number of observers 
suggest that Australia's disarmament policies during the Labor period were 
driven to a significant extent by its commitment to a wider ideological agenda 
for world politics (Butler int.; Evans 1997; Leaver 1997b; Mathews & 
McCormack 1995). 
Since each of the two subject actors has evinced a marked leaning 
towards different competing worldviews, and these in turn correspondingly 
augur for the different anti-proliferation approach favoured by each - both 
narrowly in terms of how best to curb proliferation, and more broadly in terms of 
contributing to broader formulas of world order - it would seem that there is a 
strong link between worldview and anti-proliferation behaviour. The question 
that remains is whether this is a causal connection. Although US and Australian 
elites are seen to subscribe to different worldviews, extant theory is unclear 
about why this should be so. Consequently, it is difficult to know whether their 
divergent worldviews represent an independent causal variable, or merely are 
secondary manifestations of other primary factors. 
If foreign policy worldview is in fact derived from political ideology, with 
realism on the right and liberalism on the left, as is typically assumed, then it 
could represent an key explanation in the present case. If so, this would mean 
that US decision-making elites have been more conservative (i.e. neo-realist) 
than their Australian counterparts, to the extent that, not only were the centre-
right Reagan and Bush administrations to the right of the centre-left Hawke and 
Keating governments, but less intuitively that the centrist 'new Democrat' 
Clinton administration remained to the right of the centre-right Howard 
government (albeit likely with a narrower gap). There is certainly nothing in our 
empirical findings that is inconsistent with this interpretation. 
The idea of a relatively static comparative balance between US and 
Australian ideological perspectives is not as improbable as the changes in the 
ideological orientation of their regimes over the past two decades might 
suggest. 
On the Australian side, Miller (1988) argues that the foreign policy 
differences between the two major Australian parties are more rhetorical than 
real. Additionally, the conspicuous influence of the Australian career 
bureaucracy is a force for continuity in changing political winds. This latter 
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factor is especially pertinent in the present case, because anti-proliferation 
policies have generally been formulated and implemented well below the 
overtly political ministerial level. Another source for Australia's enduring neo-
liberal penchant relates back to its status as a 'self identified' middle power. 
Whatever flaws the concept of middle powerdom may have 
national attributes policy elites in 
a prescriptive foreign pol recipe. One observer notes: 
the leadership of [Labor prime ministers] 
Paul Keating has projected the notion of middle powerdom as 
ndation its foreign (Hocking 1997: 1 
prescriptive emphasis on cooperation over coercion, and international law over 
ad hoc structures, correspond neatly with the neo-liberal outlook. Given that this 
foreign policy doctrine has been closely associated with Labor governments, it 
is not necessarily distinct from ideology, but can be seen as a reinforcing factor 
which, to some extent, may also have seeped into the Coalition's worldview. 
On the US side, despite speculation about the erosion of the bipartisan 
national security consensus that prevailed during the Cold War, and increasing 
Congressional partisanship on these specific issues, there is still a significant 
centre that shares fundamentally the same worldview. On proliferation 
response in particular, while Congressional support for treaty-norms has tended 
to divide somewhat along party lines, although not strictly - recall that it was in 
a Democratic Senate that concerns about the CWC initially delayed ratification 
- there has also been strong bipartisan support for tough supply-side (e.g. 
sanctions) and counterproliferation policies. There is likewise no evidence of 
deep schisms within the broader national security establishment from which 
many political appointees are drawn. Moreover, to the extent that ideological 
differences have existed, divided government would have hindered either 
branch of government from successfully acting on any radical shifts in 
worldview.30 
Although the link between domestic ideology and divergent worldviews is 
plausible, another viable explanation is that the difference in US and Australian 
worldviews is merely a secondary symptom of geopolitics. For example, is 
Japan pacifist for ideological reasons, or because it can afford to be by virtue of 
having the United States provide its security? If geopolitics rather than ideology 
is the root cause of the divergence in US and Australian worldviews, then these 
different worldviews are nothing more than secondary effects of this root cause. 
The credibility of this alternative explanation highlights the common inability of 
extant FPA theory to distinguish between intertwined primary causal factors and 
their subsidiary manifestations. Thus, while it can be inferred that there is a 
strong link between worldview and anti-proliferation preferences, the causal 
significance of this is open to interpretation. 
Governmental/Bureaucratic Structures 
Differences in governmental systems and bureaucratic decision-making 
structures doubtless contribute to the marked differences in the style and 
consistency of US and Australian proliferation response policies. But it is 
difficult to discern a causal variable between these factors and these actors' 
overall preferences for different anti-proliferation approaches. 
30 Other than for the first two years of the Clinton administration, neither party has controlled the 
White House and both sides of Capitol Hill during the relevant period. 
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The causal relevance of governmental and bureaucratic structures and 
processes on foreign policy behaviour represents a mainstay of FPA 
theorising. 31 Even among Western democracies, differences between 
presidential and parliamentary-cabinet systems can yield significant foreign 
policy differences. The constitutional division of powers within the US system 
gives Congress far more power over foreign and national security policy than 
most parliaments, especially regarding treaty-making. 32 The President moreover 
does not exercise explicit control over members of his political party in 
Congress. Thus, even when the same party controls the White House and both 
sides of Capitol Hill - a rare and usually brief occurrence in recent decades -
Congress is prone to act independently. At the same time, most prime ministers 
have far less control over the ministers in their own cabinet than is the case for 
the US President. The American cabinet, serving at the pleasure of the 
President, does not fulfil the collective decision-making function by which the 
term is understood in a parliamentary system. But cabinet secretaries in the 
United States are able to exert extensive control over their departments through 
a network of political appointees throughout the hierarchy, whereas ministers 
themselves are the only personnel that automatically change with the 
government in the Australian system (Blechman 1990; Halperin 197 4; Nathan & 
Oliver 1983; Rosenau 1976; Verney 1992; Wilson 1989). 
These differences in system of government suggest that the style of US 
foreign policy decision making is likely at any given moment to be more 
cumbersome, fragmented, and unpredictable than that of Australia. As for 
continuity over time, the result is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the 
dominance of senior bureaucrats in Australian policy making minimises political 
interference within departments. At the same time, the need for any US 
administration to find mutual accommodation with Congress mitigates against 
radical policy shifts, whereas a new Australian government faces no 
comparable political constraints. 
The case studies reveal that such differences in foreign policy style and 
consistency are readily apparent in US and Australian anti-proliferation policies. 
It is unclear, however, how much, if at all, these factors explain the divergence 
in their overall approaches.33 Of course one cannot validate a hypothetical 
negative. But there is nothing to suggest that fundamental US preferences 
would have been different if Congress had not played a significant role. For 
example, although the Senate can exercise a negative pressure on norm-
building through its scrutiny in the treaty ratification process, Congress under 
both parties has also been the driving force in ensuring that administrations of 
31 The emphasis in the present analysis is on governmental and bureaucratic structures more than 
discrete decision-making processes. There is a plethora of models on decision-making processes, 
including social choice theory, the Analytic Model, multiple paths to choice, the group-think model, the 
bureaucratic politics model, incrementalism, the garbage can model, communication models, decision unit 
modes, and the input-process-output approaches (Gallhofer & Saris 1997). However, these models are of 
dubious value in explaining specific behaviour. More to the point, there are insufficient data regarding 
differences, if any, in decision-making processes in the US and Australia. 
32 Verney (1992) notes that 'parliament' in this sense is almost always used to denote the 
'assembly' component in a parliamentary system as distinct from the 'government' component, both of 
which are technically part of the parliament. 
33 Of course to the extent that ideology is important, as discussed above, control of the US Senate 
could be seen as a key variable in US attitudes towards treaty-norms. However, since treaty ratification 
requires a two-thirds super-majority, and the minority retains significant influence under Senate rules, a 
significant degree of bipartisan support is almost always required no matter which party holds the majority. 
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both parties have enforced capability-denial rigorously. On the other side of the 
equation, if the Australian Parliament had had a larger role, there is no 
indication that it would have interjected any meaningful scepticism about non-
possession norm-building. If anything, circumstantial evidence suggests that 
greater Parliamentary involvement might have fu dampened support for 
supply-side instruments. Likewise, there is no indication that a stronger Prime 
Minister, or a Foreign M more politically appointed deputies, would 
have different 
Since seminal works Allison (1971) 
challenged the conception states as u rational 
influences the bureaucratic have been seen as equally or more 
important than overall governmental systems. Although views on the particulars 
are diverse, it is widely held that: 
Decision structures and their procedures exert a powerful 
influence on the substance and form of foreign policy 
behavior. If different decision structures or processes are 
employed, then frequently the nature of the resulting 
foreign policy can be expected to change (Charles 
Hermann 1978a: 70). 
Here, too, differences between Washington and Canberra are readily apparent 
at the basic structural level. Whereas the National Security Act of 1947 
institutionalised bureaucratic fractionalisation within the US executive branch, 
Australia has no such institutionalised interagency process to coordinate 
disparate elements of foreign and national security policy on a day-to-day basis 
(Ball & Kerr 1996). Consequently, control over issues is far more concentrated 
within single government departments in Canberra, whereas in Washington a 
complex, multi-layered, regularised interagency process ensures that the role of 
any particular agency is limited to interagency 'lead' for a given issue. 
These bureaucratic differences reinforce the outcomes suggested by 
governmental differences; namely, that any aspect of US foreign policy should 
be more cumbersome, fragmented, and inconsistent when compared with 
Australia. But the only bureaucratic factor that might explain consistently 
divergent anti-proliferation preferences is the consistent involvement of a mix of 
agencies on each side with different collective preferences. For instance, the 
strong anti-norm, pro-denial influence of the Pentagon in the US interagency, 
compared to the passivity and neutrality of the Australian Defence Department, 
could account for 'national' differences. On the surface, this appears to be a 
promising line of analysis. 
Survey data reveal sharply different attitudes among US agencies. If US 
and Australian attitudes are compared by agency rather than collectively (i.e. 
nationally), State Department and DFAT officials are seen to share roughly 
comparable biases towards norm-building (see Figure 10).34 Given that DFAT 
controls relevant Australian decision-making, whereas State must reach 
accommodation with other agencies, this suggests that bureaucratic variations 
in bureaucratic involvement could be a decisive causal factor. Put crudely, take 
the Pentagon and other US agencies out of the picture, and by this measure 
34 Indeed, a key DFAT official indicates that behind the scenes, Australia often worked with State 
or ACDA to help them fight other US agencies, for example floating proposals internationally which had 
been rejected by the US interagency ([DFAT] int.). 
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Figure 10: Survey Question 2 - Preferred Ap.proach (By Agency) 
Hypothetically, if you had to choose, which of the following would you 
consider to be more important in promoting your country's anti-proliferation 
goals: 
Option 1) 
Option 2) 
Building and maintaining strong multilateral treaty-
norms against the possession of these weapons; or, 
Preventing specific transfers of these weapons and 
associated equipment and technology to programs or 
countries of concern? 
SELECTED US AGENCIES VS. DFAT 
Defense /CDA State DFAT 
I• Option 1 • Option 2 D Don't know I 
Here again, there is a question of primary cause versus secondary effect, 
with the overwhelming probability that bureaucratic differences represent the 
latter. In other words, variance in bureaucratic involvement does not explain the 
divergence, so much as the factors that explain this variance. Specifically, 
national interest theory, as well as most bureaucratic politics models, to a 
greater or lesser extent recognise that, in addition to various intermediary 
factors (e.g. organisational processes, personal interests) different agencies 
'rationally' represent different components of the national interest (i.e. security, 
diplomacy, and trade) (Frankel 1970; Halperin 1974; Hilsman 1990; Nathan & 
Oliver 1983; Rosenau 1976). One official US report observes that this is the 
explicit intent of involving multiple agencies in the interagency process for 
nonproliferation (Nolan off. 1996: 21 ). 
The level of a given agency's participation therefore in large part can be 
seen as a reflection of the sub-national interests at stake on a given issue. For 
in the middle. By the same token, Commerce has also been wary of intrusive verification. Commerce 
officials who were approached for interviews all declined, so their biases are not reflected in the survey 
data. 
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nonproliferation (Nolan off. 1996: 21 ). 
The level of a given agency's participation therefore in large part can be 
seen as a reflection of the sub-national interests at stake on a given issue. For 
example, the Commerce Department has been a major player in all aspects of 
, which involves both export controls and measures 
that impact commercial interests, but it has not participated in traditional arms 
control processes Similarly, the Energy Department has 
participated actively in interagency process on because 
challenge inspection measures can of its 
laboratories, has been totally uninvolved 
no such policies have been in the offing (Allessi ). 
This logic suggests that the Pentagon is involved in proliferation response, 
and by extension that it embraces its particular preferences, because the 
United States faces a clear and present geopolitical danger from proliferation. 
Likewise, the reason that the Australian Defence Department has been 
voluntarily passive and, by extension, content with DFA T's approach, is 
because it perceives no direct proliferation threats. This inference is supported 
by the finding that Australia's Defence establishment incorporates a healthy 
dose of realism in its worldview (Kerr 1999), and officials' assertions that 
Defence would unquestionably seek to assert its influence to reshape 
Australian anti-proliferation policies if an explicit proliferation threat were to 
emerge ([DFAT] int.; [Defence] int.; White int.). The same is demonstrably true 
if it had specific military equities that were threatened. For example, the 
aggressive Defence reaction to the anti-landmine negotiations, and its moves to 
block consideration of a regional missile arrangement, indicate that it is willing 
to intervene against non-possession norm-building when its interests are at 
stake. It therefore seems very likely that differences between US and Australian 
interagency involvement have not been a major causal variable in the 
divergence of US and Australian responses to proliferation, but rather a 
reflection of differences in the geopolitical balance of proliferation threats, 
reinforced by the lower level of competing sub-national interests on the 
Australian side. 
National Identity/Political-strategic Culture 
There are a number of other agent-specific factors that are thought to 
influence foreign policy behaviour, including: national identity, domestic politics, 
and idiosyncratic leadership. None of these factors appears to offer compelling 
explanations for the fundamental divergence in US and Australian responses to 
proliferation. 
National identity is often espoused as an material variable affecting a 
given actor's foreign policy and security interests and policies (Jepperson, 
Wendt & Katzenstein 1996; Kowert 1998/99; Sampson 1987). Whereas the 
concept of worldview entails outward looking perceptions, national identity and 
the related concept of political-strategic culture pertain to self-image. For 
example, one study notes: 'The "political culture" of the United States refers to 
the political values, cognitions, ideas, and ideals about American society and 
politics widely held by the American people' (Kegley & Wittkopf 1991 ). An 
obvious parallel is the operative assumption in psychology that an individual's 
self-image explicitly affects their behaviour in predictable ways. But as Chafetz, 
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Spirtas and Frankel note, identity theory continues to suffer from two profound 
flaws: 
First, it offers too many vague and imprecise definitions -
which means that it offers none - of the concept that 
stands at its very core; second, most of this scholarship 
does not go much beyond the mere assertion that identify 
is important and that, somehow, in one way or another, it 
plays a role in how states define and pursue their national 
interests (1998/99: vii). 
Therefore, while perhaps perfectly valid, the concept at its current stage of 
theoretical development is too vague to explain the specific finding at hand. 
Beyond the general explanatory weakness of identity theory, the relative 
cultural and political similarity between the actors in question would appear to 
minimise the applicability of this factor in the present case. For example 
Siracusa and Cheong ( 1997) and Spillman ( 1997) argue that Australia and the 
United States have shared strong similarities in their national identities 
throughout their histories relative to other sets of countries. These include: 
Anglo-American culture; settler nations; vast geographic territory; multi-
ethnic/immigrant societies; urbanised, democratic; capitalist; and, federated 
system of national organisation. 
Spillman finds that the one appreciable difference is that Australian 
national identity is more informed by how it is perceived by the rest of the world, 
whereas American national identity focuses on internal integration. While this 
raises the tantalising prospect that Australian society's greater desire for 
external approval - in effect a psychological need to be liked, whether within 
the society of states or international civil society - might impel its government to 
embrace cooperative rather than coercive international relationships, this hardly 
seems a tangible basis on which to suggest causal inference regarding specific 
patterns of proliferation response behaviour. 
Domestic Politics 
Extant theory on domestic political influences on foreign policy does not 
offer a particularly useful explanatory tool for the present comparative analysis. 
On the one hand, there is a wide consensus among FPA theorists that at the 
highest decision-making levels, domestic and international pressures are 
weighed simultaneously in any foreign policy decision (Putnam 1988). Flank 
(1994) specifically argues that this has been overlooked as an important 
influence on the anti-proliferation policies of Western states. At the same time, 
political variables are extremely complex, involving the governing regime, 
opposition parties, and various interests groups (Hagan 1987; Salmore & 
Salmore 1978). Most attempts to isolate domestic political factors for 
comparative purposes therefore tend to concentrate on the sole variable of 
accountability (democratic versus authoritarian systems of government), which 
obviously is not a distinguishing factor in the present case. Halperin (197 4) 
notes that analysis is further complicated by the frequent reluctance of 
governments to acknowledge the intrusion of domestic considerations on 
foreign and national security policy. 
Turning specifically to the present case, there are no obvious differences 
between the pressures faced by successive US administrations and Australian 
governments that would explain their consistent divergence in anti-proliferation 
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preferences. Some of the differences in domestic political pressures that have 
existed reflect other explanatory factors, such as ideology and competing sub-
national interests. example, political pressure from domestic US industry, in 
the form PhRMA's opposition to BWC routine inspections, is a reflection 
the high economic stakes involved. others factors, for instance so-called 
ethnic politics, represent truly independent variables. In this regard, 
is generally be unusually subject to ethnic pressures on 
policy, particularly groups concentrated in electoral states 
Presidential election system (Halperin 197 4; Kegley & Witkopf 1991 ). 
Australia as a multi-ethnic immigrant society is probably more similar in this 
respect than most countries, United States foreign policy has been more 
to ethnic 'pork barrelling'. However, while this mig contribute 
inconsistency in implementing global anti-proliferation policies - e.g. going 
easier on Israel, or tougher on Cuba - it is hard to imagine how ethnic interests 
would shape its overall anti-proliferation approach. 
In addition to special interests, domestic pressures can take the form of 
generalised public concern. On the Australian side of the equation, this was 
clearly a major factor in the Hawke government's activism on nuclear 
disarmament in the early 1980s. However, while this policy had a spill-down 
effect in the other areas, there was never any significant concern by the 
Australian public or, for that matter, Labor Party activists, about CB/M 
proliferation. Indeed, public awareness and concern regarding these areas has 
been a markedly stronger factor in the United States. Here again, while this is 
an obvious explanation for the higher priority given to responding to 
proliferation in Washington versus Canberra, it does not appear to bear on the 
nature of that response. This leads to the conclusion that various strands of 
domestic politics may have affected the relative consistency and priority of each 
actor's proliferation response, but domestic pressures have been relatively 
neutral regarding overall approaches. 
Idiosyncratic leadership 
One of the most controversial and under-theorised variables in foreign 
policy making is the impact of idiosyncratic personality. While decision makers 
play a key role in many FPA perspectives, the focus is usually on psychological 
factors in decision-making processes, or on their institutional roles, which are 
seen to set parameters that nullify, or at least minimise, the impact of 
personality. Thus, advocates of the importance of idiosyncratic leadership 
assume that certain leaders have qualities that are resistant to moulding and 
modification by process and role variables. However, even supporters of this 
view acknowledge that such factors do limit the impact of personality. 
Specifically, the influence of personality is seen to increase with the level of the 
individual within decision-making structures, and the intensity of their personal 
involvement, and to decrease with the size of the bureaucratic organisation. 
Even under optimal circumstances, the impact of any given decision-maker's 
personality is indirect and subject to numerous intervening factors (Kegley & 
Witkopf 1991; Margaret Hermann 1978) In practice, Hermann notes that this 
narrows the scope of this factor significantly: 'The personal characteristics of 
only a few high level policy makers affect foreign policy and, even then, only 
under certain conditions' (68). 
Because proliferation response issues have generally been formulated 
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and implemented below the ministerial level in both Washington and Canberra, 
leadership theory suggests that personality is unlikely to be a major causal 
factor. The fact that the patterns in question have spanned multiple leaders 
reinforces this presumption. In fact, the few glaring instances of idiosyncratic 
leadership in the case studies bear a negative causal relationship. most 
notable example this is President George Bush's personal commitment to the 
the source of was apparently his mother, whose father had been 
g 1nJU poison gas in the First World War. Other examples include 
on the US side the deep personal commitment of a single member the 
staff to support negotiations a BWC verification , despite 
unanimous objections the interagency, and on the Australian side, Assistant 
Secretary Ron Walker's personal dedication to nascent Australia p 
process. In each of these instances, the governments were impelled closer to 
their non-proclivity approach than otherwise would have been likely. 
Summary Analysis: What is 'The' Explanation 
It is impossible at this juncture to isolate 'the' explanation for the 
divergence of US and Australian proliferation response preferences, or even to 
formulate a definitive hierarchy of possible explanatory factors. This is partly 
due to the explanatory weakness of many elements of extant theory, and partly 
an inherent limitation of the small-n problem in any two-actor comparison. That 
said, the preceding findings and analysis do suggest a clear ranking of 
variables. This allows if not a single causal hypothesis, then at least a very 
likely notional hierarchy of explanations. 
The single most persuasive explanation is differences in the balance of 
threats faced by each of the subject actors vis-a-vis CB/M proliferation. 
Although other factors also are significant influences, threat discrepancy 
nonetheless stands out as the most compelling, straightforward, and 
independent variable. It seems reasonable to surmise with a high degree of 
confidence that geopolitics is a key factor in determining national proliferation 
response preferences. 
Beyond this primary explanation, the remaining causal factors considered 
in the above section also are undeniably important. These remaining factors 
are summarised below in roughly descending order of likely importance. 
There is unquestionably a significant link between differences in the 
subjective worldviews of the relevant policy elites - along roughly realist/neo-
realist versus liberal/Grotian/neo-liberal lines - and the inclination to support 
capability-denial/consequence-mitigation versus non-possession norm-building. 
At the same time, it is open to interpretation whether this represents a root 
cause, or a secondary manifestation of other factors such as geopolitics. 
Competing sub-national interests represent a complex set of influences on 
national proliferation response. However, no such factor can be seen to have 
contributed consistently to the preference of either actor over time and across 
proliferation areas. In some instances competing interests have reinforced 
overall national preferences, but in others they have been countervailing 
pressures against those preferences. Although these factors therefore must be 
taken into account as significant causal variables when examining any 
particular proliferation response behaviour, they do not individually or 
collectively explain the consistent overall divergence in national preferences. 
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Differences in national identity may be a relevant factor in shaping anti-
proliferation preferences. However, existing theory in this area provides few 
tools with which to gauge this variable. The similarity in national identities 
between two subject actors would seem to minimises this consideration in 
present case, although it may entirely irrelevant 
attributes, governmental 
politics all appear to be 
national preferences. 
COLI 
CONCLUSION 
Complementary Research Agenda 
bureaucratic 
negligible as 
leadership, 
a 
There is a clear need for further empirical research and theoretical 
analysis on the national proliferation response preferences of other supplier 
countries. As noted in Chapter 1, the absence of empirical data on national 
anti-proliferation policies represents a gap in our basic descriptive knowledge of 
this crucial international security issue. This descriptive deficiency hinders 
meaningful comparative analysis which, in turn, restricts the scope for even 
rudimentary theory building regarding proliferation response behaviour. 
The first priority for such a research agenda is to compile comprehensive, 
complementary, descriptive data on the anti-proliferation policies of all of the 
key Western states, in order to determine the parameters of national 
divergence that exist within this core anti-proliferation coalition. Whilst the 
present study conclusively refutes notions of rigid cohesion among all Western 
states, in the absence of data on other actors it cannot put this finding into a 
larger context. Even from the limited information available, it is evident that the 
divergence between the United States and Australia is almost certainly not an 
anomaly. But it remains to be shown whether this represents an extreme case, 
or lies somewhere on a broader preference spectrum. 
Comparative analysis should be broadened as additional empirical 
descriptions make further causal inference feasible. The preceding section 
already represents a solid foundation for theory-building. The apparent strong 
causal relevance of the geopolitical balance of proliferation threats is especially 
promising in this regard, since this is a readily quantifiable systemic factor. 
Unfortunately, in light of the paucity of complementary studies to validate or 
refute this analysis, it must be regarded as tentative even for the present cases. 
It certainly is no more than suggestive for other actors. 
One of the only other comparative studies offers findings that are at least 
consistent with the analytical conclusions of the present study. It finds that 
several NATO governments show a discernible preference for arms control 
solutions, that their defence bureaucracies tend to leave proliferation response 
issues to foreign ministries, and that they perceive the magnitude and 
immediacy of the threat posed by deliverable WMD as more remote than 
Washington (Center for Counterproliferation Research n.d.). Such seemingly 
pertinent findings in a study that was not designed to be complementary 
suggests that complementary research could greatly strengthen our ability to 
draw firmer analytic conclusions. That said, the complexity of the multi-causal 
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factors involved make the likelihood of success for such a theory-building 
project uncertain. But further analysis based on the accretion of parallel findings 
would at a minimum assist in providing a broader context for the present 
findings, and ultimately might well enable the construction and testing of a 
theory of Western proliferation response preferences. Such an intermediate-
level theory of state behaviour would have explicit predictive and implicit 
prescriptive utility. 
This theory-building agenda eventually could be profitably expanded to 
examine other, non-Western supplier countries that have been openly less like-
minded in their responses to proliferation. A promising initial focus for this latter 
category would be the sub-group that has opted to participate in aspects of 
both supply-side and treaty-based nonproliferation, including Russia, China, 
South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, and South Korea. 
Public Policy Implications 
Putting aside the tentativeness of causal inferences, and the need for 
further research to rectify this analytic deficiency in our understanding of 
divergence in national anti-proliferation preferences, the major comparative 
finding of this study raises important public policy questions. These go well 
beyond the immediate comparison of the two actors. 
It is virtually a given that the effectiveness of nonproliferation depends on 
cooperation among many states. Even the world's lone superpower cannot 
hope to prevent and manage proliferation without substantial assistance. The 
level of cooperation required differs depending on the approach. Treaty-norms 
require extremely broad participation by a variety of types of states, and ideally 
seek universal cooperation. Supply-side nonproliferation requires the 
cooperation of all significant suppliers, and ideally all alternative suppliers, 
potential suppliers, and transhipment states. Consequence-mitigation requires 
at least minimal cooperation among states that are likely to face proliferation 
threats together (e.g. any alliance in which some members are in harm's way). 
Because these groupings all include at least the major Western states, these 
collectively represent the core anti-proliferation coalition whose cooperation is 
required for any approach to be effective. 
As we have seen, many observers argue that no one approach is optimal, 
and that what is needed instead is a web of anti-proliferation strategies 
incorporating all approaches. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in effect 
made this point when he beseeched MTCR delegates: 
Let us, above all, not allow bickering amongst us on what 
can perhaps be described, with respect, as theological 
issues to obscure our common purpose. That common 
purpose must lie both in the global norms we have 
achieved - and still need to improve - and in the export 
control regimes which we must seek to make as effective 
and non-porous as possible ( 1993 off.: 3 ). 
But these laudable sentiments obscure the fact that there are inherent tensions 
between the approaches. While states may agree that all of these approaches 
have a role to play, they cannot avoid decisions that involve trade-offs, 
involving both other approaches and competing interests (i.e. unrelated to anti-
proliferation or even national security), that result in their choosing (whether 
explicitly, implicitly, or unwittingly) a hierarchy of preferences. 
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Significant divergence within the core anti-proliferation coalition regarding 
the proper balance of this hierarchy cannot help but have an enervating impact 
on its constituent parts. This is evident even in the present narrow two-actor 
comparison. There can be no doubt whatsoever that non-possession norm-
building has been rendered far weaker than it would have been due to 
Washington's ambivalence. If the United States had opted to be more helpful, 
both ewe and swe could have been more stringent, more quickly, and a 
missile norm might at least have been explored. (Washington's rejection of the 
eTBT provides another obvious example of this dynamic in the nuclear area.) It 
is equally certain that capability-denial has been far less effective than it would 
have been if Australia (along with other Western governments) had supported 
US efforts to further institutionalise the multilateral export control regimes, and 
had actively supported US efforts to widen and aggressively enforce stringent 
export control norms. Nor does Australia appear to have been especially 
unhelpful in this regard compared to other key Western states. Likewise, in the 
consequence mitigation area, American efforts to manage the negative effects 
of proliferation will likely be hampered if its major allies were to mirror 
Australia's half-hearted support for eB/M deterrence and counterproliferation 
strategies (although in this regard Australia does appear to be among the least 
enthusiastic of the United States' major allies). 
It is neither the intention nor the place of this study to offer prescriptive 
judgements about which anti-proliferation approaches are superior or inferior. 
At the same time, it is safe to say that by having failed to agree on this very 
point, Western states have undercut their ability to pursue a collective strategy 
with maximum vigour. Perhaps by failing to agree on a firm hierarchy among 
approaches, Western states have avoided the risk of choosing the wrong one 
to emphasise. But then, by the same token, they have also squandered the 
chance of using any one to its full potential. If the spectrum of Western 
preferences is deeply divided, with systemic factors like geopolitics as a root 
cause, then this may well be an intractable problem. The first step in addressing 
any problem, however, is at least to recognise it as such. 
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APPENDIX 2 
in 
military has 
of the century. Following widespread use of poison gas all sides in 
United States and allies 
Germany's associated production infrastructure, 
but insisted on retaining own stockpiles to deter use others & 
Thomas 1970). Although the other victorious powers agreed forgo at least the 
first-use of CBW via the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the US Senate in 1926 refused 
to consent to ratification, arguing that the United States needed to retain the 
right use such a militarily effective class of weaponry (Smithson 1995). 
Following World War II, President Truman formalised this position by 
withdrawing the Geneva Protocol from further Senate consideration (Burcke & 
Flowerree 1991 ), leaving Washington with no explicit restrictions on its freedom 
to use CW. 
The United States declined to rule out even first-use during the early Cold 
War period. The US Army's secret war plans during the 1950s allowed for the 
use of CBW, first or otherwise, at the discretion of the President. 1 The US 
actively researched, developed and produced CW throughout this period. It was 
not until President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum-35 
(NSDM 35) in November 1969, reorienting US CBW doctrine, that the United 
States fundamentally altered its position on possession and employment. The 
US renounced first-use and instituted an unconditional unilateral moratorium on 
new production (Wright 1990). However, existing stockpiles were retained to 
provide deterrence-in-kind against the Soviet arsenal, and defensive programs 
continued (albeit at severely reduced levels). When the US finally acceded to 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol on 10 April 1975, it formally reserved the right to 
retaliate in-kind, as well as to use RCAs in limited circumstances (SIPRI 1976). 
The US maintained its self-imposed moratorium on CW production for 
more than a decade. However, the USSR did not reciprocate, and continued to 
develop and produce new generations of CW throughout the Detente period. 
Moreover, the advent of binary technology had greatly enhanced the potential 
tactical utility of CW. 2 Consequently, when Detente collapsed after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States grew increasingly concerned that 
NATO was at a severe qualitative and quantitative disadvantage in this area. 
Nor was this merely a Pentagon fetish. As one senior ACDA official testified: 
The concern is that, over the last 15 years, we have not 
1 According to Wright (1990), US Army Field Manual 27-10 of 1954 states that the US military would 
not be the first to use CBW. However, she notes that this was superseded by parallel classified directives, 
and that in any case this statement was dropped two years later in a revised version. 
2 Binary weapons use two harmless agents that are combined during use to create CW agent, 
making them much safer for the user. 
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modernizing our 
has, in 
. They 
we are 
agreed 
upgrade the stockpile, it 
break the unilateral moratorium allowing new 
1990). Capitol Hill made it clear that it 
doing so if the administration a good-faith parallel effort to 
with the Soviet Union (Mahley 
In 1985, Congress pushed through a law requiring the destruction 
percent the US unitary stockpile 1994 (Smithson 1997a). However, 
according to former US Ambassador to CD, James Leonard, this decision had 
nothing to do with either binary production or unilateral disarmament. 'We're 
destroying substantial amounts of that stockpile because its obsolete or unsafe,' 
he later explained, 'but not because we say we don't need chemical weapons 
any more' (Flowerree, Harris & Leonard 1989). In parallel, Congress finally 
authorised large-scale production of binary agents and delivery systems, 
contingent on NATO approval. The administration received this at a meeting of 
NATO defence ministers in May 1986, although it came at the price of agreeing 
to withdraw forward deployed unitary munitions from Europe, and not to replace 
them with binaries. 
This concession triggered widespread, bipartisan criticism in Congress 
and the media that the administration had paid too high a price for NATO's 
blessing. Critics argued that by eliminating any forward deployment of CW, the 
arrangement would erode deterrence-in-kind rather than strengthen it.3 In 
response to such concerns, Congress attached a provision to the Fiscal Year-
1988 Defense Authorization Bill that prohibited the withdrawal of unitary 
stockpiles from Europe until and unless they were replaced by binary munitions (ewe Bulletin [1] 1988). At the same time it tacitly dropped the requirement for 
NATO consent by appropriating funds for immediate binary production in the 
same legislation. With final deployment options therefore unclear, and parallel 
efforts continuing to negotiate a total CW ban, the administration had achieved 
its longstanding goal of closing the CW gap with the Soviet Union through large-
scale binary production. 
The production of 155mm binary munitions duly commenced on 16 
December 1987, just twelve days after funds were appropriated. Congress so 
authorised production of the Bigeye stand-off binary bomb, although this was 
delayed by technical problems. 4 Production of binary agents was scheduled to 
3 For example, both the Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote letters to the President expressing 
such concerns (New York Times 5/24/86). Then Harvard scholar Elisa Harris (and later the NSC staff 
member responsible for proliferation issues throughout both Clinton administrations), not known as a 
'hawk' on CW issues, published a scathing editorial along the same lines (1986, 29 May). The liberal New 
York Times editorial page likewise opined: 'Unilateral disarmament is not usually a policy President 
Reagan favours, but he has chosen just such a course on chemical weapons' (6/3/86). 
4 The Bigeye program had been beset with technical problems from the beginning. A 1986 GAO 
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begin October 1989 (ewe Bulletin [1] 1988). 
The issue of binary production from the start was inexorably entwined with 
parallel CW disarmament efforts. But production continued right up to entry into 
force of the US-USSR BOA signed in July 1990 (ewe Bulletin [9] 1990). 
According to data released by DOD, a significant binary arsenal had been 
produced by the time the program was overtaken by arms control. This 
included: 680 tons of munitions, including 56,820 complete 155mm shells, 
201,728 partially-filled 155mm shells, and surplus binary agents in bulk 
containers (ewe Bulletin [31] 1996). 
The US is still in the process of destroying its CW stockpile pursuant to its 
CWC obligations. The US is certain to retain small amounts of CW for defensive 
research purposes, as permitted by the ewe. 
Biological Weapons 
US doctrine on possession and use of BW and CW was identical in the 
first decades of the Cold War. BW stockpiles were amassed in order to 
preserve in-kind deterrence, with use (including first-use) being left to the 
discretion of the President. The scope of the Pentagon's offensive BW program 
continually expanded throughout this period (Wright 1990). 
Unlike CW though, germ warfare was seen as impractical, and hence 
treated as a lesser threat. The view that BW was not militarily effective was 
widely accepted throughout the US Government by the late 1960s. Citing this 
assessment, Washington formally renounced all methods of biological warfare 
unilaterally in November 1969.5 Again unilaterally, the United States invited 
scientists from other countries to observe the destruction of its BW stockpiles 
(Sims 1990a). In March 1975, the US informed the CCD in Geneva that it had 
completed destruction of its BW stockpile, as well as conversion of associated 
production facilities to peaceful purposes (ter Harr 1991 ). 
BW is the only proliferation area in which the United States does not 
currently posses the proscribed class of weapons. However, while the US has 
long renounced BW as an offensive instrument of war, it has almost certainly 
retained, and even continued to develop, small quantities of weapons agents for 
defensive research purposes, as permitted by the BWC. 
MTCR-class Missiles 
The US has possessed cruise and ballistic missiles since acqumng 
German V-1 s and V-2s respectively during and after World War 11.6 Ballistic 
missiles in particular have been at the heart of America's status as a military 
superpower since the 1950s. Indeed, its nuclear forces are typically thought of 
not in terms of nuclear weapons per se, but rather their delivery systems (e.g. 
Minuteman, MX, Trident). Likewise, some of the most important qualitative 
report was highly critical of the system's performance in tests dating back to 1983 (Washington Times 
5/29/86J. 
Some analysts have questioned this public rationale for giving up BW, suggesting instead that 
President Nixon's decision was intended to mislead Third World states about the real military efficacy of 
BW as a bluff to discourage horizontal proliferation (Dando 1994). However, there does not appear to be 
any solid evidence for this interpretation. Moreover, it seems highly improbable, in light of Washington's 
nearly exclusive fixation at the time on the Soviet threat. 
6 The US Army actually produced 1,400 reversed-engineered versions of the V-1 cruise missile 
during the war itself (Ranger 1995, Annex 2). 
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- enabling it to hit any target on It also retains 
Perhaps more 
on land-attack missiles as its 
carrying out conventional strikes. 
Missiles are the only proliferation area other than weapons in 
which US has pursues anti-proliferation while indefinitely rema1rnng a 
possessor. It is the only proliferation area in which the United States has not 
assumed formal obligations to eliminate the applicable class of weapons 
eventually. 
AUSTRALIA 
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
The Australian nation has manifested a pronounced historical aversion to 
CW since the harrowing experiences of its forces in World War I. Although in 
theory until the late-1980s it reserved the right to retaliate against CW attacks 
in-kind under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it has not possessed, nor seriously 
considered trying to obtain, CBW capabilities since at least the Second World 
War (Beazley tst. 1985; Findlay 1992b; White int.). 
Like the United States, Australia did use RCAs in the Vietnam War, 
consistent with the interpretation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol that it had 
evinced since at least the 1950s (SIPRI 1976). During the CWC negotiations 
Australia supported US efforts to preserve the right to use such items under 
limited circumstances (Cottereau 1991; Findlay 1992a). Although Australia has 
defensive military programs for CBW, it does not appear to have developed or 
retained offensive agents in conjunction with these efforts, although this is 
allowed under existing treaties. However, detailed information about these 
programs remains classified. 
MTCR-class Missiles 
Australia does not currently possess any MTCR Category I systems. 
However, Australia has a longstanding commercial interest in developing a 
space-port at Cape York in northern Queensland. In the past, it has vigorously 
sought an American blessing to import Russian ZENIT rockets as part of a joint 
venture for this purpose (Speier int.). Moreover, the quasi-official Australian 
Space Council has explicit aspirations to develop indigenous SLV production 
(DFAT off. n.d.e). Indeed, facilitating access to commercial items and 
technology appears to have been an explicit motive in Australia's original 
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decision to join the MTCR (DFAT off. 1990, 5 October; Jones off. 1990, 5 
October.). 
In terms of offensive military Category I systems, Australia has expressed 
interest since the early-1990s in purchasing the American Tomahawk land-
attack cruise missile (Mack 1992). Australia currently has no specific plans to 
pursue such a purchase (Defence off. 1997). At the same time, Defence wants 
to leave the door open to the possibility in the future, and in recent years has 
actively sought to resist any diplomatic initiatives that might foreclose this option 
([DFAT] int.; [DOD] int.).7 
Because of these commercial and military considerations, a high priority 
for Australia in the missile proliferation area throughout the 1990s has been to 
ensure its own access to relevant technology, in addition to denying access to 
others. This issue has been one of the few on which senior Defence officials 
have taken an active interest ([DFAT] ints.; Courtney int.; Darling int.; White 
int.). The missile area is unique for Australia in this regard among WMD-related 
issues. 
7 That said, a knowledgeable official explicitly refutes press reports that Australia is interested in 
Tomahawk specifically for its troubled Collins submarines, saying that it had always been other platforms 
that DOD had in mind ([DOD] int.). 
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APPENDIX 3 
NDERLYING ATTITUDES: OPINION SURVEY 
AND ANALYSIS 
An opinion survey was conducted in conjunction with research interviews 
of present and former officials in order to ascertain the underlying personal 
attitudes of relevant officials. 1 Not all interview subjects participated, and some 
participated only partially. Results are not scientific, since no attempt was made 
to secure a balanced sample - for example in terms time period of 
involvement, issues with which involved, level of responsibility, or agency 
affiliation - nor alternatively to statistically weigh the results. Nevertheless, the 
survey provides a general picture of differences in overall national attitudes, as 
well as differences in attitudes between agencies and levels of involvement. 
The survey data consistently suggests that the major pattern of national 
behavioural divergence revealed in the empirical case studies is mirrored in the 
underlying attitudes of relevant officials. 
Question 1 asks officials to assess whether the United States and 
Australia share the same broad anti-proliferation objectives. Responses show 
that officials on both sides overwhelming believe this to be the case. Question 2 
is designed to reveal bias towards capability-denial versus non-possession 
norm-building. It asks respondents to make a hypothetical choice between 
giving up capability-denial or norm-building activities. Responses demonstrate 
significant national contrasts. However, there is a far greater diversity among 
officials in different US agencies. Consequently, the overall national contrast is 
dramatically sharpened when the US agency least favourably disposed (DOD) 
to norm-building is compared to the Australian agency most favourably 
disposed to this approach (DFAT). 
Questions 3a-b asks officials for their impressions of their own and the 
other government's approach to anti-proliferation. Responses indicate that, 
notwithstanding the strong perception of shared anti-proliferation goals shown 
in Question 1, officials on each side have very different perceptions of one 
another's specific approaches in pursuing these common objections. While 
responses suggest that US officials tend to be far more critical than their 
Australian counterparts of their own government's approach, at the same time 
both sides reserve their most negative descriptions for the other's approach. In 
other words, Australian officials tend to offer overwhelmingly positive 
descriptions of their own approach and mixed- to-negative sentiments about US 
attitudes, while US officials offer mixed-to-negative descriptions of their own 
approach, but nevertheless see the Australian approach more unfavourably. 
1 As noted in Chapter 1, interviews covered nearly sixty present and past officials, ranging in 
position from desk officers to cabinet ministers. The interview strategy (i.e. interviews sought) for US 
officials gave the highest priority to cognisant assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and 
office directors (or equivalents) at the State Department, OSD, ACDA, and NSC, as well as senior US 
negotiators in relevant multilateral fora. Secondary priority was given to more senior and junior officials 
from these agencies, and officials from other agencies (e.g. Energy, Commerce, intelligence). For 
Australian officials the highest priority was given to first assistant secretaries, assistant secretaries, and 
section directors at DFAT, and senior Australian negotiators, with secondary priority assigned to more 
junior and senior DFAT officials, and officials from other agencies (e.g. Defence, intelligence). This 
strategy yielded a body of interviews that represents a wide although not complete spectrum of the 
potential universe of similar participants. 
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Questions 4a-b asks officials to assess the past and future effectiveness 
of Western anti-proliferation efforts. Responses reveal that Australian officials 
are far more optimistic than their US counterparts about the past and future 
ability of Western efforts effectively to prevent proliferation. 2 This is consistent 
with the major empirical finding, since only the norm-building approach claims 
to be able to solve the problem (as opposed to slowing it down, etc.), so that 
faith in normative responses is inherently likely to be associated with greater 
optimism than faith in less ambitious denial strategies. Australian officials are 
also far more likely to distinguish among the different proliferation areas in 
answering these questions. This is also consistent with the empirical finding, 
since capability-denial and consequence-mitigation arrangements span all 
areas equally, whereas treaty-norms vary considerably, with a strong 
instrument for CW, a weak instrument for BW, and none for missiles. 
In addition to quantifiable responses, some unsolicited survey responses 
anecdotally suggest that officials view the other side's perspectives with a 
degree of bafflement and/or frustration. For instance, many US officials express 
astonishment at the extent of Australia's conviction that norms can solve the 
proliferation problem. For example, a key ACDA official says of Australian 
views: 'They're much more uniform, but they're idealistic, naive, and simplistic. 
They think norms really work.' A long-time Pentagon official states that, while 
the US is happy to have norms underpinning its other efforts, it also recognises 
that ultimately their effectiveness is limited by cheating, breakout, and non-
participation. By contrast, he states: 'Australia has the perspective that if you 
get the agreement signed, the protocol established, the norm accepted, that's 
taken care of the problem.' Another Defense official observes: 'Norms are great 
idealism, but they have little impact when the rubber meets the road.' Even a 
State Department official favours norm-building in question 2, later expresses 
concern that many governments exaggerate the ultimate effectiveness of 
norms, saying: 'Its the same for all these global norms ... lts hard to figure 
someone who's a determined enough proliferator to assemble one of these 
programs but so law abiding that he'd give it up upon signing a piece of paper.' 
From the opposite perspective, many Australian officials seem to regard 
the United States as mindlessly obstructive in resisting normative initiatives. A 
very senior and long-serving DFAT official notes that there is a common view 
among Australian officials 'that we've been out there right in the forefront and 
the US has been dragged along kicking and screaming.' Another states: 
Australia's view has always been vis-a-vis the US position 
that it's a narrow one because in the end what's going to 
be able to assist. .. is going to be normative global 
arrangements backed up by powerful verification 
measures, not this sort of global policeman approach with 
is the alternative. 
2 Interestingly, Australian officials tend to base their views on progress in instituting and 
strengthening anti-proliferation instruments, whereas US officials tend to base their views on the extent of 
actual real-world proliferation. This is consistent with what Krause (1992) describes as 'risk oriented' 
versus 'process oriented' perceptions of nonproliferation. 
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DATA TABLES3 
TABLE 1 
Ql. In your opinion do the United States and Australia share the same overall goals in these policy areas? 
TOTAL 
NO ANSWER 
TOTAL ANSWERING 
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL 
AUST. U.S. 
43 
43 
100.0 
24 
24 
100.0 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
13 
13 
100.0 
10 4 13 7 4 
10 4 13 7 4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
35 Yes 92.3 21 81.4 87.5 
9 4 11 6 3 
90.0 100.0 84.6 85.7 75.0 
Yes, somewhat 4 1 
9.3 4.2 
No, somewhat 3 2 
7.0 8.3 
No 1 
2.3 
Don't know 
1 
7.7 
1 
10.0 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
1 1 
14.3 25.0 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
19 9 10 18 3 
19 9 10 18 3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
14 7 7 13 2 
73.7 77.8 70.0 72.2 66.7 
3 1 2 3 
15.8 11.l 20.0 16.7 
1 1 1 1 
5.3 11.l 5.6 33.3 
1 1 1 
5.3 10.0 5.6 
3 Some officials have served in relevant capacities at different agencies and\or levels over the period of the study. Such officials are 'double counted' in these 
categories. Accordingly, the total number of officials shown in the initial columns sometimes is less than the total shown in the level and affiliation columns. Some 
officials also would not reveal their level, and are therefore not included in the level columns. 
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TABLE 2 
Q2. Hypothetically, if you had to choose, which of the following would you consider to be more important in promoting your country's anti-
proliferation goals: 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
------------------------------------ ----------------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- ----------------------- -------------- -----------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ===== ===== ===== ----- ====== ===::::::::::::::;::;:::::: 
TOTAL 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
- -
NO ANSWER 
-
TOTAL ANSWERING 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Building and maintaining 20 8 4 4 3 2 3 12 6 6 12 2 
strong multilateral norms 46.5 33.3 30.8 40.0 75.0 15.4 42.9 63.2 66.7 60.0 66.7 66.7 
against the possession of 
these weapons 
Preventing specific transfers 16 14 8 5 1 10 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 
of these weapons and 37.2 58.3 61. 5 50.0 25.0 76.9 42.9 75.0 10.5 11.1 10.0 5.6 33.3 
associated equipment and 
technology to programs or 
countries of concern 
Don't know 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 3 5 
16.3 8.3 7.7 10.0 - 7.7 14.3 25.0 26.3 22.2 30.0 27.8 
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TABLE 3 
Q3a. Thinking back on your experiences as an official working on pertinent issues, how would you describe your impression of the US 
approach to anti-proliferation in these areas? 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- ----------------------- --------------
----------
TOTAL 
U.S. I ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
::;::::::::;::;:::::;:::::;:::;:::::::; ===== ===== ----- ===== ----- ====== ======= 
TOTAL 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
- - - - - -
NO ANSWER 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
- -
TOTAL ANSWERING 40 22 13 9 4 11 7 3 18 8 10 17 3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
COMPLICATED/INCONSISTENT 17 9 4 5 2 5 2 1 8 2 6 8 
(NET) 42.5 40.9 30.8 55.6 50.0 45.5 28.6 33.3 44.4 25.0 60.0 47.1 
----------
Spasmodic/Sporadic/ 12 5 2 3 3 2 1 7 2 5 7 
Schizophrenic/Patchy/ 30.0 22.7 15.4 33.3 27.3 28.6 33.3 38.9 25.0 50.0 41. 2 
Fitful/Intermittent/Not 
Uniform/Not Matching 
Rhetoric 
Divided Internally/Weakened 4 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 
by Infighting/Internally 10.0 13. 6 15.4 11.1 - 18.2 14.3 33.3 5.6 12.5 - 5.9 
Contentious/Bifurcated 
Complex/Complicated/Nuance 2 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 
5.0 4.5 - 11.1 25.0 - - - 5.6 - 10.0 5.9 
Multifaceted/Multiple 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sources/Developing 5.0 4.5 7.7 - 25.0 - - 5.6 10.0 5.9 
238 
TABLE 3 
(continued) 
AGGRESSIVE/TOUGH/PUSHY (NET) 
Aggressive/Pushy/Hard 
Edged/Heavy Handed/Tough 
Love 
TARGETED/NON-UNIVERSAL/ 
BILATERAL (NET) 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
9 
22.5 
9 
22.5 
9 
22.5 
Discriminating/Targets 4 
Programs of Concern/Specific 10.0 
Programs 
Enforcement Oriented/ 
Intelligence Driven/ 
Bilateral 
Overly Stresses Non-
Proliferation Over 
Disarmament 
PRAGMATIC/REALISTIC/RESULTS 
ORIENTED (NET) 
Practical/Pragmatic/ 
Realistic/Based on Real 
World/Unemotional/Results 
Oriented/Opportunistic/ 
Flexible/Non Rhetorical 
4 
10.0 
1 
2.5 
9 
22.5 
9 
22.5 
ALL 
U.S. 
6 
27.3 
6 
27.3 
5 
22.7 
3 
13. 6 
2 
9.1 
6 
27.3 
6 
27.3 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
4 
30.8 
4 
30.8 
2 
15.4 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
5 
38.5 
5 
38.5 
2 
22.2 
2 
22.2 
3 
33.3 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
2 2 3 1 
50.0 18.2 42.9 33.3 
2 2 3 1 
50.0 18.2 42.9 33.3 
1 4 1 
25.0 36.4 14.3 
1 2 
25.0 18.2 
2 1 
18.2 14.3 
1 2 4 1 
25.0 18.2 57.1 33.3 
1 2 4 1 
25.0 18.2 57.1 33.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
3 
16.7 
3 
16.7 
4 
22.2 
1 
5.6 
2 
11.1 
1 
5.6 
3 
16.7 
3 
16.7 
1 
12. 5 
1 
12.5 
1 
12.5 
1 
12.5 
1 
12. 5 
1 
12. 5 
2 
20.0 
2 
20.0 
3 
30.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
2 
20.0 
2 
20.0 
3 1 
17.6 33.3 
3 1 
17.6 33.3 
3 1 
17.6 33.3 
1 
5.9 
1 1 
5.9 33.3 
1 
5.9 
3 
17.6 
3 
17.6 
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TABLE 3 
(continued) 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
------------------------------------
----------------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- ----------------------- -------------- -----------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ===== ===== ===== ----- ====::::= ======= 
INEFFECTIVE/WEAK/SHORT- 8 5 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 
SIGHTED/NON STRATEGIC (NET) 20.0 22.7 23.1 22.2 25.0 27.3 14.3 16.7 25.0 10.0 17.6 
-----------------
Ineffective/Unfocused 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7.5 9.1 7.7 11.1 25.0 9.1 5.6 12.5 5.9 
Timid/Uncertain/Weak/Not as 3 3 2 1 - 2 1 
Strong as Could Be/ 7.5 13.6 15.4 11.1 18.2 14.3 
Indecisive/Non-Strategic 
Hapless/Feckless/ 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Blundering/Not Well Thought 7.5 4.5 7.7 - 9.1 11.1 12. 5 10.0 11. 8 
Out/Focused on Short Term/ 
Throwing Resources at 
Problem 
ACTIVIST/AMBITIOUS/DEDICATED/ 7 3 3 - 2 - - 1 4 3 1 3 1 
COMMITTED (NET) 17.5 13.6 23.1 50.0 33.3 22.2 37.5 10.0 17.6 33.3 
------------------
Active/Energetic/Action/ 4 2 2 - 1 - - 1 2 1 1 2 
Activist/Strenuous/Prolific 10.0 9.1 15.4 25.0 33.3 11.1 12.5 10.0 11. 8 
Ambitious/Driven/Willing to 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Go It Alone 10.0 13.6 23.1 - 50.0 - - 33.3 5.6 - 10.0 5.9 
Committed/Dedicated/ 4 4 3 1 3 1 
Determined/Engaged/Dogged/ 10.0 - - - 22.2 37.5 10.0 17.6 33.3 
Good At Follow Through/ 
Passionate/Persistent/ 
Tenacious/Concerned 
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TABLE 3 
(continued) 
EFFECTIVE/THOROUGH/WELL 
THOUGHT OUT (NET) 
Effective/Excellent/Sound/ 
Expert/Adept/Knowledgeable 
Comprehensive/Thorough/ 
Thoughtful/Balanced 
CONSISTENT/COORDINATED (NET) 
Focused/Careful/Deliberate/ 
Diligent/Good Sense/ 
Measure/Methodical 
INFLEXIBLE/CUMBERSOME (NET) 
Bureaucratic/Cumbersome 
Not Creative/Conservative 
Doctrinaire/Categorical/ 
Hidebound 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
6 
15.0 
4 
10.0 
3 
7.5 
5 
12. 5 
5 
12.5 
5 
12. 5 
2 
5.0 
2 
5.0 
1 
2.5 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ DE-
U. S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
5 
22.7 
3 
13. 6 
3 
13. 6 
2 
9.1 
2 
9.1 
2 
9.1 
1 
4.5 
1 
4.5 
3 
23.1 
2 
15.4 
2 
15.4 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
25.0 
1 
25.0 
4 2 
36.4 28.6 
2 1 
18.2 14.3 
2 2 
18.2 28.6 
2 1 
18.2 14.3 
2 1 
18.2 14.3 
1 
14.3 
1 
14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
3 
16.7 
3 
16.7 
3 
16.7 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
3 
37.5 
3 
37.5 
1 
12.5 
1 
12.5 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
2 
20.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
3 1 
17.6 33.3 
3 1 
17.6 33.3 
3 
17.6 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
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TABLE 3 
(continued) 
INFLUENTIAL/LEADER (NET) 
Influential/Precedent 
Setting/Major Initiator/ 
Powerful/Significant 
BASED ON STRATEGIC INTEREST 
(NET) 
Based on Self/National 
Interest/Strategically 
Motivated 
IDEALISTIC/PURIST/SELFLESS/ 
SINCERE (NET) 
Idealistic/Principled/ 
Sincere/Earnest/Purist 
INSENSITIVE/INSUFFERABLE/ 
OBSESSIVE (NET) 
Insufferable/Insensitive/ 
Obsessive/Manipulative/ 
Jingoistic 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
4 
10.0 
4 
10.0 
3 
7.5 
3 
7.5 
3 
7.5 
3 
7.5 
2 
5.0 
2 
5.0 
ALL 
U.S. 
3 
13 .6 
3 
13.6 
2 
9.1 
2 
9.1 
1 
4.5 
1 
4.5 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
2 
15.4 
2 
15.4 
2 
15.4 
2 
15.4 
1 
7.7 
1 
7.7 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 2 
25.0 18.2 
1 2 
25.0 18.2 
1 1 1 
9.1 14.3 33.3 
1 1 1 
9.1 14.3 33.3 
1 1 
14.3 33.3 
1 1 
14.3 33.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
3 
16.7 
3 
16.7 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
2 
25.0 
2 
25.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
2 2 
11.8 66.7 
2 2 
11.8 66.7 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
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TABLE 3 
(continued) 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
------------------------------------ ---------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
--------------
-----------------------
-------------- -----------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ===== ===== ===== ----- ====== ======= 
NAIVE/SIMPLISTIC/IMPRACTICAL/ 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
LITTLE AT STAKE (NET) 5.0 9.1 7.7 11.1 9.1 14.3 33.3 
-----------------
Naive/Simplistic/Too 2 2 1 1 - 1 1 1 
Trusting/Unworldly/ 5.0 9.1 7.7 11.1 - 9.1 14.3 33.3 
Impracticable/Not Much at 
Stake for Them/Don't Have 
to Deal With Implications 
CREATIVE/INNOVATIVE (NET) 1 - - - - 1 1 - 1 
2.5 5.6 12.5 5.9 
Creative/Imaginative/ 1 - - 1 1 1 
Nimble/Innovative 2.5 - - 5.6 12. 5 5.9 
REACTIVE/FOLLOWING/EXTERNALLY 1 1 - 1 - - 1 
CONSTRAINED (NET) 2.5 4.5 11.1 14.3 
------
Affected by Alliance With 1 1 - 1 - - 1 
U.S./Following/Reactive/As 2.5 4.5 11.1 14.3 
Strong as Can be 
SCEPTICAL OF VERIFICATION (NET) 1 1 - 1 1 
2.5 4.5 - 11.1 - 9.1 
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TABLE 3 
(continued) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Sensitive to Commerce 
Misunderstood 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
U.S. I 
AUST. 
1 
2.5 
1 
2.5 
1 
2.5 
ALL 
U.S. 
1 
4.5 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
1 
11.1 
1 
9.1 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
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TABLE 4 
Q3b. Thinking back on your experiences as an official working on pertinent issues, how would you describe your impression of the Australian 
approach to anti-proliferation in these areas? 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
---------------------- ---------------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- -----------------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ----- ===== ----- ----- ====== ======= 
TOTAL 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
- - - - - -
NO ANSWER 5 4 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 
- - - -
TOTAL ANSWERING 38 20 11 9 4 9 7 3 18 9 9 17 3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
IDEALISTIC/PURIST/SELFLESS/ 16 11 8 3 1 4 6 2 5 1 4 5 1 
SINCERE (NET) 42.1 55.0 72.7 33.3 25.0 44.4 85.7 66.7 27.8 11.1 44.4 29.4 33.3 
----------------------
Idealistic/Principled/ 12 8 6 2 1 2 5 2 4 4 4 
Sincere/Earnest/Purist 31. 6 40.0 54.5 22.2 25.0 22.2 71.4 66.7 22.2 44.4 23.5 
Good Citizens/Good 6 4 3 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 
International Citizenship/ 15.8 20.0 27.3 11.1 25.0 11.1 28.6 33.3 11.1 11.1 11.1 11. 8 33.3 
Less Self Interest 
Well Intentioned 1 1 1 1 
2.6 5.0 9.1 11.1 
ACTIVIST/AMBITIOUS/DEDICATE 14 3 1 2 1 1 1 11 7 4 11 1 
COMMITTED (NET) 36.8 15.0 9.1 22.2 11.1 14.3 33.3 61.1 77.8 44.4 64.7 33.3 
---------------
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
Committed/Dedicated/ 
Determined/Engaged/Dogged/ 
Good At Follow Through/ 
Passionate/Persistent/ 
Tenacious/Concerned 
Active/Energetic/Action/ 
Activist/Strenuous/Prolific 
Ambitious/Driven/Willing to 
Go It Alone 
CREATIVE/INNOVATIVE (NET) 
Creative/Imaginative/ 
Nimble/Innovative 
NAIVE/SIMPLISTIC/IMPRACTICAL/ 
LITTLE AT STAKE (NET) 
Naive/Simplistic/Too 
Trusting/Unworldly/ 
Impracticable/Not Much at 
Stake for Them/Don't Have 
to Deal With Implications 
EFFECTIVE/THOROUGH/WELL 
THOUGHT OUT (NET) 
Effective/Excellent/Sound/ 
Expert/Adept/Knowledgeable 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
12 
31. 6 
6 
15.8 
2 
5.3 
8 
21.1 
8 
21.1 
8 
21.1 
8 
21.1 
7 
18.4 
5 
13 .2 
ALL 
U.S. 
2 
10.0 
2 
10.0 
1 
5.0 
7 
35.0 
7 
35.0 
5 
25.0 
4 
20.0 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
5 
45.5 
5 
45.5 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
2 
22.2 
2 
22.2 
4 
44.4 
3 
33.3 
1 1 
11.1 14. 3 
1 
11.1 
1 
33.3 
1 
33.3 
5 2 2 
55.6 28.6 66.7 
5 2 2 
55.6 28.6 66.7 
1 2 2 
25.0 22.2 28.6 
1 2 1 
25.0 22.2 14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
10 
55.6 
4 
22.2 
1 
5.6 
8 
44.4 
8 
44.4 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
2 
11.1 
1 
5.6 
7 
77.8 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
4 
44.4 
4 
44.4 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
3 
33.3 
2 
22.2 
4 
44.4 
4 
44.4 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
10 1 
58.8 33.3 
4 
23.5 
1 1 
5.9 33.3 
8 
47.1 
8 
47.1 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 1 
5.9 33.3 
1 
33.3 
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
Comprehensive/Thorough/ 
Thoughtful/Balanced 
INTERNATIONAL/UNIVERSAL/ 
MULTILATERAL (NET) 
Global/Universal/ 
Internationalist/ 
Multilateral 
CONSISTENT/COORDINATED (NET) 
Focused/Careful/Deliberate/ 
Diligent/Good Sense/ 
Measure/Methodical 
Consistent/Coordinated/ 
Professional 
PRAGMATIC/REALISTIC/RESULTS 
ORIENTED (NET) 
Practical/Pragmatic/ 
Realistic/Based on Real 
World/Unemotional/Results 
Oriented/Opportunistic/ 
Flexible/Non Rhetorical 
RELIABLE/TRUSTWORTHY/ 
RESPECTED (NET) 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
2 
5.3 
6 
15.8 
6 
15.8 
4 
10.5 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
4 
10.5 
4 
10.5 
4 
10.5 
ALL 
U.S. 
1 
5.0 
4 
20.0 
4 
20.0 
2 
10.0 
2 
10.0 
2 
10.0 
2 
10.0 
3 
15.0 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
3 
27.3 
3 
27.3 
2 
18.2 
2 
18.2 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
2 
18.2 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
2 2 
50.0 22.2 
2 2 
50.0 22.2 
1 
14.3 
1 1 1 
11.1 14.3 33.3 
1 
25.0 
1 
25.0 
1 1 1 
11.1 14.3 33.3 
1 
14.3 
1 
14.3 
1 1 1 
25.0 11.1 14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
1 
5.6 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
2 
22.2 
2 
22.2 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
5.9 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
1 
5.9 
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
Reliable/Responsible/ 
Truthful/Respected/ 
Approachable 
INSENSITIVE/INSUFFERABLE/ 
OBSESSIVE (NET) 
Insufferable/Insensitive/ 
Obsessive/Manipulative/ 
Jingoistic 
BASED ON STRATEGIC INTEREST 
(NET) 
Based on Self/National 
Interest/Strategically 
Motivated 
INFLUENTIAL/LEADER (NET) 
Influential/Precedent 
Setting/Major Initiator/ 
Powerful/Significant 
INFLEXIBLE/CUMBERSOME (NET) 
Doctrinaire/Categorical/ 
Hidebound 
TOTAL 
U.S. I 
AUST. 
4 
10.5 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
2 
5.3 
ALL 
U.S. 
3 
15.0 
1 
5.0 
1 
5.0 
2 
10.0 
2 
10.0 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
2 
18.2 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
1 
9.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 1 1 
25.0 11.1 14.3 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 1 
11.1 14.3 
1 1 
11.1 14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
1 
5.6 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
2 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
11.1 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 
5.9 
1 1 
5.9 33.3 
1 1 
5.9 33.3 
2 
11. 8 
2 
11. 8 
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
------------------------------------ ---------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- -----------------------
-------------- -----------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ----- ===== ===== ----- ====== ======= 
REACTIVE/FOLLOWING/EXTERNALLY 2 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 
CONSTRAINED (NET) 5.3 5.0 9.1 - 11.1 5.6 11.1 5.9 
-------------
Affected by Alliance With 2 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 
U.S./Following/Reactive/As 5.3 5.0 9.1 - 11.1 5.6 - 11.1 5.9 
Strong as Can be 
AGGRESSIVE/TOUGH/PUSHY (NET) 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 
2.6 - - - 5.6 11.1 5.9 33.3 
Aggressive/Pushy/Hard 1 1 - 1 1 1 
Edged/Heavy Handed/Tough 2.6 - - - - 5.6 11.1 5.9 33.3 
Love 
INEFFECTIVE/WEAK/SHORT- 1 1 - 1 - 1 
SIGHTED/NON STRATEGIC (NET) 2.6 5.0 11.1 11.1 
-----------------
Ineffective/Unfocused 1 1 - 1 - 1 
2.6 5.0 11.1 11.1 
FAITH IN VERIFICATION (NET) 1 - - - - - - 1 1 1 
2.6 - 5.6 - 11.1 5.9 
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TABLE 4 
(continued) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Similar (to Each Other-
U. S. /Australia) /Supportive 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
2 
5.3 
1 
2.6 
ALL 
U.S. 
2 
10.0 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
2 
22.2 
1 1 1 
25.0 11.1 14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
1 
5.6 
1 
11.1 
1 
33.3 
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TABLE 5 
Q4a. Do you believe that efforts by Western states to prevent proliferation over the past 10-15 years have been effective? 
U.S. OFFICIALS AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
LEVEL AFFILIATION LEVEL AFFILIATION 
-------------- ----------------------- --------------
-----------
TOTAL 
U.S./ ALL MIDDLE/ DE- ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. U.S. SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
======= ===== ===== ===== ----- ----- ====== ======= 
TOTAL 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
- - - - -
NO ANSWER 
- -
TOTAL ANSWERING 43 24 13 10 4 13 7 4 19 9 10 18 3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Yes 20 10 5 5 4 4 3 10 5 5 9 2 
46.5 41. 7 38.5 50.0 100.0 30.8 42.9 52.6 55.6 50.0 50.0 66.7 
Yes, somewhat 12 7 6 1 4 2 2 5 3 2 5 
27.9 29.2 46.2 10.0 30.8 28.6 50.0 26.3 33.3 20.0 27.8 
No, somewhat 5 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 
11. 6 16.7 7.7 30.0 15.4 28.6 25.0 5.3 10.0 5.6 
No 3 3 1 1 3 1 
7.0 12. 5 7.7 10.0 23.1 25.0 
Don't know/won't answer 2 2 1 1 2 1 
4.7 - - - - 10.5 11.1 10.0 11.1 33.3 
Difference between areas 1 - 1 1 1 
2.3 - 5.3 10.0 5.6 
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TABLE 6 
Q4b. Do you believe that efforts by Western states to prevent proliferation over the coming 10-15 years will be effective? 
TOTAL 
NO ANSWER 
TOTAL ANSWERING 
Yes 
Yes, somewhat 
No, somewhat 
No 
Don't know 
Differs between areas/depends 
on type of proliferation 
TOTAL 
U.S./ 
AUST. 
43 
43 
100.0 
7 
16.3 
7 
16.3 
13 
30.2 
8 
18.6 
5 
11. 6 
3 
7.0 
ALL 
U.S. 
24 
24 
100.0 
2 
8.3 
1 
4.2 
11 
45.8 
8 
33.3 
1 
4.2 
1 
4.2 
U.S. OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
MIDDLE/ DE-
SENIOR WORKING STATE FENSE ACDA OTHER 
13 
13 
100.0 
1 
7.7 
7 
53.8 
5 
38.5 
10 4 13 7 4 
10 4 13 7 4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
4 
40.0 
2 
20.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
10.0 
1 
25.0 
1 2 
7.7 28.6 
2 6 2 1 
50.0 46.2 28.6 25.0 
1 5 2 3 
25.0 38.5 28.6 75.0 
1 
7.7 
1 
14.3 
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS 
LEVEL AFFILIATION 
ALL MIDDLE/ 
AUST. SENIOR WORKING DFAT OTHER 
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